



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND**  
**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE**  
**FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995**

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

November 25, 2002

Freedom of Information/  
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young  
CRYPTOME  
251 West 89<sup>th</sup> Street  
Suite 6E  
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on April 18, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that additional time was needed to review the records and we were unable to comply with the 20-day statutory time limit.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located records pertaining to your request on Yugoslavia Intelligence Services, ZF400128W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and five pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.3(a)(2), 1.3(a)(3), 1.5(c) and 1.5(d) of EO 12958. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.3(a)(2) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.3(a)(3) of EO 12958 provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.5(c) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.5(d) of EO 12958 provides that information pertaining to foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individual concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(C).

In addition, information has been sanitized from the records and one of the same pages withheld under (b)(1) is also denied in its entirety as the release of the information would reveal the identity of a confidential source. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D). The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Keith B. Alexander, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of another government agency. This office has no authority to release these records and they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.



THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

DOSSIER NO. 2F 40 01 28W

As of 30 DEC 80 all material included  
(Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently  
in effect.

Margorie A. Bridge 30 Dec 80  
(Signature) (Date Signed)

MARJORIE A. BRIDGE GS-5  
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA  
UP AR 381-10  
REVIEWER

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA  
UP AR 381-10  
REVIEWER A. McKenney DATE 9 July 91

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA  
UP AR 381-10  
REVIEWER A. McKenney DATE 12 Nov 91

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA  
UP AR 381-10  
REVIEWER Quile DATE 9 Dec 91

THIS MUST REMAIN T O P D O C U M E N T

TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL TO IRR\*

\*NOTE: This form is not required when material is forwarded to IRR with DA Form 2784-R, but may be used as a supplement to DA Form 2784-R to provide additional instructions.

1. T0:  
 (XX) Records Processing Division  
 ( ) Special Records Division  
 ( ) Supplemental Review Division

2. FROM:	3. DATE
Chief, CE Section	
Special Operations Detachment	
HQS, INSCOM	

3. DATE 1980

4. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL SUBJECT (Establish dossier or add material to existing dossier)

a. SUBJECT: YUGOSLAVIA INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ZF 40-01-28

b. DOB:

d. SSN:

c. POB:

e. Alias/Nee

5. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL INDEX CROSS-REFERENCES (Continue on plain bond paper if needed)

Name/Impersonal Title

DOB

POB

SSN

Alias/Nee

WEST GERMANY, US FORCES - ESPIONAGE

ZF 00 30 17

USC 552 (b) (7) (G)

6. FORWARD DOSSIER TO:

(x) Files

( ) Account Number:

7. AR 380-13 (Check one or both)

(X) Attached material meets retention criteria of AR 380-13

( ) DA Form 4312-R (Retention Control Sheet) is attached

8. DISPOSITION OF CASE (If not reflected on DA Form 2784-R

Case is closed.

9. REQUEST FOR CONTROL (For controlled dossier material only; enter data required by para 3-4, AR 381-45)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 Jun 97  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

10. IRR USE ONLY

( ) AR 380-13

( ) AR 381-45

Dossier No:

Aging Criteria:

Investigative Records Repository (IRR)  
Reviewed for retention criteria UP AB380-13  
Reviewer [Signature] Date 10/1/01

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED AND MARKED FOR  
OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Background or Complaint) (AR 381-130)			DATE SUBMITTED 4 October 1977	
SCOPE (If background) <input type="checkbox"/> IAC <input type="checkbox"/> GAC <input type="checkbox"/> FBI <input type="checkbox"/> CBI			CASE CLASSIFICATION LIMITED	
IDENTIFYING DATA				
1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME N/A		2. SERVICE NUMBER SSAN N/A	3. RACE N/A	4. GRADE N/A
5. ARM OR SVC N/A				
6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT N/A		7. DATE OF BIRTH N/A	8. PLACE OF BIRTH N/A	
9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS N/A		10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS N/A		
11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.) Contact between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official.		12. DATE (Incident cases only) N/A		13. TIME (Incident cases only) N/A
14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building) N/A		15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC. N/A		
CONTROL DATA				
16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO. (77-075) B03130-316-77		17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization) 511th MI Battalion		18. CONTROL OFFICE 66th MI Group, I&S (Prov)
INVESTIGATIVE DATA				
19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY 66th MI Group, I&S (Prov)		20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION (e) To obtain information concerning possible contact between LTC [REDACTED] and COL [REDACTED]		
21. DATE INVESTIGATION				
COMMENCED		COMPLETED		
4 April 1977				
22. STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> TERMINATED <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED <input type="checkbox"/> PENDING				
23. SYNOPSIS (e) On 23 September 1977, 2LT [REDACTED], Security, Plans, Operations and Training, Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart, Federal Republic of Germany, revealed that LTC [REDACTED] departed Stuttgart on a permanent change of station on 21 August 1977. [REDACTED] was reassigned to Headquarters Battery, 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Homestead, Florida. A copy of LTC [REDACTED] orders was provided. (7).				
COMMENTS: This Battalion has no outstanding investigative action concerning [REDACTED]. Recommend that 511th MI Battalion investigation be terminated.				
<div>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 16 JUNE 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R</div> <div>CLASSIFIED BY: Para 4b, AR 381-12, 1006174 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE C, EXEMPT ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ACSI, DA</div>				
24. DISTRIBUTION CDR, 66th MI Group, I&S (PROV) (IAINTA-GPE-TCI) - Original plus two CDR, 511th MI Battalion (IAINTA-GPE-N-CE) - file copy				
25. REVIEWED BY				
TYPED NAME AND TITLE [REDACTED], DAC, OPERATIONS OFFICER		SIGNATURE [REDACTED] Cpt MZ		

DA FORM 342 1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 342, 1 JUN 51, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

## 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

## 2. DATE SUBMITTED

23 September 1977

## 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

7 (e) On 23 September 1977, 2LT [REDACTED], Intelligence and Security Officer, Security, Plans, Operations and Training, United States Military Community Activity Stuttgart, Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt (NV1605), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York (NY) 09154, was interviewed concerning LTC [REDACTED] stated in substance as follows:

On 21 August 1977, [REDACTED] departed Stuttgart on a permanent change of station to Headquarters Battery, 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, Homestead, Florida 33039. [REDACTED] provided a copy of orders (EXHIBIT [REDACTED]) number [REDACTED] published by the United States Army Regional Personnel Center Stuttgart, APO NY 09154, which authorized [REDACTED] permanent change of station.

(e) AGENT'S NOTES: Reference Agent Report B04152-395-77, dated 21 June 1977, subject as above, wherein information was revealed concerning [REDACTED] involvement in subject incident.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 June 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-600 DOD 5200.1R

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED] ON 10/10/74  
EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE 1, E.O. 11652  
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION OF ACSI, DA  
4 2

## 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 6TH MIG, IS (PROV)  
B04152-582-77

## 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

4


2

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a  
Yugoslavian Official (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

511th MI Battalion  
APO New York 09696

**Agent Report Dated:**

23 September 1977

**Description:**

Copies of Order Number [REDACTED]  
dated 29 June 1977, pertaining to  
LTC [REDACTED] permanent  
change of station.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

*Boon*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
United States Army Regional Personnel Center Stuttgart  
APC New York 09154

ORDERS [REDACTED]

29 June 1977

[REDACTED] US MIL COM ACTV STGT (W331AAA) APO 09154

You will proceed on permanent change of station as indicated. Information concerning your port call will be provided separately.

Assigned to: Headquarters Headquarters Battery 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade  
Reporting date: 3 October 1977 (W4U2AAA) Homestead Florida 33039

Additional instructions: (a) If you plan to ship personal property at government expense contact your local transportation officer after receipt of these orders to arrange for shipment. If you ship personal property at government expense contact the transportation officer at your next duty station to arrange for delivery.

(b) You are authorized shipment of household goods and privately owned vehicle.

(c) Travel via POV is authorized as more advantageous to the government.

(d) You are required to report to the Family Housing/Housing Referral Office servicing your next duty station before making arrangements to rent, lease, or purchase off-post housing.

(e) You are authorized an additional 500 pounds for shipment of non-available items IAW DA Msg DALO-TSP-P 161602Z Jul 75.

(f) Concurrent travel of your dependents is authorized:

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DOB	PP#
------	--------------	-----	-----

[REDACTED] NA [REDACTED]

(g) Service member and dependents may travel at personnel expense and claim reimbursement, but only if travel is performed by U. S. Flag Carrier.

Dependents may travel on or after 1 July 1977 and claim reimbursement.

(h) Service member authorized return shipment of full JTR weight allowance.

Orders [REDACTED] HQ RPC Stuttgart 29 June 1977

FOR ARMY USE

Auth: Officer/Warrant Officer Asgmt Instr DFD MILPERCEN EUR dtd 12 May 1977

Ultimate asg: NA

Asgd to mgt dsq: 14000

Pers con no: FCFA09R001277

MDC: 4C07

CIC: 271421/22

PEBD: NA

Format: 414

Control speciality: 14

PMOS/PSSI: 14000

Enl/REENLB: NA

PPD: NA

Aval date: 21 August 1977

Proj speciality: 48

FOR THE REGIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER:



DISTRIBUTION:

Consolidated (11)

SIB/PFR (3)

MPRJ (1)

Ref set (1)

Redeploy (4)

CDR, US MIL COM ACTV STGT APO 09154 (3)

CDR, HHB 31st ADA Bde Homestead FL 33039 (3)

Pers Off Homestead FL 33039 (1)

Family Housing Homestead FL 33039 (1)

LTC [REDACTED] (80)

  
R. W. PATTON

CW2, USA

Asst Pers Officer

Inquiries pertaining to this order should be directed to OIC RPC Comp Team  
Ludwigsburg, APO New York 09154. Telephone Ludwigsburg Military (2726) 330.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(Background or Complaint)

For use of this form, see AR 381-130; the proponent agency is OACSI.

DATE SUBMITTED

19 July 1977

SCOPE (If background)

☐ LAC

☒ GAC

☐ PBI

☐ CBI

CASE CLASSIFICATION

LIMITED

IDENTIFYING DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME

N/A

2. SSN

N/A

3. RACE

N/A

4. GRADE

N/A

5. ARM OR SVC

N/A

6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT

N/A

7. DATE OF BIRTH

N/A

8. PLACE OF BIRTH

N/A

9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS

N/A

10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS

N/A

11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.)

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

12. DATE (Incident cases only)

N/A

13. TIME (Incident cases only)

N/A

14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building)

N/A

15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.

N/A

CONTROL DATA

16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO.

(77-075)

BO3130-268-77

17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization)

511th MI Battalion

18. CONTROL OFFICE

ISG EUR (PROV)

INVESTIGATIVE DATA

19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY

ISG EUR (PROV)

20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION

UIC Obtain information concerning possible contact between LTC [REDACTED] and COL [REDACTED]

21. DATE INVESTIGATION

COMMENCED

COMPLETED

4 April 1977

22. STATUS

☒ OPEN

☐ CLOSED

☐ TERMINATED

☐ SUSPENDED

☐ PENDING

23. SYNOPSIS (C) On 6 June 1977, [REDACTED] received a letter from [REDACTED]. The letter contained an invitation for [REDACTED] and his wife to attend an informal dinner with [REDACTED] in Stuttgart, FRG, on 17 June 1977. A reply card was inclosed and [REDACTED] indicated his acceptance of the invitation and mailed the reply on 6 June 1977 (3). On 17 June 1977, [REDACTED] and his wife attended the dinner, hosted by [REDACTED], at a local Yugoslav restaurant. [REDACTED] was accompanied by his wife and son. COL [REDACTED], Community Commander of the German Federal Armed Forces in the Stuttgart area, and his wife also attended the dinner. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had a discussion concerning a visit to the Stuttgart area by a Yugoslav Army band and chorus. [REDACTED] later said one of his major duties was to identify Yugoslav guest workers in the FRG who came under military obligation to their

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ON 16 JUNE 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH: Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

CLASSIFIED BY: Para 4b, AR 381-12, 18 OCT 1974  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ACSI, DA

24. DISTRIBUTION

Intelligence Security Group - Europe (Prov) - Original plus two  
CDR, 511th MI Battalion (IAINTA-GPE-N-CE) - File copy

25.

REVIEWED BY

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

DAC, Operations Officer

SIGNATURE

DA FORM 342

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 1, 1 JAN 53, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

19 July 1977

SUBJECT: Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

home country. [REDACTED] said he assumed his present position in September 1976 and the position was for a four-year period. [REDACTED] invited [REDACTED] to attend a promotion party he was hosting on 15 July 1977. [REDACTED] declined and said he and his family would be in Spain on vacation at that time. Political matters were not discussed during the dinner. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as a gregarious, open individual with an excellent memory for names and details. [REDACTED] spoke fluent German and poor to fair English. The dinner was concluded on a friendly note but no firm plans for future contact were established. [REDACTED] is scheduled to leave USAREUR on 25 August 1977 and will be assigned to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida (4). [REDACTED] personnel records revealed he had a TOP SECRET security clearance granted on 5 October 1976. There was no unfavorable information contained in [REDACTED] personnel records (5). Records of local military law enforcement agencies were examined and revealed no record of [REDACTED] (6).

(c) COMMENTS: Any additional contact or correspondence [REDACTED] may have with [REDACTED] will be reported. This Battalion contemplates no further investigative action concerning [REDACTED] at this time.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 JUNE 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**AGENT REPORT**

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

**1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT**

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

**2. DATE SUBMITTED**

6 June 1977

**3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER**

**4. REPORT OF FINDINGS**

3 (U) On 6 June 1977, LTC [REDACTED], Security Plans and Training Officer, Stuttgart Support Command, Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (NV 1605), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09154, was interviewed at his request concerning a letter he had received. [REDACTED] stated in substance as follows:

(U) On 6 June 1977, [REDACTED] received a letter from Colonel [REDACTED]. The letter (EXHIBIT [REDACTED]) was written under Yugoslav Embassy letterhead, dated 2 June 1977 and addressed to [REDACTED] government quarters address at 7000 Stuttgart, Roter Stich 310/2. The letter was written in the German language and when translated read in substance as follows:

"Dear Major. I hope we will finally have the opportunity to meet again after so long a time. That is to say my wife and I will be in Stuttgart on 17 June and would like to invite you and your wife to join us at an informal dinner at 2000 hours. The dinner will be at the Mira Restaurant, Kronprinz Strasse 6, in downtown Stuttgart. We hope very much that you will accept and extend our best wishes. /s/ Colonel [REDACTED]"

(U) The letter contained a card to be used for a reply (EXHIBIT [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] will reply by German mail on 6 June 1977 indicating his acceptance of the invitation.

(U) [REDACTED] will make himself available for debriefing on 20 June 1977.

(U) AGENT'S NOTES: Reference Agent Report B04152-062-77, dated 10 January 1977, subject as above, wherein information pertaining to [REDACTED] previous contact with [REDACTED] was contained. [REDACTED] was recently promoted to LTC.

CLASSIFIED BY: Para 4b, AR 381-12, 18 Oct 77  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ACSI, DA

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 June 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

10

**5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT**

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group  
B04152-353-77

**6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT**

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:** Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslav Official (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

511th MI Battalion  
APO New York 09696

**Agent Report Dated:** 6 June 1977

**Description:**

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

A copy of a letter received by LTC [REDACTED] from the Yugoslav Embassy and a copy of a card inclosed with the letter to indicate acceptance of an invitation.

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
Verteidigungsattache

[REDACTED]  
am 02.06.1977

Tel. 34 20 71

Priv. 32 52 11

Sehr geehrter Herr Major,

Endlich hoffe ich werden wir doch Gelegenheit haben uns wieder nach langer Zeit zu begegnen. Nämlich, am 17.06. werde sich mit meiner Frau in Stuttgart befinden und lade Sie und Ihre Frau Gemahlin zum infor. Abendessen am 17.06. um 20.00 ein.

Das Abendessen wird in Restaurant "MIRA", Stuttgart, Kronprinzstrasse 6 (Laspahaus in der Stadtmitte) stattfinden.

Wir hoffen sehr auf Ihre Zusage und begrüßen Sie recht freundlich

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Ihr

*Rheint 19.*  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

inf. Abendessen 17.06 Zeit, "Mina"  
An dem Empfang/Cocktail an in der Botschaft  
nimmt/nehmen

Herr  
Frau  
teil/nicht teil  
Anschrift

Nichtzubetreffendes bitte streichen.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

4 (U) On 20 June 1977, LTC [REDACTED], Security Plans and Training Officer, Stuttgart Support Command, Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (NV 1605), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09154, was interviewed at his request at Field Office Stuttgart, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion, Grenadier Kaserne, Stuttgart-Zuffenhausen (NV 1209), FRG, concerning his contact with a Yugoslav official. [REDACTED] stated in substance as follows:

(U) At 2000 hours, 17 June 1977, [REDACTED] and his [REDACTED] attended a dinner hosted by Colonel [REDACTED]. The dinner was held at a local Yugoslav restaurant, the Cafe Mira, Kronprinz Strasse 6, Stuttgart. [REDACTED] was accompanied by his wife and teen-aged son. [REDACTED] did not recall the first name of [REDACTED] wife; he believed [REDACTED] did not use his wife's first name in making the introduction. [REDACTED] did not remember the first name of [REDACTED] son or whether [REDACTED] had introduced him by his first name. Colonel fnu [REDACTED] Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) Community Commander for the Stuttgart area, and his wife also attended the dinner. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were dressed in civilian clothes.

(U) [REDACTED] party was seated by a table in an alcove located at the rear of the restaurant. The dinner consisted of pre-dinner drinks, soup, Balkan platter, ice cream, coffee and brandy or cordials. A Yugoslav white wine was served with the dinner.

(U) After the introductions and preliminary courtesies were completed, [REDACTED] launched into a discussion in German with [REDACTED] about plans for a future visit to Stuttgart by a Yugoslav Army band and chorus. The discussion lasted for approximately one hour. From the conversation, [REDACTED] gathered that there had been a mix-up in the arrangements for the visit involving the German words Korps (army corps) and Chor (chorus). In correspondence regarding the proposed visit, someone at the Yugoslav Embassy had mistakenly used the word Korps instead of Chor. [REDACTED] surmised that the primary purpose for [REDACTED] sojourn in Stuttgart may have been to resolve this mix-up. [REDACTED] complained that the visit of the band and chorus should have been arranged by the Yugoslav Embassy with the "politicians" in Bonn and that it did not properly fall within his sphere of responsibility. He had become involved with the matter only because he was Defense Attache and the band and chorus were part of the Yugoslav Army.

CLASSIFIED BY: Para 4b, AR 381-12, 18 Oct 74  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ACSI, DA

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group  
B04152-395-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

14

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 Jan 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) (C) [redacted] observed that one of his major duties as Defense Attache was to identify the Wehrpflichtigen (those under military obligation) among the Yugoslav Gastarbeiter (guest workers) in the FRG. This was not an easy task, he remarked, as there were some 300,00 Yugoslav residing in the FRG. At this point, [redacted] stated that the number of Yugoslav in the FRG was more like 600,000 rather than 300,000. [redacted] concluded this topic of conversation with a rhetorical question: "Wie soll ich denn meine Reservisten finden?" (How shall I ever find my reservists?)

(U) (C) [redacted] told [redacted] that prior to being appointed Defense Attache, he had served as a unit commander in Ljubljana (nca), Yugoslavia (nfi). [redacted] said he assumed his present position in September 1976 and that it was a four-year tour. [redacted] asked [redacted] how long he would remain in the FRG. [redacted] replied that he was leaving in August 1977. [redacted] inquired as to his next assignment; [redacted] indicated that he would be a Battalion Commander in Florida. He did not identify the unit. [redacted] congratulated him and speculated that [redacted] might receive an attache assignment after serving with the battalion. [redacted] commented that military officers on extended attache duty frequently lost contact with troop duty and military life in general. "Somebody must be taking care of you," [redacted] commented. [redacted] invited [redacted] to visit him in Florida, but [redacted] stated that he doubted he could do so as there were certain travel restrictions imposed upon him (nfi).

(U) [redacted] son became excited at the mention of Florida and indicated a desire to see Disney World. [redacted] invited the boy to visit his family once they were settled. No arrangements were made and the matter was dropped.

(U) (C) [redacted] invited [redacted] to attend a promotion party he was hosting on 15 July 1977 in Stuttgart. [redacted] declined, however, stating that he and his family were leaving Bonn-Bad Godesberg on 8 July for a vacation in Spain and would not be available on that date. [redacted] thought [redacted] said that he would return on 8 August 1977, but was not certain if he understood him correctly. [redacted] mentioned the name of a seaside resort in Spain, but [redacted] did not recall it. However, [redacted] opined that the resort was in the vicinity of Barcelona (nca), Spain.

(U) (C) During the course of the conversation [redacted] mentioned that he had attended a General Staff level school in Austria. [redacted] asked, "At Wiener Neustadt?" [redacted] replied, "No, the Landesverteidigungsakademie (Defense Academy) in Vienna."

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 16 JUNE 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/EC

AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.11

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted], 66th MI Group

B04152-395-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted]

15

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) (S) indicated that his wife had not previously visited Stuttgart and that they had considered driving to the Bodensee (Lake Constance) the following day, 18 June 1977. Both (S) and (S) indicated that traffic would be heavy and suggested (S) and his family visit the sites of Stuttgart to include the Bundesgartenschau (Federal Garden Show) in progress at Killesberg Park. (S) offered to show the (S) around Stuttgart and invited them to attend a barbeque at his quarters. After some discussion, (S) promised to telephone (S) at 1030 hours, 18 June 1977, and inform him of their decision. At precisely 1030 hours, 18 June, (S) telephoned (S) and told him, he and his family would drive to the Bodensee.

(U) (S) jocularly told (S) wife that she should be proud of her husband for having fallen asleep during a strip tease show. This was a reference to (S) meeting (S) in a bar in Nuernberg (PV 5079), FRG, which showed pornographic movies. The meeting occurred while (S) was acting as an escort officer for foreign observers during Reforger 76. (S) told (S) wife that (S) was a very easy person to get along with and that they were friends.

(U) (S) and his wife left the party at about 0100 hours, 18 June, as they had another obligation that evening. The manager of the Cafe Mira took a seat at the table and insisted that (S) and their spouses have a complimentary brandy. The manager introduced himself as "Stavel" or "Stable" (phonetic), which he explained was "Steve" in English. The manager did not give his last name. (S) noticed that (S) and the manager appeared to know each other. The manager indicated that (S) and he came from the same area of Yugoslavia and drew a strip map on a napkin to indicate their home towns. On 20 June, using a map of Yugoslavia, (S) identified the manager as being from the area of Celje (nca) and (S) from the area of Maribor (nca), Yugoslavia. While seated at the table, the manager attempted to promote his restaurant and invited (S) to return. (S) however, told the manager not to advertise the restaurant with his (S) "friends."

(U) Political matters were not discussed during the party. (S) had hoped that (S) might say something about the forthcoming Disarmament/Security Follow-On Talks in Belgrade (nca), Yugoslavia; however, (S) did not mention them and (S) did not find an opportunity to raise the matter.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 June 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

(S), 66th MI Group  
B04152-395-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) (C) [redacted] remarked to [redacted] during dinner that he had recently seen Major [redacted] in Frankfurt (MA 7754), FRG. Like [redacted] served as an escort officer during Reforger 76. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was an Adjutant General officer assigned to a Personnel Administration Battalion at V Corps.

(U) (C) [redacted] characterized [redacted] as a gregarious, open individual with an excellent memory for names and details. [redacted] spoke fluent German with no regional accent and poor to fair English. [redacted] drank alcoholic beverages slowly during the party and did not become intoxicated. [redacted] described [redacted] as a moderately heavy smoker. [redacted] stated that he liked [redacted] and felt they had an "honest relationship". [redacted] wife was about 45 years old and spoke German hesitantly, although she appeared to understand that language well. [redacted] mentioned that his wife had not previously resided in the FRG; he did not indicate whether he had been in the FRG before. [redacted] son was approximately 15 years old. He spoke some German and was taking English in school at Bonn-Bad Godesberg. During the evening he conversed in English with [redacted] wife.

(U) (C) [redacted] did not observe any vehicle in the vicinity of the Cafe Mira with diplomatic license plates or decals. During the course of the evening [redacted] mentioned the make of the vehicle he was driving; however, [redacted] did not recall it. He thought it might have been a Peugeot.

(U) (C) [redacted] and his wife left the restaurant at approximately 0140 hours, 18 June. [redacted] attempted to pay for the meal but [redacted] declined the offer. [redacted] did not see [redacted] pay for the meal. [redacted], his wife and his son remained at the restaurant. The meeting with [redacted] was concluded on a friendly note, but no firm plans for future contact were established. [redacted] stated that he was planning to host a small stairwell party at his quarters on 3 July 1977, and could invite [redacted] telephonically if desired.

(U) (C) [redacted] revealed that he was being reassigned to the 2d Battalion, 52d Air Defense Artillery, Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. His DEROS is 25 August 1977.

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ON 16 Jun E 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted], 66th MI Group  
B04152-395-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted signature]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer and a Yugoslavian  
Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

<sup>u</sup>  
(ex) AGENT'S NOTES: Reference Agent Report B04152-353-77, dated 6  
June 1977, subject as above, wherein information pertaining to [REDACTED]  
previous contact with [REDACTED] was contained. Reference Agent Report B04152-  
062-77, dated 10 January 1977, subject as above, wherein information concerning  
[REDACTED] meeting [REDACTED] in a bar in Nuernberg was contained. The interview  
was conducted with the assistance of Special Agent [REDACTED]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 JUNE 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group

B04152-395-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

## 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer  
and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

## 2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 June 1977

## 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 29 June 1977, records of the 198th Personnel Services Section, Flak Kaserne, Ludwigsburg (NV 1416), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09154, were examined concerning LTC [REDACTED] and revealed substantially the following information:

Name: [REDACTED]  
Rank: MAJ  
SSAN: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
Marital Status: Married  
Spouse: [REDACTED], NEE: [REDACTED] DPOB: [REDACTED]  
Children: [REDACTED] daughter, DPOB: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] son, DPOB: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] son, DPOB: [REDACTED]  
See item 10, DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History), dated 20 January 1972 (EXHIBIT\_\_\_)  
Relatives: See items 10 and 11, DD Form 398  
Military Service: August 1953 to present, US Army  
PMOS: Not listed  
SMOC: 4805H (Maintenance Officer, Instructor)  
DEROS: 7 September 1977  
Present Assignment: Special Plans and Operations, Stuttgart Support Command, Robinson Barracks (RB), Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (NV 1605), FRG, APO New York 09154  
Previous Assignments: See item 35, DA Form 2-1 (Personnel Qualification Record) (EXHIBIT\_\_\_) and item 13, DA Form 66 (Officer Qualification Record) (EXHIBIT\_\_\_)  
Education: See item 17, DA Form 2-1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This protective marking excluded  
from automatic termination  
(Ref: AR 340-10).

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## 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group  
B04152-403-77

## 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Contact Between a US Army Officer  
and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Security Clearance: TOP SECRET granted on 5 October 1976 by Headquarters  
US Military Community Activity, RB, based on a  
background investigation completed on 26 June 1972  
by US Army Intelligence Command

Disciplinary

Action:

None listed

Residences:

Feb 71 to present; 6th Bn 44th ADA, APO 96271, CA

Nov 67 to Feb 71; 5123 Beals Dr. El Paso, Texas 79924

Nov 66 to Nov 67; 5 Bn 2d ADA (RUN), APO 96266 CA

May 66 to illegible 64; 5123 Beals Dr, El Paso,  
Texas 79924

Feb 64 to May 64; Mainz University Housing Area  
Mainz, Germany

Aug 61 to illegible 64; Capehart 5, Btry A, 3 Bn, 61st  
ADA, Loring AFB, Maine

AGENT'S NOTES: Item's 15, 16 and 20 of [REDACTED] DD Form 398 were illegible  
and could not be transcribed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This protective marking excluded  
from automatic termination  
(Para 13, AR 340-16).

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group  
B04152-403-77

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:** Contact Between a US Army Officer  
and a Yugoslavian Official (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

511th MI Battalion  
APO New York 09696

**Agent Report Dated:** 27 June 1977

**Description:**

A copy of DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History), dated 20 January 1972; DA Form 2-1, dated 28 February 1974; and DA Form 66 (Officer Qualification Record), Item 13 (Record of Assignments) pertaining to LTC [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

# HISTORY

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

1. (Print) FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME MAIDEN NAME (If any)—LAST NAME  
 2. STATUS  
☒ MR. ☐ MRS. ☐ MISS ☐ CIVILIAN ☒ MILITARY ON ACTIVE DUTY

3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME (Other than by marriage) None  
 4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS

5. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, month, year) PLACE OF BIRTH (City, County, State, and Country) PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED  
 City Hall, Detroit, Mich

HEIGHT WEIGHT COLOR OF EYES COLOR OF HAIR SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS  
 71" 150 Hazel Brn None

6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR PHYSICAL DISORDER? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS, BARBITURATES, ETC.? ☐ YES ☒ NO DO YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20

7. U.S. CITIZEN ☒ NATIVE ☒ IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO. IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO.(S) DATE, PLACE, AND COURT  
 None None None

8. ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. NATIVE COUNTRY DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U.S. CITIZEN?  
☐ No None USA None YES ☐ NO

9. MILITARY SERVICE  
 ARE YOU PRESENTLY IN ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO. SERVICE AND COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STATION  
 O-4 USA-R4-ADA HMB 6th Bn 44th ADA, 6PO SFRAN 1 Jan 61

ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF U.S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:  
 GRADE AND SERVICE NO. SERVICE AND COMPONENT ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION

None None None

HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOUR OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

COUNTRY SERVICE COMPONENT FROM (Date) TO (Date) TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.  
 USA Army RA 31 Jul 53 31 Jul 61 HONORABLE, SFC, B6, RO

10. EDUCATION (Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)

MONTH AND YEAR	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	GRADUATE		DEGREE
		YES	NO	
Sept 48 June 52	ST Francis Seminary, Cincinnati, Ohio	X		None
Sept 52 June 53	University of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan	X		None
Jun 59 Jan 71	University of TEXAS at El Paso, El Paso, Tex.	X		BBR

11. FAMILY (List in order given: parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U.S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.)

RELATION AND NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING	U.S. CITIZEN	
			YES	NO
FATHER Edward Stanley	20 Mar 1900 Detroit, Michigan	Deceased 3 July 64	X	
MOTHER (Maiden name) Helen Barbara	10 May 1904 Detroit, Michigan	Deceased 30 May 49	X	
SPOUSE (Maiden name)			X	
OTHER (Specify) Step-Mother (Maiden name)		Unknown	X	X
Father-in-law (Maiden name)				X
Mother-in-law				X
Son			X	
Daughter			X	

OTHER RELATIVES AND ALIEN FRIENDS LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (List grandparents, first cousins, aunts, uncles, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and other persons with whom a close relationship existed or exists)

RELATIONSHIP AND NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	RESS	CITIZENSHIP
Aunt [REDACTED]	70	Housewife	Young St. Tilbury, Ontario, Can.	Canadian
S-I-L [REDACTED]	30	Housewife	Unknown	German
S-I-L [REDACTED]	28	Housewife	Unknown	German

12. FOREIGN TRAVEL (Other than as a direct result of United States military duties)

DATES		COUNTRY VISITED	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL
FROM	TO		
Less than 24hrs		Mexico	Occasional Shopping & Sightseeing trips to Mexico While Stationed at Fort Bliss, TX.

13. EMPLOYMENT (Show every employment you have had and all periods of unemployment)

MONTH AND YEAR		NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	REASON FOR LEAVING
FROM	TO			
Jun 51	Sept 51	C F Smith Co. 818 W. First St. Royal Oak, Mich.	Mr. [REDACTED]	Returned to School
Sept 51	Jun 52	Unemployed		
Jun 53	Aug 53	Detroit Hoist & Machine Co. 8201 Morrow St. Detroit, Mich.	Mr. [REDACTED]	Entered US Army
Aug 53	Present	US Army		
* Sep 51	Jun 52	Unemployed		
Jun 52	Sep 52	C F Smith Co ROYAL OAK 818 W. FIRST St. Mich	Mr. [REDACTED]	Returned to School
Sep 52	Jun 53	Unemployed		

DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. [REDACTED]

14. CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES (Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the United States or its Territories)

	NAME (List 3 credit and 5 character)	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER (Business address preferred)	CITY	STATE OR TERRITORY
CREDIT	Sears Roebuck	12	9600 Dyer	El Paso 79924	TX.
	Pacific Finance	7	9205 Dyer	El Paso 79924	TX.
	Household Finance Corp	7	Northgate Shopping Center	El Paso 79924	TX.
CHARACTER	[REDACTED]				

CAB-16-77618-1

# STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material.

15. LIST ALL RESIDENCES FROM 1 JANUARY 1937					
MONTH AND YEAR		STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY	
Jan 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Feb 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Mar 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Apr 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
May 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Jun 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Jul 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Aug 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Sep 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Oct 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Nov 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	
Dec 37	1937	1000 1st St. Apt. 40	San Francisco	Calif.	

16. PAST AND/OR PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS				
NAME AND ADDRESS	TYPE	OFFICE HELD	MEMBERSHIP	
CHI Omega Chapter University of Texas, El Paso Alameda 753, 79999	Recreational (fraternal, professional, etc.)	None	Active	None

17.	
YES	NO
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT, OFFICIAL, OR EMPLOYEE?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATIONAL, SOCIAL, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM; THE SALE, GIFT, OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANY WRITTEN, PRINTED, OR OTHER MATTER, PREPARED, REPRODUCED, OR PUBLISHED, BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES?	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

IF "YES," DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIFY NATURE AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INCLUDING OFFICE OR POSITION HELD, ALSO INCLUDE DATES, PLACES, AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATED.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of \$25, or less, was imposed)? INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. ☐ YES ☒ NO  
IF "YES," LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.

None



19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE, ATTACHED THEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF "YES" GIVE DETAILS

20. REMARKS

FORM 10 (cont.)

FORM 10 (cont.)

Applicant: NAT Cert No. [REDACTED], New 63-Pat, District Court, Eastern District  
SDS, 24 Feb 57-206, New York, N.Y.

Applicant: NAT Cert No. [REDACTED], 22 Jul 40-507 District Court, Detroit  
Mich- 101, 9 May 26-207, Detroit, Michigan

FORM 10 (Continued)

Applicant

[REDACTED] US Citizen

Son

[REDACTED] US Citizen

Son

[REDACTED] US Citizen

FORM 10 (CONT) Security Class Required for Various Military Assignments

I have executed DD Form 98 (Armed Forces Security Questionnaire) without  
qualification.

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH (See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001)

20. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM

TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

21.

THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (top secret, secret, etc.) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT COMPLETED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS

25



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SECTION III - CURRENT AND PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENTS									
RECORD OF ASSIGNMENTS									
EFFECTIVE DATE	DUTY MOSC	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OF OVERSEAS COUNTRY	NON-DUTY STATION	NON-DUTY STATION	NON-DUTY STATION	NON-DUTY STATION	NON-DUTY STATION	TYPE OF POST
00006	StuO		IgnSeidDetUSAGCSG Ft. Inn NS v/dy Austria						
0001	Presun1		For the Germany						
09310	Asst IG (Corps)		HHC VII CORPS Germany						
02162	NEO Off (Corps)		HHC VII Corps - Germany						
02162	NEO Off (Corps)		HHC VII Corps (Aug) Germany						
02162	NEO Officer (Corps)		HHC VII Corps (Aug) Germany						
02162	NEO Officer (Corps)		HHC VII Corps (Aug) Germany						
11A00	Dir. S. P. O. & T (Corps)		USA MIL CORP: ACTV STUTTGART Germany						

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

11

30

31  
NUMBER SKIPPED

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

13 July 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

DPOB: [REDACTED]

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 11 July 1977, the files of the following Source, who has provided reliable information in the past, were caused to be examined by [REDACTED] Local National Investigator, 165th MI Battalion, Intelligence and Security Group, Europe (PROV)(ISG, EUR (PROV)), Frankfurt/Main (FFM)(MA-7752), Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09757, concerning [REDACTED] and revealed no record:

Source 2212-5791

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED  
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION  
LAW PARA 13, AR 340-16

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] ISG, EUR (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.



# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 June 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS FROM OFFICIAL MILITARY RECORDS

(MILITARY AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, the records of the below listed agencies were checked, and failed to produce any information identifiable with [REDACTED]

Hanau Resident Agency 28 June 1977  
2nd Region, US Army CID Command  
Pioneer Kaserne (PK)  
Hanau/Main (MA9453), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)  
APO New York 09165

Hanau Military Police (MP) Station 28 June 1977  
709th MP Battalion  
PK, Hanau/Main, FRG  
APO NY 09165

Detachment C 28 June 1977  
42nd MP Group (Customs)  
Fleigerhorst Kaserne  
Erlensee (MA9757), FRG  
APO NY 09165

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED  
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION  
DOW PARA 13, AR 340-16

33

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 February 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS FROM OFFICIAL MILITARY RECORDS.

(201 FILE) On 2 February 1977, a check of the military personnel file of [REDACTED], 574th Personnel Service Company, Pioneer Kaserne, Hanau/Main (MA9453), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09165, was conducted with the assistance of [REDACTED], and disclosed the following:

Name with aliases: [REDACTED] (no middle name indicated)  
Rank and SSN: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
Home of Record: [REDACTED]  
Marital Status: Married, second marriage, divorced from first wife  
Assignments: See DA Form 2-1, attached as EXHIBIT  
ETS: Indefinite  
DEROS: 20 April 1979  
Security Clearance: SECRET, BI, completed by USAINTC on 15 December 1971, formerly had a TOP SECRET clearance  
Civilian Education: George Washington University, Washington, DC, graduated in 1969, MBA  
Civilian Employment: None Indicated  
Disciplinary Action: None Indicated  
Remarks: [REDACTED] personnel records were maintained at the same unit which [REDACTED] commanded; hence [REDACTED] was contacted directly to provide his personnel records.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**  
THIS PROTECTION MARKING IS EXCLUDED  
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION  
IAW PARA 13, AR 340-16

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

34

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

HRO, 165th MI Bn, APO NY 09165

**Agent Report Dated:**

10 February 1977

**Description:**

DA Form 2-1, pertaining to [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

2 USC 302 (b) (1) (v)

1. NAME	2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	3. YSSN	4. MFC	5. REPAID	6. DATE	7. TYPE OF RECORD	8. REPORT DATE
		V	0		760810	RECONCILIATION-MC-VA	

SECTION II - CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT DATA									
9. GRADE	10. DATE OF BIRTH	11. BASIC	12. CONTROL	13. DETAIL	14. SERVICE	15. SEC AGREEMENT	16. OR TERM OF SVC	17. ESI	18. DELAY IN SEPARATION
LTJG	277011	AG	AG	41	REG	R			
19. SMOS	20. DUTY	21. EN/REPL	22. MONS	23. FROM	24. LANGUAGE	25. IDENTIFY NUMBER	26. CODE	27. PRIMARY	28. TMOB
	42A00 00				GERMAN		G4		
29. STATUS	30. MOSC	31. ASI	32. MOS	33. EFFECTIVE DATE	34. CODE	35. LANGUAGE IDENTIFY NUMBER	36. CODE	37. SECURITY CLEARANCE	38. DEGREE OF ACCESS AND CODE
								SECRET	S
39. INCENTIVE PAY NO. 1	40. INCENTIVE PAY NO. 2	41. SPECIAL PAY NO. 1	42. SPECIAL PAY NO. 2	43. EFFECTIVE DATE	44. PUNISH	45. CODE	46. HITS	47. CODE	48. SECURITY CLEARANCE
49. CODE	50. EFFECTIVE DATE	51. CODE	52. EFFECTIVE DATE	53. CODE	54. EFFECTIVE DATE	55. CODE	56. EFFECTIVE DATE	57. CODE	58. EFFECTIVE DATE
59. AREA OF CURRENT/ASST FOREIGN SERVICE	60. AREA OF TRAVEL STATUS	61. OVERSEA AREA	62. CODE	63. AREA	64. CODE	65. AREA	66. CODE	67. AREA	68. CODE
69. AREA OF PREFERENCE	70. CODE	71. AREA	72. CODE	73. AREA	74. CODE	75. AREA	76. CODE	77. AREA	78. CODE
79. AREA OF PREFERENCE	80. CODE	81. AREA	82. CODE	83. AREA	84. CODE	85. AREA	86. CODE	87. AREA	88. CODE
89. AREA OF PREFERENCE	90. CODE	91. AREA	92. CODE	93. AREA	94. CODE	95. AREA	96. CODE	97. AREA	98. CODE
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719. AREA OF PREFERENCE	720. CODE	721. AREA	722. CODE	723. AREA	724. CODE	725. AREA	726. CODE	727. AREA	728. CODE
729. AREA OF PREFERENCE	730. CODE	731. AREA	732. CODE	733. AREA	734. CODE	735. AREA	736. CODE	737. AREA	738. CODE
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789. AREA OF PREFERENCE	790. CODE	791. AREA	792. CODE	793. AREA	794. CODE	795. AREA	796. CODE	797. AREA	798. CODE
799. AREA OF PREFERENCE	800. CODE	801. AREA	802. CODE	803. AREA	804. CODE	805. AREA	806. CODE	807. AREA	808. CODE
809. AREA OF PREFERENCE	810. CODE	811. AREA	812. CODE						

CONFIDENTIAL

01193	FA Unit Commander
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SECTION II - CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT DATA										TITLE		DATE	
MOS EVALUATION SCORES								<input type="checkbox"/> CONT		MOSC	TITLE	DATE	
MOSC	YR & MO	SCORE	YR & MO	SCORE	YR & MO	SCORE							
										01193	FA Unit Commander	610605	
										01183	Recon & Survey Off	620731	
										02110	Adjutant or AG	650122	
										72110	Parachutist	650122	
										02136	Non-tactical Unit Off	660608	
										02210	Pers Met Off	670425	
										02402	ADPS Off	690612	
										82110	Instructor	740304	
										02520	Training Off	750131	
										02200	Pers Off	751212	
										(P) HL	PERS MGMT	760331	
4. ASSIGNMENT CONSIDERATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> CONT													
Parachutist 641120/													
5. OVERSEA SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> CONT													
FROD	YR & MO	AREA AND COUNTRY	MO	TYPE	NTC	DEPN ARR OS							
OS Svc Prior to	21 mo	EURA-Germany	34 PCS	Yes									
		FEPA-RVN	11 PCS	Yes									
		FEPA-RVN	07 PCS	Yes									
		EURA-Germany				7601							
9. AWARDS, DECORATIONS & CAMPAIGNS <input type="checkbox"/> CONT													
NDSM/COMDL(580103)/Precht Bad AFEM (DomRep)/VSM/RVNCM/RVNOG w/PdM/ RVN Stf Svc MdL (1st CL)/BSM/BSM(1 st OLC)/MSM/ABCOM/OS Svc Bars(3)/ ARCOM(1st OLC)													
SAS equal BAD w/RULE BAR (14-16)													
CAMPAIGNS: VN CounterOff Ph IT/ VN CounterOff Ph IIT/VN Cease-Fire/													
11. AMERICAN BOARD CERTIFICATION & LICENSES OR CERTIFICATES HELD <input type="checkbox"/> CONT													
12. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY													
DA FORM 330 SUBMITTED	DATE												
750701													

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EFFECTIVE DATE	DUTY MOSC	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR OVERSEA COUNTRY	NON-DUTY DATE YR/MO	NON-RATED DATE YR/MO	TYPE REPORT
		Enlisted Service: 5501P5-580103 SPl Unassd; 580104-610525 USAR Svc not on AD.				
		Commissioned AGC-USAR from Senior ROTC (IMG).				
		Duties: Unassigned	502nd Admin Co, 2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood TX			
		Forward Observer	Btry A, 1st How Bn, 78th Arty, Fort Hood TX			
		Stu Off (FAOOC#2, TDY USAAMS)	USASREPISTA USAPERSCEN (1264), Fort Dix NJ			
		Non-Tactical Unit Off (TDY USAMS)	USASREPISTA USAPERSCEN (1264), Fort Dix NJ			
		Fire Direction Off	Btry C, 3rd How Bn, 18th Arty, Germany			
		Recon & Survey Off	Btry C, 3rd How Bn, 18th Arty, Germany			
		Asst Commo Off	HQB, 3rd How Bn, 18th Arty, Germany			
		Btry Cmdr	HQB, 3rd How Bn, 18th Arty, Germany			
		Adjutant	USAG, NA Heidelberg (3804-08) Germany			
		Asst Adjutant S-1	USAG(EL-3804-07) NA Heidelberg Germany			
		Asst Adjutant S-1 (Unit Redesig)	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Asst Chief Pers Svc Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Stu Off (Basic Abn, TDY USAIS)	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Asst Chief Pers Svc Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Chief Pers Svc Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Chief AG Off Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Chief Mgmt & Pers Mgmt Dir J-1 (TDY	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Hq USAFOR Dom Rep)	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Asst Adjutant General	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Asst Chief AG Enlisted Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		AG Advisor Exercise MAPSTRIKE	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		AG Adv Exc MAPSTRIKE (Unit Redesig)	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Asst Chief AG Enlisted Branch	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Pers Mgmt Off AG Section (SD w/12th Spt Bde)	HHC XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg NC			
		Commanding Off Repl Co	82nd Admin Co, Spt Cmd, 82nd Abn Div, Fort Bragg NC			
		Stu Off (AGOC#1)	Co A, USASCHEN/PostHq, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		Asst Pers Mgmt Off (PMD) AG Ofc	US Mil Asst Cmd(SD-5891), Vietnam			
		Pers Mgmt Off, Off Asg Sec (PMD)	US Mil Asst Cmd(SD-5891), Vietnam			
		Duties Unassigned	Stu Det, MDM USA, Fort Meyer VA			
		Stu Off (ADPS)	Stu Det, MDM USA, Fort Meyer VA w/dy			
		Chief T&PD Mgmt Ofc	USADATCOM(AG-W1PBA-00)TAGO, Wash DC			
		Prod Mgt Off (PMD) Mgt Ofc	USADATCOM(AG-W1PBA-00)TAGO, Wash DC			

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## RECORD OF ASSIGNMENT \$

RECEIVED DATE	UNIT NO	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF OVERSEAS COUNTRY	NON- DUTY DATE	NON- DUTY DATE	TYPE REPORT
		Prod Mgmt Off R&R DivCSD(Unit: Redes)	DPS DSPERS DA PERSINCOM(SF-WTPBA)			
		(1) Prod Mgmt Off R&R Div CSD	Wash DC			
		(2) Deputy Div Chief	Wash DC			
		Stu Off (C&GS 1-250-C2)	Stu Det, USAC&ASC(5025-01), Fort Leavenworth KS			
		Adjutant General	HQ TRAC USMACV(WO8VOLE), Vietnam			
		Sr Com-Atts Instr, Admin Svcs Div	HHC USAASC, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		Stu Off (ITC)	HHC USAASC, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		Sr Com-Atts Instr, Admin Svcs Div	HHC USAASC, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		Acting Dir, AMD, ACS	HHC USAIA, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		Acting Dir, AMD, ACS (Unit Redesig)	HHC USAIA, Fort Ben Harrison IN			
		SupvDocDev, DocSptDiv, FMD	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Acting Dir, FMD	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Chief, Doc Spt Div, FMD	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Crs Dev Officer	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Stu Off (MPO Crs CI #4-76)	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Crs Dev Officer	HHC 2nd Bn, Twp Cmd(PROV) FBH IN			
		Cmdr/Regional Pers Off	RFC Heman (574th PSC), Germany			
		Chr/Regional Pers Off	RFC HANAU (574th PSC), Germany			

SECTION V - MISCELLANEOUS

REMARKS

28

ITEM CONTINUATION

ITEM NO.

DATA

16 STAY/AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING/760331

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SECTION IX - RESERVE COMPONENT DATA

32a. READY RESERVE OBLIGATION EXPIRATION DATE:

b. DA FORM 3726 OR 3726-1 AGREEMENT EXPIRATION DATE:

c. SERVICE OBLIGATION EXPIRATION DATE:

d. MANDATORY REMOVAL FROM ACTIVE STATUS:

e. RETIREMENT YEAR-ENDING DATE:

33. DATE DA FORM 208 PREPARED

34. DATE DUPLICATE DA FORM 2-1 SUBMITTED:

REPORT OF CHANGES

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46
47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69

760204

760812

[REDACTED]





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 February 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED

(U) (MISCELLANEOUS) On 2 February 1977, [REDACTED] (NMN) [REDACTED] 574th Personnel Services Company (Hanau Regional Personnel Center), Pioneer Kaserne, Hanau/Main (MA9453), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09165, was interviewed in the Hanau Resident Office, 165th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, Building 5, Pioneer Kaserne, concerning his relationship with [REDACTED] (Colonel), [REDACTED] volunteered the following information:

(U) [REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] when he was assigned as [REDACTED] and an unidentified Spanish Colonel's escort officer on 10 September 1976. They first met at the Grand Hotel, vicinity of the Hauptbahnhof (Main Train Station), Nuernberg (MV5080), FRG. Source escorted [REDACTED] from 10 - 17 September 1976, as [REDACTED] attended various military briefings and demonstrations associated with Reforger exercises. During the above time period, Source and [REDACTED] had contact daily for periods of 8 to 12 hours. Source last saw [REDACTED] on 18 January 1977, when [REDACTED] dined at Source's quarters, Building 232, New Arrigonner Housing Area, Hanau/Main, FRG. Source last had contact with [REDACTED] when he received a letter from [REDACTED], dated 26 January 1977, a copy of which is attached as EXHIBIT [REDACTED]; and the letter was postmarked from Bonn-Bad Godesberg 10, dated 28 January 1977, a copy of the envelope is attached as EXHIBIT [REDACTED]. The letter, in substance, thanked [REDACTED] and his wife for dinner, invited them to visit [REDACTED] in Bonn, and congratulated Source on his promotion. Source provided the following personality data with regard to [REDACTED]:

(U) [REDACTED] told Source that he was 46 years of age. He weighed about 68.2 kilograms and was about 172.5 centimeters tall. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he was from Belgrade (cna), Yugoslavia (Y), and presently maintained an apartment in Belgrade. [REDACTED], his wife and son presently reside in Bonn,

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 16 June 97  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-808 DOD 5200.1R

CLASSIFIED BY AR 381-47, ACST DA 70  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFIED ON *Notification of Originator*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Continued, page 1 of 4 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (a) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 February 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

FRG, (nfi). [REDACTED] son attended school in the FRG, while his daughter was a student at an unidentified university in Y, and she studied Economics. [REDACTED] was assigned to his present position as a military attache in July 1976. [REDACTED] related to Source that he expected to hold this position for three years. [REDACTED] held mostly command positions throughout his military career. His previous assignment was as an infantry brigade commander of a unit in the general vicinity of Belgrade, Y. [REDACTED] claimed that while he had travelled outside Y while on vacation, he had never been assigned outside Y in connection with his military duties. Source queried [REDACTED] with regard to any travel that he may have had to the Soviet Union. [REDACTED] denied any such travel. [REDACTED] was known to make several jokes and puns at the expense of the Soviets, but Source could not cite any examples. [REDACTED] never expressed any dislike for the Soviets or the Soviet Union; but he expressed a dislike for Russian music. Source, who spoke Russian, believed that [REDACTED] stated that he had some degree of fluency in the Russian language. However, when Source spoke Russian to him, he answered in German. [REDACTED] spoke German fluently with a slavic accent. Source opined that [REDACTED] had a good understanding of the German language since he used slang and certain expressions that are usually learned by associating with German people. [REDACTED] stated that he spoke English, but that he did not speak it well, and would prefer to converse in German. [REDACTED] expressed a desire to achieve a higher degree of fluency in English, since he "likes Americans." [REDACTED] related to Source that he knew the US Military Attache in Bonn, COL fnu [REDACTED], and enjoyed his company. [REDACTED] stated that the US military attache would be departing from the FRG soon for a new assignment in the US. [REDACTED] was a heavy smoker, who preferred "Lord" cigarettes. [REDACTED] consumed alcoholic beverages, beer, scotch and liquors, but in extreme moderation. [REDACTED] owned a Citroen, model unknown, and was paying off a loan on the car. Source regarded [REDACTED] to have a likeable personality, have a good sense of humor and to be quick-witted and intelligent.

(c) During the period 10 - 17 September 1976, Source observed [REDACTED] to be very attentive and interested in all material presented in the various briefings and static displays. [REDACTED] expressed specific interest in a briefing and static display on Air Defense Artillery weapons systems, (nfi). [REDACTED] queried Source as to the organizational placement of TOW Cobra helicopters. Source responded that he did not know. [REDACTED] constantly pressed Source for accurate (word-for-word) translations of the briefings. At one time, unrecalled, [REDACTED] told Source, "You know, we do not exchange this information with the Russians, because it would compromise our position with the western countries." Source regarded this statement as odd, since Y was Communist.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 16 June 97

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1.608 DOD 5200.1R

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group

page 2 of 4 pages

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 February 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

During the 10 - 17 September 1976 time period, Source observed [REDACTED] to be taking copious notes on information mentioned during the briefings and on equipment that he observed. Source opined that [REDACTED] appeared to know items of US military equipment and US tactics well, judging from the questions that [REDACTED] asked.

(e) Source avoided as much social contact with [REDACTED] as possible during the 10 - 17 September 1976 time frame. Source did not like Communists, particularly the Soviets, since Source fled from the Soviet Union as a child. Source had relatives who lived in Siberia, USSR, victims of oppression, since they were of German nationality and not Russian. Source related this information to [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] declined to comment. For the most part, Source avoided talking about political topics with [REDACTED]. The only exception to this statement was when Source asked [REDACTED] what was to become of Y when President Tito dies. [REDACTED] responded quickly and directly, "That is taken care of."

(2) On 17 January 1977, [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED] at his quarters, and told Source that he would be in the area on the next day, and desired to invite Source and his wife out to dinner. Source did not desire to be alone with [REDACTED], and responded by inviting [REDACTED] to his quarters for dinner. [REDACTED] accepted the invitation. Source gave [REDACTED] directions to Hanau, with instructions to call [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] arrived and Source would meet him and take him home. [REDACTED] made arrangements so that MAJ and Mrs. [REDACTED] would also be present for dinner on 18 January 1977. [REDACTED], who spoke fluent German, was the Executive Officer of the Personnel and Administration Battalion, V Corps, located in the Abrams Building, Frankfurt/Main (MA7752), FRG, APO NY 09757. [REDACTED] telephoned [REDACTED] on the evening of 18 January 1977, and asked Source to meet him at his hotel, Hotel Elephant, Freiheits Platz, Hanau/Main. When [REDACTED] arrived at Source's home he presented Source's wife with flowers, and Source with a bottle of wine and two bottles of brandy from Y. Conversation did not center on any particular subject. Source explained that he commanded a personnel service unit. [REDACTED] stated that in the Yugoslavian Army, this type of job would not be considered command, but rather a staff job. [REDACTED] asked if Source had to travel far to work. This was all the military related subjects that were discussed on 18 January 1977. Source was told by [REDACTED] that he was in the area to explore the possibility of purchasing some equipment from an unidentified company in Frankfurt/Main. [REDACTED] invited Source and his wife to visit him in Bonn. [REDACTED] presented Source

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ON 16 JUNE 97  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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page 3 of 4 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED SIGNATURE]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 February 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

with his calling card, attached as EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_. After dinner, [REDACTED] returned to the Hotel Elephant. [REDACTED] impressed Source that he wished to maintain contact in the future, and stated that he would telephone [REDACTED] when he was in the area again.

(U) [REDACTED] stated that he had an uncle and possibly some cousins, who resided in Siberia, USSR. Source has never maintained contact with his uncle or any relatives from the USSR since he left the USSR in 1943. In 1943, Source left the USSR, travelled to the FRG and lived in the Mannheim (MV6182) area until 1951, when he moved to the US. Source was a naturalized US citizen. Source is presently married and has one child by this marriage. Source is divorced from his former wife, and had three children by this union. The only close foreign friend that Source has is [REDACTED], Mannheim, FRG, (nfi). Source has not had any recent foreign travel; he has never travelled to a Soviet-Bloc country since 1943. Source has a SECRET security clearance, based on a background investigation. Source has access to SECRET information about once every two months and daily access to CONFIDENTIAL information. Source has access to present and projected troop strengths for Hanau Military Community and V Corps. Source speaks fluent English, can converse in Russian and studied four years of French. Source plans to leave the FRG for an assignment in the US in February 1979. Source had no idea as to what his next assignment will entail, or where it will be.

(U) AGENT'S NOTES: [REDACTED] was concerned that any contact that he may have with [REDACTED] would reflect adversely upon him. He was advised that this was not the case. If he wished to visit or have contact with [REDACTED] that this was perfectly legal and that in itself would not be construed as any type of security risk. [REDACTED] was informed, in the form of a SAEDA briefing, that it was his responsibility to report any attempts by unauthorized personnel to obtain Department of Defense information. [REDACTED] agreed that he would report any such incidents. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was extremely cooperative throughout the interview, and appeared to make a sincere effort to recall all incidents surrounding his association with [REDACTED]

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

JUL 45

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page 4 of 4

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

HRO, 165th MI Bn, APO NY 09165

**Agent Report Dated:** 9 February 1977

**Description:**

Copy of letter dated 26 January 1977,  
from [REDACTED] to Source.

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
26.01.1977

Verteidigungsattache

Herrn  
Oberstleutnant [REDACTED]  
Pioneerkasärne  
H A N A U

Sehr geehrte Frau und Herr [REDACTED],

Ich danke Ihnen sehr für die schönen Stunden die ich bei  
Ihnen verbringen durfte. Es war wirklich wunderbar.

Meine Frau und ich freuen uns schon daran, Sie wahrscheinlich  
schon in Frühling in Bonn begrüßen zu können.

Gleichzeitig gratuliere ich Ihnen zur Beförderung und wünsche  
Ihnen und Ihrer gnädiger Frau alles Best

Ihr

*Oberst i. G.*  
[REDACTED]

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BUSC 552 (b) (7) (c)

BUSC 552 (b) (7) (c)

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

HRO, 165th MI Bn, APO NY 09165

**Agent Report Dated:**

9 February 1977

**Description:**

Envelope in which [REDACTED] mailed a letter  
to Source.


~~5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)~~

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

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Botschaft  
der SFR Jugoslawien  
64 Ljuna Rod Godesberg 1  
Schlossstrasse 1



Herrn  
Oberstleutnant

Pioneerkasärne  
USC 552 (b) (7) (c)

645 H a n a u

# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

Item of Counterintelligence Interest  
Hanau/Main, Federal Republic of Germany  
18 January 1977 (U)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

HRO, 165th MI Bn, APO NY 09165

**Agent Report Dated:**


9 February 1977 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

**Description:**

Copy of [REDACTED] calling card that he  
presented to Source.

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

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PUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

## TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL TO IRR\*

\*NOTE: This form is not required when material is forwarded to IRR with DA Form 2784-R, but may be used as a supplement to DA Form 2784-R to provide additional instructions.

1. TO:  
☒ Records Processing Division  
☐ Special Records Division  
☐ Supplemental Review Division

2. FROM: Chief, CE Section  
 Sp Opns Det, INSCOM, Ft Meade, MD

3. DATE 7 Dec 79

4. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL SUBJECT (Establish dossier or add material to existing dossier)

a. SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b. DOB: [REDACTED]

c. POB: [REDACTED]

d. SSN: Foreign National

e. Alias/Nee AKA: [REDACTED]

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5. PERSONAL/IMPERSONAL INDEX CROSS-REFERENCES (Continue on plain bond paper if needed)

Name/Impersonal Title	DOB	POB	SSN	Alias/Nee
YUGOSLAVIA INTELLIGENCE SERVICES		ZF 40 01 28		

6. FORWARD DOSSIER TO:

☒ Files

☐ Account Number: \_\_\_\_\_

7. AR 380-13 (Check one or both)

☒ Attached material meets retention criteria of AR 380-13

☐ DA Form 4312-R (Retention Control Sheet) is attached

8. DISPOSITION OF CASE (If not reflected on DA Form 2784-R)

CASE CLOSED

9. REQUEST FOR CONTROL (For controlled dossier material only; enter data required by para 3-4, AR 381-45)

10. IRR USE ONLY

☐ AR 380-13

☐ AR 381-45

Dossier No: \_\_\_\_\_

Aging Criteria: \_\_\_\_\_

Investigative Records Repository (IRR)

Reviewed for retention criteria UP AR 380-13

Reviewer Jane Chen Date 14 Dec 79

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPE-OS-D

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

16 NOV 1979

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)  
(77-213) (U)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SO)  
APO 09403

1. (U) References:

- a. Letter, 66th MI Group, dated 28 December 1978, subject as above.
- b. Report of Investigation, dated 7 November 1979, 527th MI Battalion, subject as above.

2. (U) Forwarded for your information and disposition is reference 1b, above.

3. (U) This investigation is closed.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS:

1 Incl  
as

*Robert W. Sheffield*  
ROBERT W. SHEFFIELD  
LTC, MI  
Chief, Security Division

CF:  
✓DCDR INSCOM (IASO) Ft Meade (w/incl)  
Cdr, 527th MI Bn, IAGPE-KD (wo/incl)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 12 JUL 97  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-606 DOD 5200.1R

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
When Separated From  
Classified Inclosures

DCDR INSCOM (IASO) Ft Meade

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION  
(Background or Complaint)

For use of this form, see AR 381-130; the proponent agency is OACSI.

DATE SUBMITTED

7 November 1979

SCOPE (If background)

☐ LAC

☐ GAC

☐ PBI

☐ CBI

CASE CLASSIFICATION

IDENTIFYING DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME

(FN), AKA:

2. SSN

3. RACE

4. GRADE

5. ARM OR SVC

6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT

Chief, Document Control

7. DATE OF BIRTH

8. PLACE OF BIRTH

9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS

Automatic Data Processing Service Center  
DPI-M130, 21st Support Command, APO 09325

10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS

11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.)

12. DATE (Incident cases only)

13. TIME (Incident cases only)

14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building)

Kaiserslautern, Germany

15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.

CONTROL DATA

16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO.

77-213

17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization)

527th MI Bn, APO NY 09227

18. CONTROL OFFICE

66th MI Gp I&S  
APO NY 09108

INVESTIGATIVE DATA

19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY

66th MI Gp I&S

20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION

UP AR 381-12

21. DATE INVESTIGATION

COMMENCED

COMPLETED

September 1977

7 November 1979

22. STATUS ☒ OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ TERMINATED ☐ SUSPENDED ☐ PENDING

23. SYNOPSIS Reference ROI, SUBJECT as above, dated 31 Oct 78, and Letter, SUBJECT as above dated 3 May 79. SUBJECT came to the attention of USAI

Subsequent investigation and SUBJECT interviews determined that claimed to have been a member of Yugoslavian Police Force from 22 Sep 79 to 1 Jul 72 with training by Yugoslavian State Security Service from 1 Jul 72 to 31 Dec 72, resigning at his own request. was polygraphed on 31 May 79 and 10 Jul 79, favorably confirmed 5 Nov 79.

SUBJECT terminated HIS employment with Data Processing and transferred to the Safety Division of Kaiserslautern Army Depot during mid-June 1979. SUBJECT is still employed with US Forces. (15)

Forwarded for your information and disposition is one Agent Report (15), in triplicate, pertaining to SUBJECT. This Battalion proposes no further investigative action.

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CLASSIFIED BY AR 381-12, 18 OCT 74  
REVIEW BY 7 NOV 99

24. DISTRIBUTION

3 - Cdr, 66th MI Group I&S, ATTN: IAGPE-OS-D  
3 - Cdr, 527th MI Bn, ATTN: IAGPE-KD

25.

REVIEWED BY

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

GS-13, Spec Asst Ops

S

DA FORM 342  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 342, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 July 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(IS) (U) On 5 July 1979, [REDACTED] Security Officer, Automatic Data Processing Service Center M-130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09227, telephonically contacted the undersigned in reference to [REDACTED] and provided the following information:

SUBJECT voluntarily terminated HIS employment at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center M-130, during mid-June 1979 due to job dissatisfaction. SUBJECT transferred to the Safety Division, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, at that time. SUBJECT is still employed by US Forces in HIS new position. [REDACTED] had no further information concerning SUBJECT.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
PROTECTIVE MARKING  
TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 APR 1979

IAGPE-TCI-DCE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN) (77-213)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SO)  
APO 09403

1. (U) References:

- a. Electrical message, IAGPE-TCI, 66th Military Intelligence Group, DTG 311225Z January 1979, Subject: Polygraph Examination 66-162-78 for DCE 77-213 (U).
- b. Agent Report, 66th Military Intelligence Group, dated 24 November 1978, subject as above.
- c. Agent Report, 66th Military Intelligence Group, dated 27 February 1979, subject as above.
- d. DA Form 2805 (Polygraph Examination Authorization), 66th Military Intelligence Group, dated 2 April 1979.

2. (U) Inclosed for your information and disposition are references 1b, 1c, and 1d above. Reference 1b contains the results of interview of [REDACTED] retired assistant director, Automatic Data Processing Service Center M-130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, FRG. She was [REDACTED] supervisor from January 1977 to August 1978. She would not recommend [REDACTED] for a position of trust due to her uneasiness over his background and she was unable to determine where his loyalties lay. During Subject Interview, conducted on 22 and 23 December, reference 1c above, [REDACTED] evaded questions relating to his background, especially

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Review on 1 April 1999

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ON 16 Jan E 1997  
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
IAGPE-TCI-DCE

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN) (77-213)

§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

when it related to his working for the Yugoslavian Intelligence Service (YIS). As reported in reference 1a, above, 66th Military Intelligence Group proposes to re-polygraph [REDACTED] in order to determine his current affiliation with YIS. Reference 1d, above, is forwarded for your approval.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS:



LASZLO J. BUZSAC  
MAJ, MI  
Chief, CI Division

3 Incl  
as

CF:  
DCDR, INSCOM (IASO) w/incl  
CDR, 527TH MI BN (IAGPE-KD) w/o incl

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ON 16 June 1997  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-12. The proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT  
(FN)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

24 November 1978

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

(b)(1)

On 21 November 1978,

Source first met SUBJECT on 1 January 1977 when HE began work at the ADPSC as a trainee computer operator. Source had daily contact with SUBJECT

from to

Source last saw SUBJECT on 31 August 1978 while at work. Source had no social contact with SUBJECT at any time.

SUBJECT was an immigrant from Yugoslavia. HE had left Yugoslavia as a political refugee, date unknown. SUBJECT was an orphan. HIS mother had died of cancer while HE was a young boy. HIS father was deceased, but Source had no knowledge as to date or cause. SUBJECT attended a university in Yugoslavia at the expense of the Yugoslavian government. SUBJECT had not disclosed the nature of HIS studies. SUBJECT was not married and had no children. SUBJECT had no relatives residing in the FRG. HE had an apartment in Kaiserslautern, address unknown. HE did not own a car and rode to work with co-workers. SUBJECT spoke six languages fluently, to include German, English, and Yugoslavian. Following HIS education in Yugoslavia, SUBJECT had moved to the FRG because HE did not agree with the political ideas of HIS government. HE obtained employment with the US Forces in Kaiserslautern as a supply clerk at the Property Section, KAD. The wife of another employee at the ADPSC, Mrs. FNU, also worked in the Property Section. had recommended to her husband that be recommended for employment at the ADPSC as HE

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON Approval of ACSI, DA

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(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV) 57

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT [REDACTED] (FN) AKA: [REDACTED] DPOB: [REDACTED] (77-213) (U)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 24 November 1978
3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER	

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

had impressed her as being deserving, as well as capable, of performing a more responsible job. Mr. FNU [REDACTED] spoke with his supervisor, [REDACTED] about SUBJECT. [REDACTED] in turn, spoke with Source and recommended that SUBJECT be hired as a computer operator trainee. SUBJECT subsequently applied for the position and was hired. SUBJECT was transferred to the Document Control section of the ADPSC during the Summer of 1977 as HE had expressed a desire to advance to the Director of the ADPSC, Mr. [REDACTED]

In HIS new position, SUBJECT had access to sensitive information but no classified information. In late Summer of 1977, Source spoke with [REDACTED] concerning SUBJECT as she had become aware that SUBJECT and [REDACTED] had socialized and she wanted to express her disapproval to [REDACTED] as it could cause problems among other employees, i.e., jealousy, complaints of favoritism. [REDACTED] advised Source that he had gone to a gasthaus with SUBJECT after work one evening for a couple of drinks. While there, SUBJECT had expressed to [REDACTED] a strong desire to immigrate to the United States. SUBJECT asked [REDACTED] to sponsor HIM in this effort. [REDACTED] declined and decided that he would not socialize with SUBJECT any further. [REDACTED] told Source that he felt that immigration to the US was SUBJECT'S main goal in life. Several weeks later, Source again spoke with [REDACTED] concerning Limited Access Authorizations for employees as the ADPSC was going to be working on classified programs. SUBJECT was briefly discussed. [REDACTED] advised Source that SUBJECT had spoken with him about it and that HE had requested that HE not be put in for a clearance because of HIS past. SUBJECT said that it would be difficult for US clearance personnel to verify HIS background. [REDACTED] advised Source that SUBJECT would not be put in for a clearance because of this. [REDACTED] further related that in HIS position, HE would not have access to any classified information. [REDACTED], GS-15, transferred back to the US in November 1977. Source believed that he is now working at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Source commented favorably concerning SUBJECT'S honesty, dependability, morals, and stated that SUBJECT does not drink alcoholic beverages nor does HE smoke. HE was mentally and emotionally stable, financially responsible, and did not appear to use any habit-forming drugs to include marijuana.

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AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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Page 2 of 3 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]
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1 APR 52

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**AGENT REPORT**

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-12. The proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

24 November 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SUBJECT had had no adverse contact with any law enforcement agencies. Source was unable to comment upon SUBJECT'S loyalty due to HIS past affiliation with Yugoslavia. Source was not satisfied with SUBJECT'S sketchy explanation of HIS immigration from Yugoslavia, as well as HIS reluctance to discuss HIS past with co-workers. Source had expressed her uneasiness over SUBJECT'S access to sensitive information to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] advised her that there was no apparent problem as HE had no access to classified information. Source described SUBJECT as an ambitious, perseverant individual. She was unaware of any social contacts that SUBJECT may have had and described HIM as a loner, but that HE had expressed a desire to socialize with people on numerous occasions. SUBJECT had a strong temper, which flared when HE became frustrated. SUBJECT used vacation time sparingly and took only one or two days leave approximately every six months. Source was unaware of any foreign travel SUBJECT may have had. SUBJECT did not correspond with any persons in or from an ICC to Source's knowledge.

[REDACTED]

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 2 August 1978, in which [REDACTED] claimed affiliation with Yugoslavian intelligence.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
AKA: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) On 22-23 December 1978, [REDACTED] Yugoslavian citizen, Supervisor of Document Control Branch, Automatic Data Processing Service Center M-130, 21st Support Command, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09325, residing at [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Bachelor Officers Quarters, Sembach Air Force Base, Sembach, FRG, APO New York 09130, and questioned concerning the nature and extent of HIS intelligence background and activities. The reason for the interview was explained to SUBJECT and HE was advised of HIS right to decline to be interviewed. SUBJECT expressed no objection to the interview, however he declined to execute an affidavit. SUBJECT consented to a tape recording of the interview, and expressed no objection to a transcript of the interview being typed for record, which is attached as EXHIBIT [REDACTED], the salient points of which are as follows:

(U) SUBJECT was born on [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. HIS parents died at an early age and HE was an orphan until the age of majority. At age 17, HE entered the Strokovna Sola Za Notranje Zadeve, Socialistone Republike Slovenije (Police and Security School, Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia). HE attended the school on a full-time basis and studied various aspects of law enforcement and security to include counterintelligence techniques. From June 1972 to July 1972, HE received on-the-job training as a border guard and customs inspector. From August 1972 to December 1972, HE attended an intelligence course at Zagut (Phonetic)(nca), Yugoslavia, and also worked in surveillance and VIP Protection. SUBJECT stated that HE became disaffected with his job because HE had wanted to work in the field of forensic science, that is, a laboratory, and that it became obvious to HIM that HE was not going to get that type of assignment. In December 1972, HE was advised by superiors that HE was being considered for attendance at a special school, which HE believed was in Russia. HE was advised that if HE attended the school HE could not write or receive correspondence and that no one would know of HIS whereabouts. He feared

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REVIEW BY 18 OCT 94

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(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

the assignment to the school and subsequently quit HIS job with the Yugoslavian government. From January 1973 to July 1973, HE worked a variety of odd jobs in Yugoslavia, that is, a travel agency in Kosha (Phonetic)(nca), republic of Zagart (Phonetic), Yugoslavia, for a period of three days in January 1973; as a hotel receptionist for one day, location not recalled. HE claimed to have been terminated from the position of receptionist because of pressure on the management by HIS former employer, the Yugoslavian government. HE worked at another travel agency for a short time in February 1973 but could not recall the specific dates or location. During this period of time HE lived primarily on funds HE had saved and money which HE had borrowed from friends.

During the Fall of 1972, when HE became disaffected with HIS job, HE and a close friend and former schoolmate at the police school, [REDACTED] discussed the political situation in Yugoslavia and came to the agreement that Yugoslavia could become a closer ally to Russia and that they should make an effort to prevent that possibility. They had several other friends from the police school who had similar feelings. They decided that they would attempt to provide information of an intelligence nature to the West, specifically the United States. SUBJECT claimed that the basis for their efforts were ideological. HE stated that many young people in Yugoslavia were sympathetic to the United States and feared what would happen in Yugoslavia following the death of Tito, that is, a takeover by Russia. SUBJECT and [REDACTED] decided that they would form a group in which no one knew all of the others so as to lend an element of security to their actions in the event that any one of them would be caught by Yugoslavian authorities. [REDACTED] would coordinate the activities and SUBJECT would be the courier. The other participants would work in place.

During December 1972 or January 1973, SUBJECT contacted the American Consulate in Yugoslavia and spoke to a vice-consul, name unrecalled. HE advised the consul that HE wanted to get in touch with American Intelligence personnel for the purpose of providing information of an intelligence nature. The vice-consul provided SUBJECT with a name and address of an individual in the United States that HE should write to for the purpose of establishing contact. On the first visit, HE provided the vice-consul with a partial register of diplomatic car controls (license numbers), which HE referred to as "ciphers", for the purpose of establishing credibility. The list was provided to HIM by [REDACTED].

SUBJECT wrote to [REDACTED] per the vice-consul's instructions, and requested to meet with a [REDACTED] in reference to employment as a hotel receptionist. Per instructions, three weeks from the date that HE mailed the letter, HE traveled illegally to Austria where HE was to meet with [REDACTED]. SUBJECT had obtained documents

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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BY CDR USANSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-008 DOD 5200.1R

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

from a member of their group, a FNU [REDACTED], who in turn received the documents from a FNU [REDACTED], identified as a son of Yugoslavian politician. [REDACTED] had obtained the documents from his girlfriend, name unknown, who worked in an office with direct access to classified material. Documents provided were classified Yugoslavian Top Secret, entitled Storm Sun, described by SUBJECT as the operational plans for the police forces during war. Storm Sun was contained in several sealed envelopes, which SUBJECT carried with HIM in a small suitcase. The vice-consul was unaware that HE was taking any documents with HIM to Austria. SUBJECT obtained the documents on a Friday afternoon at the close of business. HE could not recall the specific date, but said it was on a four-day Yugoslavian holiday weekend. HE took a train to the Yugoslavian border, got off the train, walked along the border for several hundred yards until finding a safe, well-covered area to cross on foot, and then traveled to Phelock (Phonetic)(nca), Austria, by train or bus. HE went to the Park Hotel and asked for [REDACTED] SUBJECT stayed at another hotel in Phelock, name unrecalled. HE asked for [REDACTED] several times over the next three days, but Waytes was not registered in the hotel. On the fourth day, SUBJECT returned to Yugoslavia the same way by which HE had come and returned the unopened documents to [REDACTED] SUBJECT stated that although the envelopes were sealed, HE felt that [REDACTED] could have copied the enclosed information and then resealed the envelopes. HE would have let [REDACTED] keep the envelopes if he had not been able to copy the information at the time. Following HIS return, HE recontacted the vice-consul and advised that [REDACTED] had failed to make contact. The vice-consul was surprised and advised SUBJECT to go to the American Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, under the pretense of a tourist guide making application for a group tourist visa for travel to the United States. SUBJECT did so but received no response from any of the embassy personnel. SUBJECT recontacted the vice-consul who recommended that HE write to [REDACTED] again.

(c) SUBJECT became nervous about HIS activities, and was frustrated because of the failure to make contact with the Americans. HE was having difficulties obtaining employment in Yugoslavia and decided to leave Yugoslavia. On 5 July 1973, SUBJECT illegally crossed into Italy by taking a train from HIS home to Goritza (Phonetic)(nca), Yugoslavia, located on the Yugoslavian/Italian border, crossed on foot, took a train to Mon Falcone (Phonetic)(nca), near Verona (nca), Italy, switched to another train which took HIM to Milano

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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1 APR 52

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA: [REDACTED]

DPOB: [REDACTED]

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

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3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(nca), Italy, switched to another train which took HIM to Kersa (Phonetic)(nca), Italy located on the Italy/Switzerland border. SUBJECT crossed the border on foot, and then took a train to Zurich (nca), Switzerland.

(U) (C) SUBJECT stated that upon arrival in Zurich, HE contacted a man named FNU [REDACTED]. HE had met [REDACTED] in Yugoslavia during Spring 1973 when HE was working as a bartender in a hotel. [REDACTED] was staying in the hotel, name unrecalled, as a tourist. [REDACTED] told HIM that if HE was ever in Zurich to stop and visit. SUBJECT explained to [REDACTED] that HE needed a job. [REDACTED] contacted his father who owned a farm near Lucerne (nca), Switzerland. From approximately 10 July 1973 to 25 September 1973, HE worked at the [REDACTED] farm as a laborer. During this period of time, SUBJECT applied for asylum with the Swiss government. Kuttel and his father were unaware that SUBJECT had left Yugoslavia illegally. In September 1973, Swiss police arrested SUBJECT. The Swiss charged HIM with exploiting [REDACTED] because he was a homosexual. HE believed that in reality they just did not want to grant HIM asylum. HE felt that the charge was false and was an excuse for the Swiss government to deport HIM. HE stated that HE at no time had participated in any homosexual act and that HE was not a homosexual.

(U) (C) From September 1973 to May 1974, SUBJECT worked at the Zurich Insurance Company, Zurich. On 29-30 April 1974, Swiss police contacted SUBJECT and advised HIM that HE should leave Switzerland as HE had said HE would do following the incident with [REDACTED]. They provided HIM with a paper, not further identified, saying that if HE could not find a residence in another country within a year, HE could return to Switzerland. HE stated that upon HIS application for asylum upon entry in Switzerland, HE had been interviewed by Swiss Intelligence concerning HIS background and that HE had provided them with general information concerning the Yugoslavian police and Security Service. During HIS residence in Switzerland, HE wrote another letter to Dagman in New York. He later received a letter, postmarked Munich (PU 9035), FRG, from [REDACTED], which advised SUBJECT that [REDACTED] saw no opportunity for HIS employment in the near future. SUBJECT made no further effort to contact US Intelligence after receiving the letter.

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ON 12 June 97  
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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

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3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(C) On 3 May 1974, SUBJECT took a train from Zurich to Basel (nca), Switzerland. At Basel HE illegally crossed into the FRG on foot because HE had no legal travel documents. At Basel HE turned HIMSELF over to German authorities. HE was then taken to Munich, FRG, where HE was interviewed by German agents

for a period of four to six weeks. HE provided information to them concerning HIS background, Yugoslavian police and intelligence services, and showed them graduation certificates and employment records concerning HIM that HE had in HIS possession. HE believed that they had made photocopies of HIS papers. German authorities issued HIM a temporary residence permit for Germany. SUBJECT then moved to Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), FRG, where authorities told HIM HE might be able to find a job. HE obtained a job at the Savoy Hotel, Kaiserslautern, as a bartender. During HIS employment at the Savoy, HE met a lawyer named FNU, who frequented the bar occasionally. SUBJECT learned that was a famous German lawyer from Kaiserslautern. SUBJECT had made application for asylum with the FRG during this period and HE told about HIS situation. offered his services if SUBJECT ever needed help.

(C) On 29 September 1974, SUBJECT was arrested by the German police who advised HIM that HIS application for asylum had been turned down. SUBJECT was advised that HE would have to leave Germany and return to Yugoslavia or Switzerland. SUBJECT called and asked for legal assistance. went to the police station in Kaiserslautern where SUBJECT was being held and advised the police that if they would release SUBJECT to him overnight, HE would voluntarily return to the police station the next morning. SUBJECT then went home, packed HIS belongings, and returned to the police station the following morning.

(C) On 30 September 1974, German police placed SUBJECT in a locked security compartment of a train which took HIM to Basel. At Basel HE was turned over to Swiss police who transferred HIM to the jail in Zurich, where HE was incarcerated for several days. Swiss police then put HIM on a plane bound for Yugoslavia. HE was not accompanied by anyone during the flight. Upon arrival in Yugoslavia, SUBJECT approached a police official and advised him, in English, that HIS name was, that HE was an American who had caught the wrong

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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## AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT (FN) AKA: [REDACTED] DPOB: [REDACTED] (77-213) (U)		2. DATE SUBMITTED 27 February 1979 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER	
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS  <p>plane, that all his papers and belongings were on another flight, and that HE wanted to return to the West. The policeman spoke with supervisors and then returned SUBJECT on the next flight to Switzerland. SUBJECT stated that HE did not want to return to Yugoslavia because the Yugoslavians would assume that HE had provided information to the Western authorities and put HIM in jail. Upon arrival in Switzerland, HE attempted to get someone to purchase HIM another plane ticket. HE could not buy HIS own ticket as HE was in the International area of the airport and could not leave it without proper passport or visa. An airport official recognized HIM and placed HIM under detention. SUBJECT was then escorted back to Yugoslavia on the next plane, turned over to Yugoslav authorities.</p> <p>u          (S) SUBJECT was then imprisoned at Slovinia (Phonetic)(nca), Yugoslavia, because HE had not paid the Yugoslavian government the \$2000 debt HE owed them for HIS schooling. HE said that the imprisonment was an excuse that they used and in reality they had put HIM in jail because they suspected HIM of providing information to the Western authorities. HE was sentenced to a two-year term for the failure to pay back the debt. During the first fourteen days, HE was visited daily by Yugoslavian security authorities who interviewed HIM concerning HIS activities in the West. They also asked HIM if HE would be willing to work for them again. HE refused because they had put HIM in prison and HE did not want to work for them in any capacity. HE was in the prison from 10 October 1974 to 10 September 1976.</p> <p>u          (S) Upon HIS release from prison, SUBJECT promised the Yugoslav authorities that HE would not leave Yugoslavia again. Three days after HIS release, SUBJECT illegally departed Yugoslavia via the same basic route that HE had taken in 1973. HE decided to return to the FRG because HE thought that HE could obtain work there again and HE had not been notified officially that HIS asylum had been turned down by the FRG. Upon arrival in Kaiserslautern, SUBJECT recontacted [REDACTED] and made application for recognition as a refugee with the FRG. SUBJECT made application for employment with the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, US Government, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern. HE was subsequently hired as a clerk at the supply depot, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern. SUBJECT was granted a residence permit by the FRG due to HIS employment, which limited HIS residence to the Kaiserslautern county</p> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED              ON 16 JUNE 97              BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO              AITM Para 1-600 DOD 5200.1R</p> </div>			
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)		6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]	

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

area, FRG. SUBJECT showed the undersigned HIS residence permit, which was stamped with an authorization by German authorities with no limitations on travel.

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(S) SUBJECT telephonically contacts [REDACTED] on a frequent basis due to HIS past difficulties with German authorities. [REDACTED] was an appointed defense attorney for suspected terrorists, including members of the Baader-Meinhof gang. SUBJECT did not believe that [REDACTED] sympathized with any terrorists or participated in any terrorist activities. SUBJECT did not like terrorists and considered terrorists to be fools with communist leanings. HE had not participated in any terrorist activities. [REDACTED] appealed HIS denial of refugee status and advised SUBJECT that the appeal process would take seven or eight years. During that period SUBJECT would be able to stay in the FRG as long as HE was employed.

U  
(S) SUBJECT had not participated in any intelligence activities since HIS attempted contact with US Intelligence in 1973. HE has not provided any information to any Warsaw Pact nation concerning HIS employment with the US Government. HE has not traveled to any Warsaw Pact nation since September 1976. HE has not visited or corresponded with anyone from a Warsaw Pact nation since HIS departure from Yugoslavia in September 1976. HE has not been approached or asked to provide any information to anyone concerning HIS employment with the US Government. HE has not offered any intelligence information to anyone since 1973. HE believes that the Yugoslavs are unaware of HIS whereabouts and did not want them to find out as HE fears reprisal. HE stated that they would be suspicious that HE could have provided sensitive information concerning Yugoslavia to German or American authorities. HE does not want to return to Yugoslavia under any circumstances. HE has had no travel out of the Kaiserslautern area since September 1976, with the exception of a trip to Basel, Switzerland, in August 1978. HE insisted that HIS entrance into Switzerland was by accident. HE was celebrating HIS birthday with a visit to a woman in Luedoch (Phonetic)(nca), near Basel (MC 4634), FRG, who had assisted HIM when HE crossed the border in 1974. SUBJECT took a train from Kaiserslautern, missed HIS stop in Basel, FRG, and got off at the next stop which was Basel, Switzerland. SUBJECT spent most of the day in Basel, contemplating HIS situation. HE then telephoned [REDACTED] and advised him of HIS situation. Matsky, in

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ON 16 JUNE 97

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-608 DOD 5200.1R

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Page 7 of 10 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT (FN) AKA: [REDACTED] DPOB: [REDACTED] (77-213) (U)	2. DATE SUBMITTED 27 February 1979
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

turn, called German authorities who advised him of what SUBJECT should do. SUBJECT turned HIMSELF over to Swiss Authorities who returned HIM to Germany.

u SUBJECT stated that HE is not happy living in Germany and would like to live in another country. HE considered moving to South Africa in 1974 following a conversation with a FNU [REDACTED], identified as a representative of Phoenix Clothing, a resident of South Africa, who suggested that SUBJECT consider moving there. SUBJECT had met him in the bar at the Savoy Hotel during 1974. SUBJECT contacted the South African embassy in FRG and asked about moving there and they advised HIM that it would be impossible. HE also considered moving to the United States and discussed it with HIS supervisor at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center, M-130, [REDACTED] step-father was from Yugoslavia and he sympathized with SUBJECT'S situation. [REDACTED] offered to help SUBJECT if possible. SUBJECT inquired with the American Embassy in the FRG who advised HIM that HE would need a sponsor in the United States before it would be possible. [REDACTED] was transferred to the United States before SUBJECT had a chance to discuss it with him. HE has not approached anyone else concerning a move to the United States.

u SUBJECT stated that HE was not trying to hide HIS past from US authorities and that on HIS employment application HE had been truthful concerning HIS past employments. HE believed that the US Government was aware of HIS past and did not desire to question HIM in detail. HE stated that if HE had wanted to hide HIS identity, or past, HE would have gone to Frankfurt train station and arranged to purchase a phony passport and identity papers. HE thought that it would cost about five hundred dollars from a "dealer" at that location. HE believed that a large number of people purchased false identity papers at that location frequently.

u HE did not ask for HIS job as supervisor, Document Control section, M-130, but rather it was offered to HIM because no one else would take it. HE did not want access to any classified information because of HIS past. HE did not want HIS supervisors to find out about HIS past because if they knew, they would not trust HIM and HE would be terminated as a security risk. HE is unhappy with HIS job because of long working hours and a shortage of personnel. HE has applied for another position with the Assistance Support Section of Kaiserslautern Army Depot and is waiting for an opening.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT  
[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT  
[REDACTED]

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ON 12 JUNE 1997  
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AUTH Para 1-600 DOD 5200.1R

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USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

When queried concerning HIS current knowledge of any intelligence activities by Yugoslavia, HE stated that HE had not been in touch with any of HIS former friends since leaving Yugoslavia in 1973. At the time that HE quit the police school, HE was aware that one of HIS classmates, [REDACTED], was to be ultimately assigned to a covert or clandestine position in the FRG, but did not know if he actually was sent. HE believed that HE could recontact old friends, if HE wanted to, who could provide information to US Intelligence. HE stated that HE was not really interested in establishing contact with former friends due to previous lack of interest by US Intelligence and because it would be very difficult for HIM to know who HE could trust in Yugoslavia. HE said that HE at no time had wanted to make a "deal" with any intelligence agencies. HE was familiar with the term "intelligence fabricator" and denied being one.

SUBJECT consented to a polygraph examination to verify HIS truthfulness, but stated that HE was reluctant to do so because HE believed that a polygraph machine was unreliable. HE stated that HE had knowledge of the polygraph operation due to training at the police school. HE stated that people could be trained to "beat" the machine, and therefore, the Yugoslavs did not trust the results. HE stated that Yugoslav authorities do not use any form of drugs for inducement of truthful statements due to laws forbidding usage.

SUBJECT reiterated HIS fear that the information HE provided to the undersigned could get back to Yugoslav authorities and did not want anything in HIS handwriting on file with US Army Intelligence. HE stated that HE was giving consideration to termination HIS employment to avoid any further problems.

AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT was reluctant to provide information to US Army Intelligence due to past difficulties with other intelligence agencies. HE was evasive during questioning and very emotional when pressed for specific details of HIS past. SUBJECT inferred that in return for information and answers to questions HE wanted to be assured that HE would not be terminated from HIS employment afterwards. Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 4 October 1978, in which SUBJECT stated that the name of the vice-consul in Zrinjevac (Phonetic)(nca), Yugoslavia, who provided HIM with an address to

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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1 APR 52

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**AGENT REPORT**

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

AKA: [REDACTED] (FN)

DPOB: [REDACTED]  
(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

27 February 1979

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

write to, in the United States, was [REDACTED]. SUBJECT used a code name "[REDACTED]" during all correspondence with [REDACTED]. Discrepancies between information provided by SUBJECT in this Agent Report and prior Agent Reports are as follows: Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 2 August 1978, in which SUBJECT advised that HE was employed by Yugoslavian Intelligence from the Fall of 1971 to 1976. Also claimed was legal entrance into West Germany with falsified travel documents. SUBJECT claimed to have assisted another "agent" from Yugoslavia in meeting with US Intelligence in a neutral country for the purpose of turning over document pertaining to Yugoslavian Intelligence Operations Plans. Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 16 September 1977, by S/A [REDACTED], summary of application for asylum, in which SUBJECT claimed to have successfully graduated from the police academy in June 1972, worked for the Yugoslavian State Service from August 1972 to December 1972, when HE was returned to uniformed police duties because of HIS bad attitude. SUBJECT subsequently resigned from the police. Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 18 October 1978, by S/A [REDACTED], in which a Confidential Source received information from the German Consulate in South Africa pertaining to SUBJECT'S character. Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] assisted in the conduct of the above interview.

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ON 16 June 97  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1.608 DOD 5200.1R

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]


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1 APR 52

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# 66th MI Group



## EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:**

AKA: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

(FN)

**File Number:**

**Preparing Unit:**

Kaiserslautern Field Office  
527th MI Bn, APO New York 09227  
27 February 1979

**Agent Report Dated:**

**Description:**

Transcript of recorded interview of  
[REDACTED] on 22 & 23 December 1978

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ON 16 June 97  
BY GDR USA/COM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-2.5 DOD 5200.1R

EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

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USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

AKA: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
(77-213) (U)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (G)

TRANSCRIPT OF SUBJECT INTERVIEW TAKEN 27 - 28 DECEMBER 1978

Q: What's happened to you since the time you graduated from high school to the present time? Your background, your history?

A: Well, OK, I would like to ask some questions first before we start this conversation. Are there more people going to be here right now or are they coming afterwards?

Q: Coming later possibly.

A: Possibly, just not for sure they are going to come?

Q: It's up to me to determine to what extent you were affiliated and if you are indeed currently still affiliated with them or any other intelligence agency.

A: So I'm being investigated actually.

Q: Of sorts, you might say that. That's why we're here, to find out what happened to you, how you got here, what you're up to, and the whole nine yards. So first why don't we...

A: Uh, huh, so that's my status.

Q: We have jurisdiction because you are employed by the United States and you work for us.

A: That's what I wanted to say. Supposing I would quit a job?

Q: That would make no difference to us. Like I said before, what we want to do is go back from when you first had contact with Yugoslavian Intelligence.

A: OK. That's anyhow still....I would still like to finish that question that I asked you. Because I made some bad experiences with them.

Q: With the Germans?

A: Yeah.

Q: With the German people you talked to when you came over?

A: Yeah, the German people and a couple of other people. You see, I understand your work and in the final stage when the decisions are being made, most of the time people already know what's going to happen. So a person would just like to get some more information on something. That's why I'm asking, you know, because I told you I had that story from Germans in talking to the people for two months, not only one day. Afterwards as I needed some assistance from their side, no one was there.

Q: Well, maybe we can do better.

A: I was not dealing; I was not dealing, but you know I was just expecting people. So you see and how can the people expect me to provide them with whole information or useful information. I don't know what they are going to do.

Q: As far as your employment, if that's what's bothering you...

A: That was a big mistake the Germans made.

Q: We're not concerned with that.

A: They couldn't offer anything. Nothing.

Q: By what do you mean offer?

A: I was applying for residence permit, for instance. They told me I could



get it, they told me. They can tell anything. Afterwards they just disappeared.

Q: Your residency here in West Germany is dependent upon your job, right?

A: I don't think so, is it?

Q: I think it is. I think if you work for the United States you can get a temporary pass.

A: Just me?

Q: I would think so. Someone else?

A: That's new for me. I was thinking about it. There was a possibility. But everybody is entitled in my situation to a temporary pass unless they don't decide what's going to happen to you, or else you have another job.

Q: That's irrelevant to what we want to talk about. We're not going to get you thrown out of the country; we're not going to get you fired; but we do want to know because of the nature of your background just how much there is to your background that we don't know about which may influence your job. Do you follow me?

A: Yeah, positively. As I said I was just thinking about the whole situation. Yeah, OK.

Q: What is your name and....

A: So, suppose we were not going to be finished today? Are we going to stay here?

Q: Probably.

A: And I won't have a chance to call anybody?

Q: Oh, yeah, we'll make sure you have an opportunity, as long as it's on the up and up. Who is it you would like to call?

A: I would like to call my lawyer that takes care about me.

Q: Your Lawyer. For what reason?

A: He sponsors me.

Q: He is your sponsor in Germany?

A: Yes.

Q: OK.

A: And just let him know that...Normally I call him on a daily basis because of bad experience.

Q: Oh, you've been having bad experiences here?

A: Old reasons been leading me to handle it that way.

Q: I don't understand. You say the Germans have been harassing you or something?

A: Oh, they most probably would, yeah. And they did, and I didn't have any chance to call anybody, so, you see, that is why I'm....

Q: When was this?

A: Oh, that story in Switzerland.

Q: Oh, when you went to Switzerland?

A: And before that, too, you know. They wanted to kick me out of the country. I didn't have a chance to call anybody although I had a phone in my room servicing.

Q: What was the deal with Switzerland?

A: The guy would get upset, believe me, he definitely would get upset if I wouldn't call him (attorney) on a daily basis and let him know that I'm still here, you know, he would try to mess some fellow up. That's why I would like to call him. In the evenings, you know.

Q: Yeah, we can allow that. That's no problem.

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A: That's just the reason. On a daily basis, since he'll never know. It could be not necessarily Germans, you know, or you or whoever.

Q: Yeah, you mentioned that on your way up here for the interview that you had this knock on your door by terrorists or something. Why don't you explain that to me.

A: It could be, as well as, whoever.

Q: Well, what happened?

A: Well, nothing, they were just checking the house. The people were registered allright, obviously the house. There is a lot of transients, traffic, you know, people coming, going. And a knock on the door, you know, wanted me to open the door, and I didn't open it. Not immediately, something like that. It's not normal, not usual, that someone at seven o'clock in the evening knocks on your door and says it's the police. What for? That they would like to see my registration certificate or whatever, they can send me a postcard and say present that paper to us.

Q: Yeah.

A: That would be normal way. This is not important.

Q: This is Mr. [REDACTED] by the way. Well, they knocked on your door at seven o'clock Friday night, said they were the Polizei?

A: Was it Saturday, or was it Friday? I even don't know. It was Saturday, I believe.

Q: What did they ask you?

A: What did they ask me? To show my papers.

Q: Did you show them your papers?

A: I showed them. Without any word of excuse. Nothing.

Q: Do you think that was intentional harassment of you?

A: No, I wouldn't say it like that. In other ways. Obviously there are some people who are trying to make my life difficult.

Q: Anyone in particular that you know of?

A: I didn't ask the gentlemen about names. I didn't ask you about names, even. They could have told me, whatever.

Q: You mean the Germans that were at your door?

A: The Germans, yes. The same in Munich, you know. I been living in the house with that people for two months, you know.

Q: OK. Well, unless you have any objections, I'd like to do it chronologically. You know, your background, how you got here, and your contacts with US Intelligence before. OK? Do you see any problems with discussing that?

A: What do you consider as US Intelligence?

Q: OK, when we spoke before and you mentioned you had been contacted. Let's go back to when you first were employed by the Yugoslavians.

A: OK, but first I'd like to emphasize something. That is that we are now going to talk about a period of time and the things that happened six years ago.

Q: OK, no problem.

A: That's a long time frame.

Q: OK, you got out of high school, right?

A: Oh, high school, we call it junior college. What do you consider as a high school? Is that important now, what a high school is? OK, we have a public school for eight years, and afterwards, we have a junior college and a...

Q: Prior to university.

A: OK, I went to....I made big mistake and that is I didn't take my German vocabulary over here and a couple of words that I won't, can't translate since I don't know your system. But, anyhow, it was a police school, let's call it like that. It's a type of a closed police college, I would say.

Q: And what was the name of the college?

A: In my mother's language?

Q: Yes. In your native language.

A: Could I write it down? I think that would make things easier. That was the name at that time. They do have a new name if you would like me to write down the new name.

Q: The other name is fine. So we know which school.

A: That got it. Is there somebody?

Q: What, in Munich?

A: Yeah.

Q: I have no idea. What's he talking about?

A: Talking about a conversation that I had with the Germans in the year '74. I been talking with the people for two months.

Q: The Germans?

A: Yes. And provided them with fresh information that they wanted to have that obviously nobody from your side was there.

Q: That's quite possible. You know the Germans.

A: I know everybody, that's true. Anyhow, you know it would be useful. Especially because you do have a coding agent down there in Sieindorf in the refugee camp. You know you do have an American guy sitting there and I passed through there from number....And put down my name and everything.

Q: OK, well, just for our records, for this conversation.

A: And I had papers and everything, what I don't have now. Did the Germans give you papers at least?

Q: Yeah, they gave us some.

A: Copies of papers?

Q: Some.

A: OK, I put down on there. What do I put down, my birth name? First name, last name, what? Date of birth? This is type of a strange situation, you see. When I come to Germany, they ask me questions. If I work for Americans, they ask me questions. If I go back to Yugoslavia, not because I wanted to, but since I have to they are going to ask me questions. They did ask questions. Come back to Germany, they ask you questions again.

Q: You work for the US now.

A: I do, but anyhow the easiest way would be, you know, once to go to the chief terminal at Frankfurt and buy a passport. It costs 500 Marks, you know. And my name would be Mueller or Schultz or whatever. And find employment in a German company, like ten thousands of people I'm sure did the same.

Q: You work for us and you've made certain....

A: Certainly I did because sooner or later I would have to.

Q: Since you work for us we have to discuss them.

A: That's why I said if that would happen if I would create a job.

Q: But no one is holding your job up.

A: Because for a couple of months....I do have somebody....obviously they would get somebody from the States unless I don't get another job. That was my question, I'm honest. Damn questions, and the final result is nobody understands you.

Q: OK, but you have to look at it from our side and you come to Mr. [REDACTED] and say you work for Yugoslavian Intelligence. Are we going to just drop it there?

A: I thought you knew, gentlemen, maybe I shocked you or surprised you, but I thought you definitely knew.

Q: Well, you must know from being in Europe that not always are things passed from one country to another.

A: Well, anyhow, I thought based on my Yugoslavian standpoint, that if somebody were to apply for a job with the Army, automatically his name would be passed to the authorities. To make the necessary follow-up. Automatically.

Q: You'd think so, but that always doesn't happen.

A: Well, obviously it does not, but I thought you knew. You see. As I applied for a job. I really don't know any secrets that way. I know that I worked, you know, and it would be worse if I would work and finally you would find out that I did. On my application form I put down titles, you know, and no reaction. So I said OK, the guys know everything, so what?

Q: When did you go....

A: Unless the guy came, the gentleman came, and I said OK, I understand your work, you know, I did the same. Then he was shocked.

Q: When did you go to the school? What years?

A: When? I'm going to make some notes in English, you know. So believe me I definitely would do your job just because of that interrogation. Because in the final effect if some people are going to decide that I do present some type of unacceptable security risk, let's say, they're going to fire me anyhow.

Q: Maybe, maybe not.

A: Well.

Q: Do you think you're a security risk? Are you scared?

A: Well, If I would be in your situation, yes, I would fire a guy. But most probably my people down there (Yugoslavia) would do the same.

Q: What makes you think...I already told you I'm not really concerned with whether you work or not. It's just as fine with me if you work as if you don't. Your job's not at stake here. We just want to know the details of your background.

A: But just because I'm working for Americans.

Q: You work for us.

A: So supposing I wouldn't.

Q: If you worked for the Germans, they're going to come and ask you the same things.

A: They did.

Q: Well, they may here locally. And if you're not working for the Americans the Germans will probably withdraw your pass to be here. You'll have no job, no employment to stay. You already know that.

A: No. We know the rules.

Q: If you're unemployed they'll throw you out of the country, right?

A: I'm not going to be unemployed, never.

Q: You're what?

A: I'm never going to be unemployed. Because I'm ready to accept any type of job.

Q: Laboring?

A: Whatever. I did that in the past.

Q: You like your job now though, right?

A: It's a job, that's it, I guess.

Q: Pay's good?

A: Not necessarily.

Q: You dress pretty nice. It must pay fairly well.

A: How much do they pay you?

Q: Like what, a thousand dollars a month?

A: What, clear?

Q: Yes.

A: I beg your pardon.

Q: How much do you clear a month?

A: What do you think?

Q: I'd say about a thousand.

A: Dollars? I beg your pardon. I wish I would.

Q: How much do you make?

A: Do you know that I'm single? You do know. Do you know how much the taxes are if you are single in Germany? About one third of everything. What I make clear is about 800.

Q: \$800 clear a month and you've got no car, no other expenses.

A: No.

Q: Send any money home or anything?

A: To whom?

Q: That's what I say. So you have about \$800 a month clear. That's a lot of money even in Germany.

A: I've got people in my office that make more than me.

Q: Oh, yeah.

A: Only what they are, are lower grades.

Q: But the pay's good, right? It's a good secure job, regular hours, weekends off?

A: Who says that? I worked yesterday (Sunday). Don't have enough people.

Q: You're shorthanded, is that what you're saying? We all do that.

A: No, you see, if you think Germans would kick me out of the country because I don't have a job, as I said, I would get a job immediately. I would be a waiter or bartender.

Q: Then you are aware of the fact that if you don't have a job, you can't stay? You know that don't you?

A: No, that's not true.

Q: It's not true?

A: You see, I'm considered as....I'm not a recognized refugee. They're still proving that.

Q: They're still proving that you are not a recognized refugee?

A: Yeah, I'm not. Didn't you know that?

Q: What are you?

A: They refuse to recognize me as a refugee.

Q: What do they recognize you as?

A: It depends on what you understand as a recognized refugee. As a recognized refugee you get a permit to stay in the whole Germany.

Q: So what have you got?

A: So if I would be a recognized refugee, I definitely would not work for Army.

Q: Why not?

A: And I would not be in Kaiserslautern, because I do not like the place.

Q: So you're being here is dependent on your job with the United States.

A: Is dependent on my residence permit, first. I have to stay in Kaiserslautern. And so since I have to stay in Kaiserslautern, I have to find a job in Kaiserslautern. And the situation in K-town means that I have to find a job with the Army. So supposing I wouldn't work for an Army, I would go to an employment office and try to find

another job. If I couldn't, I would tell the guys, Hey, let me go to Frankfurt, a residence permit for Frankfurt.

Q: And they'd just do that for you?

A: They would have to do it for everybody. Otherwise they would have to support me. And as they finally don't decide that I am not a refugee, and that could take up to seven, eight years....

Q: Isn't it possible that they could deport you from the country?

A: Not under that circumstances. Unless I don't have this paper here. (Residence Permit)

Q: Could I see it?

A: Of course.

Q: I think you showed me that last time, didn't you?

A: Did I? Because there are thousands of people in my status who don't work. They don't want to work. Because you get support from German authorities. I'm just working because I don't want to be supported because, you know,....

Q: Well, no one is trying to take away your job right now, but you have to look at it from our side. We would like to know what kind of background you've had, just for our own knowledge, because right now we don't know whether you are currently working for the Yugoslavs.

A: As I said, I wanted to clarify my situation here, as I said, I do understand that you would like to get some information on the Yugoslavian system, organizations of different services, things like that. If that is the purpose of that conversation here now what actually is a part of a....this conversation here. But as I said, in the final stage the guy who loses the mine, I always lose.

Q: If they were going to fire you, then you'd be fired already. And we wouldn't waste all this time.

A: Let's say, like that, you know, as well as I do, if you'd fire me then you wouldn't have any chance to get any information. Now you still have chances to get information since you did not fire me yet.

Q: You came to him with this information.

A: Yeah, definitely it is.

Q: We're just following up what you told him so that we can get the entire story. If we were just interested in just getting rid of you, you'd be already gone. We have no reason to fire you. We just want the complete story. That's one thing we haven't had the opportunity to go through yet. In our short visits. When you get a little bit here, a little bit there....

A: Can you imagine how afraid I was down in Yugoslavia since I didn't know what was reported down in Germany? And this stupid guy came to the police by myself. As I didn't know what type of information the guys held down there.

■ You've never been in that situation. That's why you don't understand that. As I told the guys I never talk to Germans about anything. I actually did been talking for two months. Supposedly they would have some people providing them with information. It's not a big deal in Germany these days to discover somebody providing Eastern countries with information so why shouldn't the Yugoslavs have information that I actually talked to German intelligence service and that I provided them with that and that information that I was not supposed to. You try to understand that? Can you understand that today I am talking to you again and two months later I am back to Yugoslavia supposedly not because I would like to go but supposedly because I am going to be kicked out. And the guys are going to say, Hey, first you promised not to leave the country and you did, and what did you do, you went exactly to Germany again, and what did you do there, you worked for Americans and besides that you talked

to them. That's a nice story.

Q: What would they do to you?

A: What would they do? You know, Yugoslavia is not always the same country as here. Well, differences anyhow. Not everything is OK here in Germany, but at least they cannot accuse you that you did something or put you in prison just to keep your mouth shut.

Q: They don't do that or they do do that?

A: They do positively do that.

Q: They do for sure?

A: Oh, for sure.

Q: Is that what you're afraid of as far as going back?

A: Yeah.

Q: You've been in prison there before?

A: Exactly.

Q: How long were you in prison?

A: Two years.

Q: Two years? When was that?

A: Alone. Isolated.

Q: When was it?

A: '76, no 1974 to 1976 and was kicked out of the country.

Q: How did you wind up being in prison?

A: That is a good question.

Q: What lead up to it?

A: I don't want to talk about everything. Pertaining to that stuff.

Q: Would like a cup of coffee?

A: No, thank you. I don't drink coffee. Now that you know that you don't misunderstand me, that I'm not willing to cooperate. I'm just....Maybe I don't have as much experience as you gentlemen have. I know the methods. The people who are working, there is not a big difference. The theoretical.

Q: Well, we are not planning to deport you. So you can relax on that count.

A: Well, I cannot.

Q: In fact as far as we know, if you turn out to be a good guy and you tell us everything you know....

A: What difference, they are going to kick me out, so what. Who's going to help me?

Q: Have you ever thought of moving to the United States?

A: I never thought about it. I actually was afraid of the States because....

Q: Are you sure? You never asked anybody about it? You never told anybody you wanted to go to the United States?

A: Well, that was before as I wanted to leave the country; as I had to leave the country.

Q: Why do you have to leave the country? You just told me you could stay here as long as you want?

A: I mean Yugoslavia said I never....The Germans asked me if I wanted to go to the United States, so I did contact several consulates to see what the possibilities are to go to the United States. I contacted a Yugoslavian originally as I still was working for my service. But you see, that was years ago and I really did not care where I am going. I just wanted to go.

Q: Well, to go to the United States you have to have a sponsor. You must have asked somebody if you had expressed an interest. Did you ask anybody to sponsor you?

A: No.

Q: Are you sure?

A: Well, I asked. What is to ask? Oh, yeah, I did ask a couple of guys. I talked to them about the fact that I needed a sponsor. There is even a guy who offered to be a sponsor. But you never know if the people would sponsor you or if...That is a big deal. It is a big decision to say I am going to sponsor a guy if you don't know him.

Q: Yes, they are responsible for him.

A: Yeah, but you see, the same in Germany I have a guy who will sponsor me.

Q: That's your lawyer.

A: Yeah.

Q: What's his name?

A: [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED]

A: Yeah, he's famous.

Q: Here in Kaiserslautern? He has a daughter, doesn't he?

A: Yeah, I been living at her place.

Q: You are living with his daughter?

A: I was living there.

Q: You were living with the daughter?

A: Yeah, not with the lady, I mean, she is married. But I had a room.

Q: With her?

A: In her house, yeah.

Q: What was the address there?

A: [REDACTED]

Q: Pardon me?

A: [REDACTED]

Q: And the number?

A: [REDACTED]

Q: [REDACTED] Where are you living now? What is the address?

A: You mean me? A second residence? I had two residences. Didn't you know that? You didn't know. You disappoint me.

Q: Are you familiar with the United States?

A: Vaguely.

Q: It would be a lot nicer to be in the United States.

A: I tell you something I always said frankly. I always liked you Americans. I had a good impression. People in Yugoslavia, especially young people, they definitely have sympathy for the United States. What our government doesn't like at all. Or does not always like.

Q: With your linguistic capabilities you could have an awful lot of opportunities in the United States. Americans aren't known for their abilities with foreign languages.

A: I tell you something, the simple reason that I'm here in Germany, I don't care where I would be. I just want to live in peace.

Q: Well, like Mr. [REDACTED] said, he is not threatening you with losing your job or anything like that. Do you have anything of interest to us?

A: And that I am actually sorry as I told you that nobody from the old people was in Munich as I talked to the Germans. Because I been talking to that people for two months. Providing them with everything, you know.

Q: Unfortunately somethings that you told them didn't turn out to be true. Some of what you told me is not necessarily true.

A: When I provided to the Germans, as I told you, they were not in a position to guarantee me that afterwards they were going to provide me with a residency permit for Germany. So how.....



Q: So you lied to them? So then you tell me another thing and it doesn't jive and I say [REDACTED] is not telling the truth somewhere.

A: But, you see, they should have expected that. They are professionals.

Q: So am I.

A: That's the deal. So you see...

Q: So I want to know what the truth is, you see...

A: So that's what I told you in the beginning. That's why I wanted to clarify my status in the beginning.

Q: Here's your golden opportunity to do that.

A: Because I told you that if you don't have anything to offer me...

Q: Oh, in other words, you want me to...

A: I'm not asking give me money; I don't know what to do for me. I just asked the guys to afterwards be fair, not to kick me out. Because afterwards I'm going to be in danger.

Q: That's fair.

A: And they were not in the situation. They were not in position to guarantee that. So what they must calculate the risk that what I can tell will not be too dangerous for me afterwards. Supposing the Yugoslavs find out that I did talk, I could say, Hey guys, you see, the information that I provided the Germans, that is nothing. Don't you see that I didn't want to provide the information to them.

Q: You told them some lies.

A: I had to play that card.

Q: And you told me the same lies. And then you tell me something different.

A: No, I didn't talk to you. I didn't talk to you yet.

Q: You have in some parts. Some of the things you told me, where you were, times you were in jail, didn't jive, and your trip to Switzerland that you didn't want to tell me about.

A: Well, we never officially had a conversation.

Q: That's right. That's what we're doing right now.

A: We never officially had a conversation. That's why I asked right at the beginning what my status is.

Q: And I told you, you have your job.

A: And I told you....

Q: As long as you continue to cooperate, you will have your job. And there will be no problems and nobody is going to tell the Yugoslavians. Do they know where you are at?

A: Who?

Q: The Yugoslavians?

A: Do they know that I'm here? I don't think so.

Q: OK, I'm not planning on telling them.

A: Well, you see, let's talk like people that understand something about business. If you have people in Yugoslavia providing you with information, we do have people. Most probably that provides us with information. So who can guarantee me that....

Q: I don't know if you have any people over here or not.

A: It does not necessarily have to be here. Does not necessarily have to be Yugoslav people. You know that cooperation.

Q: That could happen whether or not you talk to us or not. Just the fact that you work for the United States.

A: That's true, that's true. But supposing that I'm going to have to go back to Yugoslavia. I'm a dumb guy again.

Q: But on the other side, as it stands right now, you are fighting having to go back. Right?

A: Right.

Q: Because you have a job with us, you cooperate with us, then the United States through your employment is trying to keep you here, then I don't think the Germans are going to throw you out.

A: Well supposing it won't or supposing anyhow you would like to keep me here, but the Germans say no, we don't give you the residence permit any more.

Q: It doesn't work that way.

A: Of course it does work. It works another way, too,...

Q: As long as you have a job here, the Germans won't throw you out of the country.

A: Oh, so why didn't they want to let me in afterwards since I went to Switzerland?

Q: Say what?

A: Why didn't they want to let me in?

Q: The Germans?

A: Yes.

Q: Because your pass said you weren't supposed to....

A: No. My pass says that I am supposed to travel.

Q: We know from the people here that they've given it to you in black and white that you are supposed to stay in Kaiserslautern.

A: I didn't know that.

Q: That you work here and live here.

A: I didn't know that.

Q: Do you have papers that say that?

A: And still...

Q: The day after I talked to you, you got on a train and you went to Switzerland. You gave me some story about going to the refugee center. What did you do in Switzerland?

A: I told you a story about a refugee center?

Q: Yeah, that's what you told me. You said you had an appointment with the refugee center there.

A: No.

Q: That's what you told me.

A: That is a misunderstanding. You always should have a tape recorder with you. Why should I explain to you some dumb stories. The refugee center is in Switzerland.

Q: That's what you told me.

A: Did I say something about the refugees? Yeah, you see what I told you. Oh, no. It just said I am not authorized to go to Switzerland and am confined to Kaiserslautern area. I said supposing I have to go to the refugee center, to Zinsdorf, what I had to go but not on that day.

Q: What is your status in Switzerland?

A: Before that.

Q: What is your status in Switzerland?

A: Let me finish that. That misunderstanding. I said if I have to go to the refugee center at Zinsdorf, so if I am confined to the Kaiserslautern area, why did they tell me to go there on the 9th of February 1977?

Q: Why did you go down there a couple of months ago?

A: You mean to Switzerland? I had my birthday. And I was not intending to go to Switzerland.

Q: You had your birthday?

A: Yeah, on the [REDACTED]. And that's the time I went to Switzerland. I didn't want to go to Switzerland.

Q: Yeah, but you wound up in Switzerland?

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A: Yeah, because I got out of the train too late, and it's a damn situation down there.  
 Q: I'm not familiar with it. How does it work?  
 A: Well, if you go down to the south of Germany by train and there is a terminal in Basel that still is Germany. But if you still go one station further, you are....  
 Q: And that is how you would up in Switzerland?  
 A: Yes, that is exactly how it happened. And you see if a guy would have to hide something I would never present my passport to the German guy on the border.  
 Q: Where were you heading when you wound up by accident in Switzerland?  
 A: I was in Switzerland, in the Swiss territory.  
 Q: I mean where were you going? What was your destination?  
 A: You mean as I was going down to the south? Luedoch . That's a city down on the border. Because I know one lady working a gasthaus who took care about me from about the year '74 as I came to Germany for the first time and I promised when I got a job here and things were fine I would come to see her. That was my purpose.  
 Q: Was this like a fiance? A girlfriend, or something?  
 A: No, it was an old lady who has a gasthaus and she knew my status. Because of several people coming across the border.  
 Q: And you were going down to visit her and stay a couple of days?  
 A: And tell her that everything is fine. I finally did have a job, and I was living in Germany.  
 Q: So you are on the train and missed the cut-off for the station? What stop should you have gotten off at? For that town? Was the town right on the railroad?  
 A: Yeah.  
 Q: And the name of it was what?  
 A: Luedoch. It is not on the way. You have to get off the train. It is at Basel, but it is German Territory, and one station more, it says Basel again, but it is Swiss territory.  
 Q: So you would up crossing the border?  
 A: It has a French territory, too. Yes, in a train.  
 Q: Then what happened?  
 A: Well, what happened? I stayed there a couple of hours, almost one day.  
 Q: Then you tried to come back?  
 A: Yeah, of course. Officially.  
 Q: And that's when you had the problem?  
 A: Uh-huh.  
 Q: When you tried to come back?  
 A: Yes. Officially. As I came back to the border to the railway station where I was supposed to get out of the train, you know. I just...  
 Q: That doesn't make sense, [REDACTED].  
 A: What doesn't make sense?  
 Q: You wanted to get off at one stop to go visit your friend; you over-shot it into Switzerland; you got off and spend the day running around Switzerland.  
 A: Of course, then you say I'm here in Switzerland, so what?  
 Q: Yeah, but you know you are not supposed to be in Switzerland.  
 A: Exactly, that's it.  
 Q: So you spent the whole day running around Switzerland?  
 A: Of course, what would you do? Present your passport again?  
 Q: I'd be booking out of the country ASAP.  
 A: How?  
 Q: On the train. The same way I came in.

A: They are going to control you.  
 Q: Wouldn't it have been better....  
 A: You see, that was a dumb situation. I had to unless it's going to be dark at least to get across the border.  
 Q: Wouldn't you have been safer to have stayed on the train and said, Conductor, I missed my stop. I want to go back?  
 A: Conductor?  
 Q: Or whoever?  
 A: No. Not necessarily.  
 Q: It would have been more plausible for you to stay on the train when you knew you made a mistake rather than leaving the train to spend the day there and then try to get back? You made it worse.  
 A: Believe me, I don't trust any authorities at all.  
 Q: But you had to deal with the authorities any way, didn't you?  
 A: That's true, and that's why I don't trust any authorities at all.  
 Q: What did you do during the day in Switzerland? Who'd you meet with?  
 A: Nobody.  
 Q: You didn't see anybody. Didn't meet with anybody you know.  
 A: No.  
 Q: You didn't see anybody. Didn't meet with anybody you know.  
 A: No.  
 Q: You're sure about that?  
 A: I'm positive.  
 Q: Didn't see a single friend or associate?  
 A: I don't want to see any friends or associates in Switzerland.  
 Q: You didn't meet anybody?  
 A: Except the people I used to live with.  
 Q: OK. Who was it that you went to see that you used to live with that you saw that day in Switzerland?  
 A: On that day? I didn't see anybody on that day.  
 Q: You didn't see a soul?  
 A: No.  
 Q: You didn't visit with anybody? Have dinner with anybody?  
 A: Not on that day, no.  
 Q: Was there another day?  
 A: Yeah, I went to Switzerland a couple of times before.  
 Q: OK, so on that trip, nothing. No contact? You didn't call anybody either?  
 A: Yeah, I did call my lawyer in Germany and explain to him the story.  
 Q: What did he do?  
 A: Well, he contacted German authorities and told me what to do.  
 Q: So, that's the only person you contacted.  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: No one in Switzerland?  
 A: No.  
 Q: These friends in Switzerland that you had seen before, when had you seen them?  
 A: Oh, no.  
 Q: OK, you wanted us to talk to you like everyone knows what is going on. Now look at it from our side. If you're going to have a meeting with someone you're going to have it in a third country. Right? So it makes....  
 A: That's why I would like to meet a resident, a person being in a third country, that's true.  
 Q: OK, that's why it looks a little curious from our side.  
 A: But that would be too dumb. That would be too dumb.

Don't you see that? To go to Switzerland when I know or can assume that everybody is monitoring me. How can I go to Switzerland? Jesus Christ.

Q: You did.

A: But I didn't want to. You see.

Q: But if I had to do the same thing I would come up with the same story as to why I had to go. It was a mistake. I didn't know why I went in there.

A: Would you do that? That would be big mistake. I wouldn't do it. I wouldn't like anybody to know that I went to Switzerland at all. If I would like to contact somebody and tell the guy what you are assuming that I got in touch with military intelligence. What's my instructions?

Q: Some time ago, [REDACTED], you were in Switzerland with a man in a room. The police came and you were arrested. Do you want to tell me where and when?

A: What? What?

Q: Yes, that is what the Swiss say.

A: I was arrested?

Q: Weren't you arrested in Switzerland?

A: No, not under that circumstances.

Q: What circumstances were you arrested under?

A: Arrested?

Q: Or detained by the police?

A: 6:30 in the morning as I wanted to go to work.

Q: OK, were you living in Switzerland?

A: Yeah. Officially.

Q: When was this?

A: '73.

Q: 1973?

A: Oh, let me see. That's was 29, I never forget a date. The 29th of April, or 30th. No, it was not May.

Q: You were going to work? You're working?

A: Yeah.

Q: Where were you working?

A: An insurance company.

Q: Which one?

A: Zurich Insurance Company.

Q: Zurich Insurance Company. And you were living with someone else?

A: No. I was living in an old house of an old lady, 96 years old or something.

Q: Who else was in the room?

A: Nobody else.

Q: OK, and what happened when the police came?

A: You see, they....Nothing, they just opened the door. They ringed the doorbell down there.

Q: OK, then what?

A: Then they told me to go with them.

Q: Yes. Why?

A: They didn't say why.

Q: They took you in and they never told you why?

A: Well, yes, afterwards they told me. Since they didn't want me to...leave the country because I was...I promised them to do that.

Q: You promised them to leave the country?

A: Yes, and they gave me the papers to leave the country.

Q: Where did the papers say you were to go?

A: Nothing, they just told that I was authorized to re-enter into Switzerland within a period of one year, if no country was going to be willing to accept me.

Q: So did they deport you?

A: They did not deport me. They couldn't. Because they took the paper. You know, like that garbage.

Q: What prompted them to pick you up? You were not supposed to be in Switzerland, was that the reason?

A: No. I applied for asylum in Switzerland and they refused asylum twice, but I still had a bunch of possibilities to appeal. And that's what they didn't like. So I told them, OK, Gentlemen, I'm going to leave the country, but I don't have paper. I don't have passport officially to go across the border. So they said they were going to give me some papers and they gave me a paper. That's true.

Q: So is this when they picked you up?

A: Oh, that was before. One month before. And afterwards as I got a paper I still didn't leave. Because I had a damn good job there. And I said, you know, I still have some good possibilities to appeal. And that's when the guys made upset.

Q: Did you ever contact Swiss intelligence and offer to sell then information?

A: No, they contacted me automatically as they....debriefing as I came down and applied for asylum.

Q: OK, you applied for asylum and they did you like we did? Brought you into a room and started asking you questions?

A: Yeah, that's exactly the same procedure.

Q: And what did you say?

A: And the same situation happened with the Germans and the same situation is going on now with the Americans. I'm getting tired of that. Just because I...

Q: Your past is kind of rough to go with, you know. It's not like you grew up on a farm somewhere and you're innocent. You were trained by the police, you worked for the police there, and poof, you're over here all of a sudden and people agree to arrange meetings with you and visit and take information and you don't show up for meetings. And they wonder just what is going on, what kind of person you are.

A: When was that?

Q: A number of times. With the Americans. You never met with the Americans.

A: Oh.

Q: They sent you addresses in the mail and you never showed up.

A: Who did not show up?

Q: You didn't show up.

A: I did show up.

Q: They say you didn't.

A: Well, you see, of course they are going to say I did not. But they did not show up. Oh, hell.

Q: Didn't they have an alternate place?

A: No. That makes me upset.

Q: They had no alternate sites?

A: They did not show up. That makes me upset, this conversation right now.

Q: Where was this...

A: Because that was definitely not true. Definitely somebody provided you with damn information.

Q: Well, OK, that's the reason for this meeting, because what you've said and what they've said, don't jive.

A: They gave me addresses and I contacted them on the address and I came to the place the way it was arranged, stayed there for three days, extended for three days, and nobody showed up.

Q: That was in Switzerland?

A: That was in Austria.

Q: In Austria. Where in Austria?

A: In Philoch , Park Hotel, didn't you know that?

Q: OK, and that was in Austria?

A: Yes, and I went to the consulate afterwards and said, Hey, listen. I took a risk, went to Austria, and nobody came. So the guy told me to go to Belgrade to the embassy and that's what I did. Risked again and went to Belgrade. Come on.

Q: Well, that's not our organization that you're talking about. Something isn't...

A: And then our guys asked me about that trip to Belgrade. They were not sure but they assumed that I went to Belgrade. And they asked me if I did contact the embassy.

Q: Which embassy? The American embassy?

A: Certainly. And the guy in the consulate in Yugoslavia told me to go there and say such and such and that's what I did. And nobody reacted. No reaction. Then I go to Milan and nothing happened again. I was in Paris in your consulate, too, don't you know that? And nothing happened.

Q: We have no record of that.

A: And I was prostituted. And besides that, as I told you, I had some papers that might be interesting for you to see, that I risked.

Q: And that was what year?

A: '72. '73.

Q: While you're going to the police school?

A: Yeah, I was working, right?

Q: Why do you think American intelligence would be interested in a police department?

A: It was not a police department. The papers that I wanted to present to them.

Q: OK, what were the papers that you wanted to present that were of interest to the Americans?

A: Some military papers. Organizations plans for the police and state security forces in a case of war.

Q: So in time of war, these plans told where the police department were to go, how they would react? That's all they were?

A: I don't know. I didn't see the papers. You would have to open and close them again.

Q: You knew what they were though when you took them.

A: Roughly. Roughly, yeah.

Q: You had to pull them out of the file?

A: Not I. I did not.

Q: Then how did you know what they were?

A: The people did.

Q: What people are you talking about?

A: My friends.

Q: Your friends? So you were running as a courier between your friends and American Intelligence.

A: Yes. Exactly.

Q: In other words, they gave you the papers and said, Bob,...

A: Because I had several reason to hate our guys down there. Because they made my life difficult. That's the reason that I'm still sitting here, you know discussing to you and to everybody....

Q: So they set you up?

A: What do you mean they set me up?

Q: They set you up. They gave you the papers. They said, Bob, go to the American consulate in Austria and...

A: No. No, I did that by myself.

Q: But they helped you.

A: Yes, of course. Not everybody in Yugoslavia, as I told you, does necessarily agree with system, as such. Not everybody.

Q: OK, who are the friends you are talking about?

A: The people who are working...who used to work for, I don't know if they are still working. In police forces, in intelligence, whatever. I don't know where all the people are working now.

Q: Was this an attempt on your part to establish your bonafides to us?

A: Yeah, exactly. That was it.

Q: Do you still have these contacts that you had before?

A: No. I don't. I might establish these contacts again. I don't know if the people are still working in the same positions, you know, no slightest idea. But I'm.... That case I'd have to have a strong interest.

Q: Could you provide good things for us if you wanted to? Do you still have the capability?

A: Yeah, I could, I think.

Q: Could you just summarize what you could provide us if you wanted to?

A: Things change so far. Believe me, it's been six years.

Q: You're going to have to tell us a little more than....So far you've been talking all the way around the circle and you haven't come to the middle. I'd kind of like like you to sit and....Fact that's what Mr. [REDACTED] trying to get you to do....Let's talk, if you have something that you'd like to provide to the United States, or....

A: The reason that I was able and willing to provide you with information was that I told you everybody is not satisfied with the situation in Yugoslavia. There are a bunch of people as is such. They don't like the way of....Let's say that everybody can see what is going to happen after that Tito dies. The Communist party being too strong, you know, stories like that. And many people have sympathy for the United States, the way of living there, democracy, that type of open democracy. Especially young people, if they see that there is something that they can do against that situation down there, they're going to do it. So it was on that basis....Besides that the guys, police forces where I worked, wanted me to go into a service where I didn't want to go and they didn't want me to do a job that I wanted to do. And that's what I didn't agree. And afterwards they started to make me troubles as I quit the job and tried to find another employment, they made me difficulties all the time. So, I said, OK, guys, that's enough.

Q: What kind of work were you doing?

A: What I wanted to do? I just wanted to work in a laboratory. You know, some investigation of traces, whatever.

Q: A paper job?

A: Not a paper job.

Q: A desk job?

A: Not a desk job. Everything, microscopes, you know analyze anything.

Q: OK, a regular lab. Forensic science?

A: Yeah.

Q: And what kind of job were you stuck doing? That you didn't like.

A: They wanted to, they wanted me to work in state security. That would be a translation of an organization.

Q: And what kind of work were you doing?

A: Lab. Different.

Q: What kind of work were you doing?

A: Everything.

Q: What is there....

A: Everything.

Q: Tell me some of the things....

A: Being responsible for safety of some politicians, if they wanted me to.

Q: Being a body guard?



A: Body guard, I was doing. Following some, you know, some suspicious guys, you know, providing information, sitting there.

Q: Surveillance?

A: Yeah, and stuff like that.

Q: Anything intelligence related? Did you pass secrets or look at documents? Or go out and talk guys into working for Yugoslavia?

A: No, I was too young. Besides that, I didn't want to work, so how should they task me with such duties?

Q: Your only job was that of a body guard and running surveillance?

A: Yeah.

Q: Anything else?

A: No. That was it.

Q: OK, did you investigate people, you know, ring doorbells and ask somebody what they thought of so and so?

A: We don't do that. You're going to be surprised.

Q: You don't check people out for security clearances?

A: Not in that way.

Q: You don't ask people questions?

A: We have complete different methods.

Q: Well, how do they do it over there? I don't understand. That's the common way of doing it, everywhere. Everybody asks who knows him, you know.

A: Obviously not. I personally was shocked about your ways of checking people. Because, you know, everybody in the house knows clearances, people from military intelligence are getting some information. We don't do that like that in Yugoslavia.

Q: How do they do it there?

A: It is a type of....

Q: Covert?

A: Covert, yeah.

Q: You go out and you spy on them?

A: Yeah.

Q: Just follow them around for a while?

A: Follow them around for a while, try to get in touch with them in the pubs, clubs, you know. The places they go.

Q: Is that what you were involved in?

A: Yes. A couple of times.

Q: Were you ever dispatched outside of Yugoslavia? You never had a collection mission?

A: No. But I knew a couple of guys that had.

Q: Were these some of your friends?

A: School friends.

Q: The ones that gave you information to take to the West?

A: Oh, no. That wouldn't be a job for the state security. That would be a job for the state department. They have their own intelligence service, too. Called UID. You know that.

Q: So your job really wasn't all that much. You went out and....

A: No. I never tried to...to make it important. To say it had importance.

Q: How did you get in touch with these guys that had access to military secrets?

A: Well, these are the friends that did have such jobs. Because they been working on that fields.

Q: OK, but they were assigned to your office, too, then?

A: No.

Q: But how did you meet them?

A: We were school friends. Do you understand, we were school friends.

Q: From junior college?

A: Yes. From the police college.

Q: So they went on their side, the overt, the offensive? And you were in sort of counterintelligence.

A: They worked in different areas because that police college is a type of college where they recruited people. They select the people. They say, OK, guys, you're suitable for that. They are directed, you know. To different fields. All the services do recruit people from that college.

Q: Do you remember their names?

A: Oh, yeah, I do remember a couple of names.

Q: Do you think they may have ever contacted the Americans themselves? If they did, we can check and see if they're still around and if they still work there. Do these people want to defect?

A: I'm sorry, I didn't understand that question.

Q: Did they want to come over to the other side themselves? These people that provided you with this information?

A: No. No.

Q: They were just doing it, giving it to you as a favor for you to get out?

A: No, they didn't know that either. I would say on a patriotic basis. Just because of the political situation in Yugoslavia and not being satisfied with the political situation in Yugoslavia. And not agreeing that the Communist party be so strong. Yugoslavia is going the Russian way. Just on that basis, I would say.

Q: But they must have known that you were going to provide....

A: And some disappointments. You know the reasons why somebody can cooperate with somebody.

Q: But they were providing you with information that they knew you were going to provide to the West. But they don't want to move. They want to stay where they are?

A: Yeah.

Q: Would they like to work in place?

A: Yes.

Q: These people would be willing to work for us?

A: Yes.

Q: Through you? Are you still able to contact them?

A: That's a good question. I told you, I would have to have reasons. Because that would be a big damn reason.

Q: If you had reasons?

A: I would contact them.

Q: Could they provide current information of interest to us?

A: Yes, if they are working in that field, probably they could.

Q: What did they have access to when you left?

A: I know a couple of guys that officially had clearances of any type, political like. And no doubt about it, nobody would say, Hey, it's a security risk. And the people climbing up there, I had some people going to the police academy afterwards. Four guys.

Q: These guys that you knew when you left and had contact with, what did they have access to? What kind of information?

A: That's a long story, but anyhow, the guy that actually had an access, has a girlfriend that has access. And, you know, she would provide him with information.

Q: These KGB types, you know, equivalent of KGB?

A: What do you consider as KGB type? KGB is what I consider as not similar to our state security, it would be similar to our state department intelligence service. But it would be KGB types of information, yeah.

Q: Would they have knowledge of agents, that are outside of Yugoslavia in covert positions?

A: It's a question they would have the names, but most probably they would have the contact names. Or address, or whatever.

Q: So they could give information that could help us to possibly surface agents that are outside of Yugoslavia.

A: Yugoslav agents?

Q: Yeah. Run by Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.

A: Yeah. Because a couple of guys went to Belgrade afterwards which is a federal, you know.

Q: Do you still maintain contact with those guys, postcards?

A: No, I told you, I don't want anybody to know that I'm here.

Q: But what about these guys? They're your friends, right?

A: They are my friends and that's what hurts always when you leave a country, you lose a couple of good guys. And afterwards you go to a certain country and they make you get out again. Then you say forget it.

Q: Do you know any Yugoslavian representatives of the government here in Germany?

A: What do you consider as a representative of the government? Does it have to be a diplomat?

Q: Anybody. Anybody that works in that business. Overt or covert. It doesn't have to be, embassy people obviously aren't....

A: I don't know right now. As I said, in the year '74 when the Germans kicked me out as Americans, as I said, did not contact me, I didn't want to contact anybody and actually didn't contact anybody since '74. And you have to understand....

Q: But you knew who they were in '74.

A: I knew a couple of guys here, yes. They were supposed to go to Germany.

Q: Are they still around? Do you remember their names and where they went?

A: Yeah, I remember the name of one guy. I gave that to the Germans, now I don't know what came out of that.

Q: Why don't you give it to us again and we'll check it out? If it's right then we have something to go on. Maybe you're giving us some accurate data.

A: If somebody made a mistake, it definitely was not me.

Q: Well, if you're want to cooperate and you're sincere we'll work with you, but I want to make damn sure before I say anything that you're telling me the truth.

A: I think it's definitely too late, gentlemen.

Q: Definitely what?

A: Too many things happened since this time.

Q: Sometimes it's better to have a time period between.

A: I would understand everything, but not that they kick me out of the country as they promised me not to do so.

Q: Yeah, but wouldn't you, if you were in their position, be a little bit concerned about someone who presents himself with all this information. I mean, if someone presents himself to Yugoslavian intelligence....

A: That's never happened to you?

Q: Of course, and you're a little bit concerned.

A: Concerned, yes, but you don't kick out the guy afterwards. You definitely don't. They give you some guarantees telling you you can stay here, here are your papers and now go ahead.

Q: You were dealing with the Germans.

A: That was not a deal. I just wanted to handle my life, that was all. I was willing to explain what I could.

Q: You've got to keep in mind, we want to know if what you're saying is true.

A: Well, you see, I spent two, I spent in a prison two years and that was too much.

And since that time I hate Germans, as is such, believe me, although I am here, I do hate the people.

Q: What prison were you in?

A: In Yugoslavia. I was alone, isolated from other people.

Q: What prison?

A: You mean a name of the prison? Well, it was up in my republic.

Q: Which is?

A: Slovinia . I come from most part of Yugoslavia.

Q: Could you spell that? And the dates that you were there? OK, the Yugoslavians have people today surface in the West that are supposedly trying to defect that are actually being controlled by the Yugoslavians, right?

A: Yeah, that's true.

Q: Now when that....when anyone comes forward with good information, people wonder whether or not they are actually being controlled by the Yugoslavians.

A: Yeah, that's true. They're not propogated. I know what you mean. But you always have to take a risk.

Q: Right.

A: That you did not.

Q: That the Germans did not?

A: That you did not, either.

Q: OK, you have one story as to what happened, when you tried to contact us; they have another story.

A: And we are here to find out the true story. My story is the true one.

Q: Right now you are talking with us. With the US Army. That maybe the Army is interested in your information. We asked to speak with you.

A: Yeah, I am talking again to another service. I do understand. No service in the world is going to say, OK, we did not contact the guy because we forgot or we didn't want to, or we found it was a risk, or whatever provocation. Nobody is going to say that. Especially if afterwards, you would prove that the information was useful and was current. And I'm assuming that's what happened to me in my case.

Q: Did you actually provide....

A: Definitely going to say, Well, the guy did not contact us. That is not true.

Q: Yeah, well, I'm not saying that you're a liar because they've screwed up before. OK? But right now we're talking about a different time. What information did you actually provide?

A: What I actually provided? I provided information to the consulate in Saarbreck, that was the register of code names for diplomatic car controls....

Q: License numbers.

A: License numbers.

Q: For the diplomatic cars? OK and where were the diplomatic cars? Cars in the West driven by diplomats?

A: No. Cars in our country driven by diplomats.

Q: OK, and they were the standard license numbers on their private owned cars and stuff?

A: Yeah, it was just a register of code words, just as I said.

Q: Of code words?

A: Yes.

Q: I don't understand what you're getting at. Code words.

A: Ciphers. Does that mean anything to you?

Q: Yes. For communications?

A: Yes. For communications.

Q: How extensive a list was it?

A: Well, it was a beginning of a big list, but I couldn't provide all the list in time. Just the list that pertained to our republic. And I told the consul that I was going to give him some more.  
 Q: Who was the consul at the time?  
 A: The name I wrote down last time.  
 Q: OK, the one we've got on file.  
 A: He was the only good guy I met so far. At least I got the impression he was OK.  
 Q: OK.  
 A: He trusted me and that was OK, although it was too dangerous to contact him in the consulate at the time.  
 Q: Where was he at? He was out of the country at that time. Or he was the American in Belgrade, I think you said?  
 A: No. He was the guy working in the consulate as vice-consul in Saarbeck, in Kirchheim.  
 Q: OK.  
 A: And I contacted him a couple of times. Five times, maybe. Maybe more. And afterwards we found out that it was simply too dangerous that I always go to the consulate and we made a decision not to contact him any more in that way.  
 Q: He provided you with addresses to mail to, right?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: Did he explain to you who he was working for?  
 A: No, I never asked him. He was a consul. If I would be a consul, I would have done the same. Technically I would have some contacts and would know who to notify that there is a guy who is interested....  
 Q: Do you remember the addresses that he gave you?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: What were they?  
 A: The first address, the only address that I had actually, was [REDACTED] I don't know the....  
 Q: [REDACTED]  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: [REDACTED]  
 A: Yes, and there was a post number, I don't remember, [REDACTED] maybe. I don't know.  
 Q: [REDACTED], P.O. Box?  
 A: Yeah, maybe.  
 Q: And the name was what?  
 A: [REDACTED]  
 Q: [REDACTED]. And you wrote to him?  
 A: Yes, several times.  
 Q: And he never came back to you?  
 A: The instructions that I got from the consul was to write a letter to the gentleman and ask to see a certain Mr. [REDACTED]  
 Q: Who?  
 A: [REDACTED] In order to talk to him about employment in hotel reception.  
 Q: In what?  
 A: Hotel reception. And three weeks afterwards, after this, I put a stamp on it, the letter, I should go to the Park Hotel in Austria, Pheloch, and ask for a gentleman. And that is what I did. And now they are trying to tell me I did not try to contact you.  
 Q: OK, this was this guy [REDACTED], or whatever?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: OK, you went to the motel, checked in, and you asked for him again?

A: Hotel.

Q: And you registered?

A: No.

Q: So you checked in and waited? For three days?

A: Yes.

Q: You were told to do that?

A: No.

Q: OK, he never showed?

A: No.

Q: Then what happened?

A: I went back to Yugoslavia.

Q: With the documents?

A: With the documents.

Q: And the only document you had was the list with the license numbers?

A: No, I gave....that's what I gave to the consul .

Q: OK, what was it that you gave...

A: I brought it to the consul. I gave actually to the consul not a list, I made an extract of the list. By typewriter, if I can remember. I did not do it, but a guy did it.

Q: A friend.

A: A friend, yeah.

Q: OK, what was it that you took to Austria?

A: That was the organization plans.

Q: The mobilization plans. Plans for the regular police.

A: Code word, Storm Sun.

Q: Storm Sun? OK, and you took the plans back with you? How big a book was it?

A: It was not a book. Envelopes. Closed envelopes. They were not opened. You guys would have to open and close them again. It would be your business.

Q: How did you manage to get out of Yugoslavia with those in your possession?

A: I went illegally.

Q: You went illegally?

A: I was working on the border, you know everybody who was in the police college had to do that. Pass control. So I knew the ways to go. Across the border. So that is what I did.

Q: So then you went across the border illegally with the documents?

A: Exactly. I gave the documents back and went to the consulate. Not immediately, as far as I know, but anyway, I went to Skoska at the consulate. I told him that I'm definitely disappointed because nobody showed up. He didn't know that I was carrying some documents, as far as I know.

Q: Did not know you were?

A: No. No.

Q: Then what happened?

A: He told me to go to the embassy, if I can remember. In Belgrade. Go to the, well, since he told me I would be asked what I would like to have I should say libraries. That's what I did you know, receptionists desk. And I should apply for a visa, so they gave me some papers, some forms to fill out, and I....actually I said I was a tourist guide working for a big travel agency that would like to get some information about getting a group visa for a trip to the United States so I would like to talk to the vice-consul or whoever is responsible for issuing the visas. That was the story. So they wait me in a certain room and a German showed up and I said my name is such and such and could you maybe ask an embassy if that name means something.

Q: Weren't you a little nervous about going to consulate in Belgrade? I mean, with all the people watching, that was quite overt to do that, wasn't it?

A: Yeah. I was nervous. If somebody had asked me from our side what did I do in the consulate I would have told them I applied for a visa, I would like to visit the United States. So what?

Q: Did you write back to that address?

A: I did a couple of times afterwards.

Q: Did you ever get any response?

A: Yes.

Q: What did they say?

A: That was in Switzerland, I don't know the date. They said that Mr. [REDACTED] wrote me a letter and said he doesn't see any possibilities for me to work with his firm in the near future. Something like that. What was that? And the letter was mailed in Munich.

Q: The letter was mailed in Munich?

A: Yes.

Q: What was in your mind when you did all this? What were you trying to do?

A: You mean what was I trying to do? As I mailed the letter?

Q: And as you contacted the consulate, as you said you wanted to provide things, what were you trying to accomplish? Were you trying to leave Yugoslavia? Were you trying to be recruited? What were you trying to do?

A: As I told you just cooperation in order that in a moment as our president was going to leave, was going to die, and a critical situation was going to be down there in Yugoslavia, I would like, or I wouldn't like Russia to be there. Like is happening to Czechoslovakia. Something like that.

Q: So you were attempting to be able to work in place?

A: Yeah.

Q: For the United States? To keep the Soviets from taking over?

A: Yeah.

Q: But yet you didn't like your job. You wanted out of it.

A: I wouldn't get out of it if I knew why to stay there.

Q: So what you're saying is you would have stayed with your job if Uncle Sam had said, Yeah, we'd like you to work for us?

A: Yes.

Q: What was this school you'd been offered in Russia?

A: That was...what offered it? They didn't say exactly to me. They said something about an academy in Belgrade, a military academy in Belgrade. But I had several reasons to believe that it's not going to be Belgrade. Because then you had some instructions in our school, actually work in Russia. College education in Russia. So and especially as they said it's going to be a type of a closed school so you are not going to be able to contact relatives, stuff like that. So I was suspicious afterwards.

Q: How did you get out of the school.

A: Oh, I didn't go to this school.

Q: Was it something you were drafted for?

A: Oh, I was drafted for. And that's what made me upset.

Q: Why didn't you go? Normally if you get drafted, you haven't got a choice.

A: That's true.

Q: So how did you get out of it?

A: I quit the job.

Q: You what?

A: I quit the job.

Q: You quit the job. With the police?

A: Yes.

Q: But yet you had to work for them to pay back your school?

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A: Yes.  
 Q: So then what happened? How did you pay back your schooling?  
 A: I didn't pay back my schooling yet.  
 Q: You still owe them for school?  
 A: Four million and so much.  
 Q: How much?  
 A: Four million and so much Yugoslavian dinyas , that's about four thousand DMarks. That's a big deal.  
 Q: Four thousand dollars?  
 A: Four thousand Marks, that would be a big deal.  
 Q: OK, two thousand dollars.  
 A: Yeah, in Yugoslavian circumstances that would be...  
 Q: I thought that's why you were put in jail for two years.  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: So you don't owe it if you went to prison and served your time?  
 A: Of course, you do. Of course, you do. You were just punished because you did not keep a contract you signed.  
 Q: Then that doesn't relieve you of liability?  
 A: No way.  
 Q: So you still owe them \$2,000. If you went back to Yugoslavia would they put you in jail again?  
 A: No, they could not put me again because of the same crime. That's against the prosecution law.  
 Q: For the same crime.  
 A: Yeah.  
 Q: So you were prosecuted for not paying your bill.  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: So if you went back they couldn't prosecute you again?  
 A: No, but they could ask a local, I mean a civilian, to try to get the money.  
 Q: Civil court?  
 A: Civil court.  
 Q: But they can't send you back to jail.  
 A: No.  
 Q: So why would you be afraid to go back if they can't send you to jail.  
 A: Because I been here the second time after I promised them not to leave the country?  
 Q: You promised them not to leave Yugoslavia?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: You promised them not to come to Germany?  
 A: I promised them not to leave Yugoslavia.  
 Q: Then why aren't they looking for you?  
 A: It's not a question... I had, I must say, a lot of influence of the people in the police college.  
 Q: In the police college?  
 A: They knew me. I was a good student.  
 Q: Yeah, but you more or less defected, though.  
 A: I was a good student. And I actually had power, for instance, I organized a hunger strike in the police college. That was me.  
 Q: How old were you?  
 A: Nineteen years old.  
 Q: How much influence can a nineteen year old have in....  
 A: All were the same age. To the schoolers, to the students. We were all the same



age. I was actually a trouble maker, yes.

Q: But yet you were well respected and had a lot of power. Obviously not among the teachers.

A: It depends. They knew. I can use my power. Any time I want to.

Q: What kind of power are you talking about? I don't see any great power in sitting down and not eating. What's so powerful about that?

A: You mean me? The whole school did not.

Q: Just because you said, Let's go on a hunger strike.

A: Me and a couple of guys told not to go because of certain discrepancies in this school.

Q: Like what?

A: Well, they wanted to....It was funny, but anyhow, they wanted to reduce our self-defense training and replace it with some extra hours on our military education based on information by some police headquarters chiefs, our people were not educated to salute and stories like that. So they said we are going to intensify that.

Q: So you and a couple of guys got together and said, OK, School, we are going on a hunger strike.

A: Yes, exactly.

Q: How come they didn't throw you out of school.

A: That's a good question. They couldn't since I already gave some good interviews for some newspapers and public media.

Q: Oh, you gave the press some information.

A: Yeah, but not about that. I gave the press some good information about that school and trying to get some more people to go to that school. All the time traveling from one school to another trying to convince young people to go to....

Q: So you were a recruiter for them.

A: Yes. That will best story.

Q: On one hand you were a good guy and on the other hand you were disruptive.

A: Yeah, I was a bad guy, if I wanted to be.

Q: How do they feel about you now?

A: I don't know, I never thought about it. I try not to think about it.

Q: But you said that you don't believe that the Yugoslavs know where you are?

A: I don't believe so.

Q: Isn't it a little dangerous for you to frequent a Yugoslav restaurant where Yugoslavs are known to go?

A: Well, OK. I do go to Yugoslav restaurants several times. But...

Q: But you are exposing yourself by walking in.

A: It's ridiculous. If Yugoslav restaurants are called Yugoslav restaurants but they are not Yugoslav restaurants and no Yugoslav guy is going to go to that restaurant.

Q: You are Yugoslavian and you go to the restaurant.

A: I'm just surprised because...No. They don't serve Yugoslav food, as is such. They just serve some food that they call Yugoslav food, but that's just the food for the foreigners.

Q: Do you have Yugoslavian friends here?

A: No.

Q: None?

A: No, I don't.

Q: The way you're explaining it, it doesn't seem like the Yugoslavs are very smart. Here you are, you leave the country and you're sitting here, you're working for the Americans and then you feel that in no way do the Yugoslavs know that you're here.

A: Well, OK. They cannot know from my side, let's say like that. I didn't contact anybody. OK, Does that sound better?

Q: But they're closely related with the Soviets, right?

A: In certain relationships, yes.

Q: So the Soviets have influence?

A: Not necessarily.

Q: Do you think the Soviets know that you're here?

A: If they would be interested, yes, definitely.

Q: Don't you think that the Yugoslavs would pass information to the Soviets regarding you?

A: If they would be interested to know where I am, they might pass information on everybody. That could provide them that information. Just normal cooperation basis.

Q: Do you think the Yugoslavs are worried about you....

A: Yes.

Q: ...and the damage you could do?

A: Yes, yeah.

Q: So they would be most happy to get a hold of you again?

A: Yes, because they know they have reasons to be afraid of it.

Q: Isn't this a bad place to stay?

A: It is! Every place is bad to stay.

Q: But you said that you don't have any current data. Anything valuable?

A: But they know I still might.

Q: Like what?

A: Well, they can assume. I told you I knew a couple of guys and I still know those people. I don't know what changes from that time till now, you know.

Q: Do you think they are still watching your friends?

A: That's a bad story. They don't know who my friends were. Everybody was my friend and nobody.

Q: You're not worried about them coming along and shooting you, are you?

A: I am.

Q: You are?

A: Surprised?

Q: The last time I talked to you, you weren't scared. You said you really didn't think they were that interested.

A: It depends.

Q: On what?

A: If I just keep silent and quiet and don't do anything, you know, and they see that I don't do anything, and I'm just a potential risk, then they most probably won't do anything.

Q: But if you were talking, you think they would come after you?

A: Yeah. That would be the normal reaction, don't you think so? They tried to kill some guys that actually were just extremists, you know, Nationalists, you know, Croatsians.

Q: Here?

A: You know that.

Q: Why hasn't anyone contacted you to try to get you to work for the Soviets or the Yugoslavs?

A: No, because they know they lost their chance. Since they put me in prison they lost their chance.

Q: Did they try to get you to go back...

A: Yes, they did. Yes, as I was in the prison.

Q: They tried to get you to go back to Germany...

A: For 14 days I been talking to the guys.

Q: To target you against the Germans or the Americans?  
A: They didn't give me any specific instructions, just asked me every day for a period of 14 days, asked me damn questions about Germany and places I been there.  
Q: Why didn't you say, Yes, I would leave....  
A: And asked me....  
Q: What?  
A: Yes, and if I would come here again and say, Hey, listen guys, here I am, they sent me. What would that happen?  
Q: Well, you're here now?  
A: Well, I am here now.  
Q: Spent two years in prison because you said you wouldn't come over here and now you're over here. That doesn't make sense? No, he said he spent two years in there because he didn't pay his college bill.  
A: Well OK. I mean...  
Q: Which is it?  
A: I mean as I was in the prison, they contacted me immediately, OK? And they talked to me for 14 days.  
Q: After they threw you in jail?  
A: Yeah.  
Q: For not paying your bill?  
A: And they would not let me out. If I would just say...  
Q: Because they wouldn't worry about the bill if you would go back to work for them?  
A: Exactly, but would have said yes, they would have let me out immediately.  
Q: What did they want you to do that was that valuable?  
A: To go back.  
Q: To do what?  
A: First I would have to say yes.  
Q: But why did you say yes?  
A: Then I'm going to get information was to do. Isn't that...  
Q: That's what they wanted you to do?  
A: Isn't that normal way?  
Q: I don't know. I'm asking you what they asked?  
A: Yeah, yeah, of course. Go back...  
Q: I would have said yes.  
A: You would have said yes?  
Q: And then I'd be over here. You'd have a better chance of being over here...  
A: After the Germans have kicked you out, you would have said yes?  
Q: You're here again!  
A: Well, I am here again, of course I am here again.  
Q: But now you served two years in prison when you could have served 14 days while they screamed at you, said yes, and come over here.  
Q: How did you get out of there the second time to come over here?  
A: Illegally.  
Q: The same way-forged passport?  
A: Almost the same way, almost the same way, almost the same way.  
Q: After you got out of jail?  
A: Three days afterwards.  
Q: You just got out and went and got your pass and came right over?  
A: Passport? Who gave me a passport?  
Q: How did you get out?  
A: Without a passport.  
Q: How did you get from there to here? To Kaiserslautern.  
A: Illegally.

Q: Where did you go?  
A: Italy, Switzerland, the ways that I knew.  
Q: How exactly did you do it? You left prison and three days later you went.  
A: Some guy working for the police forces on the border in Yugoslavia helped me to go to get across the border from Yugoslavia to Italy. He showed me a place to go, to cross.  
Q: No papers, just crossing?  
A: No papers, just crossing. Italy, Switzerland - I knew the place from before, from Chiasso.  
Q: That was to Italy first?  
A: You have to go to Italy first. To do it you have to go through Italy or Austria. I didn't go through Austria since I didn't know the way to go from Austria to Germany.  
Q: So how did you get from Italy to anywhere else without papers?  
A: Illegally again in Chiasso in Italy.  
Q: Who helped you?  
A: I knew the way.  
Q: Did you walk?  
A: Yeah.  
Q: Walked the entire length...  
A: And I damn got....  
Q: ...of a couple hundred miles?  
A: Couple of miles?  
Q: Couple hundred.  
A: Oh, you mean from Italy to Switzerland - by train. To Milan and afterwards to Chiasso.  
Q: With no papers?  
A: With no papers. I don't need the papers if I want to buy a ticket.  
Q: You left the country though. Didn't they stop you at the border?  
A: How did I leave Italy, as I told you, I got across the border, Yugoslavian and Italian border, took a train, go to Milan by train, change a train, go by train in direction of Switzerland to Chiasso, that's a border, get out....  
Q: In Europe you need papers when you cross the border.  
A: Of course you do, but I didn't legally cross the border.  
Q: So you illegally crossed the border and...  
A: And afterwards used the train again, yes.  
Q: So you got off the train, walked on down the roads a little ways, and crossed over, and went back?  
A: Yes, yes, that's what I did.  
Q: So at what point did you start doing things legal? In Germany?  
A: No, not the second time. I did it the first time. I most probably won't do it anymore. As I came to Germany I went over the border illegally again and came to Kaiserslautern, contacted the lawyer,...

Q: Your current lawyer?  
A: Yeah.  
Q: What's his name?  
A: Hatsky. Contacted him, explained him the story, and he was shocked.  
Q: Why did you contact him? Did you know him?  
A: Well, he was my lawyer when they kicked me out.  
Q: The first time?  
A: He was the guy who told me to go to the police because he was not expecting them to kick me out and he expected....  
Q: And you trusted him, you went back....  
A: I damn sure did contact him, the lawyer, of course I do because it was not his

mistake, he did several things for me afterwards, after I left the country. He wrote to everybody, the Swiss Embassy, everybody.

Q: How did you first meet him?

A: In a hotel.

Q: Just visiting?

A: As I was working in the Savoy Hotel in '74. He was a guest, you know. In the bar...

Q: And you became friends?

A: Yes.

Q: What kind of lawyer is he?

A: He's very famous lawyer.

Q: What does he do? What type of work does he do?

A: He has an office with, about he has two more guys, no one more guy working for him, two more guys working for him.

Q: What kind of...Is he a prosecutor or a defense lawyer or what?

A: He is a famous defense lawyer, yeah.

Q: Who has he defended that's famous?

A: Baader-Meinhof group.

Q: Oh, one of their lawyers.

A: Yes.

Q: So he is a terrorist lawyer?

A: He was doing it.

Q: Was? He's not now?

A: Well, it's finished, you know.

Q: Don't the terrorists have some connection with the Soviets in some places?

A: Huh, it's a good question. They definitely do have.

Q: Did you know he was a terrorist lawyer?

A: I didn't know it at the time, I'm sorry, I didn't know it that time.

Q: When did you find out?

A: On the TV.

Q: Didn't it worry you a little bit?

A: No.

Q: He's a lawyer defending terrorists and they're obviously connected with the Soviets, and there you are...

A: Ok, do you have a German vocabulary here? I would like to find the words. He was a lawyer of the terrorist but not since the terrorist selected him but since the locals told him to do so. That's what the Germans call a "Pflichtverteidiger".

Q: So he's a public defender?

A: Yeah.

Q: He was a public defender?

A: Yeah.

Q: And he was famous?

A: Yeah.

Q: Wasn't his daughter also involved in those activities?

A: I don't know, I don't know. I heard several stories from his daughter.

Q: To the effect that she was with terrorists?

A: No, I heard some stories on the guy she's been married with bu...

Q: He was? Didn't the lawyer defend him on a couple of occasions on terrorist charges?

A: I don't know. The guy was working for the police.

Q: What's he do for the police?

A: I don't know. He wears a uniform.

Q: Is this lawyer sympathetic to the terrorists?

A: I don't know. We never had the political discussions.

Q: You must have ideas. As much as you see him, hell, you talk to him every night.

A: You know that, well, I just say "Here am I, everything is OK." and that's all.

Q: Didn't you say you lived with her? In the same house?

A: With the daughter, yes. In a separate room.

Q: Did she ever discuss anything of a political nature with you?

A: No.

Q: So you have no idea what turns her on? And you don't know if the lawyer is sympathetic to the terrorists?

A: No, I couldn't, couldn't classify him.

Q: How about to the Soviets or the Yugoslavs?

A: I just have an opinion about his profession.

Q: What is that?

A: He would like to be baker, butcher or cook, and go to the United States because Europe has no future at all. That's saying something.

Q: But he's now a famous lawyer, right?

A: Yeah, but not because of terrorists. He simply is a famous lawyer because his father-in-law is a famous lawyer, was famous lawyer in Kaiserslautern.

Q: When was the last time he defended a terrorist?

A: That was in Kaiserslautern, I don't know, I'm not here, I'm sure. Well now, it was '76. '76 he still did, I do know he was tied up with it.

Q: That was when they blew up the police station, wasn't it?

A: I found it out on the TV as they showed him and certain others.

Q: You didn't ask him about it after you found out about it? Certainly you would have been a little startled.

A: No. It's his profession.

Q: So you just looked at it there on television and...

A: Oh, yes, I was surprised.

Q: How do you feel about terrorists? Are you sympathetic to their causes?

A: What I don't like is the word terrorists, that's what I'm going to tell you.

Q: Call it whatever you want, revolutionaries, whatever, people like Baader-Meinhof.

A: I think they're a bunch of dummies.

Q: Say again?

A: They are dummies-idiots. That's not the way I would work if I were them.

Q: Would they be heard any other way?

A: First of all they are communists.

Q: All right.

A: And since I positively do know communists, even if I would like their methods or if I would not like the German government I would not work for them because they are communists and idealistical.

Q: With all the money that the terrorists have don't you think they could afford a lawyer other than a public defender?

A: There are not many who would be willing to protect or to defend terrorists.

Q: Was he ordered to defend the terrorists?

A: Yes, he was ordered to defend the terrorists.

Q: And now after defending the terrorists, he's a famous lawyer.

A: Not after, he was a famous lawyer even before he defended them.

Q: Even though he defended the terrorists, he is still a famous lawyer.

A: Yeah, because the people understand that he was ordered to defend them. They are able to distinguish between a lawyer ordered to defend a person and one who was hired to defend a person.

Q: So far as you know, he has no connections ideologically with any terrorists?

A: No.

Q: This daughter of his that you had roomed with for some time, her dad a famous lawyer, her husband has some sort of terrorist ties and you had heard rumors of? You never talked with her about it?

A: Her husband has what?

Q: Some sort of ties, you said.

A: No, he's working for the police, He's wearing a uniform. He's a policeman, you understand.

Q: What were the rumors you heard about him and the terrorists?

A: I didn't hear anything about the terrorists. I heard some stories from a lady working in my office that knew the husband. That he had some affairs when he was a boy, when he was sixteen or seventeen, some conflicts with the family. I don't know. I didn't ask any details what the story was. I just know that the relationship between my lawyer and his daughter is not too good. It's not OK at all. If she is going to see her mother she first checks out with her father and if he is against it she is not going to see her mother. For the Christmas party in '77 as I was still living there everyone came but her father and mother.

Q: What is your lawyer doing to keep you in the country now? You call him every day.

A: Well, not every day. Almost every day.

Q: Why do you call him almost every day?

A: Because of the bad experience I had with the authorities.

Q: So you think that all of these authorities are against you so you call him every day you are protected, is that right?

A: No, but supposing that, you see...

Q: Can't you just call him when you need him?

A: No, I cannot because the people don't like me to call him. That's the reason.

Q: Who doesn't like you to call him?

A: You see, as the German police wanted to deport me, they didn't let me call him.

Q: What does that have to do with you calling him every day?

A: I'm telling you I'm still here and nothing happened.

Q: Oh. He told you to do that?

A: No, I suggested that.

Q: He said that's OK?

A: Yes.

Q: Why did the Germans want to deport you? I can't understand that.

A: I cannot understand it either.

Q: You come from Yugoslavia and you try to get to stay here, and you offered to provide things of an intelligence nature....

A: No, I didn't want to provide it.

Q: You didn't?

A: No.

Q: You wanted to provide it to the Americans.

A: Yes.

Q: Is that why they wanted to get rid of you?

A: Most probably, after I explained to them some strange stories.

Q: When the Germans talked to you for a long time, did they try to get you to work for them?

A: No, not directly because they couldn't guarantee me a residence permit for Germany. They came with empty hands and that was all.

Q: So this is why you wouldn't work for them? They didn't offer you anything?

A: They didn't do anything for me, no.

Q: Is this why they're trying to deport you?  
A: Might be the reason, too, yes.  
Q: You are an intelligent person, you know, why the Germans want to deport you?  
A: Well, because maybe I do represent a security risk.  
Q: Do they think you're working for the Yugoslavs?  
A: Not necessarily, but they do know that I told them at the beginning as we had our conversation, I'm not going to cooperate unless I know what my future is going to be, because I don't want to put me in trouble, afterwards. Like they kick me out to Yugoslavia. I do know the stories. Like you can pleasantly discuss it and afterwards they kick you out.  
Q: You wanted to do like you said. You didn't like the word "trade", right?  
A: Yes.  
Q: Why don't you like that word if that's what you wanted to do?  
A: Because it was not a trade.  
Q: You are trading your future here for information and your security in West Germany.  
A: Actually I did not ask those people to help me because I know that not necessarily they have that power. I just told them that unless I do have my residence permit, for instance, that I do know what's going to happen. Unless I do know that I can stay in Germany, that I don't have to be afraid of the Yugoslavs, then we can talk.  
Q: What Germans did you talk to? LfV?  
A: I talked to that guy too. There were people from federal intelligence service, BND.  
Q: It's a counterintelligence unit.  
A: BND? It's not a counterintelligence unit.  
Q: OK, LfV.  
A: Yeah, I talked to them too for a couple of days.  
Q: Did anyone pitch you to work for the Germans?  
A: No, the conditions were not there.  
Q: The conditions weren't there, but did they ask you to work for them?  
A: No, that would be a risk. First I have to tell you who I am and everything I know, that you know you can trust me, afterwards you can offer me a job.  
Q: The LfV talked to you for two months, right?  
A: Yeah, almost for two months. OK, they did not talk to me for two months, maybe that's incorrect, but definitely one month, yeah, I'm sure.  
Q: What do you think the reason for them talking to you for one or two months was? Were they testing you?  
A: No, they wanted to get information on the Yugoslavs, structure of our services, stuff like that, typical intelligence work. You can call it a briefing if you want to.  
Q: To get everything out of you and then throw you away.  
A: Exactly. That's the impression I got from the first hour.  
Q: Isn't there somewhere else you can go besides Germany? You could have picked England or France.  
A: Yeah, I could have.  
Q: Isn't this a bad place to end up if they don't particularly like you?  
A: I didn't know that they didn't like me.  
Q: They threw you out.  
A: Well, you mean now.  
Q: But you came back a second time, why?  
A: Just because I knew that it wasn't right that they kicked me out, that was definitely against the law.  
Q: Why not try another country.  
A: Maybe because of language problems.  
Q: You're a linguist, you speak French, Italian.....



A: Yeah, I do speak French, Italian, but I'm not going to Italy or France since I didn't have any contacts at all. Here in Germany I've been working for three or four months and I knew that I was able to get a job, like my old job, in a hotel again, or most probably I could get it again.

Q: You were deported from Germany, right?

A: Yes.

Q: Were you in contact with your lawyer to try to come back here? You said they threw you out illegally?

A: No, I didn't contact him, I just came here to Germany and came directly to his office.

Q: And he started fighting to keep you here?

A: Yeah.

Q: I realize you have contacts, but, you went to a country where you knew that you were going to face trouble.

A: Every country you are going to face problems.

Q: But you knew you were going to face problems here. Maybe not so many problems in Italy, you've got Italian. You could have gone to Italy just like you did here the first time. You could have gotten a job like a bartender like you did here, or whatever you did. And you could have gotten another lawyer there just as easy to help you.

A: But I don't give up because of a couple of services of a certain country, because Germany still had some low courts, and still have some laws and rules.

Q: All countries do. French are more liberal than the Germans.

A: But, you see, as I already applied for a residence permit in Germany and since they did not officially refuse it, but they just kicked me out of the country, based on the police regulations.

Q: After two years in prison you still came back.

A: Yeah, I came back. Because after I'm going to have papers, believe me, when I'm going to have paper that says to me I can travel, I will positively leave Germany.

Q: Are you sure that you haven't provided any information to anybody?

A: Where, Yugoslavia?

Q: Are you familiar with the term "intelligence fabricator?" Swindler? Intelligence swindler? Someone that sells intelligence to anyone that wants to buy it?

A: Yeah, I know that word, is that what you are considering me?

Q: We are asking you; have you done that?

A: No.

Q: Do you think you are?

A: Who thinks I am?

Q: I'm asking you, do you think that you are? Do you think that's why the Germans want to throw you out because they think you are, because you wouldn't give them information?

A: Well, certainly they are not glad if I don't provide them information that they would like to have, after they talk to me.

Q: But there are a number of countries that you can go to, I'm sure there are other countries that you have contacts in that you could have gone to, why didn't you go to South Africa?

A: I was thinking about it.

Q: By the way, who is that friend in South Africa.

A: A friend, I hate that word. I don't have any friends at all.

Q: All right, the acquaintance.

A: It's a guy that was a guest in the hotel, do you see, when you are serving at the bar in this hotel, Savoy.

Q: Tell us who he was and how you met him.

A: I just met him at the bar. I was the barkeeper.

Q: He was a guest?

A: Yes.

Q: Was he black?

A: No, but colored, Indian I think, born in India, yeah.

Q: Was he a British citizen?

A: We didn't talk so far.

Q: What was his name?

A: Moosa.

Q: Was he a businessman?

A: Yes, he was a businessman based on the story that he told me.

Q: What did he say he was?

A: He was working with a company, Phoenix clothing, something like that.

Q: So you say that you'd like to go to South Africa?

A: Yeah, I told him that I was willing to go where ever, but since I didn't have papers I couldn't go.

Q: When you went to Germany you didn't have papers. Why couldn't you go to South Africa?

A: How?

Q: The same way you came here. You went across all those borders when you got out of jail in Yugoslavia illegally, you can't tell me that how creative you are, you couldn't have gotten to South Africa.

A: It wouldn't be so easy, let's say it like that. I went to the consulate, to the South African consulate....

Q: You went to the South African consulate?

A: I don't know if that was in Munich or not, I'm not quite sure, anyhow, I went to the consulate and said, Hey listen, which possibilities do I have to arrange with the Germans that I can leave the country, you know, go to passport control at the Airport, and go to South Africa. And apply for residence permit or whatever. He told me none. And I went to the embassy in Cologne, too. Someone is trying to tell me I didn't try...Of course, I did.

Q: Are there any travel restrictions on you?

A: No, I don't

Q: Why can't you get a plane and go on a vacation to South Africa and stay?

A: Because I need a visa. I don't have this paper.

Q: They won't give you a visa for a vacation?

A: No. I would need a visa for Switzerland, any country.

Q: The way the Germans are trying to get rid of you, I'm sure they'd be most happy to get rid of you.

A: They were happy. That's why they placed that in my passport when I wanted to go back.

Q: If you were talking to me and I told you that I was thrown out of Germany, and I spent two years in prison, and as soon as I got out I went right back to the place that I was thrown out of, that doesn't sound logical.

A: It's still better than being in Yugoslavia, and threatened by our authorities.

Q: You went directly to Italy, why not stay there and get a job there, or back to Switzerland, you said....you'd do anything, sweep streets, why not sweep them in Italy? Now you're facing anything as far as the Germans are concerned if you lose your fight to stay here. It doesn't sound logical for you to come here where you are going to face problems. What have you got here that you wanted to come back to?

A: I'm going to be faced with problems where ever.

Q: Yes, but you know that you are going to be faced with problems here because they

threw you out. You are fighting them now.

A: They did, but they kicked me out based on the police regulation, but not based on the laws.

Q: How did you know this?

A: Why did they kick me out on police regulations?

Q: Why didn't you try to fight it when they threw you out on police regulations?

A: I couldn't, I didn't have a chance. They arrested me in a hotel as I was working and said that I have to leave the country.

Q: Here you got this big lawyer, and he couldn't keep you in...

A: And then I, since that moment I didn't have that lawyer. I had another lawyer.

Q: You said that you had him in contact before and that's why....

A: I did on the bar as a guest, I did contact him and tell him the story. I'm getting nervous.

Q: That's OK. So you knew him before.

A: I'm not the strongest person anymore you know. I had another lawyer here in K-town, OK?

Q: OK.

A: As my present lawyer was in the hotel as a guest and I, by chance, you know, found out that he was a lawyer and he was a guest, I said at once, Hey listen, I'm having difficulties getting a residence permit, could you maybe help me? He said OK, I'm going to, and that was all. After the police arrested me, I called my first lawyer and he was not in the office, so the only possibility that I saw was to call that guy. So I called that guy and he came to the police station. That was actually the first official contact that I had with him. They already wanted to kick me out. He said to them that he guaranteed them that I would come back tomorrow if you say that he has to be here and that he is going to leave the country. Because the guy guaranteed for me, they let me free. Next day in the morning, I came to police headquarters by myself, with everything, my luggage and said here I am.

Q: At the lawyer's suggestion?

A: Yes. They sent me to Switzerland.

Q: What happened to you when you went to Switzerland?

A: Switzerland? Then I went to Yugoslavia.

Q: Did you try to stay in Switzerland?

A: Yes.

Q: Why did they turn you down?

A: That's a good question. Who knows?

Q: So then they kicked you out. You went to Yugoslavia, the police were waiting for you there.

A: And I came back to Switzerland. On the same day, a couple hours later.

Q: You came back? After you were sent to Yugoslavia?

A: I came to the Yugoslavia airport, yes, and I tried everything I could, that was tried to explain to the guy at the border, in English, that I'm not a Yugoslav citizen, at all.

Q: But you told me you were. But you are lying to him now.

A: Yes, I'm lying to him now.

Q: And they sent you back to Switzerland.

A: I told him that I missed the plane, that I was placed on the wrong plane, that I should travel to I don't know where, but not to Yugoslavia, OK? That all my luggage and all my papers were on another plane. I explained that to them in English, OK?

So the guy sent me back.

Q: They just put you on a plane, no guard, nobody made sure you got on a plane, you were deported by an official government....

A: They did not know that I was deported! Come on, I was not deported by an official government.

Q: You mean they didn't give you any papers? No papers at all?

A: No! No!

Q: They just stuck you on the plane with no papers at all?

A: Who, Germans? Germans did not. Swiss people did.

Q: The people kicked you out here, right, the polizei, OK, they didn't give you any papers.

A: Of course they gave me papers.

Q: You get on this plane and you land in Switzerland, right? Have you got any papers on you?

A: You see, they did not kick me out. Actually officially they did not.

Q: Then how did they do it?

A: Actually they showed me and my lawyer, a certificate of a Swiss consulate that I can go back to Switzerland. And stay there unless they're going to make a decision about my political asylum.

Q: They tricked you to get you out of the country?

A: Exactly. So based on that information my lawyer suggested me to go and leave if I do have that possibility to stay in Switzerland.

Q: Do you have that piece of paper with you?

A: No. They just showed it to him.

Q: You accepted that?

A: Accepted that as official information, yes. So you are wondering now that I don't believe anybody?

Q: You got into Switzerland, you had no papers, nothing?

A: Yes. They officially brought me to the border.

Q: They took you to the border?

A: They took me to the border?

Q: They drove you to the border?

A: They drove me there, yes.

Q: OK, then they turned you over to the other people.

A: Exactly. That's what happened.

Q: They didn't say anything to the other people?

A: No.

Q: Just kicked you out of the car and left you standing there?

A: Well, they definitely had some base, some paperwork there. There was an agreement, I'm sure.

Q: So the Germans told the Swiss that you were being deported from the country, being asked to leave the country because you didn't have proper paperwork.

A: Yes.

Q: So the Swiss said, OK, fine?

A: Yes.

Q: So they booked you on a plane to Yugoslavia?

A: No. They placed me on a train and to transport me to Zurich because that police was the police that...because I was living in Zurich before. They was taking care about me. And then I spent there, I don't know how many days, in a prison. Two days, three days maybe.

Q: The Swiss put you in prison?  
A: Yes.  
Q: Why didn't you just leave the train?  
A: I couldn't. They locked me in. I wish I could.  
Q: So you were under guard then the whole time, right?  
A: Yes.  
Q: Under police guard?  
A: Actually nobody was on the train, but I was locked in. They have a special....  
Q: A special compartment for prisoners?  
A: Yes.  
Q: OK. By that time you knew that things weren't working out well. When you left Germany you thought you were going to be given asylum in Switzerland?  
A: Exactly or at least they would let me stay there unless they are going to have a final decision what to do. Because that was not legal that they took my papers and told me to leave the country. First time Swiss authorities did not deport me, the first time. They told me to leave the country. They took away my passport and reissued to me a visa and told me to go where ever I wanted to, but just go. Leave. Otherwise they are going to deport me back to Yugoslavia. That's what they said.  
Q: OK, so you had no choice. Either leave Switzerland or go directly to Yugoslavia.  
A: Exactly.  
Q: But they told you you were going to be given asylum in Switzerland.  
A: Well, I was not told they refused asylum. But I appealed the case.  
Q: But you told me that they presented you at the border with a paper.  
A: Yes. Unless the final decision is going to be made, something like that.  
Q: So it was just an interim place for you to stay until they decided?  
A: Yeah.  
Q: Then you were on the train, you were locked up, and you were on the way to Zurich.  
A: Yeah.  
Q: What did you do when you got to Zurich?  
A: In Zurich they put me in prison for just three days and afterwards they put me in a plane.  
Q: Did they talk to you when you were in prison for three days?  
A: They did. And I told them that I'm going to make trouble in the plane. I'm going to hijack the plane. I'm going to try to do everything.  
Q: What were you so afraid of in going back to Yugoslavia?  
A: I sure had reasons to be afraid to go back to Yugoslavia.  
Q: What?  
A: I gave the Germans some information that's not true. That I did not provide them with information, I damn sure did. And even if the suspect, even if they would know I talked to Germans that would be sufficient for Yugoslavs.  
Q: To do what?  
A: To do what? Prosecute me. To punish me.  
Q: Put you in prison?  
A: Put me in prison for a couple of years.  
Q: Was that what happened?  
A: For a couple of years.  
Q: Well, was that what happened?  
A: Well, yes.  
Q: Was this crap about going to prison for a couple of years because of \$2,000 just a bunch of crap?

A: Well, that was just a reason. They couldn't prove me, you know, that I did talk to Germans.

Q: Did they ask you?

A: Of course they did.

Q: When you landed, at the airport, the police were there waiting, right?

A: No. They were not waiting. They didn't know that I was coming.

Q: Oh, you just popped in. Then what happened? You just popped back out and went to Switzerland?

A: Exactly.

Q: And what happened when you got to Switzerland?

A: And I was in Switzerland at the airport in an international area.

Q: How the hell did you back on the damn airplane and get back to Switzerland?

A: I told you, I convinced the police guy at the airport that I took a wrong plane and I have no papers here, nothing. And I am an American citizen.

Q: And he just turned around and put you back on the airplane?

A: Oh, he did not. He consulted some higher headquarters. You know, I understood every word.

Q: Did you pay for your plane ticket?

A: Yes. Afterwards.

Q: Afterwards.

A: No. Before, I had money. I know afterwards...I don't know. But I did pay.

Q: OK, you paid. You bought a new ticket right there in Yugoslavia.

A: Yeah.

Q: And booked back out, with no papers. No ID at all.

A: No papers at all. They asked me. But I said I have no papers at all. In my suitcase. And my suitcase most probably is in the other plane.

Q: What nationality did you say you were?

A: American.

Q: And they didn't ask for any visa, passport, ID Card?

A: And my name was [REDACTED] I told them my name was Paul Wilson.

Q: They didn't ask for your driver's license or anything?

A: They did. I had my ID card in my shirt. But I knew they are not going to investigate me, you know, because I still have....Well, not everybody wants to risk....

Q: Yeah, but I'm telling you it takes some pretty crafty, intelligent, and clever individual to pull that off.

A: Yeah, you see. But if you have to...

Q: And you're just sitting there telling me that you're just the poor innocent guy that has no experience and no knowledge.; And you're just as knowledgeable of the terminology of our business as we are. And you pull things like this, getting off a plane and going over and telling a cop that I'm just a poor lost American....

A: But you have to. Have you ever been in a situation...

Q: ...right out of the country, now something isn't right?

A: Have you ever been in the situation that you have to do something? Because of your, because you feel threatened by something? Because of you...

Q: But you were going to say because of my position. That was right on the tip of your tongue.

A: My situation, position? What do you consider as position? What do you consider as situation?

Q: The point is this, [REDACTED]. I'm not going to buy that whole story of you just...

A: The Swiss people know it.

Q: ...a plane. You do know how to do it, right? You knew what you were doing to

start with.

A: Did you...Did you....

Q: I'm not even so sure that you spent some time in prison. I'm beginning to wonder if you ever were in prison. Maybe you were on their payroll. Maybe you were at that time.

A: Of course. That's why you have me here.

Q: And you went back for your two year tour in Yugoslavia to see your girlfriend, your wife, or whatever you....

A: That's why you have me here?

Q: What can you give us to prove to us that you are what you say you are. If you are crafty enough to do everything you have done, then you must be clever enough to prove to us....

A: You see, oh, no.

Q: You're a good talker, but you haven't said anything to convince us yet. You've been careful not to mention names, you've been careful to avoid dates, you've been careful not to drop anything that's relevant. You give us this nice story; it sounds like something I've read.

A: But it's true.

Q: James Bond had good stories like that.

A: But the story is true. You see, it is a funny story. But it is a true story.

Q: Well, let's start having some names.

A: Did you know that I tried a suicied in a Swiss prison?

Q: No.

A: You try to get me upset, you people. Please, don't, interrupt the conversation like that.

Q: I mean, you have all these great things that happened to you...

A: It's not a great thing. It's just a thing that I did. Because I had to. I damn sure had a good reason to be afraid.

Q: But how about starting to give us some specifics, names of people.

A: Names of what?

Q: Names that we can verify.

A: What names of what? Are you trying to get me upset? You obviously are trying to get me upset.

Q: Contacts, people you work for....

A: But as long as that...is here, I'm not going to talk any more. That's it.

Q: Over here that you know. If you were working in Yugoslavia in your old position, and I came to you with the same story, would you believe me?

A: You wouldn't believe it anyhow, even if it would be true.

Q: Not true. We want to believe it. We wouldn't be sitting here talking to you.

A: But you don't want to believe me, I tell you. I convinced the guy that I was an American citizen, it was not easy, but I did convince the guy. Afterwards they pushed me back to the plane and they told him, OK, let him go, you know. Like that. Don't complicate and I just left.

Q: So you came back to Switzerland?

A: I came back to Switzerland to the airport, you know, to the international area. Without pass control. There is no pass control, in the international area, OK? So I dialed couple of numbers. I tried to find out what should I do. So I found a guy, gave him money, and asked him, Go, get me a flight ticket, because in the international area, you cannot buy a flight ticket. At least in Zurich you cannot. So I said to a guy, Would you please buy me a flight ticket to Germany. It was a guy

working for the Swiss police that knew me, from the prison. And he was just....

Q: From the prison? Prison in Yugoslavia?

A: Prison in Switzerland.

Q: So you called him up....

A: He was there, you know, in charge, obviously. Not in uniform. And he did take the money, because that is not a Swiss territory, actually. It is international. Would you please buy me a flight ticket back to Germany. I would like to go back to Germany, you know? Back to Germany, you know.

Q: He was the official....

A: Still, I still was believing that that was the mistake of Germans, you know. That they didn't know that the Swiss authorities were intending at the beginning of that conversation already to send me back to Yugoslavia, you see.

Q: Why didn't you steal someone's passport? You did everything else, but. Wouldn't that have been logical?

A: I told you, next time I know, I'm going to buy some. You see, and if I should be once prosecuted, I'm going to tell the story to the court, you know.

Q: What was the name of the guy that you called in Switzerland? How did you have his telephone number? The prison guy. How did you have his name. .

A: No, he was in the airport.

Q: He worked in the airport?

A: Yes, the police, sometimes, depends where you are assigned to. He was once or twice assigned, you know, to duty in the prison. Not in uniform, you know.

Q: Yeah.

A: He knew my face. I knew his face.

Q: But you called him on the telephone, you said.

A: No, and this time he had duty on the airport.

A: That is awful coincidental.

A: Yes, it is.

Q: That the day before he has duty in the prison and the next day he's there in the airport.

A: Well, he was not the day before in the prison.

Q: But that was the same....

A: That was months....

Q: The same day type thing. You were only in Yugoslavia for a day. It was the same day you came back.

A: But, of course, I was in prison for a couple of days. I told you. I was not in prison only for one day. In prison for a couple of days.

Q: But I'm talking about the length of time between the time you were in prison, went to the airport, were shipped to Yugoslavia, talked the cop into sending you back, came back to Yugoslavia....

A: And said, Hey listen, I'm here and the situation is such and such, please...

Q: Would you buy me tickets to Germany?

A: Would you buy me tickets to Germany.

Q: So he knew you while you were in prison there.

A: Yes, he knew that I was in prison there.

Q: To be deported to Yugoslavia.

A: That I was supposed to be deported to Yugoslavia.

Q: So now here you are coming back two days later and saying, Hey, here I am back from Yugoslavia and need a ticket for Germany. So he goes over and buys you a plane ticket?



A: Yes, he did. He did go. He did go and at that moment, you know, another guy was there, too, that recognized me, you know. Because he was there as they deported me.

Q: Are you sure these weren't intelligence type contacts?

A: I don't know.

Q: They were a couple of people you called.

A: Where? In Switzerland?

Q: You tell me a Swiss cop is going to risk his career by buying a stranger from Yugoslavia a plane ticket after they've already deported you?

A: But he didn't know they deported me to Yugoslavia.

Q: He knew you were in prison.

A: He knew that I was in prison, yes.

Q: Did he know why you were in prison? To be deported to Yugoslavia. That's just what you said.

A: I don't know. I can provide you any information that you would like to have, but how do you know that it's true?

Q: It can be confirmed.

A: Exactly. Confirmed how?

Q: Through other sources.

A: Well, OK. You can get other sources that will confirm the story.

Q: Do you think that you're valuable enough through your contacts to make it worthwhile?

A: I don't know. I didn't think about it until today. Do you believe it? You do believe it. I tell you, I didn't think about any type of intelligence work until today.

Q: I believe just about anything, but I'm not going to take anything on you just saying. And I don't think you would either if you were in the other position.

A: Of course I wouldn't. That's why you would like to have proof, OK? Or maybe you would like to have some advantages of, you know.

Q: Wouldn't you, if you were me?

A: Of course.

Q: Then you can understand why I'm asking?

A: Of course, I do understand.

Q: You said you got upset with the Germans because they wanted everything and didn't offer you anything. Well, we don't want to give you everything and get nothing.

A: You don't give me anything. If you consider me as a security risk, and you definitely do consider me as a security risk....

Q: We do? You've got a nice job....

A: Definitely do because....

Q: We've taken care to protect your job over there, nobody knows about it, you're still secure, still making good money, got a new apartment....That sort of thing. And here you are saying we haven't done anything for you. You don't think that we could fire you if we wanted to?

A: Beg your pardon?

Q: You don't think that we could fire you if we wanted to?

A: Of course you could fire me. I'm 99 point 9 percent sure that you are going to fire me. The decision has already been made to fire me. Now you convince me that is not so.

Q: Why would we bother even talking to you? Here in this room right now.

A: What?

Q: What we're talking about. No decisions have been made.

A: I'm telling you a true full story that you don't believe, so why should I believe you?

Q: We didn't say that we didn't believe you. We're just saying that they're just some little discrepancies here.

A: It is a strange story, of course, to convince the police guy and several police guys on the border....

Q: How do I know that you're not doing the same thing right here that you did to the Germans in Munich?

A: Yeah, but you see, the Swiss police know. Why didn't you contact...You did contact them. Did they tell you that I actually did come back on the same day? They did not. You see, if they don't want to tell something...

Q: That's why we're talking to you. To find out. But I want some specifics. I don't want this...

A: Maybe they didn't want to tell you that they are....

Q: ....a strange guy that liked your looks and bought you a plane ticket back to Germany.

A: You know that they are afraid of calls because they worked against the law, you know.

Q: Who worked against the law?

A: Swiss authorities.

Q: They worked against the law?

A: Against the law.

Q: In buying your ticket. What did they have to gain by buying you a ticket?

A: Not buying the ticket. In kicking me out of the country.

Q: Oh, you think anybody is going to hurt them for throwing little ol' Robert Dolzan out of the country?

A: Yes, yes. A good lawyer could make an affair out of this story.

Q: But you've been kicked out of Switzerland for ten years and there isn't anybody that can touch them.

A: Oh, that's not true.

Q: Isn't it? Why did you get arrested when you went to Switzerland last....

A: It depends, if I would have an interest, you know to spend my money there on lawyers and fight with different authorities, I would. And if I would like to contact some journalists from some newspapers, they definitely would be interested in my story. But I would compromise myself. Yugoslavs would know where I am.

Q: You might say that.

A: But otherwise, I would. You can believe me, I would.

Q: You're between a rock and a hard spot, aren't you?

A: I am.

Q: Have you contemplated going to another country?

A: No, the guy went to buy me a ticket and at the same time, there was another guy there in the airport who recognized me because he was there on the same day as they deported me. So he said, what am I doing here? So I told him. I am back. Of course, and he said. Well, he didn't say anything in the beginning, you know. And then he said I should go with him and I said, Hey listen, that is not a Swiss territory and I'm not authorized to enter a Swiss territory or they're going to kick me out again. But as international territory, all what I would like to do is just to leave this place, you know. But he took me with him and put me in prison again for one night and next day they had a guy who went with me.

Q: Why couldn't you have...

A: And, you know, Yugoslavian border, he just showed a....

Q: Yeah, but you know you're not supposed to be in Switzerland for ten years.

A: That was the first time.

Q: They notified you.

A: That was the first time. But that was the first time.  
 Q: What made any difference?  
 A: Well, I came back.....  
 Q: You were kicked out for ten years.  
 A: ...from Yugoslavia, I had to go somewhere. That was the first time. The Yugoslav authorities said, well, OK, let's send you back to Switzerland. Where is he coming from? Zurich? OK, the plane is still there. Go back.  
 Q: But you promised not to go back. Now you say the Yugoslavs are sending you back to Switzerland and then to Germany. And you're saying you already promised them you wouldn't be living there.  
 A: But that was two years after again. You see, we are talking about different dates.  
 Q: Well, the first time Yugoslavs said...  
 A: You're talking about the first time. Not now. That's first time. Near '74.  
 Q: You quit the police academy, you illegally left the country, and now you're telling me the Yugoslavs made arrangements for you to illegally leave. Make up your mind.  
 A: No. As I came from Switzerland in '74, OK? I was kicked out of country. '74. The Yugoslavs on the border on the airport, they did not recognize me. That was another republic. That's Croatia. I didn't have any papers. I spoke...  
 Q: You illegally left the first time.  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: Then you came to Germany and you were deported in Germany in '74. Within six months.  
 A: In Switzerland. Yeah, from Switzerland, deported to Yugoslavia. Sent back. To Yugoslavia by plane. Now I am in Yugoslavia in the airport. Explain the guy a story, I am American citizen, that missed his plane and was placed in the wrong plane, OK? And I would like to go back to Zurich immediately, OK? And the guys after they consulted several people, believed me. And let me go to the plane. They sent a guy to accompany me to the plane, OK? And here I was again back on the same plane that took me.  
 Q: So you wound up in Germany?  
 A: Back to Switzerland. Back to Zurich, to the international area. Trying to buy a ticket; get out of this place. The first guy that knew me, I asked him to buy a ticket otherwise, I must go through pass control and I didn't have a passport and how could I....  
 Q: You said you made some calls before you ran into this guy.  
 A: No. Not this time.  
 Q: That's what you said. You said you made a couple of calls to a couple of friends, contacts.  
 A: But not this time.  
 Q: Which time?  
 A: The second time. In August.  
 Q: The last time when you....  
 A: Yeah, the last time. You have to analyze the story, you know, look at the dates. Then was it.  
 Q: OK, did you come back to Germany that day that you go back?  
 A: No, no. I did not because they put me in prison again for one night and the next day sent me back to Yugoslavia again. In order to be sure that I actually will leave the plane and go to Yugoslavia, they sent a guy to accompany me.  
 Q: And when you got there, he said, here is Mr. [REDACTED].  
 A: No. He did not. Oh, that would be too official.  
 Q: What did he do?

A: He just presented his identity card as a tourist, bought a tourist visa valid for 30 days and left that area and went back to Switzerland.

Q: What happened to you?

A: And I was there waiting to show my passport, and I didn't have any, so I had to show my card. So here I lie. Weren't you here yesterday, somebody said. Yes, I was. And you're not American? No.

Q: Then what?

A: They said what's your name? I told them. They made some phone calls and that, you know, here I was.

Q: So then you were placed in prison.

A: Yeah, a couple of days later they did.

Q: And that's when they talked to you for 14 days?

A: Yes.

Q: And they attempted to get you to...

A: Yes.

Q: ...to work for them.

A: Yes. Wanted to know my story first. Where I'd been all that time. What I'd been doing.

Q: When they asked you to work for them why did you say no? Wouldn't that have gotten you out of prison?

A: First you have to get somebody out of prison and then you can talk about cooperation.

Q: But they offered....

A: They did offer, yeah, they did offer.

Q: Why didn't you agree to anything to get out of prison?

A: I hate the people. I wouldn't cooperate with them anyhow.

Q: So you spent two years in jail rather than cooperate.

A: Positively. Till the last day. That's what I did.

Q: With all the things you've done, why did you take that fall so easily?

I mean with all the countries you've crossed illegally and getting sent to Yugoslavia and tricking them into getting sent back to Switzerland, then when you get over there you....

A: Don't you see they are kicking you out of every country, so what do you do? You just give up and say here am I. Maybe I'm going to have a chance to escape out of prison afterwards.

Q: Yeah, but if you said to them, yes, I'll work for you. And they sent you back to Germany and you'd be in Germany.

A: Since I know persons there. What? The guys would tell me, work for us and go to Germany? Hummp.

Q: Bob, did you ever when you got back during that 14 days or even later to get out of prison early, since you were apparently supposed to be there longer than two years, that's a pretty light sentence even in Yugoslavia. What story did you eventually give the Yugoslavs to get you out early?

A: No, I didn't want to get out early. I didn't have any stories at all. First I was just waiting. What they are going to accuse? What did I do? You see?

Q: You left the country illegally.

A: That's not a crime.

Q: But you were employed in a police/intelligence capacity. The first time I talked to you, you told me you had forged your own fake identity papers, to get out of the country. Now you're saying you had no papers.

A: The first time as I went to meet a guy there in Philoch, is another story. First

I tried to contact somebody from your side. If I had contacted somebody I would have stayed. Since I did not succeed in contacting somebody and I had that papers that time in Philoch, you see...

Q: You're saying that the only time you had the phony ID Documents was on these one day trips?

A: No. I had my documents as I went to Switzerland the first time, I mean, my school papers, certificates, diplomas, whatever.

Q: Yeah.

A: As I went to Switzerland. I had them in Austria on the border in one restaurant that I knew. And went to Switzerland and the Swiss police told me to get the papers, so I made a trip to Austria. They told me how to get across the border, got the papers and came back to Switzerland and presented them the papers. Took that papers afterwards to Germany, presented the papers to Germans. After I went back to Yugoslavia a second time, OK? Intelligence Service in Yugoslavia took all the papers and I don't have them any more. That's what I wanted to say.

Q: But you can get them, can't you?

A: My certificates? Are you interested in seeing them?

Q: Possibly.

A: Don't they have a copy. They must have 50 copies of that garbage.

Q: Didn't you tell me that you still had contacts there, if you wanted to get...

A: Yeah, yeah, certainly. If I personally would be interested in getting the certificates, or would like to get them for some reason, I could get them. Why not?

Q: You could get just about anything you wanted, couldn't you?

A: Depends. I don't know who is working now in that positions. I know things have changed there, definitely have changed.

Q: Were you ever charged with being a homosexual? By anyone?

A: That's an old story that they always...

Q: What's the story?

A: ...try to bring up in the school already.

Q: What story? Well, you were arrested by the Swiss.

A: Because of that?

Q: That's what they say.

A: Hummp.

Q: What happened? You said it's an old story.

A: What happened when? Nothing happened in this way. Nothing happened.

Q: Were you arrested and charged with being a homosexual?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever been accused of being a homosexual?

A: Accused? How do you mean accused? Officially accused?

Q: Did anyone ever tell you that they thought you were?

A: It was a speculation that was brought up in a school in the last year after I was recognized as a trouble maker, in order to....

Q: In Yugoslavia?

A: Yeah. In order to put me in discredit, you know.

Q: Are you a homosexual? Are you bisexual?

A: No.

Q: Who was the young fellow you were with downtown Saturday?

A: This Saturday? A young boy 14 years old. That's my landlord's son. I have contacts to their family, you know. I'm considered as a....

Q: Do you go places with him often? Take him out, buy him things to eat?

A: You mean the guy. The family, no. The whole family, no.

Q: The boy? You were alone with the boy.  
A: Well, I was alone with the boy, but I'm several times with the whole family. They invite me, I invite them.  
Q: But you were alone with the boy. All day Saturday. Taking him around, buying him stuff to eat, visiting.  
A: Oh, buying him stuff to eat. Come on. That's a normal trip if I take him downtown. I buy some stuff and he would buy some stuff for me.  
Q: Do you take him with you a lot? Associate with him a great deal. You seemed to be pretty good friends.  
A: Yeah, well he helped me quite a lot.  
Q: So you were paying him back, then?  
A: Yeah, in a...  
Q: Do you have an interest in him?  
A: No. He was painting my walls, he was...  
Q: Is he a homosexual?  
A: Oh, a guy of 14 years. He is a kid.  
Q: What's the matter with 14 years?  
A: He's a kid.  
Q: German 14 year olds are pretty grown up.  
A: I never...occupy myself with that question.  
Q: What?  
A: I was never asking him that question. Why should I?  
Q: So, no police have ever accused you of being a homosexual?  
A: No.  
Q: You've never participated in homosexual activities?  
A: No.  
Q: They never arrested you when you were in a hotel with another man?  
A: No. No.  
Q: Another man in Switzerland?  
A: No. That's a story that makes me still upset.  
Q: Still makes you you upset?  
A: It does make me upset.  
Q: You just said you'd never heard it before.  
A: Because it's a dirty story. It was a dirty story in Yugoslavia already, you know.  
Q: We're not talking about Yugoslavia. This is before you were ever there. Switzerland. This is after you left the school.  
A: Yeah, but that story came up already there.  
Q: What story? From the school that you were queer?  
A: Yeah.  
Q: How did that story get from Yugoslavia to Switzerland?  
A: Depends. They could have some informants down there that provided that information.  
Q: You don't really expect us to believe that, do you? That the Swiss, of all people, would have spies in Yugoslavia?  
A: Damn sure, they got some.  
Q: Is that why they deported you? Because they thought you were homosexual?  
A: That is no reason to deport somebody, is it?  
Q: Well, they had to have a reason to throw you out. I haven't heard anything that would justify the Swiss throwing you out.  
A: Why did the Germans kick me out? Let me ask it like that.  
Q: Let's ask you.

A: I don't know. You know why they kicked me out officially?

Q: Everybody...

A: Because I illegally entered the territory, the Federal Republic of Germany.

Q: OK, so that's the reason the Germans threw you out. Why did the Swiss throw you out. Everyone goes to Switzerland. Adolf Hitler could have gone to Switzerland.

A: OK, officially why the Swiss police kicked me out, official explanation was, because I don't offer any guarantee for loyal and fair behavior. Loyal and fair behavior.

Q: What did they base that on?

A: That was the official explanation that I got.

Q: What was that based on? You must have done something...

A: What do you understand as loyal?

Q: You had a boyfriend down there in Switzerland.

A: That was not a boyfriend. It was a gentleman that I knew from Yugoslavia as a tourist and as I...

Q: You lived with him for a while.

A: Of course. That was the only place that I could stay as I came out of Yugoslavia.

Q: And the Swiss arrested you. In a hotel room.

A: No, no. That's a...

Q: You were never in a hotel room with him?

A: No.

Q: Was that individual a homosexual?

A: No. Not that I would know.

Q: OK, you brought up that other individual on your own. And you must know that there was a connection. You're sure you were never...

A: I met the guy in Yugoslavia after I quit a job and I was looking for another job and I found one, you know. And they put me in prison for one day or two. Found a second one and the same story happened, you know. And that happened several times. Afterwards I went to the coast, to the seaside, and said here are many hotels and maybe I can find a job in a hotel. And I met a guy there. He was on vacation down there. And we were sitting together in the same desk, and we started discussion. And I explained to him I'm not a tourist. I'm just looking for a job, you know. And afterwards he left and he gave me his address and said if you come to Switzerland I can visit him and got his address. That's all.

Q: And he was Yugoslavian?

A: No, he was Swiss guy.

Q: OK.

A: And I placed that address somewhere on file. And forgot about it. Because that was February, maybe, January or February. And a couple of months later in July as I first left Yugoslavia illegally....

Q: What year was this?

A: '73. I said well, where should you go now. You don't know anybody outside. And then I said well, there was a guy that you met and I didn't find his address, but I knew the name.

Q: What was the name?

A:

Q: Is he still living in Switzerland?

A: I don't know. So I came to Zurich and I had a look in the telephone directory. And found his address. I came there to his home, but he came a couple of hours later. And I said here am I. Explained him the story, you know, roughly, what happened.

That I could not find a job down there because of some difficulties. So I would like to have a job in Switzerland. And the guy sent me to his father. He has a big house down in Lucerne. So I stayed there for a couple of weeks. Helped him. He has a big farm there and made some money in that way. So the story that the Swiss people, police is trying to tell everybody is that I actually was exploiting the guy because of his homosexual - I don't know how to call that....

Q: But he was?

A: I don't know. I don't have proof of that.

Q: Do you feel that the Swiss used this as a basis for throwing you out or giving you a bad reputation?

A: Well, that's what they officially gave it as a explanation. They don't want to give me asylum, that I was exploiting an Swiss citizen because of his homosexuality.

Q: Why didn't you say that when we asked you to start with? You said you knew nothing about homosexual..

A: Because you said something about being arrested in a hotel room with a man and a story like that.

Q: I asked you if you were ever accused of being a homosexual and you said no.

A: But it was not accused if you say I understand...

Q: Accused means someone said you are a homosexual.

A: It depends who says that.

Q: In fact as long as we are on the topic, I'd like to know about women you've been accused of exploiting, marriage type. Where you've promised them marriage, they've given you money, and suddenly you've changed your mind and left them. Any truth to that?

A: Oh, no.

Q: Have any women loaned you money before?

A: You see, that was...

Q: You see everything like that we want you to explain.

A: I know. If you would like to get rid of somebody, if you would like somebody to leave the country because, he is a strange type of person. Is he working, is he not working, what is he doing. Then they try to find reasons to kick him out.

Q: We can understand that, but you need to explain things that we've heard. The Swiss say you've done it; the Americans say you've done it; the Germans say you've done it....

A: Of course, you've got to understand, it's your business, you see? What the Germans's said?

Q: What the Swiss said, too. Said you swindled some money out of a girl, called you a marriage swindler.

A: What? In Germany?

Q: Yes. You had any girl friends since you've been here. Any girls you've lived with? The lawyer's daughter?

A: Living with the lawyer's daughter?

Q: You were living in the same house. Not living with her.

A: Yeah.

Q: How about other women?

A: Which ones?

Q: Any others. That you've lived with.

A: I didn't live with any woman. The only woman I lived with was in Switzerland. My landlady.

Q: How about girl friends? You ever been engaged?



A: No.  
 Q: Never been engaged to be married?  
 A: No.  
 Q: Never had any girlfriends?  
 A: I have no or I had no.  
 Q: Had no.  
 A: I had girlfriends, but not been engaged with them.  
 Q: Oh, then they loaned you money.  
 A: No.  
 Q: They never loaned you any money?  
 A: No.  
 Q: Then that was all lies that they fabricated?  
 A: I don't know what they made up.  
 Q: So if they say that you are a marriage swindler, that is a complete lie?  
 A: That was never presented to me officially.  
 Q: Officially. How about unofficially.  
 A: Unofficially that was never presented to me.  
 Q: So you knew nothing about that until we mentioned it? Never heard of it?  
 A: No. The only lady as I lived with as I said was as I lived in Switzerland the lady as had the house. Was 86 years old lady. And I do agree that maybe relationship between me and the lady was mother-son. OK? Because she was completely alone. But I just had a room there and that was all. Actually she did help me. She wanted me to stay there because she was afraid of being alone in that big house and she was sick, too. But as I said, officially.....  
 Q: Did you ever borrow money from her?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: Did you ever pay her back?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: How much did she loan you?  
 A: I don't know how much that was in the nowadays.....  
 Q: Did you ever kind of cosy-up to her and maybe make her think you were interested in marrying her?  
 A: Oh, come on...  
 Q: Or any other....  
 A: Come on.  
 Q: You never got engaged?  
 A: No.  
 Q: You never asked anybody to marry you?  
 A: No.  
 Q: That's kind of strange for a man your age.  
 A: Oh yeah?  
 Q: Unless you're homosexual.  
 A: You think so?  
 Q: If you married a German, could you stay in Germany?  
 A: Yeah.  
 Q: Why haven't you done that? You've tried. You've done an awful lot of things to stay out of Yugoslavia, why not marry a woman to stay here. That seems to me to be very easy compared to the other things you've done. The easiest of the bunch.  
 A: Well, not necessarily I could stay here as far as I know.  
 Q: Have you ever thought about doing that?

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A: Yeah. Several time. Of being adopted or getting married.

Q: Why didn't you try to do that?

A: I was just afraid of losing my personal freedom.

Q: If you go back to prison in Yugoslavia you'll lose your personal freedom.

A: Yeah. You have to calculate the risks.

Q: I'd rather lose my personal freedom being married than being in a Yugoslavian prison.

A: You have to compare the risks.

Q: How can you compare the risk of being in a Yugoslavian prison to being married?

A: Actually I could pay some money, OK? But you asked me why I didn't steal a passport. I do everything, but. So I wouldn't get married just to stay here in Germany, because then I must have a good reason why I like to stay here, why I love to stay. But I don't have those reasons to stay in Germany.

Q: I'll tell you what, [REDACTED] that just doesn't jive. I mean, a guy like you, you look fairly nice, you dress nice, you make good money, you go out and you socialize a little bit, you are not a homosexual which means you must have an interest in girls, right?

A: Oh, do I have interest in girls?

Q: You like normal sex, right?

A: Oh, do I have some boyfriends?

Q: Huh?

A: If that is homosexual to have boyfriends.

Q: You have male friends. Everyone has male friends. We are talking about something different. You are sleeping with them. You are doing a number of things to stay out of Yugoslavia, I mean, you are crossing borders illegally. That's dangerous. If you'd go to that extent, yet something as simple as marrying a German in order to insure your staying in Germany, why haven't you done that?

A: Because I would have to find a woman that I would like as such so that I would marry her not because of staying here, but because of her.

Q: You have morals about marrying someone and you're crossing borders illegally.

A: Exactly. I can distinguish between different morals. To cross the border illegally is not such a big crime as to marry a lady just to stay here in Germany. But tell the lady different story.

Q: We're talking about your life.

A: I'm talking about my life, definitely I am, because I still have other possibilities. If I marry a lady I would tell her because I love her, whatever, because I have feeling I would like to live with you.

Q: What about marriages of convenience?

A: But I would never say I'd like to marry because of....

Q: So you are taking a chance of going back to Yugoslavia rather than marry someone that you don't love.

A: No, I'm taking chance and buy passport. I prefer that possibility.

Q: Why haven't you done that? Why haven't you just stolen a passport?

A: That would be a crime.

Q: But you can go to Frankfurt and buy one illegally?

A: I try to avoid a crime. If possible.

Q: Isn't crossing the border a crime?

A: It is not a crime.

Q: It isn't?

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A: It is not.  
 Q: Illegally entering a country?  
 A: It is not a crime.  
 Q: Illegal aliens. That is a crime in every country. Then why were you being thrown out of Germany?  
 A: It is against the regulations, OK? But it is not a crime. It can be a reason to kick you out of the country.  
 Q: You can also be put in jail for that.  
 A: Yeah, but the public prosecutor did not. Because I didn't the first time illegally enter Germany. I must emphasize that.  
 Q: The first time you didn't, but you had no papers. You just told us you were illegal.  
 A: I must emphasize it. It is not illegal, I came to the guy on the border and said here am I. I had my identification card. I did not have a passport, but I had my ID card and I applied for political asylum. I did not illegally actually...  
 Q: Yeah, well. That's defection when you come to them and say here I am; I want to leave my country and come to your country. That's called defecting. That's a little different than sneaking around the borders, in and out, catching planes, telling them you are a US citizen. That's different. That's called illegal entrance. You go to prison, if they catch you.  
 A: But, you see, public prosecutor did have possibility to accuse me. Why didn't he?  
 Q: He didn't need to. He got you out on the other stuff.  
 A: Oh, no. The authority already on the border did not ask the public prosecutor to accuse me.  
 Q: OK, the first time. I understand that completely. The first time you didn't know. You thought here I am, a Yugoslav, I'm asking for asylum in Germany. They're just going to open up their arms and take me. The first time I'll buy that. But when you've been jacked around for all this time, I can't buy that a second time.  
 A: Yeah, but you see. It's an interesting story. OK, may I show you that? As I wanted to officially enter the Federal Republic of Germany on 7 August '78, they refused there. As I on 26 October '78, that means several months later, officially applies for my residency permit would be extended. They did extend it. And the people knew that the only way I could get into Germany was illegally.  
 Q: That's because they're screwed up. You caught a clerk...I'll bet you told them you were an American citizen, didn't you?  
 A: Who, the Germans?  
 Q: Whoever it was that punched that bear.  
 A: The guy issued me the pass. That's the same one.  
 Q: They made a mistake, though, didn't they?  
 A: No. Did not.  
 Q: Sure you didn't cover that up?  
 A: No.  
 Q: The thing that I cannot understand...I'm trying to believe you, OK?  
 A: OK, I contacted a German lawyer from the Swiss side. And said what should I do? He said I'm going to notify the authorities here, that you are there, since the authorities on the border are different authorities again, OK? Do whatever you want to. But he knew that I don't have any choice at all. The Swiss police told me how to leave Switzerland and to let you know how if you want to. I said no, I know how to. Illegally. So I did get across the border illegally. And contacted my lawyer and explained him my story.

Q: But you are an intelligence agent, or you were.

A: Oh, I am intelligence agent.

Q: You were, you said you were. In Yugoslavia you were an intelligence person, right? Worse than that...Police/intelligence, right? Normally for someone to be picked or chosen or drafted for that position, he has to be evaluated mentally. And they have to assume that the person will be able to do the thing that he is chosen to do. Or you wouldn't be chosen for that job. OK, you did that job and you crossed all these borders, and you've done all this and you've been able to put off going this place and that place and then you stop short of stealing, marrying someone if you don't love them, if doesn't sound logical to me.

A: I was not tasked by anybody. As I illegally crossed the borders, I was not tasked by anybody.

Q: I'm not saying that. I'm saying that you have to have a certain mind...

A: Yeah.

Q: ...to be chosen to be in intelligence.

A: Yes, but just in case you have to as you don't have any choice at all. If I would like to officially apply for asylum I have to enter the certain country.

Q: The first time...

A: OK, the first time....

Q: I understand the first time completely. But you're doing all this stuff..

A: And the second time as I came to Germany, I came because the Germans told me that time that nobody is sending me back to Yugoslavia. And there is agreement between Swiss authorities and German authorities.

Q: You are too intelligent for that. And you're passing off as being naive.

A: I was damn sure naive. You see, that's good. The lawyer was there...

Q: They threw you out once and you stood up and let them do it again? That doesn't make sense.

A: Of course because now I have a paper that I didn't have before. And I do trust our German laws and German law courts.

Q: But they're still trying to get you out, right?

A: They're still trying to get me out.

Q: And your lawyers fighting it?

A: He's fighting it. And I'm going to fight.

Q: Have you ever been tasked by anyone to gather information for them or provide them information?

A: No.

Q: I thought you were familiar with the terminology. You know what tasking is?

A: Yeah, I know. Of course I'm familiar with the terminology. We use the same terminology you do.

Q: So you have worked then?

A: Theoretically, I do know that at least.

Q: Theoretically. You have a good memory since it's been six years since you went to school.

A: I learned English and German ten years ago. Definitely. OK, my English is not the best, but you can understand me.

Q: Do you know of anyone among your friends when you were going to school, that was brought into intelligence and trained and dispatched to the West in order to do an intelligence job? Tasked?

A: I don't...Let me ask you a question. Why should I know that?

Q: You know everything else.

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A: You think they would have told me or I would...

Q: [REDACTED] you said you had friends that work in that department.

A: ....have a need to know basis?

Q: You have one foot in intelligence. You have friends.

A: Do you know if you're friends are tasked by somebody?

Q: Sure.

A: Oh, come on. You don't; who tells you if the guy Exsipsilon is coming with a name such and such to Moscow.

Q: The guy who gave you the information to take to the West obviously has some information.

A: They are not. I was not interested that time in getting information of people eventually of people being educated and dispatched afterwards to the West because I personally was not interested in getting that information. Why? To provide who with that information?

Q: You took the papers.

A: But if he would have asked me that time, if the guy would have contacted me and he said I would like to have that and that, OK, let's see what I can do. But I personally was not interested in finding out if the guy such and such was actually in West.

Q: What positions were these individuals in at the time they gave you those papers?

A: I heard of a couple of guys climbing very quickly.

Q: No, no. I asked a specific question. At the time they provided those papers, what was their job? You must know.

A: Yeah, of course, I know.

Q: What was their job?

A: One guy was working for State Security.

Q: In what position?

A: He was the son of a politician, very important, very famous politician in Yugoslavia. [REDACTED] I don't know his other name. Believe me.

Q: He was your friend and he gave you...

A: He was not my friend. He provided the information to my friend. His name was- let's put it down. [REDACTED] That's important politician.

Q: So his son provided you documents.

A: Shocked? I was shocked, too.

Q: Espionage.

A: Yes.

Q: This is what we wanted to begin with.

A: Because of conflicts with his colleagues.

Q: This is what we asked you to start with and you kept hemming and hawing around.

A: No.

Q: In order to verify your story, you can't say some guys gave me some stuff and I was going to pass it but nobody wanted it. We want names, exactly what it was.

A: Ok, if somebody provides you with information....

Q: But you didn't provide us with information.

A: I did not, no.

Q: There is nothing we can do about that now. The time is passed. It didn't work. We're trying to rectify that now.

A: Unfortunately didn't work.

Q: Right on the name.

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A: If you get some information from somebody, OK? Don't you have some rules that most of the time you don't want to know who gave you that information in case you are going to be caught by somebody and get some stuff...

Q: That's right, but they have to work through someone.

A: ...injected into your body, you're going to explain the story, no?

Q: You have to get the stuff somehow. They had to evaluate you.

A: Yes, but in that case I just know the name of one single person and that it too much that I knew that. A risk was big. That person...

Q: If that's all you know, then, fine. But we wanted to know all you knew. Is this the contact that you said you could contact now if you wanted to?

A: Not necessarily. That was the guy that provided me that information. And besides that it is a question if that is true that he got it from that guy, you know. It depends how he is going to protect his informants.

Q: So, is that the individual who provided you with the items that you had.

A: Yes. If I would like to get some information, to deliver some information, I don't care how. Place it in an envelope or leave it somewhere. I don't want to see any faces at all.

Q: You have to be contacted somehow. And someone has to know...

A: I contacted the guy.

Q: It was your idea?

A: It was my idea.

Q: Did you pick up that information at dead drops and stuff? How did you get it from him? He just walk and hand it to you?

A: No.

Q: How?

A: A friend brought him. She was working there.

Q: What was her position?

A: She had access to all that TOP SECRET documents, you know, all that.

Q: But did it come from him to her, then to you?

A: We were friends. He was disappointed about police, too. The guy wanted to study, he was intelligent, wanted to study, had some political opinion and he could not study because of his political opinion. He was assigned to work as he wanted to go to university and stories like that.

Q: The son of that important politician?

A: Not the son of that important politician. That's the guy that provided me with the information. The whole chain of, you know, of people being involved in such things.

Q: The chain is what we want.

A: So, we discussed about what to do. I had the same problem. I wanted to do a job and I couldn't because of certain contracts, so I said I don't like the way they are doing it right now. I knew the guy for a couple of years. I knew his opinion, his political opinion and he knew mine. He trusted me, I trusted him. We said we should do something against that. That's how the discussion came up, you know. And I said, what document could we provide? To the Americans. Offer our help and afterwards we are going to provide some information. Who could be suitable. He said I could have some contacts who could provide the information and that's how the whole thing came up.

Q: Were these copies of something? Or originals?

A: Originals.

Q: Originals. Someone took originals. Didn't that cause some problems?

A: That caused a problem. That was a risk. That's what I said. If somebody had noticed that the originals were not in place when say at 4 o'clock you closed the office and make a security check and if that envelope is not under lock and key.

Q: What was the classification?  
A: TOP SECRET.  
Q: It was Yugoslavian TOP SECRET. So it was a controlled item. And no one noticed?  
A: No because that lady, I don't know the lady, but that lady most probably has to perform that controls. So she says it's here, and it's here.  
Q: The girlfriend?  
A: The girlfriend. I knew the ciphers.  
Q: Now who else besides that individual did you feel that you could get to cooperate with you to provide items of intelligence interest to the Americans?  
A: Things have changed, I told you. I don't know. I can tell you, I had some people who were convinced Communists and two years later, I heard as I was in Yugoslavia, hey you know that guy? You know what happened to him? He quit the job and he's working against and having trouble, you know, opposite. Do you remember that guy? He changed his colors. You never know, did he officially change or did he just working to have a job. Say yes, the sun shines although it does not.  
Q: Are there a lot of people that are busy trying to trap people?  
A: Trap people?  
Q: You know, pretend that they are loyal to the other...  
A: Yeah.  
Q: ....side and want to give away secrets and as soon as you participate, they burn you?  
A: Burn?  
Q: Arrest.  
A: No. No.  
Q: Was this the only time you...  
A: That's a cheap way of catching the people. It depends.  
Q: But you said that the way your intelligence outfit worked that you'd go to bars and talk to people, stuff like that. So that's doing exactly what you're talking about.  
A: Yeah, but these people are not normally considered dangerous. As a big risk. Because if somebody, I'm a stranger, I don't know the guy and I'm just drinking a beer every evening and start some type of political discussion and the guy says all right. If he doesn't know me, he's not dangerous.  
Q: You just talked to foreigners, to visitors. Did you try to illicit?  
A: No.  
A: You see, you got an instruction, you know, supposing that information about that and that should be provided. The following is important. A couple of guys are tasked with that, you know.  
Q: What did you call that when guidance came down for what you're supposed to do? What was the term for that form.  
A: Just instruction.  
Q: Just instruction?  
A: Yeah, instruction.  
Q: Do you remember a form number?  
A: We don't have form numbers, as such. As in Army. We don't have a form that would have a number that is termed such and such.  
Q: But it would just be a piece of paper? Did it come to you on a napkin?  
A: No.  
Q: That's what I'm asking.  
A: It's a piece of paper with an official title out there, who is sending it. Such and such, you know. Based on newest information that we have. Based on newest political situation in Yugoslavia following information should be provided. And

signature of the guy.

Q: When you took those papers, the TOP SECRET papers, that you were going to pass. You said you crossed the border illegally.

A: Yes.

Q: You crossed the border with the papers. Where were the papers?

A: In my suitcase. A diplomatic suitcase.

Q: You just put the papers in the suitcase?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you try to conceal them?

A: No.

Q: Weren't you worried that you might be searched?

A: Diplomatic suitcase, no.

Q: A regular small suitcase type?

A: A normal suitcase, you know, where you could put some information.

Q: Don't they search items?

A: Where, at the border?

Q: Yeah.

A: I knew that border since I was working there, I told you.

Q: And you figured they would just let you pass since they knew you.

A: I didn't officially pass the border. I could have. Nobody was not suspicious. What for? If I would have officially...

Q: But you didn't pass?

A: Not officially, no. Why should I risk it if I don't necessarily have to?

Q: Wait a minute. You said you were in Yugoslavia. And where was your first meet supposed to be?

A: In Austria.

Q: Austria? You crossed the Yugoslav border into Austria?

A: Yes.

Q: With those TOP SECRET documents?

A: Yes. Illegally.

Q: Weren't you worried that they might be searching your bags?

A: Who? They had to see me first.

Q: Yeah, but when you crossed the border, don't they ask you if you have anything to declare?

A: You see, do you know the word Green Border?

Q: You mean a different border pass?

A: Go across the border where no official....

Q: With no problems.

A: No.

Q: On a train? A regular train pass? Nobody there?

A: I don't know what you imagine about crossing the border, but obviously we do have some misunderstanding. You're understanding is that illegally crossing the border is that I don't have a paper, but I officially go where everybody goes across the border. OK, is that what you understand?

Q: Wait. Border crossings, you have to stop in a vehicle...

A: Border crossings, OK, is that what you understand? OK, what I consider is an illegal border crossing is to cross the border somewhere in the dark.

Q: OK, we understand, we have a language problem. OK, when you crossed the border with those documents did you illegally cross away from the...

A: Away from, yeah.



Q: You got off the train and went somewhere else...You went back to Yugoslavia the same way?

A: Yeah.

Q: Where was it you crossed?

A: That is what I understand illegally crossing.

Q: OK, now the second time.

A: How do you call it in English? Learn me. Next time when I am going to be interviewed with somebody.

Q: Black.

A: OK, black. That's black.

Q: You got off the train, walked down a ways...

A: No, it was not a train. We don't have trains there.

Q: You drove to the border?

A: No.

Q: How did you get to the border? The second time you left, you said you tried to do it again.

A: Yeah, that was in Milan. That was the last.

Q: How did you get into Italy?

A: I crossed the border illegally.

Q: With the same documents?

A: With the same documents.

Q: And when you couldn't pass them then, you went back to Yugoslavia and gave them back.

A: And forgot about it.

Q: Who did you give the documents back to?

A: Again from the same person I got them from.

Q: The girl.

A: The boy. I didn't know the girl.

Q: Didn't you say...

A: I didn't know the people in the background...

Q: OK, so the boy...

A: ...participated in that chain. And I didn't want to.

Q: You just gave it back to the boy. He said He'd give it back to his girlfriend and take care of it?

A: Yeah.

Q: And that boy is the name that you provided?

A: Yeah.

Q: And that is the only people that you know?

A: No.

Q: Lots more?

A: ;There were 400 people in that school. And they reduced us to, what? 110? They reduced that to 70. and reduced that and reduced that. In the beginning I knew 400 people. I do know and I did know the best people.

Q: You did know?

A: As I was a good student, too.

Q: You said you do know those people. You know where they are?

A: Well, I don't know if they are still working, you know. But I do know them. As a person. If you was to draw me a picture today and say do you know that guy I would say, Oh, yeah, his name is that.

Q: Do you know anybody who may be working over here?

A: Only the name of a guy that I knew that he should work here. That time already. I placed his name down there.  
 Q: That's him. Your old friend. The one that....  
 A: No, no, no. Only make...should work in Germany. The other guy studied. He quit the police job, too. He wanted to be a lawyer.  
 Q: I don't understand. You lost me.  
 A: Well, you asked me a question about a guy who could be working here.  
 Q: Who could be working here?  
 A: I put down here a name and made a note, should work in Germany.  
 Q: How do you pronounce the name?  
 A: [REDACTED]  
 Q: [REDACTED]. He's the individual who provided you the TOP SECRET.  
 A: No.  
 Q: We're talking about two different people?  
 A: Two different people.  
 Q: Did you write down the individuals name that provided you the TOP SECRET document?  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: Ok, I couldn't see what you were writing.  
 A: Provided...Oh, no, and you're going to have my handwriting here. What do you think about that?  
 Q: We'll live with it. Nobody will see it.  
 A: You'll leave it them? What will you do with the tape afterwards?  
 Q: So you knew two individuals. The individual that might be here in Germany?  
 A: Yeah.  
 Q: And the other is the individual who actually provided you with the TOP SECRET document. Now that individual that provided you with the documents is the individual that you went to to try to arrange something to do against....  
 A: Yes.  
 Q: Did he say that he had been doing it in the past?  
 A: When you are talking about things like that normally try to confine yourself to essential questions because it is not necessary that I know...I do assume that's the same rule in your service, but in Yugoslavia, it is a strict rule, not to ask if you not have to and don't answer if you don't necessarily have to.  
 Q: Have you ever been polygraphed?  
 A: What? On a lie detector?  
 Q: Have you?  
 A: No. We don't trust in lie detectors.  
 Q: What do you trust? Beating it out of you or something?  
 A: In a society like now it is a question of who can trust who. It is always difficult, isn't it?  
 Q: Yes.  
 A: It is difficult for me to convince you gentlemen, it is difficult even to buy my stories, my explanations.  
 Q: If we weren't interested in and weren't willing to believe in, we wouldn't have brought you here.  
 A: I know.  
 Q: But now we're getting somewhere. We're getting names. It's important to get names. You understand...  
 A: Contacts. You have to start somewhere. Of course. One day the guy is going to apply for a visa to the United States and you can contact him, ask him to help you. He positively will help you, maybe, I don't know. Depends how you are going to approach him. Not like Germans. That's definitely not the way to approach people.

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I know what you mean. I positively do know what you mean. You do have to have names. Some possible contacts, you know. Possible informants that you can use.

Q: What we also want to know is what can you do?

A: But you see...

Q: For us if you wanted to.

A: That's what I wanted to say. I just wanted to say that. You just took it right out of my mouth. If you would like to get some information I think it's better to let someone that knows the people better than you do. Because it's a risk if you're going to talk to the guy.

Q: That's right.

A: How do you know if the guy changed in that time, you know? And he's going to say, Hey listen, I got an offer, he's going to accept it and afterwards he's going to accept it in order to find out how did you get his name.

Q: We're talking now.

A: It was just on a patriotic basis that time and because I personally do have sympathy for Americans and I still do have and I don't work for Germans. I'm going to be honest. Not necessarily help for Germans. I offered my services. And you did not contact me.

Q: What could you do now to help us if you wanted to? Anything?

A: Of course, you know, that in the beginning I would need some time.

Q: We understand that completely. I would just like to have you tell me what you could do if you wanted to.

A: Let's talk completely professionally. Explanations that you know and explanations that I know. Just talk professionally.

Q: I thought I was.

A: We have to search, check out the area, you know. Who do we have in which status. What type of situation do we have right now.

Q: But you feel that you are capable to do that?

A: I do feel capable, yes.

Q: OK, that's what we want to know.

A: Of course, I do feel capable. No matter which methods I would use. Standard method like...I don't know. Money, blackmail, I don't know what. First I would prefer some guys working on an ideologically basis. That is the strongest basis. To work with. Money is risk. Depends who offers more. Or blackmailing, suddenly the guy can say now I'm going to tell everybody everything. I'm going to my secret service and tell I did that and that because of...And here we are.

Q: OK, we, our government trusts a lie detector. Would you be willing to go on a lie detector and have them ask you the questions that we've been asking? Are you working for the Yugoslavian government? That type of question.

A: I would like to know the questions exactly that I would be asked.

Q: That's right. Before you are asked you sit down and you discuss the wording.

A: You are deferring to me. You think I couldn't understand English question after I helped to argue with Captains and Majors who are missing microfiche reports of every type?

Q: Normally that is done just to make sure that you understand. You said that there were a few words...

A: OK, there might be, yes, please, why not?

Q: If you prefer, it could be done in your native language.

A: I would like to hear the guy that is going to speak that language. Find out some familiar voice. I'm joking.

Q: You have no objections to being polygraphed?

A: Well, I said, it depends what the questions are going to be?

Q: You'll know what the questions are going to be before it even starts. You'll get to read through them, he'll explain it to you, in fact, the guy's very good about it. Very good about understanding as far as...

A: We have the same garbage.

Q: No, he's very good. He'll sit down and explain the whole thing to you, how it works.

A: We bought a damned expensive lie detector. As we tried to find out who made a cry if somebody killed five people in the year such and such. We checked so many people with that lie detector.

Q: So you have used them?

A: Oh, yeah.

Q: Just for criminal or for intelligence, also.?

A: For intelligence also.

Q: Then why don't they like them?

A: Because they still do think that even if you have some people with allegiance, is that the word? Allegiance. And if that people have been professionally trained to explain some stories, you know, they could explain it also under the lie detector. And with some type, how do you call that, suggestion? You can even cause that machine to...

Q: That's right. It's not infallable, but the thing is if they questioned someone and the individual said, no, I don't work for intelligence and the thing said it was a lie, then you know pretty sure that he was. It's good in that...

A: Well, it's good in that point. That's what I was trying to tell you.

Q: It's just an aid. It's not any final...

A: As I said, me, personally, I'm scared to come against lie detectors. I think generally in Yugoslavia we are scared to come against lie detectors.

Q: Yeah, but it's so tiring...

A: Even for crime investigations we don't use it, and besides it is forbidden, by law to use lie detectors in Yugoslavia, officially.

Q: For evidence in court.

A: Yeah. Even in during the investigation it is forbidden to use lie detectors.

Or chemical methods of any type. So we don't use them in crime investigations.

Risk is not so...somebody kills five people, so what?

Q: There are some things they can clarify.

A: Reaction of course, we would use it, or some chemical. Stuff, I don't know what.

Q: You can verify basic things, like, are you 38 years of age. Say yes or no. You say no...

A: Hey, I'm a totally broken person after so many years of traveling from one country to another, so I'm just wondering what is going to happen with that lie detector. Most probably going to burn out.

Q: Perhaps. OK, so you have no objections to being polygraphed. Providing you can check over the questions?

A: Yes.

Q: OK, no problem. If there are a few things that I could yet ask you because we never did get it out of you, OK? Specific dates, when you went to the school, when you left the school, when you made your trips, when you first left Yugoslavia.

A: No. Don't expect me to do that.

Q: You should be able to approximate the dates, you did with the Germans and the

Swiss, the months and years...

A: Approximate? I made a definite dates, didn't I? To Germans and Swiss?

Q: Maybe to them, but not to us. So now do it for us. When...

A: I have to approximate right now. I didn't do that before.

Q: When did you go to school? From when to when?

A: They are the dates that I know, you know. 29 September '69. I'm getting old.

Q: '69?

A: Yeah.

Q: That's when you entered school?

A: Yes. To 28 June '72.

Q: '72? A three year school?

A: Yeah, thereotically it's three years of school.

Q: OK, then what from June '72?

A: Well, then you have additional training, you see. Then I worked for one month on the border. I don't know was that...Oh, no. Hey, I cannot guarantee anything.

Q: As best as you can remember. Right after school you went to the border. For one month.

A: Yeah, I think so.

Q: OK, June to July. Then how about August.

A: In August I went to Zagut. That's the capital town of Karosch. And I had there one intelligence course.

Q: An intelligence course? Who taught it? Government? Military?

A: Everybody. A little bit of everybody. It was to provide you overview, basic principles, methods...

Q: Then what?

A: And that stuff took five, six months.

Q: From August to...

A: To December.

Q: To December? This was all in '72?

A: Yeah, but besides that we worked, too. I have to emphasize that.

Q: Yeah.

A: Not always, but sometimes we had tasks.

Q: Starting in January '73, where did you go?

A: I didn't start anywhere. I quit the job.

Q: You quit in January of '73?

A: Officially I quit the job on 16 December '72, already.

Q: Then what did you do?

A: Before I quit the job, it was not accepted. That I quit the job. I did get back my workbook, you know, in Yugoslavia, you have workbooks. Employment certificates, you know. That was the time as I contacted, December or January, that was the time as I contacted American consulate first. I think.

Q: Then what?

A: I found a job in travel agency. That was in January, maybe 8th of January, I think.

Q: That was in Yugoslavia?

A: Yes. And three days later they arrested me on the street. Because I didn't have my papers. Who did? My ex-girlfriend did. Wearing unifrom, anyway, wearing uniform, you know.

Q: You didn't have your papers with you?

A: Oh, yeah, I did have, but the papers have to be checked, you know. They told me that they were sorry, they actually were sorry.

Q: Papers for what?

A: Well, ID cards.

Q: You didn't have your ID card with you?

A: Oh, yeah, but they have to check it, so I would have...

Q: A set-up?

A: Yeah, a set-up. They told me it was a set-up. They knew it was a set-up. They were sorry about it. I think they today are still sorry about it.

Q: OK, so then you went to jail.

A: Just for one day.

Q: Then what?

A: Just for one day. Then well, a couple nights visit in the jail. The guys trying to tell me it doesn't work like that. I cannot just simply quit a job after I been trained for certain work and after the state pays so and so much money and I should change my mind. Because that job that I got right now, I cannot work there any more.

Q: Then what?

A: Well, I refused any type of cooperation, so they have to set me free, you know. The police know they can only keep you up to a certain time. Well, then I found another job. Oh, OK, it was in a hotel reception.

Q: You worked as a receptionist...

A: I did not. I was supposed to. Because as soon as they found out that I applied for...well, it was unfortunate actually, the lady who was the personnel officer who was interviewing the applicants, saw my certificate. She said, Oh, look at that, she said. You are a good student there. You know that I know that and that guy who is the chief of such and such. I help him out in that regard, you know, his people working in our hotel, that's perfect. She was glad, you know, and I couldn't say, Hey, Lady, don't do that, you know. Exactly that's what she did.

Q: You didn't get that job?

A: No, because they arrested me.

Q: Again?

A: Again. put me in prison for three days with an explanation that time Bachlafée the guy from Iran came to visit and passed another law, you know, tramps....

Q: Vagrants.

A: ...yeah, clean the streets, you know. For three days. So they kept me there. They said, well, what should he do here. So I didn't get third job, second job. Then I got a third job. I went to another republic. I went to Zagart (PH). To a little town of Kosha. To the travel agency. Said here, most probably here I'm going to have now possibility to work since it's another republic, you know like another state in the States. And I got a job there. I been working for, what, two days? And I had to go to my republic, officially, you know, and I'm sitting on the train at 2 o'clock in the morning and the guy in uniform passed by and saw me and it, unfortunately was a guy that didn't like me. He was not my school friends. He was an older guy, you know. But you know as I was now out of a job, I didn't want to have it, and I couldn't find another job, a lot of people that could be considered as my enemies had a feeling of satisfaction. Now they could. Here's the problem. So they came into the train, took me out of the train, again checking my papers. Always the same. What can you do? That's how the story ended again. They found all the papers that I had that I'm working there and there company and they arrange with the company somehow, you know. That I couldn't go back to work again. Since they told them I still...And that was third work. That was third job. A fourth job. God knows, I had so many jobs.

Q: So you worked odd jobs for a while?

A: For one day, you know, made all possible efforts to get it and then lost it.

Q: How were you living, borrowing money? From your folks to pay your food bill.

A: That's a good question. How did I live at the time? I have couple of relatives down there, too. And I had a couple of friends that helped me, too.

Q: They just loaned you money to get you by. When was it that you first came to or first left illegally and you wound up in Germany?

A: That I first left and came to Switzerland? 5th of July.

Q: Of '73?

A: Yes. That was after they cancelled my last job. After I lost my last job I couldn't do it any more. It was too much.

Q: Then you went to Switzerland?

A: Yes.

Q: How long were you in Switzerland?

A: I been there illegally working on the farm of that guy and working as a waiter there in a certain hotel two months. Illegally. After two months because the Swiss guy didn't know the whole situation. He didn't know that I was there illegally.

Q: OK, so you worked there for two months and then you came to Germany?

A: No, I worked there for two months and afterwards I contacted the police. First I contacted a refugee organization and wanted to provide information on how to... what to do. And they told me to call the police and the gentleman said, well, OK. I'm going to talk to him and talked to the people several times. Several days and the guy from Bern came to town. But they didn't put me in prison. They took away my papers and made some copies of that. Took my ID card and gave me a certificate of each ticket and they said go ahead and look around.

Q: That was roughly September, then that you talked to the police?

A: Yeah. And then I found a job for starting 25th September '73 and I was working in an insurance company.

Q: It was what? The Zurich Insurance?

A: Yes.

Q: That's in Zurich, too, right?

A: Yes.

Q: So you were living there in Zurich the entire time?

A: Yes.

Q: Then when did you come to Germany?

A: Third of May maybe.

Q: Of the next year?

A: '74, yeah.

Q: You worked at the insurance company the whole time?

A: Yes. I always liked to work without interruption if the people will let me. I don't care what type of work.

Q: OK, then came to Germany 3 May '74. When were you thrown out of Germany?

A: 30 September.

Q: 30 September?

A: Yes.

Q: OK, and that was the trip when you wound up back in Yugoslavia?

A: Yes.

Q: OK, then you were in jail from roughly...

A: Not roughly, I know. From 10th of October '76, no...

Q: '74.

A: '74, to 10th September '76.

Q: OK. Then in September '76 you got out and three days later you went to the West.

A: Couple of days later, yeah. And here I was again.

Q: And you've been here ever since, huh? That's not bad. You've been here almost three years. Two years.

A: Do you like such a life if you get a residence permit extended for six months. That you can make no plans at all.

Q: It's better than Yugoslavian prison. Right?

A: I'm aware of that fact, believe me.

Q: When was that trip to Switzerland, the last time?

A: It is better than prison, but it is not a good life, either. I'm getting older.

Q: When was that last trip to Switzerland? Just a couple of months ago when you were arrested?

A: 6th of August. Something like that. August.

Q: OK, Mr. [REDACTED], do you have any questions for Mr. [REDACTED] Yeah, when you were initially sent to prison in Yugoslavia did they confiscate your clothes?

A: Yes.

Q: And did they also confiscate any and all monies that you had on you?

A: Confiscate? What do you consider as confiscate?

Q: Take away from you?

A: And not give it back?

Q: Yes.

A: No. But they positively checked everything.

Q: Approximately how much money did you have prior to going into prison?

A: That's a good question. 250 Marks I spent for the lawyer immediately. You see, just for that short visit. 600 so much that I spent for flight tickets. I don't know how much I had. Definitely had some.

Q: Do you know approximately how much you had left over before you went into jail?

A: I'll have to think about. I did have some money, but I didn't have all that much. But I did have to change some Germany money to our money, but I still had money. I don't have slightest idea. Not much, I'm sure I didn't have much since I spent all that...

Q: Did you have access to any other accounts? Did you have a bank book that you could draw money on?

A: After I went to prison?

Q: Yes.

A: Oh, no.

Q: Did you have any bank books in your possession?

A: A guy working for a government in Yugoslavia? Being rich?

Q: Did you make any money while you were in prison?

A: Yes.

Q: And how much did that come to?

A: That I know exactly. I had 176, 000 dinars. How much is that? I don't know how much is that. It would be approximately 200 Marks in German currency.

Q: Now before you left Yugoslavia did you get any more money from anybody?

A: No.

Q: You had 200 Marks, approximately, payment before you left prison and they gave you the money that you had before you went into prison back.

A: Yes.

Q: Or did that 200 Marks include that money that you went to prison with?

A: No, the money that I went with, they deposited so that you could use it when you wanted to buy something in prison.

Q: Did you use that money while you were in prison?

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A: Yeah, of course I did.

Q: And they gave you 200 Marks approximately...

A: Yeah, yeah.

Q: OK. Did you receive any other monies during your travels, to Italy...

A: You know what you are going to ask me? How did I pay that stupid rail way tickets. I know what you are going to ask me. The railway ticket up to Zurich cost exactly, if I can remember, maybe 54 Marks. You had to...that's a bunch of money in Yugoslavia. Could be half your months pay depends what type of job you have.

Q: From Italy all the way into Zurich cost 54 Marks.

A: Yeah, if I can...I had a railway ticket. Would you like to have copy of it? My lawyer does have it. And you can exactly find out how much that costs.

Q: Where did you initially take the train from?

A: OK, you know Goritza ? You don't know, maybe you do know, maybe you are specialists. Maybe you been to Yugoslavia. I don't know. Anyhow, Goritza, that's on the border on Yugoslavia. That's divided into parts. Yugoslav part. Another part is Italian. The people speak my mother's language. Let's say it like that. So I took a train there, but on Italian side. You have two railway terminals, you know.

Q: And what route by rail did you take? To Italy?

A: I took Italy?

Q: Well, through Italy.

A: Through Italy I went...

Q: You say that you went through..

A: Oh, yeah, I do know that. The first train from Goritza to, God what is the name of that...I went to Milan, but I have to change a train. And the name of the place was...If you had a map, I could tell you the name of the place where I changed the train. You have to. There is no direct connection between Goritza and Milan.

Q: From Vincinza/Verona area?

A: No, no. That's just a short way. Pretty short way. Just take a normal train that stops on each stop. What was the name of the place? Mon Falcone is that a name? I think is a name they call it. Yeah.

Q: And from there...

A: Yeah. I think Mon Falcone is the name of the place I changed the train.

Q: Milano Bozano....

A: Milano, no just Milano. I got off train in Milano and took another train to Kersa. In Kersa, got out of the train, you know, got wet.

Q: Crossed over?

A: It was raining. Definitely, believe me. And so on the Swiss side I took a train again. Oh, the name of the place, what was the name of the place? It is not Kersa, oh, it is Kersa. No, it is not. Oh, no, trying to remember. Well, anyhow on the Swiss side I took a train again.

Q: A train up to Zurich?

A: And then I went, yeah, I went directly to Zurich. Directly. Without interruption. And from Zurich I went to Basel, back again over the border, take a train again.

Q: Can you explain all the ways that you crossed these borders?

A: The Swiss were deeply impressed about it. How I passed the border. How do I chose a place to get across the border? That was unfortunately a part of my education. So I could use it afterwards. Well, OK, normally, I choose, I did choose, I chose a place suitable is a town that is divided into different areas. Or where...

Q: Where the border meets on both sides?

A: Because there are people. There is always an explanation if you are caught. You don't know it. So Grietza for instance, is a town like that. OK? And Kiasas is the same. Basel, the same.

Q: It is just a matter of just walking from one end of the town to the other?

A: Yeah. Find some suitable place, it could be a garden, or some little suburb of the town, you know. But still that you have an explanation that you are here actually and here are people and if someone is trying to get back across the border in the daylight nobody is going to say, Hey listen, this guy is going across the border illegally. Especially there are some people having gardens divided across into two different states. And this is the case in these areas. So, that's the way I cross the border normally. And besides you have immediate possibilities of getting some bus or railway connections out and you can disappear out of that area. Except in the Yugoslavia side we have guards on that side of the border, that is not always the case here, so in Yugoslavia is dangerous to get across the border. You must know the person who is familiar with the border to say go this way. That is OK, I know it, because I'm working here. That is what I did.

Q: If there were maps available, would you be willing to...

A: Certainly. May I use your toilet, please? ---- Why don't you just fire me, please. Or just let me go, let's say, like that?

Q: Let you go? You haven't done anything yet. As far as I can see, I don't see any reason for you to lose your job.

A: But I do see it.

Q: What?

A: Who in hell in the world would keep a guy in that type of sensitive position, is that a sensitive position since we are processing some classified information that was never classified before and suddenly now it is classified? And I would need to have a memory like that to keep that 50 boxes of reports in my mind or have God knows what type of camera or decolorator, maybe, to make....

Q: Do you think you are a security risk? Do you think you are?

A: Well, I tell you, that's why I do not agree with that conversation. I have nothing against you, but you know, if I would be you, sitting there interviewing you, I would say, Hey, I'm not quite sure. But anyhow. Why take a risk, if you don't necessarily have to. What for?

Q: Let's put it this way. Don't quit your job. Your job hasn't come up.

A: I beg your pardon?

Q: You losing your job has not come up. You are being talked to because you made certain disclosures to him regarding your background.

A: You know why? I have to emphasize that here. Is that tape recorder on? I was asked to fill out some forms. About a security clearance. My personnel and me. And I talked to my boss and said I don't see any possibilities to get a security clearance because I am coming from Yugoslavia. I didn't say that I am working some strange job there. But I said and besides that I don't have a residency permit for Germany, so why should I get a clearance and I be here just for a year and a half. So if I am going to give some references people to contact, what are you going to do, go down to Yugoslavia and contact them? So I said, I don't see any use to fill out that form. And the lady said OK, and when the German come I'm going to let you know. And explain the story why you don't want to fill it out. And that was it and he came and went to get some information about some people. And I said I, Hey, listen, I understand your job, I did the same. Besides that I was assuming that you knew. That would be for me a normal thing based on my Yugoslavian standpoint. OK? Somebody

would apply for a job in our Army automatically an application would be forwarded to a certain people being responsible for internal security. Automatically checks would be made. That's what I thought, so I said OK, I have nothing to hide. They most probably do know that I am here. And as I said, I do not consider myself a security risk, so don't get so... Why should I be afraid? And I shocked the gentleman as I told him I had been working. And he said he didn't know nothing about it.

Q: Well, now we know and there is still no one saying you're going to lose your job.

A: And from that moment, I consider myself a security risk. Because if you'll let me work for two years that I was assuming that you did know I was here, and you did not know, and now you do know and most positively you are going to...

Q: Well, let's not look at it from the viewpoint of your job or not your job. Because your job is not at stake here. There is no reason to fire you and there is no reason for you to quit. If you have told us everything and if you've been truthful.

A: Of course, I've been truthful! Jesus.

Q: What we'll do from here is we'll sit down and type up a transcript of the recording, you know, of everything that's been said...

A: That's what our people been doing, too, you know. That's why I hate tape recorders. I hate all type of tape recorders, small or big, believe me. But it's a good way.

Q: Yeah, but it's accurate. We don't transpose, we don't lie about what you've said...

A: I know about your methods. I had to positively study them. We have been instructed not to use a pencil and a notebook at all. Because it makes a bad impression on the person that you are interviewing. Now he's writing down what I said. Did I say it correctly? Or is that true? If you could just have a normal discussion having a tape recorder that a person does not see. I know your way, though.

Q: It's open. It's about as open as you can get.

A: Not here. Now in Yugoslavia what you are going to discuss is going to be recorded.

Q: In secret. Yeah, we like to have everything up front. To let you know where you stand.

A: That's type of psychologically...

Q: Not really. You know you are being recorded. We know you are being recorded.

A: I would assume that I am being recorded on your tape recorder right now.

Q: We have different types of rights.

A: Beg your pardon?

Q: I said, our rights are a little different.

A: Yeah, obviously they are.

Q: And we try and make it as fair as possible. In any case, we'll analyze what's been said...

A: I'm going to be surprised if tomorrow I go to the employment office and try to find a job.

Q: Well, don't quit your job. You like your job, and you do a good job. I wouldn't quit it. You are not going to quit your job, are you?

A: Would you like me to be honest?

Q: There is no reason to quit your job.

A: I most probably will. If you want me to be honest.

Q: Why? It's up to you, but we're not going to fire you. In other words, I don't care what you do myself, but if you like your job, I wouldn't quit. We're not going to fire you.

A: I know that statement. I know it. I know that statements in an employment contract because of reasons of national security.

Q: You mean clearance?

A: Not only clearance, to fire somebody.

Q: If you want to quit your job, that's up to you. But you're not going to gain anything by quitting your job. We're not asking you to.

A: It's better to have quit a job than to have lose a job. Listen, you if anybody has reason not to believe anybody in this world, it's me. Not because I would be professionally deformed like maybe the people are, maybe sceptical.

Q: Well, how long ago did you mention this thing to Mr. [REDACTED] Quite a while ago, right? Well, you weren't fired then. Why do you think you'll be fired now?

A: Honestly, I knew that you were going to contact me. Because before I would fire somebody, I would try to get some information from them. Why not?

Q: Well, quit if you want to, but don't blame us. We have nothing to do with it.

A: I'm not blaming anybody.

Q: I personally wouldn't quit. I wouldn't quit either, because I don't think you're going to lose your job.

A: As I came to Germany as I talked to the people, to say what I would do, that's how do you call it? Do you call it golden bridge? Do you call it golden bridge?

Q: You make it sound like you have something to hide.

A: Don't you call it golden bridge? That's what we call it. Golden bridge. You know try to get to...

Q: You sound like you're trying to hide something. That's why you want to quit.

A: I'm not hiding. I'm just talking out of my experience. I'm sorry. I've burned my fingers too, too often. Because of nothing. Do you understand me? I lost 55 jobs just because of...

Q: 55?

A: That's a word, that's a number that I like to use to explain the quantity.

Although I do appreciate what you've told me last time. If I'm not going to work for Americans, I'm going to work for another company. So,....

Q: Except that the other company may come, may ask some questions.

A: Even if I'm going to serve drinks in a bar somewhere? You can make a lot of money on tips.

Q: It's up to you. Do what you want, but we don't see any reason to fire you. I don't see any reason to fire you.

A: Not you, the people.

Q: What people?

A: I'll be responsible to make decisions afterwards and the risk should be calculated. And I don't know what's coming up in the DPI, but I do understand that we are going to process more classified information. I don't know if we are going up to SECRET level or not, but supposing we are, and I stay in a position that I would...Just look. Consider the situation logical. If I would stay in my position and my people with clearances are going to have to check the reports, they are most probably going to need some assistance. So I have to check the reports. Unfortunately I have exactly that position. I didn't want to have it. I emphasize that. They offered it to me because nobody wanted to have it.

Q: I understand you've been having some problems at work lately. Getting along with people, losing your temper, becoming a little belligerent, telling people to go stick it up their...

A: Yes.

Q: What's that for?

A: Well, the good management that we have in our house for a period of about three

months. I liked to work as Mr. Duffey was here. Everybody, not just me. Everybody liked to work there.

Q: You got along with [REDACTED] pretty good?

A: Yes. [REDACTED] I consider Mr. [REDACTED] as a friend.

Q: Did you socialize with him?

A: Yes.

Q: Quite a bit?

A: Well, depends what you consider as a bit.

Q: How often did you go out to eat?

A: Well, not often, but we did go out sometimes.

Q: Talk shop?

A: Because what I understood was that his step-father was coming from Yugoslavia.

Q: Did you ever ask him to sponsor you?

A: Well, we talked about going to the States, too. I don't think that I asked him to sponsor me. That's not a question that you ask somebody. What he suggested to me was just to go to the States just to see if I'm going to like it. Afterwards, we're going to see what we can do and he said he would help me if he could.

Q: Have you stayed in contact with him since he went back to the States?

A: No.

Q: You'd still like to go to the United States?

A: It was just an idea, I told you to be somewhere, not be disturbed. Or interrupted when you wanted to work, you know. Did you finally consider that I'm going to stay the full five years now and I can find an apartment, buy furniture because I don't have to sell it afterwards for a cheap price, whatever, you know, just to make some plans. I'm going to study that, learn that, you know.

Q: Did you and Mrs. [REDACTED] ever socialize?

A: No. But she was a fair type of manager. And afterwards Mr. [REDACTED] came in the position and he didn't have any slightest idea about the work. Really. And if I don't have idea, if I'm not familiar with the circumstances, being first time in a foreign country, European circumstances, you know, I'm not trying to change every thing immediately. Because I came here. That's the biggest mistake that all managers do. So he tried to change all the things here, reduced my personnel, took them to his division, because they are going to do my work and afterwards they did not do my work and I'm here without people. Now I have to work more because I don't have people. You see nothing changes, so what are I going to tell. That I'm an outspoken person, I'm not going to say, Listen, Mr. [REDACTED], I'm very satisfied, I'm very happy to be here. I'm not.

Q: So, you're not really happy with your job?

A: No, I'm not happy. If you're trying to convince me today that I have a nice job, I don't have a nice job. Not right now, at least.

Q: So, that's one reason why you're thinking about quitting?

A: That's another reason why I'd quit, too.

Q: In fact, you've told some people you'd thought about quitting, haven't you?

A: I've already applied for a couple of jobs. And the first job I'm going to get is going to be...I was even willing to accept a lower graded job. Because in the final stage I would just lose 40 Marks before taxes and that's nothing.

Q: Where all have you applied for other jobs?

A: Well, no, I just sent an application to, you know, your Army. The first application was in your Army, anyhow. I applied for assistant support. I wanted

to go to assistant support. To get some more education on data processing. Anyhow, as I say that application is still being kept on file in CPO whenever I would have a chance to get a job that would be suitable, I'm going to take it. That's true. That's why I also, you know...

Q: Have you ever provided any information available to you in the DPI to anyone other than employees of DPI? Have you ever given away information on DPI?

A: No. That's, you know, I do have FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY clearance, and like that. That's of no effect, you know, also from the past, and the same as I would Swiss...Internal things you shouldn't discuss with strange people. I don't know their clearance. If I say I'm not satisfied, I'm not the only person who says I'm not satisfied, I'm just maybe the loudest. And if I do say so, then I think so.

Q: So you haven't been giving away secrets?

A: Secrets of what?

Q: Our secrets.

A: Your secrets?

Q: Confidential type, program secrets.

A: I don't know anything about it.

Q: But the people who work for you do.

A: No, they don't have clearances. But now Mr. [REDACTED] left, OK? You know, the problem was actually, [REDACTED] was chief of the divisions. Operations and chief of the management division, too. And automatically my boss through that. And if I, as chief of Input-Output Control, should discover some errors that have been made within our DPI and point it out to the operators, besides that I'm pointing out my boss. That's a type of difficult situation. That's a type of dumb situation. That's what has been the case all the time. So now he has left, back to Operations. But now I'm short of people. And I don't see that I'm working six days a week. Just because I don't have sufficient people and I don't know when I'm going to have a day off, since I worked so many days. And I'm getting nervous. That's a high pressure position, you know.

Q: Do you consider yourself stable?

A: Not any more.

Q: Emotionally. Do you take pills?

A: You know what you mean? That somebody's going to say, Hey, listen, guy, we're going to help, you know, now provide us with some information. No. I do consider myself...I told you. I have limits. Buy passports, I wouldn't buy it. Steal a passport, I wouldn't buy it. But go across the border illegally, I'd do it. Hell, I'm not satisfied. This this and this has to be changed.

Q: Are you taking any medication or pills?

A: No. I don't smoke, I don't drink. No pills.

Q: How do you work off your nerves?

A: That sometimes is not easy.

Q: So what do you do?

A: Go to a restaurant, have a nice beer, and go to sleep. Or eat something. Or just forget, you know. When I leave the office, I don't want to know anything about the office any more.

Q: What is your address now, you say? Your home address?

A: Didn't you ask before? If you don't mind, I wouldn't like for that paper to be here, OK?

Q: Do what?

A: Would you make, maybe some notes? On your paper and give that paper back to me.

Q: Of your address?

A: Yeah, or the street, whatever. No, I mean all the paper, all that notes.

BUSC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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Q: We'll keep all that.  
A: I would like to keep all that, you do understand?  
Q: Why?  
A: Why? Supposing one day Yugoslavs might get that...  
Q: This piece of paper is not going with it. That's just being used as an assistance to the tape. For spelling of names. Don't worry about it. That's a note.  
A: But they are written by me, you know.  
Q: Just like those notes that we've written over there. All those are going to....  
A: OK, but even if they would not be, they are notes that I did not write, so I still could say that is not information that I provided.  
Q: I doubt if...  
A: But there is positive proof that I...  
Q: They won't get hold of our report.  
A: How do you know they won't? You always have to calculate the risk. That is our mentality.  
Q: These papers....  
A: There always is possibility they will.  
Q: This is going to be destroyed.  
A: We have a presumption they will. That's how we are handling our jobs.  
Q: All we can say is we'll do our best to protect your identity from the Yugoslavs and your locale.  
A: Well that doesn't help me a lot you know. I do know what you are going to do. But it doesn't help me a lot. As I was down in Yugoslavia deported from Germany and Switzerland, I had to find some good, good explanation and stories as to why I spent so many months in Switzerland and Germany without any papers. I had to find some good, good damn stories and had to find out what did they have, did they have something?  
Q: What stories did you give them?  
A: All possible stories. But they obviously, fortunately, did not have any information. Or they did not want to tell me. They might have reasons.  
Q: Ok, if they were going to....  
A: And I'm in the same situation right now.  
Q: Analyze this stuff and then what we're probably going to do is, in another week or two, schedule you for a polygraph examination to verify some points such as your school, dates of travel, the fact of your not giving away any classified, the fact that you're not working for any other intelligence agency. You pass that stuff, you're OK.  
A: You think I would be able to work for an intelligence agency and I would work for an intelligence agency with my principles that I have. The Germans told me to steal a passport...Yes, I was asking myself why I did not. Why I did not buy it. Jesus Christ, thousands of people did that. Why I did not contact some people in Yugoslavia and said, Hey, listen, give me a passport, my name is such and such. I don't going to disappear. I do have people who are using passports.  
Q: Where in Frankfurt can you buy a passport?  
A: Oh, everybody knows that.  
Q: I don't. Tell me.  
A: You don't? Just go to the railway station. Contact some guys. Of course, don't go and say...  
Q: Some guys?  
A: Yeah. Just contact some dealers. They are there.  
Q: Oh, you know who they are?

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

A: I don't know who they are, but I know that they are there. Definitely, they are.  
Q: Just, kind of mosey around and say, Hey, I need a passport...  
A: No. It depends. It does not work the first time, but you can get some...  
Q: Contacts?  
A: Contacts. What is it about? Depends if the guy trusts you or not. I have some people living in Germany, Yugoslav people, so I would just have to contact them. There are some people from Yugoslavia, for sure, working here as normal workers.  
Q: Who?  
A: Who? There are half a million of people here.  
Q: You would just go to one of them and ask....  
A: Well, it would depend who would be suitable. Go to somebody, you know...  
Q: Do you have any close friends that are from Yugoslavia that you could get a passport from?  
A: No. As I told you, I have no contacts with Yugoslavs here in Germany. But to get a falsificated passport here in Germany wouldn't be a big deal. Definitely it would not be a big deal. And if I would have done that, my life would have been much easier.  
Q: Unless you have any other questions, we're going to terminate the interview. That will be the end of it for today. In fact, until I get back with which should be a week or two, providing you're still employed, providing you don't quit, that is. If you don't quit, we'll get back to you. Then we'll have the polygraph. If you pass the poly, you're OK. If you don't pass the poly, then we talk some more.  
A: Well, I would just have one question. How in hell and why in hell are you following me downtown.  
Q: Actually, I'm not following you. I just ran into you when my wife and I were downtown shopping.  
A: Did you? Did you? Where was that?  
Q: Hertie's  
A: And I didn't see you?  
Q: You were standing right next to me. That'll teach you.  
A: That's a big mistake.  
Q: Mr. [REDACTED] going to run you back to where ever it is you need to go in Kaiserslautern. Here's the keys to whichever car it is out there. That's it, so...  
A: OK.



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IAGPE-TCI 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

28 DEC 1978

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FH)(77-213)(U)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SO)  
APO 09403

1. (U) References:

a. Electrical message, IAGPE-KD, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, DTG 191505Z December 1978, subject as above.

b. Report of Investigation (ROI), 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, 31 October 1978, subject as above with seven Agent Report (AREPT) inclosures, attached.

c. ROI, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, 15 September 1978, subject as above with three AREPT inclosures, attached.

d. AREPT, 66th Military Intelligence Group, 2 August 1978, subject as above, attached.

e. FONECON, [REDACTED] (ODCSI USAREUR), [REDACTED] (66th Military Intelligence Group), 20 December 1978, subject as above.

f. Polygraph Examination Authorization (DA Form 2805), IAGPE-TCI, 66th Military Intelligence Group, pertaining to SUBJECT, attached.

2. (U) The attached ROIs and AREPTs are forwarded for your information and disposition. DA Form 2805 is forwarded for your approval. (b)(1)

3. [X] This investigation [REDACTED] SUBJECT is employed by USAREUR and is suspected of being involved in espionage. The investigation revealed that he had been assigned to the 6th Operations Group of the Yugoslavian State Security Service prior to his defection

Classified by Para4b, AR381-12, 18 Oct 74  
Review on 31 December 1998

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CF: DLUR, INSCUM (IASU) W/3 Incl only

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 DEC 1978

IAGPE-TCI

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)(77-213)(U)

from Yugoslavia in 1974. During the interview of SUBJECT, he admitted his past employment with the Yugoslavian Intelligence Service (YIS), volunteered to be polygraphed [REDACTED] (paragraph 1, reference 1a, above).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Original Signed*

4 Incl  
as

KENNETH E. HALLOWAY  
COL, MI  
Director of Operations

CF:  
DCDR, INSCOM (IASO) w/3 incl only  
CDR, 527TH MI BN (IAGPE-KD) w/o incl

b USC 552 (b) (7) (G)

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Background or Complaint) For use of this form, see AR 381-130; the proponent agency is OACSI.				DATE SUBMITTED <b>31 OCT 1978</b>	
SCOPE (If background) <input type="checkbox"/> LAC <input type="checkbox"/> GAC <input type="checkbox"/> PBI <input type="checkbox"/> CBI				CASE CLASSIFICATION	
IDENTIFYING DATA					
1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED] (FN), AKA: [REDACTED]		2. SSN	3. RACE	4. GRADE	5. ARM OR SVC
6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT Chief, Document Control		7. DATE OF BIRTH	8. PLACE OF BIRTH		
9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Automatic Data Processing Service Center DPI-M130, 21st Support Command, APO 09325		10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS			
11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.)		12. DATE (Incident cases only)		13. TIME (Incident cases only)	
14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building) Kaiserslautern, Germany		15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.			
CONTROL DATA					
16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO. 77-213		17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization) 527th MI Bn, APO NY 09227		18. CONTROL OFFICE 66th MI GP I&S (PROV) APO NY 09108	
INVESTIGATIVE DATA					
19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY 66th MI GP I&S		20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION AR 381-12			
21. DATE INVESTIGATION COMMENCED Sep 1977		COMPLETED			
22. STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> TERMINATED <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED <input type="checkbox"/> PENDING					
23. SYNOPSIS Reference: DA 342, dated 15 September 1978, subject as above. (b)(1) (S) On 28 September 1978, [REDACTED] disclosed the following information pertaining to SUBJECT: [REDACTED] At the Gasthaus Source saw SUBJECT and two other individuals sitting at a table nearby. SUBJECT, upon seeing Source, introduced the two individuals to Source. They conversed for a few minutes after which SUBJECT and the two individuals returned to their table. [REDACTED] CLASSIFIED BY: AR 381-12 dtd 18 Oct 74 EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY: Upon Approval of ACSI, DA					
24. DISTRIBUTION 3-CDR, 66th MI GP I&S (PROV), ATTN: IAGPE-TCI 3-CDR, 527th MI Bn, ATTN: IAGPE-KD 146 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)					
25. REVIEWED BY TYPED NAME AND TITLE [REDACTED], GS-13, Spec Asst Ops					

DA FORM 342  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 342, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

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Report of Investigation (dated 31 OCT 1978 )  
DA Form 342

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)

AKA: [REDACTED]

DPOB: [REDACTED]

23. (b) Synopsis (continued)

[REDACTED] concerned REFORGER and the number of Russians troops on the Chinese border. Source saw SUBJECT later on that same day in HIS office, but he did not see the two individuals who had been with SUBJECT during lunch hour. The two individuals who were with SUBJECT at lunch time were introduced to Source as being from the ADPSC M-126, Kleber Kaserne, Kaiserslautern. Source was unable to remember the individuals' names. (5) On 28 September 1978, SUBJECT was interviewed as a co-worker in connection to a Limited Access Authorization investigation, at which time HE disclosed additional information concerning HIMSELF as follows: SUBJECT, who had disclosed information concerning HIS contacts with the Yugoslav government to USAI at an earlier date, wondered if HE should be looking for another job, due to these contacts. SUBJECT also indicated that HIS first contact with US Intelligence was in January 1973, when HE contacted a member of the US General Consulate in Zrinjevac, Yugoslavia by the name of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] provided SUBJECT with several addresses in the US where HE could contact representatives of the US intelligence. SUBJECT used the name of [REDACTED] during all contacts and correspondence with US intelligence. SUBJECT stated that HE sent license numbers of Yugoslav personnel in the West to the addresses. SUBJECT indicated that HE never was able to appear at the scheduled meetings, no further information. SUBJECT disclosed that in June 1978, HE was asked by the refugee authorities in Basel, Switzerland, to come to their office for an unspecified reason. SUBJECT took the train from Kaiserslautern, FRG, to Basel, where HE missed the proper stop to get off the train. Because of this, SUBJECT was arrested by the Swiss authorities for illegal entry into Switzerland. HE was in the Basel jail for two days after which time HE was released and returned to Kaiserslautern by train. SUBJECT had no other foreign travel. SUBJECT has a limitation put upon HIM by the German authorities which restricts HIS residence to the Kaiserslautern county area but HE was under the impression that there were no travel restrictions placed upon HIM. (6) On 2 October 1978, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was interviewed concerning SUBJECT. Source and SUBJECT know each other since the first week of July 1978. Since [REDACTED] is the supervisor of the Document Control Branch, ADPSC M-130, Source tried to establish good liaison with SUBJECT'S office, because on times they have to rely on each other's services. Source and SUBJECT met socially on several occasions, having dinner or lunch together. SUBJECT told Source that HE had a Masters Degree in Political Science and that HE had attended a military junior college in Yugoslavia. SUBJECT indicated to Source that at one time HE tried to continue HIS studies at Munich, Germany, but was unable to obtain a quota. After finishing HIS studies in Yugoslavia, HE contacted a friend in Munich to find out what the job situation looked like. HIS friend suggested to HIM that HE check in the Kaiserslautern area for employment.

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Report of Investigation (dated 31 OCT 1978 )  
DA Form 342

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)

AKA: [REDACTED]

DPOB: [REDACTED]

23. (C) Synopsis (continued)

SUBJECT is fluent in the German, Russian, French, English and Italian languages. SUBJECT had attended a Management Development Course, which was sponsored by the Civilian Personnel Office at Kaiserslautern. According to Source, SUBJECT seems to be financially well-off because HE dresses well. Source is suspicious that SUBJECT may be involved in intelligence activities because of HIS general demeanor, HIS background, and the similarities between SUBJECT and the information he learned about the KGB from a book he read recently. (7) On 16 October 1978, Source 2212-4890 revealed that [REDACTED], DPOB: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is presently residing at [REDACTED] where HE has HIS secondary residence and at [REDACTED] where HE has HIS primary residence. (8)

In addition to the above, records reviewed of the Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, revealed that SUBJECT was promoted to C-6, effective 1 September 1978. In HIS official personnel file, DA Form 2784-R, indicating no record, was located. (9) On 16 October 1978, Source 2212-4039 revealed that SUBJECT was in Switzerland from October 1973 to 3 May 1974. At that time, HE had applied for political asylum in Switzerland but at the same time HE travelled to the FRG. Due to this, SUBJECT was returned to Switzerland from where HE was deported to HIS native country by the Swiss authorities. SUBJECT reappeared in Kaiserslautern in 1976 at which time HE requested political asylum in the FRG. SUBJECT carries an Alien Passport (Fremdenpass), which has to be extended every six months. SUBJECT, who entered the FRG illegally and requested political asylum in the FRG was given 'Duldung' (toleration) by the German authorities. Due to this, HE is restricted in residence, travel and employment to the Kaiserslautern City and County limits. A letter received by the German Consulate in Durban, South Africa, had revealed anonymous information indicating that SUBJECT was a swindler and marriage imposter, who had swindled large amounts of money from two females. SUBJECT'S request for asylum was denied, to which SUBJECT submitted a rebuttal. HE requested that the lawyers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] intervene on HIS behalf in connection with HIS request for asylum. In August 1978, Source learned that SUBJECT was jailed in Basel, Switzerland for several days, because of entering Switzerland illegally. SUBJECT'S 'Duldung', residence and work permit have to be renewed every six months. (10) On 6 October 1978, [REDACTED] GS-14, Director, Automatic Data Processing Service Center, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, APO NY 09325, SUBJECT'S supervisor since July 1978 indicated that he considered SUBJECT to be loyal and trustworthy, but that he was unable to recommend HIM for a position of trust and responsibility because he did not know SUBJECT well enough. (11)

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ON 22 JUN 1999

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Report of Investigation (dated 31 OCT 1978 )  
DA Form 342

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)

AKA: [REDACTED]

DPOB: [REDACTED]

(U) Forwarded for your information and disposition are seven (7) Agents Reports, in triplicate, pertaining to SUBJECT.

~~(C)~~ This Battalion will interview SUBJECT'S former supervisor, who recently retired but resides in this Battalion's area of responsibility, in order to determine the circumstances of SUBJECT not having a Limited Access Authorization as the Chief Document Control Branch. Upon approval from your office, this Battalion will thoroughly interview/debrief SUBJECT in order to determine details pertaining to HIS intelligence background and activities for HoIS, if HE is presently maintaining contacts with any HoIS, and what HE intended to achieve when HE revealed HIS intelligence background to an S/A of this Battalion (re: Agent Reports, dated 2 August and 4 October 1978, both signed by S/A [REDACTED]). This Battalion also considers it necessary to polygraph SUBJECT soon after HE has been interviewed, in order to verify HIS statements. Some of the information SUBJECT HIMSELF revealed to S/A's of this Battalion and information received from other Sources is contradictory.

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

29 September 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(5) (U) On 28 September 1978

Source related information during the interview substantially as follows:

On Monday, 25 September 1978

SUBJECT and two other individuals sitting at a nearby table. SUBJECT and the two men approached their table. SUBJECT introduced the two men by name, but Source could not recall their names. SUBJECT advised Source that the two men were from the ADPSC M-126, Kleber Kaserne, Kaiserslautern,

Unidentified Male (UM) 1 was described as the Commanding Officer and Chief of Operations, M-126. Source believed that UM 1 was a 1LT, US Army. UM 1 was described as follows:

Height: 5'7"-5'10"  
Weight: 165-175 lbs.  
Build: Slender  
Hair: Brown  
Eyes: Unknown  
Race: Caucasian  
Dress: US Army fatigues, single black bar for rank insignia

UM 2 was introduced to Source as UM 1's assistant. UM 2 was described as follows:

Height: 5'10"-6'  
Weight: 215-225 lbs.

CLASSIFIED BY AR 381-12, 18 OCT 74  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON Approval of ASI, DA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Continued) 150

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

29 September 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

AKA:

DPOB:

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Build: Stocky  
Hair: Sandy brown with grey on sides  
Eyes: Unknown  
Race: Caucasian  
Nationality: German  
Dress: Light in color, conservative business suit

UM 1 said at one point, "What do you think the Russians will think of that?". Source heard the word "Russia" two more times during their conversation. Toward the end of their conversation, Source heard UM1 say, "We know that the Russians have more troops on the Chinese border than they do in Europe."

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Page 2 of 3 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.



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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FM)

AKA:

DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

29 September 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U)  
(C) AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 2 August 1978, in which SUBJECT admitted prior employment by HOIS.

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Page 3 of 3 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(c) On 28 September 1978, [REDACTED] was interviewed as a co-worker pertaining to a Limited Access Authorization investigation at the Automated Data Processing Service Center (ADPSC) M-130. Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09325. Following the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following additional information concerning HIMSELF:

u  
(c) HE referenced previous discussions with the undersigned pertaining to HIS former contact with the Yugoslavian Government, and inquired about the extent of investigation concerning HIMSELF that had been done concerning HIM. HE asked whether or not HE should begin looking for new employment as HE felt that HE may lose HIS job with the ADPSC because of HIS former contact with the Yugoslavian Government. HE stated that HIS first contact with US Intelligence was in January 1973 when HE contacted a member of the US General Consulate in Zrinjevac, Yugoslavia. The man's name was [REDACTED] provided SUBJECT with several addresses in the United States where HE could communicate with representatives of US intelligence. HE stated that during all contacts and correspondence with US intelligence HE used the name of "[REDACTED]". HE stated that HE did write and sent license numbers of Yugoslavian personnel in the west to the addresses. HE stated that several meetings were arranged through the mail but that HE had not been able to meet with anyone at these meetings for unspecified reasons.

u  
(c) [REDACTED] stated that in June 1978, HE was asked by refugee authorities in Basel, Switzerland, to come to their office, reason not specified. HE took the train from Kaiserslautern, FRG, and upon arrival in Basel HE missed the proper exit and was arrested by Swiss authorities at the next exit for illegal entry into Switzerland. HE was incarcerated in the Basel jail for two days awaiting release. HE stated that the German authorities did not want to let HIM back into Germany which was why HE was in jail so long. The German authorities did allow HIM back into Germany on the third day and HE returned to Kaiserslautern via train. [REDACTED] denied any other foreign travel. HE stated that German authorities had limited HIS residence to the Kaiserslautern county area, but that it was HIS understanding that HE had no travel restrictions placed upon HIM.

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

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CLASSIFIED BY: AR 381-12 dtd 12 Oct 74  
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY: Upon Approval of ACSI, DA  
(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

██████████ (FN)

AKA: ██████████

DPOB: ██████████

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

u  
AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, dated 2 August 1978, Subject as above, by ██████████, wherein ██████████ indicated past employment by Yugoslavian intelligence and past cooperation with US intelligence.

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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Page 2 of 2 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

██████████, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

██

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(7)(C) On 2 October 1978, [REDACTED]

(C) Source first met SUBJECT during the first week of July 1978 [REDACTED] was supervisor of the Document Control Branch, ADPSC M-130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot (KAD), Kaiserslautern, FRG, APO New York 09325, and as such was responsible for the handling and key-punch of computer cards for ADPSC M-126. Source stated that it was his desire to establish good liaison with [REDACTED] to improve the operational efficiency of his [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUBJECT did so and [REDACTED] During their conversation, SUBJECT related to Source that HE was from Yugoslavia, had received a Masters Degree in Political Science from a university in Yugoslavia, not further identified, had attended a military junior college in Yugoslavia, not further identified. While attending the university, SUBJECT was a member of a small group of political dissidents, approximately five to seven members, who did not follow the Yugoslavian Communist Party philosophy. SUBJECT told Source that during HIS last years at the university, HE traveled to Munich, FRG, on a student visa for the purpose of enrolling in the University of Munich. SUBJECT was unable to enroll as the quota of foreign students at the university was full. SUBJECT then returned to Yugoslavia and completed HIS studies there. Dates of travel were unknown. SUBJECT stated that after graduation, HE contacted a friend in Munich to obtain information on job opportunities in the FRG. The friend, not further identified, recommended that SUBJECT seek employment in Kaiserslautern, FRG, as a large number of foreign nationals were employed by US forces there. SUBJECT then freely exited Yugoslavia and traveled to Kaiserslautern. HE then applied for work at the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, (KACPO), Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, FRG, APO New York 09227. SUBJECT was able to obtain

CLASSIFIED BY: AR 381-12 11-78 OF 74  
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

DECLASSIFY: Upon Approval of ACSI, DA

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(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

(b)(1)  
5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

a job as a warehouseman at KAD. SUBJECT worked as such for about three to four months, and was then offered a job by the KACPO with the ADPSC, KAD. During SUBJECT'S employment with the ADPSC M-130, KAD, SUBJECT developed a close friendship with the Chief of Operations, [REDACTED], GS-14. [REDACTED] and SUBJECT frequently socialized, details unknown. As a result of their friendship, [REDACTED] promoted SUBJECT to the position of Supervisor, Document Control Branch, M-130. [REDACTED] was transferred in November 1977 to Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. SUBJECT corresponds with Duffy occasionally. Source stated that during their conversation, they briefly discussed politics, and during the conversation SUBJECT opined that HE thought that the reason US Forces were in Germany was to prevent the development of another Reich, i.e., war machine. SUBJECT analyzed US presence in the FRG as an occupational force. SUBJECT told Source that HIS interests were in politics and that HIS father had lined up a position with the Yugoslavian Government prior to HIS departure to the west in the diplomatic field. SUBJECT advised that HE was not interested in that line of work. Source told SUBJECT that he had recently read a book entitled "The KGB" and asked SUBJECT if HE knew anything about the Russian KGB. SUBJECT advised that the Russian Government had at one time offered HIM a scholarship to study in Russia but HE had turned it down for personal reasons. SUBJECT mentioned that HE was fluent in five languages, Russian, French, German, English and Italian. Source told SUBJECT that he had traveled to Russia as a tourist. Source stated that SUBJECT declined to talk further about Russia or the KGB and changed the subject.

The manager brought them a bottle of special wine, i.e., high quality, for consumption during their meal. After the meal, the manager brought each of them a shot-glass of a special liquor, not further identified, which the manager insisted was on-the-house. During the meal, they discussed Yugoslavian culture, life styles, and food. After dinner, Source gave SUBJECT a ride home to HIS apartment located on Trippstader Strasse, Kaiserslautern.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

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DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

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Source did not go into HIS apartment.

(U) Source had maintained business contact with SUBJECT on a weekly basis from July 1978 to present, primarily via telephonic communications. During these visits, SUBJECT usually opened each conversation by asking Source where he had been and what he had been doing during the previous weekend. Source felt that HE was prying to some extent, but did not pursue the issue. On several occasions SUBJECT reiterated to Source that HE was unhappy in Kaiserslautern, that HE had a poor social life, that HE was disliked by citizens of the FRG, and that HE was not accepted by Germans on a social basis. During one conversation, SUBJECT told Source that HE had attended a Management Development Course sponsored by the KAGPO, and that about a month after HE attended, HE had tried to implement newly learned techniques with the German employees in HIS office and had had unsuccessful results. HE said that the techniques were geared for US personnel, and that HE was unable to transfer the principles to Germans.

(U) Several weeks after Source met SUBJECT, he discussed SUBJECT with a friend of his, [REDACTED] 1LT, Transportation Corps, assigned to the 76th Transportation Company, Pirmasens, FRG. [REDACTED] was a former student of political science, had a strong interest in Russia and Yugoslavia, and had traveled to both countries, dates unknown. [REDACTED] advised Source that SUBJECT was in an excellent occupational position if HE were working for the eastern block countries in an intelligence collection capacity. [REDACTED] commented that HIS current position would be "good cover" for intelligence operations. Following that conversation, Source decided that he would not become closely associated with SUBJECT in the event that HE was involved in any intelligence activities, and he did not want to jeopardize his career in the US Army.

(U) [REDACTED]

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
(b)(1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)  
(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (G)  
(b)(1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)  
(b)(1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

[REDACTED]

(c) Source contacted [REDACTED] acting S-2, 37th Transportation Group, and advised [REDACTED] Source was advised by [REDACTED] that he was overreacting and that if HE was indeed involved in any intelligence activities, [REDACTED]

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) (b)(1)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(S)(U) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]

During the lunch, SUBJECT asked Source his opinion of what it would be like for SUBJECT to move to the United States. HE wondered if the American citizens would treat HIM badly because HE was a foreign national, and if HE would have a bad social life. SUBJECT also mentioned that HE was considering a move back to Yugoslavia because of HIS unhappiness in Kaiserslautern. Source could not recall any other details of the conversation.

(S)(U) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

(S) Source stated that SUBJECT appears affluent because of HIS nice clothing and basic lifestyle. Source had the impression that SUBJECT'S father was wealthy and that SUBJECT was receiving a good salary at the ADPSC. Source believed that SUBJECT was very intelligent and quite knowledgeable of world affairs. HE was mature, well-mannered, polite, sociable. Source believed that SUBJECT was mentally and emotionally stable, of sound moral character, and honest. Source is suspicious that SUBJECT may be involved in intelligence activities because of HIS general demeanor, HIS background, and the similarities between SUBJECT and the information he learned about the KGB from the book that he read recently. Source did not know whether or not SUBJECT had a security clearance, but stated that he hoped so because of the close proximity of SUBJECT to a sensitive installation.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

u AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, Subject as above, dated 2 August 1978, wherein [REDACTED] claimed prior affiliation with Yugoslavian intelligence agencies. During the above interview, S/A [REDACTED] was present.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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ON 22 JUN 1999

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

### AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

(8) On 16 October 1978, records of Source 2212-4890 were reviewed and disclosed the following information pertaining to SUBJECT:

Name:

DPOB:

Citizenship:

Residences:

[REDACTED]  
Yugoslave

SUBJECT came from Switzerland on 1  
November 1974

From 1 Nov 74 to an unknown date:

1 St. Quentin Ring, 6750 Kaiserslautern,  
FRG.

15 January 1977 to 15 April 1978:

1 Gasstrasse, 6750 Kaiserslautern, C/O  
Stein.

15 April 1978 to present:

[REDACTED] (Primary residence)

From an unspecified date to the present:

[REDACTED] (Secondary Residence)

Remarks:

Source's file did not contain any record  
as to where SUBJECT moved to, after HE  
moved from [REDACTED]

until HE moved to [REDACTED]

AGENT'S NOTES: Kaiserslautern (MV 1077) and Stelzenberg (MV 0870) are  
located within the Federal Republic of Germany.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66TH MI GP I&S (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

## THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FROM OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS

(9) On 16 October 1978, records of the Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York (NY) 09227, were re-checked and disclosed the following additional information concerning DOLZAN:

Name:

DPOB:

Address:

Position:

Chief, Document Control Branch, C-6/4,  
Automated Data Processing Service  
Center, M-130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot,  
Kaiserslautern, FRG

Effective Date of Promotion:

Identity Document #:

Remarks:

1 September 1978  
Fremdenpass (Foreigners' pass) [REDACTED]  
Request for Counterintelligence Investi-  
gation, DA Form 2784-R, dated 24 January  
1978, completed 10 May 1978, indicating  
'No Record' was located in SUBJECT'S  
official 201 file.

AGENT'S NOTES: Reference Agent Report, dated 14 September 1977, subject as above, signed by S/A [REDACTED], which disclosed information pertaining to SUBJECT'S 201 file.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP I&S (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

(U) On 16 October 1978, records of Source 2212-4039 were reviewed and revealed the following results:

(U) SUBJECT was in Switzerland from October 1973 to 3 May 1974, during which time HE applied for political asylum. SUBJECT, despite of having applied for asylum, left Switzerland and entered the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),

SUBJECT was returned to Switzerland and subsequently Swiss authorities deported HIM to Yugoslavia, HIS native country.

(U) SUBJECT reappeared in Kaiserslautern in 1976 and requested political asylum in the FRG. SUBJECT provided a letter signed by Mr. SUBJECT'S lawyer, in which Hatzky indicated that he would provide lodgings to SUBJECT as long as HE was in Germany and would render financial assistance to HIM, if HE needed it. SUBJECT received a Fremdenpass (Alien Passport) number which has been extended to 29 October 1978. The Alien Passport has to be extended every six months. SUBJECT obtained this passport due to HIS employment with the United States Army. SUBJECT, who entered the FRG illegally, requested political asylum within the FRG. While awaiting the final results of HIS request for asylum, HE is authorized to stay in a specified area within the FRG, because HE was given 'Duldung' (toleration) by the German authorities. Due to this Duldung, SUBJECT is restricted in residence, travel and employment to the Kaiserslautern City and County limits. Any breach of this restriction could result in disciplinary action by the German authorities.

(U) A letter dated 8 February 1978 from the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, which was located in SUBJECT'S file, indicated  
CLASSIFIED BY: AR 381-12 dtd 18 Oct 74  
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11651  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY: Upon Approval of ACSI, DA

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(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH MI GP I&S (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

(U) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

(U) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (C)

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA: [REDACTED]

DPOB: [REDACTED]

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

that SUBJECT'S Request for Asylum had been denied. SUBJECT rebutted the denial and requested the lawyers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] from Kaiserslautern, to intervene on HIS behalf. SUBJECT is presently awaiting the results of HIS rebuttal.

[REDACTED] SUBJECT had been jailed in Basel, for illegal entry into Switzerland. SUBJECT only was in jail for a couple of days, and then was released in order to be able to return to Kaiserslautern.

(u) SUBJECT'S Alien Passport, work and residence permits and the Duldung, have to be renewed every six months. Renewal of SUBJECT'S Duldung is based on HIS continuous employment or on the fact that someone provides HIM with lodgings and financial support. In case that SUBJECT'S Duldung is no longer approved, HE has to expect deportation to HIS home country. As long as the results of SUBJECT'S rebuttal for HIS request for asylum are pending HE cannot, by law, be deported.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66TH MI GP I&S (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 October 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT

On 6 October 1978, GS-14, Director, Automatic Data Processing Service Center (ADPSC), DPI M-130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09325, was interviewed at his office, concerning provided essentially the following information:

Source first met SUBJECT in approximately mid-July 1978 when he became Director, ADPSC, DPI M-130. From July 1978 to the present, Source and SUBJECT maintained daily duty contact with no social contact. Source last saw SUBJECT on 6 October 1978 while at work.

knew SUBJECT only as SUBJECT was born in Yugoslavia. HE had specified the town's name in conversation with once, but could not recall the name. SUBJECT was unmarried and has an apartment in Kaiserslautern. HE has no car and rides to work with co-workers. SUBJECT speaks six languages to include English, Yugoslavian, and German.

Source attested to the excellence of SUBJECT'S morality, integrity, loyalty, dependability, and character. considered SUBJECT to be mentally and emotionally stable. SUBJECT does not appear to have any financial problems. SUBJECT has no close friends, contacts, or relatives residing in an Iron Curtain Country (ICC). SUBJECT has not traveled to any ICC. did not know of any adverse contact with any law enforcement agency, except for an incident which occurred when SUBJECT was returning from Switzerland on annual leave. HE was detained by Swiss authorities, reason unknown, for a short time. stated that, Security Officer and SUBJECT'S immediate supervisor, could provide further details. SUBJECT did not use any drugs or controlled substances, to include marijuana.

stated that although he had no reason to doubt or question he could not recommend HIM for a position of trust and responsibility with the US Army. stated that, "Recommendation to me means that I have sufficient information to make a judgement without reservation."

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PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Background or Complaint) For use of this form, see AR 381-130; the proponent agency is OACSI.				DATE SUBMITTED 15 September 1978	
SCOPE (If background) <input type="checkbox"/> LAC <input type="checkbox"/> GAC <input type="checkbox"/> PBI <input type="checkbox"/> CBI				CASE CLASSIFICATION	
IDENTIFYING DATA					
1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED] (FN), AKA: [REDACTED]		2. SSN		3. RACE	4. GRADE
6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT Chief, Document Control		7. DATE OF BIRTH		8. PLACE OF BIRTH [REDACTED]	
9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS Automatic Data Processing Service Center DPI-M130, 21st Support Command, APO 09325		10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS			
11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.)		12. DATE (Incident cases only)		13. TIME (Incident cases only)	
14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building) Kaiserslautern, FRG		15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.			
CONTROL DATA					
16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO. 77-213		17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization) 527th MI Bn, APO NY 09227		18. CONTROL OFFICE 66th MI GP I&S (PROV) APO NY 09108	
INVESTIGATIVE DATA					
19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY 66th MI GP I&S		20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION AR 381-12			
21. DATE INVESTIGATION COMMENCED Sep 1977		22. STATUS <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> TERMINATED <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPENDED <input type="checkbox"/> PENDING			
23. SYNOPSIS Reference: Letter, IAGPE-KD, dated 16 August 1978, subject as above.  Source indicated that he met SUBJECT for the first time on 6 March 1978, while attending an Organizational Effectiveness Course. Source stated that SUBJECT like every other student introduced HIMSELF during the first day of the course. SUBJECT introduced HIMSELF by HIS name, [REDACTED] that HE was from Yugoslavia, that HE supervised ten (10) persons at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), FRG. HE indicated that HE had been in West Germany for about two (2) years, that HE was a bachelor and that HIS hobbies were photography and movies. Source indicated that following SUBJECT'S selfintroduction, he made a remark to the effect that he wondered if SUBJECT in HIS capacity as a supervisor needed a security clearance. Source believes that SUBJECT replied that HE did not need a security clearance.		REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 JUN 1999 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P			
24. DISTRIBUTION 3-CDR 66th MI GP IS (P), ATTN: IAGPE-TOI 2-CDR 527th MI BN, ATTN: IAGPE-KD		166 CLASSIFIED BY AR 381-12, 18 OCT 79 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11852 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY ON <i>Upon Approval of R&amp;I, DA</i>			
25. TYPED NAME AND TITLE [REDACTED], GS-13, Spec Asst Ops		REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]			

DA FORM 342

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 342, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Report of Investigation (dated 15 Sep 78 )  
DA Form 342

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FM)  
AKA: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
(77-213) (U)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

23. Synopsis (continued)

clearance. Source had limited contact with SUBJECT for the remainder of the course, which lasted until 10 March 1978. Source saw SUBJECT again during a luncheon at the Officers and Civilians Open Mess, Vogelweh/Kaiserslautern on 2 May 1978. SUBJECT telephoned Source on 1 August 1978, indicating that HE had been interviewed by a Special Agent. (2) (3) On 22 August 1978, Source 2212-4324 revealed that SUBJECT had been arrested by Swiss authorities because HE had entered Switzerland even though HE had been declared Persona Non Grata by the Swiss authorities until 1982. SUBJECT also violated restrictions which were imposed on HIM by German authorities and which restricted HIS movements to the city and county of Kaiserslautern. (4)

Forwarded for your information and disposition are three (3) Agent Reports, in triplicate, pertaining to SUBJECT.

This office recommends interviewing SUBJECT'S American supervisor prior to interviewing SUBJECT. Results of outstanding NTRs will be forwarded to your office upon receipt.

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/P0  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5206.1P

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED  
TO SUBJECT

On 16 August 1978, [REDACTED] GS-11, Offensive Counterespionage Section, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Group IS (PROV), Vogelweh/Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09227, was interviewed at his place of business concerning SUBJECT.

Source first met SUBJECT on 6 March 1978 while attending an Organizational Effectiveness Course, sponsored by the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern. Source attended the course with ten other individuals from various units in the Kaiserslautern area, to include [REDACTED] SFC, 527 th Military Intelligence Battalion. The course was scheduled to run from 6 March to 10 March 1978. During the first day of the course, each of the participants gave a self-introduction which consisted of their name, place of business, hobbies, and where they were from. SUBJECT'S self-introduction consisted of HIS name, [REDACTED] that HE was from Yugoslavia, that HE was a supervisor for approximately ten persons at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, that HE had been in West Germany for about two years, that HE was a bachelor, and that photography and movies were HIS hobbies. Following SUBJECT'S self-introduction, each of the class participants gave an analysis of the speakers delivery as their first impression. Source stated that he directed a comment toward SUBJECT and one other German national, named [REDACTED] (phonetic). Source said words to the effect that because both spoke good English, both were foreign nationals, and both were in supervisory positions for the United States Government, Source wondered if their jobs required a security clearance. The class reacted to his comment with amusement. Source believed that SUBJECT responded that HIS job did not require a security clearance. Source had limited contact with SUBJECT during the remainder of the course. They occasionally spoke during coffee breaks and lunch breaks. Source could not recall any specifics of the conversations. Source stated that SUBJECT usually sought out the company of the female participants during the breaks for conversation. The class ate lunch together two or three times during the course, but that during these lunches he had little if any verbal contact with SUBJECT. Source stated that following the conclusion of the course on 10 March 1978, it was agreed by the participants that they would meet for lunch at the Vogelweh Officers and Civilians Club (VOCC), Vogelweh/Kaiserslautern on 2 May 1978, to discuss the application of the management

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
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(Continued) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

skills they had learned during the course. On 2 May 1978, Source went to the VOCC as planned and saw two of the participants upon entry, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were also early and waiting for the others to arrive. Source sat down and spoke with them for about twenty minutes before the others arrived. During this conversation they discussed management techniques, the course, and other small talk, the specifics of which Source did not recall. During the luncheon, SUBJECT mentioned to Source that the Automatic Data Processing Service Center where HE worked was running some new classified programs, but that HE had nothing to do with the jobs requiring a security clearance. No further comments were made by SUBJECT during the lunch. Source heard nothing further from SUBJECT until approximately late May 1978 when he was advised by S/A [REDACTED] 527th Military Intelligence Battalion (527th MI Bn) that she had interviewed SUBJECT as a reference in a security clearance investigation. SUBJECT had told [REDACTED] that HE knew a [REDACTED] from the same office and for her to tell [REDACTED] hello the next time she saw him. [REDACTED] did so, at which time Source advised her to tell SUBJECT hello the next time she saw HIM. Source next heard from SUBJECT on 1 August 1978, when SUBJECT telephoned Source at his place of business. SUBJECT advised Source that HE had just been interviewed by a Special Agent from the 527th MI Bn, and that the Special Agent had told SUBJECT that Source may speak with HIM at a later date. Source advised SUBJECT that he did not think that he would visit HIM, and that HE must have misunderstood the Special Agent as Source did not work on Personnel Security Investigations. SUBJECT did not go into any details of HIS conversation with the Special Agent, nor did HE advise Source of the nature of the interview. During the conversation, SUBJECT suggested to Source that he organize another luncheon to discuss management techniques learned at the course held in March. Source told SUBJECT that he would look into it, but to date had not done so. Source had no further contact with SUBJECT.

(c) Source stated that SUBJECT had not at any time made any inquiries about Source's job or any other facet of Source's life. SUBJECT did not provide Source with any other background information about HIMSELF during any of their conversations. Source did not make any inquiries of SUBJECT concerning anything other than their management course.

(c) Source stated that he was somewhat familiar with other details of SUBJECT'S background based on information provided to him during June 1978 by S/A [REDACTED] Defensive Counterespionage Section, 527th MI Bn. This information consisted of

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. REPORT OF FINDINGS

2. DATE SUBMITTED

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3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

information pertaining to SUBJECT'S application for asylum in West Germany, an arrest for homosexual activity in Switzerland, HIS expulsion from Switzerland for intelligence related activity, and SUBJECT'S claimed former employment by Yugoslavian intelligence. Source stated that he had no official interest in SUBJECT due to the nature of HIS past. Source could provide no further information concerning SUBJECT.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

<p>1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT          (FN)          AKA: [REDACTED]          DPOB: [REDACTED]          (77-213) (U)</p>	<p>2. DATE SUBMITTED          18 August 1978</p> <p>3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER</p>
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## 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT

On 16 August 1978, [REDACTED] SFC, S-2, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, 66th Military Intelligence Group I & S (PROV), Vogelweh/Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09227, was interviewed at his place of business concerning SUBJECT.

Source first met SUBJECT on 6 March 1978 while attending an Organizational Effectiveness Course, sponsored by the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern. Source attended the course with ten other individuals, including [REDACTED] GS-11, 527th MI Bn. During the first day of the course, each individual stood up and provided the other participants with a self-introduction to include their name, place of business, interests, and hobbies. [REDACTED] stated that HIS name was [REDACTED] that HE was employed as a supervisor at the Automatic Data Processing Center, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, and that HE was from Yugoslavia. Source could recall no further details of HIS remarks. Following HIS introduction, each of the participants gave an analysis of HIS delivery. Source stated that several participants stated that they thought HE would eventually become the class leader because HE had impressed them as a leader. SUBJECT impressed Source as a shy, quiet person. SUBJECT spoke English fluently. Source stated that [REDACTED] identified above, commented on SUBJECT'S ability to speak English, and asked if HE had a security clearance. SUBJECT appeared a little embarrassed, smiled, and did not respond as some of the other participants were laughing. From 6 March to 10 March 1978, Source spoke with SUBJECT on approximately two occasions. Both of these times were during class breaks of about fifteen minutes. SUBJECT was usually with another German national named Willie (phonetic), last name unknown. When Source spoke with them it entailed discussion of class material and management techniques. SUBJECT did not inquire as to Source's occupation or work nor did they discuss SUBJECT'S work. Source stated that following the course, all participants were to meet for lunch during May 1978 to discuss the application of management principles they had learned during the course. Source was unable to attend the meeting due to personal commitments. Source had not seen or heard from SUBJECT since the end of the course on 10 March 1978. Source had no further information concerning SUBJECT.

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<p>5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT          [REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)</p>	<p>6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT          [REDACTED]</p>
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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

AKA:

DPOB:

(77-213) (U)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

~~(4)~~ On 22 August 1978, Source 2212-4324 revealed the following information:

~~(S)~~ SUBJECT entered Switzerland at an unknown time and exited that country on 8 August 1978, at which time HE was detained by German border authorities. The reason for the detention was based on the fact that SUBJECT had violated a restriction imposed on HIM by the German authorities. SUBJECT's movements within the Federal Republic of Germany are confined to the city and county of Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), FRG. Subsequent to coordination between the German authorities and the Swiss authorities SUBJECT was arrested by the Swiss and jailed in Basel, Switzerland. The reason for SUBJECT'S arrest by the Swiss was that HE had entered Switzerland eventhough HE had been declared Persona Non Grata by the Swiss authorities until 1982. According to Source, SUBJECT is expected to remain in jail for an unknown period of time after which HE will be released and sent back to Kaiserslautern.

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CLASSIFIED BY *AR 381-12, 18 Oct 74*

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

DECLASSIFY ON *Upon Approval of ACST, DA*

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

(FN)

(AKA

DOB:

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) On 1 August 1978, at 1030 hours, SUBJECT was interviewed as a developed character reference concerning a Personnel Security Investigation, on [REDACTED] CIV, Foreign National, DPOB: [REDACTED] a co-worker of HIS at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center, DPI-M130, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, Kaiserslautern, Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09227. During the course of the interview SUBJECT provided information concerning HIMSELF, substantially as follows:

(U) [REDACTED] is a citizen of Yugoslavia. HE had been a student and employee of Yugoslavian intelligence from approximately fall 1971 to 1976. HE identified the agency as "SLUZBA DRZAVNE VARNOSTI", agency for state security, which was identified as a subordinate agency of the branch of the Yugoslavian government responsible for internal affairs and state security, named "REPUBLISKI SEKRETARIAT ZA NOTRANJE ZADEVE SR SLOVENIJE." During the first four years of HIS association with the agency HE was a student. As a student, HE studied political science, government, criminal law and investigative techniques, intelligence techniques, i.e., collection, defensive operations, case control, personnel security investigations, customs, document control, foreign languages consisting of English, French, and German. HE additionally studied on HIS own time the languages of Russian and Italian. HE considered HIMSELF fluent in all languages studied. Following HIS completion of the school, HE went through a six month program of on-the-job training. HE worked on the border checking passports and other identity papers of travelers, specific location not identified, for the first month. The second month was spent working at a police station, location not identified, working in the various divisions learning basic police functions. The third and fourth months were spent working as a criminal investigator. HE mentioned one case which HE worked on dealing with a homicide investigation. The fifth and sixth months were spent working with the state security service, as identified above, conducting personnel security investigations and other similar investigative tasks. HE stated that HIS sole desire in working for the agency was to work in a laboratory or a desk job and was dissatisfied with HIS assignments. In

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON ~~APPROVAL OF ACS, DA~~

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
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(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
(AKA [REDACTED])  
DOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1976 HE fled to the West utilizing legal, but falsified, travel documents which HE made for HIMSELF. HE fled because of job dissatisfaction and a dislike of Yugoslavian political ideology. Following HIS border crossing in 1976, no specific date named, HE turned HIMSELF over to West German authorities, not further identified. HE was housed by the West German authorities in a house, location not specified, for a two month period. HE was authorized free movement but was required to sign in and out when HE left the house. During the two month period HE was interrogated concerning HIS education and employment with the Yugoslavian state security agency. HE stated that HE provided them with accurate answers concerning all questions they had asked. HE could not recall the name of the West German agency which had spoken with HIM, but stated that they were all dressed in civilian attire and utilized interrogation techniques HE recognized from HIS training in intelligence techniques. Following the two month period, HE was released and furnished with a West German Travel Pass, which identified HIM as an alien resident. The document was issued in the name of Robert Dolzan. Robert is the English translation of "Bojan." HE stated that HE has not traveled outside of West Germany since HIS border crossing, and has had only limited travel as a tourist in West Germany. HE has had no correspondence or contact with any persons from an Iron Curtain country since HIS arrival in West Germany. HE stated that HE is not working for any intelligence agency of any country and is not providing anyone with information concerning western governments, agencies, or military operations. HE stated that it was unlikely for Yugoslavian intelligence to trust HIM and that they would not want to see HIM for friendly purposes. HE added that although HE is not trying hard to hide from them, HE would prefer that they did not know HIS whereabouts.

(b) Following HIS release by West German authorities, HE traveled to Kaiserslautern, FRG, where HE obtained work as a supply clerk for an unspecified unit of the US Forces. This job was obtained by making application with the Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern. HE made application for a higher paying job advertised by the CPO, Daenner Kaserne, in approximately the Spring of 1977. The position was described as a desk job at the Automatic Data Processing Service Center, Kaiserslautern Army Depot.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
(AKA  
DOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

HE was accepted for the position, and received a transfer to M-130, KAD. HE is currently in a supervisory position in the Document Control Division, M-130, and supervises about six employees. HE has no security clearance, and has no personal access to any classified information. However, all personnel working around HIM do have clearance and access to classified information. HE stated that at one time when personnel were being selected for Limited Access Authorizations, and subject to personnel security investigations, which was in approximately January 1978, HE spoke with a supervisor from M-130, and advised the supervisor, not further identified, that it would be difficult for HIM to obtain a clearance as HE was a Yugoslavian citizen, and that it would be impossible for US Forces to check HIS background. The supervisor concurred and the issue was dropped. HE advised that all US personnel, to include those at M-130, were told by HIM that HIS past consisted of being a student of political science and that HE escaped to the west for political reasons. HE added that no one to HIS knowledge in Kaiserslautern knew of HIS past ties to Yugoslavian intelligence.

U When queried concerning contacts with other intelligence agencies, HE stated that HE was surprised that no one from US intelligence services had contacted HIM since HIS arrival in the West. HE stated that in approximately 1973, while a student, HE had made contact with a representative of US Intelligence, not further identified, and offered the representative information concerning Yugoslavian intelligence. HE stated that the person was not from Military Intelligence, FBI, or a branch of the Department of Defense, but rather "the US Intelligence Agency". HE traveled to a neutral country, not further identified but inferred as Austria or Switzerland, where HE met with the person and provided him with copies of documents and other unspecified information. These meetings were held in motel rooms, specific location and names of motels not further identified. This period of association lasted for about six months and then HE terminated HIS activities for fear of being caught by HIS authorities. HE stated that on one occasion HE had assisted another "agent" and close personal friend, not further identified, in arranging a meeting with US Intelligence. This meeting consisted of HIS friend

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE

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1 APR 52

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AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

(FN)

(AKA

DOB:

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

traveling to a neutral country and meeting the person in a motel where HIS friend was to turn over copies of Yugoslavian intelligence operations plans. The friend did travel to the neutral country at the arranged time. He waited for two days and the person never met with him. The friend then returned to Yugoslavia and advised SUBJECT of the situation. SUBJECT was advised by HIS friend that he would not do it again because of the risk of being caught by Yugoslavian authorities and that he thought the Americans were not interested in what he had offered to them. SUBJECT has had no contact with the friend since HIS arrival in the West, but believes that the friend is still employed by Yugoslavian intelligence.

HE stated that HE had nothing to hide from US Intelligence and was willing to discuss HIS past again with US Intelligence as required. HE added that shortly after HE began work at M-130, HE was sent to a Systems Management Analysis course conducted by the US Army. At this course there were two members of the 527th Military Intelligence Battalion, identified as a FNU and a FNU. At the beginning of the course, each of the participants stood up and gave a short resume of his past. SUBJECT told the people present that HE was a Yugoslavian citizen, where he worked, and that HE had formerly been a student of political science. HE stated that following HIS speech, each of the students was to give an analysis of HIS speaking style. HE stated that FNU commented that "anyone who is a Yugoslavian citizen who can speak English so good sure shouldn't have a security clearance." This comment was made in jest and resulted in chuckles among the participants. HE stated that no further questions concerning HIS past were asked by anyone at the school, specifically those identified as persons from the 527th MI Bn. HE commented that although HE was surprised that no one from US intelligence agencies and contacted HIM, HE was not particularly alarmed because HE was familiar with the problems of communications between agencies of different governments as HE had seen similar problems while affiliated with Yugoslavian intelligence. HE said that further information concerning HIM should be on file with other Intelligence agencies, specifically US Intelligence and the German Intelligence agency which interviewed HIM upon border-crossing.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

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AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 August 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

(AKA

DOB:

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(S) HE stated that HE would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination if necessary, however expressed a lack of faith and trust in the polygraph as being an accurate instrument. HE stated that Yugoslavian intelligence no longer utilized these machines because of problems with accurate analysis of the results by operators, HE expressed concern that HE may be a victim of an inaccurate polygraph examination, however reiterated HIS tacit willingness to be polygraphed upon request. HE further requested that the information HE provided be kept within US Intelligence channels and to the agency of the FRG which had initially interviewed HIM upon border-crossing.

(S) When queried concerning the specific nature of the Yugoslavian intelligence agency that HE worked for, HE stated that the exact translation was difficult but that the nearest thing to it that HE could think of was the KGB of Russia.

(U) SUBJECT was advised that HE may be contacted again at a later date by US personnel concerning HIS past, and HE stated that HE had no objections.

(S) AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT was apprehensive during questioning, however, was friendly, cooperative, and sincere in answering questions. HE appeared coherent and well-versed in the English language, i.e., no problems in understanding words and questions. During the course of the interview, some lines of questioning were not pursued as it was conducted in a "coffee break room" at M-130, and the interview was occasionally interrupted by persons attempting entry. SUBJECT declined to answer some questions because of the nature of the interview location. SUBJECT gave the undersigned the distinct impression

Spelling of personnel from the 527th MI Bn was phonetic.

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

6. SIGNATURE

, 66TH MI GP IS (PROV)

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.
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Page(s) 180-181

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Foreign National

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

15 September 1978

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 23 August 1978, records of the US Department of State, Passport and Security, Washington, DC, were examined for information pertaining to [REDACTED] Foreign National, with negative results.

AGENT'S NOTES: The aforementioned records check was conducted by Liaison Branch, 902d Military Intelligence Group, Alexandria, Virginia.

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THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED  
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION  
(PARA 13, AR 340-16)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

SP OPS DET, INSCOM

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
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☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

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8 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

IAGPE-TCI

12 JUL 1978

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FM)(77-213)(U)

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
US Army, Europe and Seventh Army  
ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SO)  
APO 09403

1. (U) References:

a. Report of Investigation (ROI), 527th MI Battalion, 20 December 1977, Subject as above, with eight Agent Report inclosures, attached.

b. Electrical Message, IAGPE-KD, 527th MI Battalion, DTG 281000Z June 1978, Subject as above.

2. (U) The attached ROI is forwarded for your information and disposition.

3. (U) Investigation concerning SUBJECT, a USAREUR employee, was initiated [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(7)(D)

[REDACTED] SUBJECT admits to having been assigned to the 6th Operations Group of the Yugoslavian State Security Service prior to HIS defection from Yugoslavia. The 527th MI Battalion conducted LACs and MACs (reference 1a, above) and is currently conducting further investigative action, to include interviews and NTRs. Checks of files at DCII, USAIRR and this Headquarters revealed no record of SUBJECT. The 18th MI Battalion is being queried to determine if they have any record of SUBJECT, who reportedly processed through Camp Zirndorf in May 1974.

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

CLASSIFIED BY ~~Para4b, AR381-12, 199-174~~  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON Approval of ACSI, DA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CF: DCDR, INSCOM, FT MEADE, MD, ATTN: IASO (w/inc1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


IAGPE-TCI ~~§~~ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (FN)(77-213)(U)

4. (U) Upon completion of outstanding checks, this Headquarters contemplates conducting an interview of SUBJECT to be followed by a polygraph examination, if appropriate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

cf:  
DCDR, INSCOM, FT MEADE, MD,  
ATTN: IASO (w/incl)  
CDR, 527TH MIB, KSLN, GER,  
ATTN: IAGPE-KD (w/o incl)

  
CHAD B. WHITE  
COL, MI  
Director of Operations

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION  
(Background or Complaint)  
(AR 381-130)

DATE SUBMITTED  
20 DEC 1977

SCOPE (If background)

☐ LAC

☐ GAC

☐ PBI

☐ CBI

CASE CLASSIFICATION

IDENTIFYING DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME

2. SERVICE NUMBER/  
SSAN

3. RACE

4. GRADE

5. ARM OR SVC

6. DUTY OR JOB ASSIGNMENT Document Control &  
Review Clerk, Auto Data Processing

7. DATE OF BIRTH

8. PLACE OF BIRTH

9. DUTY STATION OR BUSINESS ADDRESS

Auto Data Processing

21st Spt Cmd, KADC, Kaiserslautern, FRG

10. HOME OR QUARTERS ADDRESS

3 Alte Schmelz, Stelzenberg, FRG

11. TITLE OF INCIDENT (Fire, explosion, etc.)

12. DATE (Incident cases only)

13. TIME (Incident cases  
only)

14. LOCATION (Installation, unit, building)

15. SERIAL NUMBERS OF EQUIPMENT, TANKS, ETC.

CONTROL DATA

16. CONTROL SYMBOL AND FILE NO.

77-213D

17. INVESTIGATION MADE BY (Organization)

527th MI Bn

18. CONTROL OFFICE

UP AR 381-12

INVESTIGATIVE DATA

19. INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY

527th MI Bn

20. REASON FOR INVESTIGATION

UP AR 381-12

21. DATE INVESTIGATION

COMMENCED

COMPLETED

7 Sep 77

22. STATUS

☐ CLOSED

☐ TERMINATED

☐ SUSPENDED

☐ PENDING

23. SYNOPSIS Reference Msg, 061210Z Sep 77, IAINTA-GPE-TCI, 66th MI GP IS (PROV), Munch, Ger, Subject as above. SUBJECT came to the attention of USAI

Source 2212-4324

CLASSIFIED BY AR 381-12, 18 Oct 74  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON APPROVAL OF ACSJ, DA

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24. DISTRIBUTION 3 - CDR, 66th MI Gp IS(P), IAINTA-GPE-TCI  
2 - CDR, 527th MI Bn, IAINTA-GPE-KD

25.

REVIEWED BY

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

GS-13, SPEC ASST OPS

DA FORM 342 1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 342, 1 JUN 55, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION  
SUBJECT: DOLZAN, Bojan

23. SYNOPSIS (Continued) 29 DEC 1977

[REDACTED]

(1) Source 2212-4039 provided essentially the same information as 2212-4324. (2) Records of the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern, FRG, did not reflect training by the Yugoslavian State Security Service, but did reflect attendance from 1 Oct 72 to 30 Jul 73 at University, Fakultät fuer Politischen-Wissenschaftlichen-Sozialistischen Journalismus (Faculty for Political-Scientific-Socialistic Journalism), which was partially during the period HE claimed to have been trained by the Yugoslavian State Security Service (3) Records of Sources 2212-4040, 2212-4886, and 2212-4890, provided no derogatory information concerning [REDACTED] (406) Sources 2212-4036 and 2212-4041 had no record of SUBJECT (7-8).

Forwarded for your information and disposition are eight (8) Agent Reports, in triplicate.

This Battalion is awaiting results of coordination between LLO Rheinland-Pfalz [REDACTED] as required by above reference. Results will be forwarded upon receipt.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~AGENT REPORT~~

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proper agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(U)  
CIV,  
DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

9 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 30 August 1977.

[REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (1)

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group IS (PROV)

SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52


REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 50, WHICH MAY BE USED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)  
5 USC 552 (b) (1)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)



# EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

**Subject:** [REDACTED] DPOV: [REDACTED]

**File Number:** 77-213

**Preparing Unit:** 527th MI Battalion

**Agent Report Dated:** 9 Sep 77

**Description:** Translation of a report concerning SUBJECT from  
Source 2212-1324

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EXHIBIT \_\_\_\_\_

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☒ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b) (1) 5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☐ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)  
NO DUPLICATION FEE  
FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 189

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

On 13 September 1977, Source 2212-4039 provided the following information to [REDACTED] Local Wage Rate Investigator, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional):

Name:

DPOB:

Citizenship:

Occupation:

Yugoslavian

Police Official, Supply Clerk, and Computer Operator (Trainee)

Yugoslavian Identity  
Document Number:

[REDACTED] issued in Ljubljana, valid until 4 August 1976

Foreigner's Passport  
Number:

[REDACTED] Registration Number [REDACTED] issued on 29 October 1976, by the AA, KV (Auslaenderamt, Kreisverwaltung) (Foreigners' Office, County Administration), Kaiserslautern, valid until 29 October 1977

Residence Permit:

Until 29 October 1977, granted by the AA, KV, Kaiserslautern

Work Permit:

Until 29 October 1977, granted by the Arbeitsamt (Labor Office), Kaiserslautern

Marital Status:

Single

Father:

[REDACTED], deceased

Mother:

[REDACTED], nee: [REDACTED], deceased

Residences:

October 1973 to 3 May 1974, Zurich, Switzerland; the request for asylum in Switzerland had been disapproved on 23 April 1974; 4 May 1974, crossed the border to the FRG in Loerrach without a valid identification; 7 May 1974, SUBJECT applied for asylum in the FRG at the Bundesamt fuer die Anerkennung auslaendischer Fluechtlinge (Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees), Zirndorf, File Number [REDACTED]

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PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

June 1974, 15 Alspitzstrasse, Soecking;  
no date indicated to 27 June 1974, Zirndorf;  
28 June 1974 to 1 October 1974, 1 St.-Quentin-Ring, Kaiserslautern;  
1 October 1974, SUBJECT was deported to Switzerland;  
handed over to Swiss authorities at the Border Police Office, Kreuzlinger Tor, Konstanz;  
1 October 1974 to 9 October 1974, in custody at the Police Kaserne, Zurich;  
9 October 1974, deported to Zagreb, Yugoslavia, by plane;  
9 October 1974, returned the same day illegally to Zurich by plane;  
10 October 1974, again deported to Zagreb by plane;  
11 October 1974 to 19 September 1976, nothing indicated;  
20 September 1976, came illegally to the FRG and crossed the border near Loerrach;  
4 October 1976, SUBJECT applied again for asylum in the FRG at the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, Zirndorf, File Number Jug-Y-23.312, which is pending; HIS application for asylum, dated 7 May 1974, had been cancelled on 17 February 1975;  
4 October 1976 to 13 October 1976, Landesdurchgangslager (State Transit Camp), Rheinland-Pfalz, Osthofen;  
13 October 1976 to present, [REDACTED] primary residence, c/o [REDACTED] Lawyer;  
no date indicated to present, [REDACTED] secondary residence, c/o [REDACTED].  
1 November 1976 to present, supply clerk and computer operator, Kaiserslautern Army Depot, 219 Mannheimer Strasse, Kaiserslautern

Employment:

Application for Asylum:

Summary of SUBJECT'S statement he made at the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees,

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Page 2 of 6 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Zirndorf, on 1 October 1976, when HE applied for asylum in the FRG: On 1 October 1974 I was deported from Kaiserslautern to Zurich, Switzerland, by plane. On my arrival in Zurich, I was arrested and kept in the Zurich Prison until 9 October 1974. On 9 October 1974 I was deported from Zurich to Zagreb, Yugoslavia, by plane. At the arrival at the Zagreb Airport I was only in the possession of my Yugoslavian Identity Document. I had no passport. With my Identity Document I could not leave the airport. When I saw no way out, I went to a police official in civilian clothing and explained to him in the English language that I was a US citizen and that I had taken in Zurich, erroneously, the plane to Zagreb. When I was asked for my passport or other identification I explained that all my personal papers were in my baggage, which had been loaded in Zurich on the plane which went to Frankfurt/Main. At the same time I asked permission to contact the US Embassy or the US Consulate. The police officials and the airport personnel had a discussion about my case and they decided to let me return to Zurich by plane at 1700 hours. I had arrived at 1530 hours. At 1830 hours I was back in Zurich. In Zurich I had to pay for my flight home. I went to the Transit Room and called my former landlady and asked her to bring me money to buy a ticket to fly to another country. While I waited, a police official, who had been on duty when I departed for Zagreb, saw me. In spite of my protest, I was arrested in the Transit Room and turned over to the airport guard. On 10 October 1974, I was again deported to Zagreb. This time a police official in civilian clothing accompanied me to Zagreb. After arriving in Zagreb the police official left me. He did not turn me over to the Yugoslavian authorities. At the passport check they recognized me as the person, who had pretended to be an

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PROTECTIVE MARKING IS ENGRAVED FROM AUTOMATIC  
[REDACTED] MINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

Page 3 of 6 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

## AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

American. At that point I had to give up. I was arrested and put in the Zagreb Prison for one night. On 11 October 1974, I was transferred to the Ljubljana Prison where I was in pre-trial confinement until my trial. On 9 December 1974, I was sentenced by the Ljubljana County Court to two years imprisonment, for fraud and embezzlement. The fraud charge originated from the condition that a student has to serve a term with the police twice as long as spent in police schools. Otherwise all costs for this education has to be paid back to the government. When I voluntarily entered the school in 1969 at the age of 17, I did not understand the full meaning of this. The embezzlement charge was based upon the fact that I had failed to return office stationary I had received. The pre-trial confinement was taken into my account. I served my time in solitary confinement at the prison, Dob/Slovenia, Yugoslavia, until 10 September 1976. After my arrest I had to make a written statement to the SDB (Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti) (State Security Agency), concerning my residences after my escape from Yugoslavia. After I had made that statement I was interrogated in detail over a period of two months. Since I had left Yugoslavia without a passport, I had to confess that I had been in Zirndorf. I had only my identification document. I denied the fact that I had applied for asylum in Zirndorf. They wanted to know why I had not become a member of the Communist Party, why I had resigned from my employment with the SDB, and why I had been in contact with Hostile Intelligence Service (HoIS). I had had no contact with HoIS. In Munich I was questioned for one month by German authorities. I suppose these officials were members of the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) (Federal Intelligence Agency). From 1969 to 28 June 1972, I attended a police school, which I completed successfully. From there I had to perform my duty as policeman at various police stations, before I was transferred for one month to the Passport Control Office, Wurzenpass. Then the SDB approached me,

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PROTECTIVE MARKING [REDACTED] EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

Page 4 of 6 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

and I was transferred to the SDB. From 1 August 1972 to 16 December 1972 I attended a special training course of the SDB in Zagreb. The main subject in the course was how to fight guerillas. I was at various times reprimanded because of my attitude and the political remarks I had made. As a result of that I was told to leave the SDB and return to the uniformed police. On 31 December 1972, I terminated my employment. I had turned in my credentials, my weapon, and my written resignation to my chief of the SDB. After my resignation they arrested me four or five times. Each time I lost the employment which I had just found. Once they put me for three days in prison. At that time representatives of the SDB asked me, if I had thought about my situation and if I would know what to do. They wanted me back. On 17 March 1973 I received a letter from the Republican Office for Internal Matters, Ljubljana, in which I was informed that I had to pay 4,107,000.00 old Dinars within 20 days. That money was for paying the police school I had attended and the special training I had gone through. I did not answer that letter and did not hear anything about that matter any more. Since I was compromised at each new place of employment I found, I decided to escape from Yugoslavia. While I was in prison in Dob/Slovenia, I was several times approached by SDB representatives. Each time they offered remission of penalty if I would cooperate with them. I told them that I would like to go to a foreign country after my release from prison. After my discharge from prison on 10 September 1976, I stayed with my step-brother in Ljubljana. Since I expected further reprisals I had to escape from Yugoslavia under the stress of circumstances. I escaped with the assistance of a friend.

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PROTECTIVE WORKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

Page 5 of 6 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the component agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

DPOB:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Remarks:

As per a notification, dated 20 August 1974, from the Landratsamt (County Administration Office), Starnberg: In spite of HIS request for asylum in Switzerland, SUBJECT came to the FRG [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For that reason HE was not deported back to Switzerland. But since HE started working at the Savoy Hotel, 1 St.-Quentin-Ring, Kaiserslautern, in spite of HIS illegal entering the FRG, [REDACTED]

5 USC 552a (b) (7) (D)

AGENT'S NOTES: The following cities are located within the Federal Republic of Germany: Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), Loerrach (LT 9974), Zirndorf (PV 4278), Soecking (PU 7319), Konstanz (NT 1379), Osthofen (MA 5206), Stelzenberg (MV 0870) and Starnberg (PU 7419).

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA  
Auth Para 4-102, DOD 5200.1R

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TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-10)

Page 6 of 6 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

## INFORMATION PROVIDED IS FROM OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS

3 On 12 September 1977, the following information pertaining to SUBJECT was obtained from the records of the Kaiserslautern Area Civilian Personnel Office, Daenner Kaserne, Kaiserslautern (MV 1077), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09227, by [REDACTED] Local Wage Rate Investigator, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional):

Name: [REDACTED]  
DPOB: [REDACTED]  
Citizenship: Yugoslavian  
Occupation: Document Control and Review Clerk (Automatic Data Processing) (ADP), present pay grade and salary C-5/2, 1,602.00 DM per month  
Supervisor: [REDACTED] Chief, ADP Management Division  
Identity Document Number: [REDACTED] issued in Ljubljana  
Foreigner's Passport Number: [REDACTED] issued in Kaiserslautern  
Marital Status: Single  
Residences: October 1974 to October 1976, Yugoslavia; no date indicated to present, [REDACTED]  
Residence Permit: Until 29 April 1977  
Emergency Address: [REDACTED] Lawyer, resided at [REDACTED]  
Employment: 1 July 1972 to 16 December 1972, official, Republikanisches Sekretariat fuer innere Angelegenheiten der Sozialistischen Republik Slowenien (Republican Office for Internal Matters of the Slovenian Socialist Republic), Ljubljana, reason for termination: political reasons, no further information (nfi); 17 December 1972 to 24 October 1973, nothing indicated; 25 October 1973 to 30 April 1974, claims adjuster, Zuerich Versicherungsgesellschaft (Zurich Insurance Company), Zurich, Switzerland, reason for termination: residence permit was not renewed;

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PROTECTIVE MARKING [REDACTED] FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

## AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)  
DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

1 May 1974 to 30 June 1974, nothing indicated;  
 1 July 1974 to 1 October 1974, barkeeper, Savoy Hotel, 1 St.-Quentin-Ring, Kaiserslautern, reason for termination: return to Yugoslavia;  
 2 October 1974 to 31 October 1976, nothing indicated;  
 1 November 1976 to 31 December 1976, supply clerk, Depot Property Division, Kaiserslautern Army Depot Complex (KADC), Kaiserslautern;  
 1 January 1977 to present, computer operator (trainee), and as of 17 June 1977 promoted to document control and review clerk (ADP), Document Control Branch, ADP Management Division, ADP Service Center DPI M 130, 21st Support Command, Duty Station: KADC, Kaiserslautern.

Knowledge of  
 Languages:  
 Military Service:  
 Education:

English and German: Fluently; French: Fair.  
 22 September 1969 to 28 June 1972, Military Service, nfi  
 1 September 1959 to 20 June 1967, Elementary School;  
 1 September 1967 to 20 June 1969, High School for Languages;  
 22 September 1969 to 28 June 1972, Fachschule fuer innere Angelegenheiten der Sozialistischen Republik Slowenien (Technical School for Internal Matters of the Slovenian Socialist Republic); made HIS final high school examination;  
 1 October 1972 to 30 July 1973, University, Fakultät fuer politischen-wissenschaftlichen-sozialistischen Journalismus (Faculty for political-scientific-socialistic Journalism).

Previous Convictions: Sentenced in Yugoslavia for political reasons, nfi.

AGENT'S NOTES: Stelzenberg (MV 0870) is located within the FRG.

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 TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

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Page 2 of 2 pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

## AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
AS A CONDITION OF PROVIDING INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT

4 On 12 September 1977, Source 2212-4040 provided the following information  
to [REDACTED] Local Wage Rate Investigator, 66th Military Intelligence  
Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional), concerning [REDACTED]

Name:

DPOB:

Citizenship:

Yugoslavian

Marital Status:

Single

Residences:

28 June 1974 to 1 October 1974, 1 St.-Quentin-  
Ring, Kaiserslautern;

1 October 1974, SUBJECT was deported to Switzerland.

Residence Permit:

Until 30 August 1974; the renewal was disapproved;  
reason not indicated.

Disposition of

SUBJECT'S File:

On 20 October 1976, SUBJECT'S file was forwarded  
to the Kreisverwaltung (County Administration),  
Kaiserslautern.

AGENT'S NOTES: Kaiserslautern (MV 1077) is located within the Federal  
Republic of Germany.

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

## AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE WAS GIVEN AN EXPRESS PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
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On 13 September 1977, Source 2212-4886 provided the following information to [REDACTED] Local Wage Rate Investigator, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional), concerning [REDACTED]

Name:

DPOB:

Citizenship:

Occupation:

Marital Status:

Residences:

Yugoslavian

Clerk

Single

No date indicated to 13 October 1976, Landesdurchgangslager (State Transit Camp), Osthofen;  
13 October 1976 to present, [REDACTED]  
c/o [REDACTED]

AGENT'S NOTES: Osthofen (MA 5206) and Stelzenberg (MV 0870) are located within the Federal Republic of Germany.

199

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TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

# AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

(FN)

DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

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On 12 September 1977, Source 2212-4890 provided the following information to [REDACTED] Local Wage Rate Investigator, 66th Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security (Provisional), concerning [REDACTED]

Name:

DPOB:

Citizenship:

Marital Status:

Residences:

[REDACTED]  
Yugoslavian

Single

No date indicated to 28 June 1974, Ljubljana;  
28 June 1974 to 1 October 1974, 1 St.-Quentin-  
Ring, Kaiserslautern;  
1 October 1974, moved to Switzerland;  
no date indicated to present, [REDACTED],  
[REDACTED] primary residence;  
15 January 1977 to present, [REDACTED],  
[REDACTED] c/o [REDACTED], secondary residence.

AGENT'S NOTES: Stelzenberg (MV 0870) and Kaiserslautern (MV 1077) are located within the Federal Republic of Germany.

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PROTECTIVE MARK [REDACTED] EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED] 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

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# AGENT REPORT

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1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

[REDACTED] (FN)

DPOB: [REDACTED]

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

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7 On 13 September 1977, Source 2212-4036 could provide no information  
concerning [REDACTED]

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TERMINATION (PARA 13, AR 340-10)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED], 66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[REDACTED]

DA FORM 341  
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# AGENT REPORT

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(FN)  
DPOB:

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 September 1977

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

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On 12 September 1977, Source 2212-4041 could provide no information  
concerning

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DECLASSIFICATION (PARA 13, AR 340-16)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

66th MI Group IS (PROV)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341  
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VOL II - FIVE

As of 6-22-76 all material  
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Rio E. Lard 6-22-76  
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS B. WARD 5  
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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UP AR 331-10

REVIEWER

DATE

9 Dec 92

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

UP AR 331-10

REVIEWER

H. McKinney 13 Nov 91

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA

UP AR 381-10

REVIEWER

DATE

H. McKinney 9 July 96

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203

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

File No.

Hq. SIC REGION VI  
APO 696 - US ARMY

NOTE: Use this slip for notes in connection with this paper. All notes will be NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY TOP TO BOTTOM. Papers should have attached all records necessary for intelligent action. A line will be drawn the full width of the slip with each note.

SUBJECT: UDB, KNOJ and KOS - RE: Jugoslavian Intelligence Organizations			
NO	DATE	FROM	TO
1	23 Dec	REGENSBURG	REGION VI
<p>INCL: SOI, S/R REGENSBURG, 21 Dec 48, Subj as above (5cc)</p> <p>DIST: 3 - Hqs EUCOM 2 - Region VI</p>			<p>1. Forwarded herewith is SOI, S/R REGENSBURG, Subject as above, dtd 21 Dec 48. Note information contained in paragraph 2 concerning a change of name of UDB to KOS, which if substantiated would indicate a change in the O &amp; G. (This information was reported in S/R REGENSBURG Periodic Report 112, under Section V, Positive Intelligence).</p> <p>2. For your information and distribution.</p>
<p>USC 552 (b) (7) (C)</p> <p>S/A Operations Officer</p> <p>Log No. 14864</p>			
<p>CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED (OR CHANGED) TO <del>CONFIDENTIAL</del> BY AUTHORITY OF LT. COL. E. M. McDERMOTT REGION-VI GS CIC Jst 16 Jan 51 Elmer T. Neighars/stlt</p>			
<p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 JUN 1999 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01750 AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P</p>			
<p>204</p> <p>CARDED</p> <p>204</p> <p>PAGE 3 of 1 PAGES COPY 2 of 2 COPIES</p>			

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VI-R-2612

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 21 December 1948

PREPARING OFFICE

7970th CIC Group, Region VI, Sub-Region REGENSBURG, APO 225, US Army

SUBJECT

UDB, KNOJ and KOS

RE: Yugoslav Intelligence  
Organizations

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . A  
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . B  
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . C  
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . D  
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E  
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1  
PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2  
POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3  
DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . 4  
IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5  
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . 6

## SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Reference Section Four, Part III, paragraphs 66 and 69 of the Consolidated Orientation and Guidance Report, the following information pertaining to Yugoslav Intelligence organizations is herewith submitted.

2. UDB (Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti - Administration of State Security; also abbreviated UDBA, formerly known as OZNA) is known in Yugoslavia as a dreaded secret police organization on a parallel with the Soviet MVD (Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs, formerly known as NKVD). Since the TITO-Cominform controversy, UDB actions have been much milder and less rigorous, which seems to indicate that TITO is striving to gain the support of the people by moderating his previously severe tactics. In an effort to conceal its activities and to camouflage its identity, the name of the UDB has recently been changed to KOS (Korpus Obavestajne Sluzbe - Corps of Intelligence Service). Another recent change is the use of beautiful women by the UDB to obtain intelligence information from susceptible men. (B-6)

3. KNOJ (Korpus Narodne Otbrane Jugoslavije - Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia) are local councils composed of Communist members and sympathizers. Each village, community, town and city with its districts has its own local council with very experienced, loyal members who are unofficially known as security organs. Their task is to watch all meetings of the inhabitants of the particular locality, to inform official organs in cases of emergency, and to assemble people for official meetings, discussions, performances and celebrations. They are in charge of all arrangements concerning the arrival of high officials and serve as interpreters of public opinion, as well as instructors regarding state orders, requisitions and other executive measures. KNOJ corresponds somewhat to the German Volksturm. (B-6)

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Col B A Tormey by *Chitchi*

Date 5 Aug. 1952

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INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

NO. 7596

SLB/vgs

Date 19 October 1948

File No. V-1553

Suspense                     

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Corps of Intelligence Service ("Kos" Korpus  
Obavestajne Sluzbe)

FROM	TO	FOR ACTION INDICATED
------	----	----------------------

Mr. 

Mr. 

1. Attached is copy of letter Headquarters EUCOM, dated 7 October 1948, subject as above, for your information and action as indicated in paragraph 4, basic letter and return to our files.

2. Organizational chart has been withdrawn from this Headquarters

  
Special Agent, CIC

Incl: a/s

APPROVED:

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Special Agent, CIC

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LT. COL. E. M. McDERMOTT  
REGION V, 68 CIC Det  
*16 Jan 51*  
*Elmer T. Neighlans 1st Lt.*

*No information on hand on "Kos" 27 Oct. 48*

ALL CORRESPONDENCE MUST BE ROUTED THROUGH MESSAGE CENTER

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11-10-48  
PIERSON for Rock

HEADQUARTERS  
7970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

7596  
APO 757

7 Oct 1948

D-10643

SUBJECT: YUGOSLAV CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ("KOS" -  
KORPUS OBAVESTAJNE SLUZBE)

TO : See Distribution

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, sub-  
ject: UDB, file as above, dated 10 February 1948, which inclosed  
report and organizational chart from the Department of the Army  
regarding the UDB.

2. A report from another agency, evaluation C-6, states  
that the entire Yugoslav Intelligence System has now been pooled  
in the "KOS" (KORPUS OBAVESTAJNE SLUZBE). The structure of  
"KOS" is said to be analogous to the structure of the former  
German Abwehr, and former German officers are said to have been  
involved in the initial organization of "KOS". However, an F-6  
report states that "KOS" is only a subsection of UDB.

3. Transmitted herewith is Organizational Chart of the  
alleged "KOS".

4. It is desired that any available information you may  
have regarding subject organization be reported to this  
headquarters.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL ERSKINE:

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206

EARL S. BROWNING,  
Major, Infantry  
Director, Plans, Training  
and Operations

1 Incl a/s

Lt. [redacted] rk/62  
OPS

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LT. COL. E. M. McDERMOTT 16 Jan 51  
REGION V-60 G-10  
Erma B. Mahan

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BIO NO: 4135-0000  
 WIS NO: ~~SECRET~~ COUNTY: Yugoslavia  
 REPORT NO: CI Report J-161 WDGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT  
 SUBJECT: "KCS" - Yugoslav IS Corps  
 FROM: ID LUGCM APO 403 REFERENCES:  
 EVALUATION: 7-3 DATE OF INFORMATION: Middle of August 1948 DATE OF REPORT: 15 October 1948  
 INCL: PREPARED BY: SOURCE:

SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:

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Additional information to CI Reports No. J-141 and J-119 concerning the "KCS"  
 (Corps of the IS) is forwarded.

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PORT NO. CI Report J-161  
PAGE NO. 1

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"KOS" - Yugoslav IS Corps

1. CI Reports No. J-141 and J-119 contained information concerning the reorganization of the Yugoslav IS. The Annex to CI Report No. J-141 is a diagram of the "KOS" (Corps of the IS) showing the organization which is said to have replaced the previous Yugoslav IS organizations.
2. The statements contained in CI Report No. J-141 have now virtually been confirmed by another source (F).
3. This source disputed, however, the assumptions contained in CI Report No. J-119 according to which the "KOS" is a sub-section of the "UDE" (Ministry of the Interior). Source maintains that the "KOS", headed by [REDACTED] is on a higher level than the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Defense, and the party apparatus. "KOS" is controlling these three institutions.
4. In addition, source forwarded the following small corrections to be applied to the diagram of the "KOS" organization contained in the Annex to CI Report No. J-141.
  - (a) Below First Section-sub-section "AO" cancel "missions unknown" and insert "Fight against Enemy Organizations".
  - (b) Below third Section-sub-section "Surveillance of the Armed Forces" cancel "O" and insert "Z".

b6  
b7C  
b7D

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DD FORM 1000-0100	COUNTRY: Yugoslavia
MIC NO.	
REPORT NO. 31 3-141	WDGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT I.D. NO.
SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Yugoslav IS	
FROM: 1000-0100 403	REFERENCES: 1000-0100 403
EVALUATION: 1-6	DATE OF INFORMATION: 1000-0100 403 16 Sep 1948
INCL ONE	PREPARED BY: SOURCE:

SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:

The former Yugoslav IS was subordinated to the minister of the interior. This structure was inefficient. The Yugoslav IS has now been pooled into the "KOS" (Intelligence Corps). Organization of the "KOS" is reported.

T. No. 10 3291

3940

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deorganization of the Yugoslav IS

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1. In JI Rpt J-32 it was reported that the Yugoslav IS, in its military branch organized as "OZNA" and in its civil branch organized as "UDB", was subordinate to the minister of the interior. This structure of the Yugoslav IS showed weaknesses and uncertainties, in so far as in the "OZNA" as well as in the "UDB" the intelligence organs were intermingled with the executive organs and were assigned overlapping missions.
2. According to information supplied by a usually reliable source, the entire Yugoslav IS has now been pooled in the "KOS" (Korpus Obezbeštajne Glazbe, Intelligence Corps). (The first report concerning the "KOS" was submitted in JI Rpt No. J-119). At that time, only small "KOS" groups had been observed, however, with low-level KNOJ units (Corps of National Defense).
3. The structure of KOS is analogous to the structure of the former German "Abwehr" (counter intelligence service); former German officers are said to have been involved in the initial organization of the "KOS".

On the whole, the "KOS" is organized in three sections:

First section: Active intelligence concerning military, economic, and technical matters.

Third section: Counterintelligence; surveillance of the armed forces, the population, the KNOJ; fight against foreign agents.

Second section: Sabotage, terror, and provocations.

The presumed top organization of the "KOS" is shown in the attached annex.

4. The assumption contained in JI Rpt J-119 (F-6), according to which the "KOS" is a subsection of the "UDB" (Ministry of the interior), is still unconfirmed.

1 Annex.

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS  
APO 209, U. S. ARMY

5 June 48  
18  
HQ TRUST  
CONTROL No. 1237

5 June 48  
Ref. No. S-6033

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: OZNa Organization in the Federal Republic of  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, JUGOSLAVIA.

RE : History, Personnel and Locations of the  
Various Intelligence Units.

1. [REDACTED] Data contained herein is  
intended to augment and complement details presented in earlier reports  
of this nature [REDACTED] (Ref. No. S-5163, SUBJECT:  
Development of the Intelligence Network of the Communist Party of JUGO-  
SLAVIA for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 12 April  
1948; Ref. No. S-5172, SUBJECT: OZNa Organization, Composition, Functions  
and Methods in JUGOSLAVIA and Abroad, dated 16 April 1948, and Ref. No.  
S-5196, SUBJECT: OZNa Organization, Composition, Functions and Methods in  
JUGOSLAVIA and Abroad, dated 12 May 1948). To facilitate the compo-  
sition of the following material, it is suggested that the former Sum-  
be used as references. Complete background details relative to the p-  
sonalities mentioned herein are also available and will be compiled and  
forwarded through normal channels in the near future. Comments and evalu-  
ation from higher Headquarters would be appreciated. Evaluation: C-3.

PART I

HISTORY OF FEDERAL OZNa IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2. In 1944, [REDACTED], representing the newly formed OZNa  
Commission in the Central Committee of the KPJ, sent a letter of direc-  
tives to lower (Regional, Provincial or Rural District) Party Committees,  
instructing the political secretaries of each unit to form an OZNa found-  
ing Commission in compliance with specific instructions. (See Ref. No.  
S-5163, page 10, paragraph 25.) Members of the KPJ Regional Committee  
for Bosnia and Herzegovina were consequently selected to fill the allocated  
positions (see Ref. No. S-5196, page 14, paragraph 40).

3. Orders received from the Central Committee stressed the fact  
that OZNa should be exceedingly well organized and directed in Bosnia and  
Herzegovina, as this Republic contained such a wide assortment of political,  
religious and national elements, that strict control of the general popu-  
lation was essential. It is pointed out that the nationalistic spirit of  
all factions in this area is highly developed, due to the constant changes  
in the local government and the desire of each element to retain its

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SOI No. S-6033 (cont.)

Page 2.

integrity despite all forms of opposition, consequently the Party placed several of its most reliable and experienced intelligence agents in Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of its formation.

4. In the Spring of 1944, Federal OZNa contained approximately 10 members and was located at Sanski Most, in the vicinity of Prijedor. Approximately one month after its formation, this unit was moved to Jajce and Headquarters were established in a villa outside of the town on the road to Banja Luka. At this time, the organization was strengthened with the addition of about seven new agents. When it became evident that the war was approaching an end and that Sarajevo was about to be liberated, in March 1945 Federal OZNa Officers were divided into three groups and deployed in the following manner:

a. [REDACTED] was placed in charge of a group of Federal OZNa agents attached to the 29th Partisan Division commanded by General [REDACTED]. The intelligence personnel advanced with the Division through Mostar, over the Ivan Planina Mountains and entered the city of Sarajevo from the South. During these operations, [REDACTED] received reinforcements from the Provincial OZNa of Herzegovina.

b. [REDACTED] commanded a second section which was attached to the Fifth Partisan Corps led by General [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] Political Commissar. The Corps proceeded through Travnik and Zenica and entered Sarajevo from the West. [REDACTED] worked closely with OZNa Officers attached to the Fifth Corps and received additional assistance from intelligence personnel of Provincial OZNa for [REDACTED].

c. [REDACTED] supervised the activities of a third group which was placed with the Third Corps commanded by [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] as Political Commissar. This Partisan formation advanced through Sokolac and came into Sarajevo from the East. [REDACTED] intelligence unit was assisted in its operations by Third Corps OZNa Officers and personnel of the Provincial OZNa for Eastern Bosnia.

5. These three sections of Federal OZNa united in Sarajevo in accordance with prearranged agreements and as a result of their formulated plan of action, over 1000 anti-Communists or collaborationists were apprehended and incarcerated during the first day the Partisans occupied the city. [REDACTED] commanded Federal OZNa immediately following the liberation of Sarajevo, but he was soon replaced by [REDACTED] who flew from Belgrade to assume his new position.

COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL OZNa FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1945 - 1946):

6. The following Officers are all members of Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina. These individuals are listed in order of their organizational importance and not in regard to their rank or official position:

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SOI No. S-6033 (cont.)

Page 3.

Major General [REDACTED] - Chief (Nacelnik) of Federal OZNa.  
Major General [REDACTED] - Assistant Chief (Pomocnik Nacelnika)  
of Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Chief of the Counter Intelligence  
Section of Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Political Secretary of the Party Bureau  
in Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of the Political Section of  
Federal OZNa.  
Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] - Chief of a Section in Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of the Political Section of  
Federal OZNa.  
Captain [REDACTED] - Member of the Counter Intelligence  
Section of Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of the Political Section of  
Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of Federal OZNa.  
Captain [REDACTED] - Assistant Federal Public Prosecutor  
for Bosnia and Herzegovina (automatic member  
of Federal OZNa).  
Captain [REDACTED] - Member of Federal OZNa. (Party  
professionalist and most individuals are un-  
aware of his intelligence position.  
Major [REDACTED] - Chief of the Economic Section of  
Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Chief of the Control Section of Sta  
Employees (automatic member of Federal OZNa).  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of the Political Section of  
Federal OZNa.  
Major [REDACTED] - Member of the Counter Intelligence  
Section of Federal OZNa.  
Second Lieutenant [REDACTED] - Member of the Counter Intelligence  
Section of Federal OZNa.  
Captain [REDACTED] - Member of the Counter Intelligence  
Section of Federal OZNa.  
First Lieutenant [REDACTED] - Special courier for Federal OZNa.  
Second Lieutenant [REDACTED] - Administrative Section of Federal OZNa.

In addition to these personalities, there are three additional  
Officers assigned to Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; however,  
Source was unable to recall their names. One serves as personal assist-  
ant to [REDACTED] of the Counter Intelligence Section, [REDACTED] (fnu)  
serves as personal assistant to [REDACTED] of the Control Section and  
the functions of the third are unknown.

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7. Approximately 30 to 40 typists are employed by Federal OZNa.  
In addition to this number, about 30 low-ranking OZNa Officers and Warrant  
Officers work in the file section, photographic laboratory, coding and  
decyphering room, garage, etc., however none of these individuals are  
primarily essential to the advancement of the intelligence mission.

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PERSONNEL CHANGES IN FEDERAL OZNa FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1945):

8. The following individuals were former members of Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, in 1945 they were reassigned to the indicated positions:

Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] - Assistant Chief of Sarajevo City  
OZNa.

Major [REDACTED] - Former member of the Counter Intelligence Section of Federal OZNa; transferred to Central OZNa in Belgrade.

First Lieutenant [REDACTED] - Formerly represented Federal OZNa in the Cazinska Krajina region; later dispatched to Stockholm SWEDEN, as the Secretary of the Yugoslav Ambassador.

9. The following Officers joined Federal OZNa only after the Liberation of Sarajevo:

[REDACTED] Member of the KPJ Regional Committee.

INSTALLATION USED BY FEDERAL OZNa FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:

10. Federal OZNa Headquarters for Bosnia and Herzegovina is located in a modern building on the corner of Sokolska Ulica, Sarajevo. Prior to 1941, this house was used as a Masons' Lodge and during the period of hostilities it served as a Ustasha Police Command. All buildings immediately adjacent to this installation contain only state or Party offices, such as the KPJ Central Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Regional SKOJ Committee, the Hipotekarna Banka, etc. Apartment houses in this vicinity may be leased or purchased only by members of the Communist Party.

11. Federal OZNa Headquarters contains four stories in addition to the ground floor. A detachment of approximately 30 KNOJ guards are billeted in the latter area, which also has appropriate accommodations for reception and waiting rooms. The offices of the Chief and the Assistant Chief of Federal OZNa and of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Section are located on the first floor, as is the mail room and the Switchboard control. The various OZNa sections maintain their offices on the second floor. On the third floor one may find the photographic laboratory, the coding and decyphering rooms and four to five detention cells. It is believed that Federal OZNa files and archives are also located on this floor. Contents of the fourth floor are unknown and the roof of the building is flat. There is a radio transmitting set in this installation.

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12. Garage facilities used by Federal OZNa is contained in the same building as the Headquarters and a rear entrance is used for vehicles. Additional parking space is to be found at the WOLF Garage in Misirbina Ulica, Sarajevo. In 1946, Federal OZNa Officers had approximately 30 vehicles (sedans, jeeps and trucks) at their disposition, as well as about 20 motorcycles. All transportation had either Yugoslav Army or civilian license plates.

PROCEDURE USED TO GAIN ADMITTANCE TO FEDERAL OZNa HEADQUARTERS:

13. An individual who enters Federal OZNa Headquarters and knows the name of the Officer with whom he wishes to speak, gives this information as well as his own name to the KNOJ guard on duty at the main door. The guard immediately contacts the indicated Officer by means of the inter-office telephone and when the latter person has given his approbation, the visitor is accompanied to his room by one of the KNOJ soldiers. Only in instances when the OZNa Officer gives specific authorization is the visitor permitted to proceed unescorted into the main section of OZNa Headquarters.

14. If a prospective visitor is unacquainted with all OZNa Officers but possesses certain information which he wishes to divulge to interested authorities, he is referred to the OZNa representative on duty in the waiting room. Here he explains the nature of his call and then is either escorted to the appropriate section, or else an officer from the detachment in question is contacted and precise instructions are procured.

15. None of the OZNa Officers may be visited for personal discussions during their working hours. This regulation applies to all members of their families, etc.

16. Individuals visiting OZNa Officers are required to leave their identity cards in the custody of the KNOJ guards. In 1946, after depositing their identification papers, each visitor was given a card which was to be signed by the Officer contacted, and no private individual was permitted to depart from OZNa Headquarters prior to having returned this document to the guard on duty. This method of strict control was placed into force mainly to preclude the undesired exit of OZNa interogatees before they had been officially dismissed by their questioner.

PRESCRIBED COURSE CONDUCTED BY FEDERAL OZNa FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:

17. This course (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 20, paragraph 57) is held in the King Peter Barracks located in Rankovica Trg (both are pre-war names), Sarajevo. Lecturers are composed primarily of Russian officers; however, neither the names of these individuals nor specific examples of the material discussed are available.

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PART II  
HISTORY OF SARAJEVO CITY OZNa

18. Sarajevo City OZNa was originally organized by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the Spring of 1944. [REDACTED] was appointed as the first Chief of this unit, [REDACTED] was named as his assistant, and these individuals were aided in the accomplishment of their assigned missions by [REDACTED] and others. [REDACTED] the Political Secretary of the KPJ Sarajevo City Committee, was automatically in control of the City OZNa unit, and in this capacity he furnished [REDACTED] with all directives required for the completion of successful operations in accordance with the Party line. All City OZNa members were at that time located in Sarajevo and normal contact with Federal OZNa was maintained through the use of the wireless transmitter set belonging to the KPJ Regional Committee. This apparatus was originally given to a Partisan unit for military usage by Allied supply authorities; however, it was appropriated by the Communist Party.

19. Immediately following the liberation of Sarajevo in April 1945, [REDACTED] assumed command of City OZNa in addition to his duties as Chief of Federal OZNa. Within a short while, however, he was substituted by [REDACTED] and the latter individual, in compliance with instructions received from [REDACTED] the Political Secretary of the KPJ Central Committee for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, selected the cadres which were to compose the Sarajevo City OZNa.

COMPOSITION OF SARAJEVO CITY OZNa (1945 - 1946):

20. The following Officers, all of whom are members of the Sarajevo City OZNa, are listed in order of their organizational importance and not according to their rank or official position.

Lieutenant Colonel	[REDACTED] - Assistant Chief of Sarajevo City OZNa, Chief of the Counter Intelligence Section contained therein.
Colonel	[REDACTED] Chief of Sarajevo City OZNa.
Captain	[REDACTED] - Political Secretary of the Party Bureau in Sarajevo City OZNa.
Major	[REDACTED] - Chief of a Section of City OZNa.
Major	[REDACTED] - Member of City OZNa.
Captain	[REDACTED] - Member of City OZNa.
Major	[REDACTED] - Member of City OZNa.
Major	[REDACTED] ("Djuras") - Member of City OZNa.
Captain	[REDACTED] - Member of City OZNa.
Captain	(NU) "Muse" - Member of City OZNa.
Captain	[REDACTED] - Member of City OZNa.
First Lieutenant	[REDACTED] - Communist Party professional;

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few individuals know of his intimate connections with the Intelligence Service.

First Lieutenant [REDACTED] Chief of City OZNa's Prisons.  
[REDACTED] (rank unknown) - Chief of the Administrative Section of City OZNa.

21. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], the original chief functionaries of Sarajevo City OZNa, were transferred to Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina when the City OZNa was reorganized and enlarged. In addition to these officials, this intelligence unit is composed of approximately ten additional lower-ranking authorities, the names of whom are unknown to Source. Sarajevo City OZNa maintains a staff of about 15 typists and general clerks.

INSTALLATION USED BY SARAJEVO CITY OZNa:

22. Headquarters of Sarajevo City OZNa is located on the corner of Cemaluseva Ulica and Kralja Petra (pre-war) Ulica, with the main entrance on the former street. This installation is immediately adjacent to only one other building and this latter construction is used as living quarters for the City OZNa Officers. In addition to the main door, access to OZNa Headquarters may be effected through the garages located in the rear of the building and in this manner prisoners or confidential informers are normally introduced to the premises.

23. Sarajevo City OZNa Headquarters consists of a ground floor and three additional stories. The ground floor contains billeting facilities for the 20 to 30 KNOJ guards, messing accommodations for City and Sarajevo Rural District personnel, as well as the central telephone switchboard. The Offices of [REDACTED] (Assistant City OZNa Chief), [REDACTED] (City OZNa Chief) and [REDACTED] are located on the first floor, while the remainder of the more important City OZNa functionaries work in separate rooms on the second floor. The third floor contains detention cells which were constructed by Ustasha police authorities during the war. Only prisoners of special importance or high security threat are incarcerated in this space. The roof of the building is flat.

24. Garage facilities used by Sarajevo City OZNa are located to the rear of the unit Headquarters and are entered from the Kralja Petra Ulica. City OZNa personnel have between 10 to 15 vehicles and approximately 10 motorcycles at their disposition. [REDACTED] is in charge of the garage and vehicle maintenance. The three brothers HALACEVIC (fnu) were used as drivers during secret arrest activities or other similar operations of a highly controlled nature, whereas [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were employed in this capacity for normal missions.

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PART III  
HISTORY OF SARAJEVO RURAL DISTRICT OZNa

25. Sarajevo Rural District OZNa was established officially only in April 1945, inasmuch as prior to this time this geographical area was covered by Herzegovina Rural District OZNa, Eastern Bosnia Provincial District OZNa, Central Bosnia Rural District OZNa, Travnik Rural District OZNa and Sarajevo City OZNa. This new unit assumed many of the duties and commitments previously handled by the preceding intelligence detachments and was originally composed of OZNa Officers drawn from the sections previously operating in that area. The Sarajevo Rural District OZNa was organized under the supervision of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of OZNa, as well as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Communist Party.

COMPOSITION OF SARAJEVO RURAL DISTRICT OZNa (1945 - 1946):

26. The following Officers, all of whom are members of Sarajevo Rural District OZNa, are listed in order of their organizational importance and not in accordance with their rank or official position:

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Major	[REDACTED] - Chief of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .
Major	[REDACTED] - Assistant Chief of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .
Captain	[REDACTED] - Head of the Counter Intelligence Section of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .
Captain	[REDACTED] - Member of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .
First Lieutenant	[REDACTED] - Chief of the Administration Section of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .
First Lieutenant	[REDACTED] - Chief of the Anti-Resistance Movement Section of <u>Sarajevo Rural District OZNa</u> .

27. In addition to these individuals, Rural District OZNa is composed of approximately five (5) subordinate Intelligence Officers and maintains a clerical staff of about 10 employees.

INSTALLATION USED BY SARAJEVO RURAL DISTRICT OZNa:

28. Sarajevo Rural District OZNa Headquarters is located in Kraljice Marije Ulice, Marin Dvor, Sarajevo. This installation is a one-floor villa and no other buildings are situated in the immediate vicinity. A garage for OZNa vehicles is to be found to the rear of the house and the entire premises are guarded by a permanent detachment of 10 to 15 KNOJ troops. In addition to these basic sentinels, Rural District OZNa had at its immediate disposition in 1946 one KNOJ Brigade

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and two similar units composed of regular Army troops in order to combat the concentrated Chetnik and Krizarji resistance groups existing in that area.

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF SARAJEVO RURAL DISTRICT OZNa:

29. Sarajevo Rural District OZNa is regarded as being the most important of all Rural District Intelligence units, inasmuch as the territory which it covers is larger than that serviced by any other similar group throughout the rest of JUGOSLAVIA. Sarajevo Rural District OZNa is in charge of the administration and control of the Zenica Penitentiary which contains only political prisoners. To facilitate this direction, an OZNa Officer normally maintains the position of Assistant Prison Director, although officially this installation is dependent upon the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

30. Additional information pertaining to miscellaneous OZNa activities in JUGOSLAVIA and abroad has been procured and is in the process of compilation. Results will be forwarded through normal channels in the near future.

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[REDACTED]  
Special Agent CIC

APPROVED:

[REDACTED]  
Chief CIC TRUST

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS  
APO 209, U. S. ARMY

HQ TRUST

CONTROL No. 1107

12 May 48

Ref. No. S-5196

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: OZNa Organization, Composition,  
Functions and Methods in JUGOSLAVIA  
and Abroad.

RE : Practical Examples of the Theoretic Procedures.

1. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

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[REDACTED] Data contained herein is intended to augment and complement details presented in an earlier report emanating [REDACTED] (Ref. No. S-5172, SUBJECT: Same as above, dated 16 April 1948) and to facilitate comprehension of the following material, it is suggested that the former summary be used as reference. It is pointed out that the succeeding information is to be used as illustrative examples of the various OZNa practices and theories outlined in Ref. No. S-5172 and references to the specific section of the earlier report will be made whenever practicable in order to eliminate a certain amount of questions or misunderstandings in the mind of the reader. Certain phases of this summary deal with the OZNa theory contained in Ref. No. S-5163, SUBJECT: Development of the Intelligence Network of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 12 April 1948 and, in such cases, appropriate references will also be made. Complete background details relative to the personalities mentioned herein are also available and will be compiled and forwarded in the near future. Comments and evaluation from higher Headquarters would be appreciated. Evaluation C-3.

A. ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE SECTORS.

2. In 1938, when Intelligence Sectors became an integral part of KPJ functions in the Central, Regional and rural District Committees (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 3, paragraph 8), [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were given the responsibility of supervising and directing all activities of this nature in the Central Committee of the KPJ. [REDACTED] was appointed to this task for the KPJ Regional Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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B. ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

3. In April 1941, when the Intelligence Sectors were transformed into Intelligence Centers, (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 4, paragraph 9) [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] retained their positions of responsibility for this branch in the Central Committee of the KPJ. The Intelligence Center of the KPJ Regional Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina was composed of the following members at this time:

- [REDACTED]
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

4. Members of the Intelligence Center for the city of Sarajevo included:

- [REDACTED]
- Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

5. Intelligence Center Personnel attached to the Eastern Bosnia Provincial Committee included:

- [REDACTED]
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

6. The Intelligence Center of the Bosanska Krajina Provincial Committee was composed of the following personnel:

- [REDACTED]
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

7. The Intelligence Center of the Herzegovina Provincial Committee contained the following members:

- [REDACTED]
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

8. Intelligence Center Personnel attached to the Cazinska Krajina Rural District Committee included:

- [REDACTED]
- Chief of the center
  - Member of the Center.

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9. The Sarajevo Rural District Committee Intelligence Center included the following:

- 
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

10. The Intelligence Center of the Romanija Rural District Committee contained the following members:

- 
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

11. Intelligence Center personnel attached to the Visegrad - Foca Rural District Committee included the following:

- 
- Chief of the Center
  - Member of the Center
  - Member of the Center.

12. Headquarters of the following Intelligence Centers were located in Sarajevo:

Intelligence Center of the Regional Committee of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Intelligence Center for the City of Sarajevo.  
Intelligence Center of the Eastern Bosnia Provincial Committee  
Intelligence Center of the Herzegovina Provincial Committee  
Intelligence Center of the Sarajevo Rural District Committee.

13. Personnel in these organizations maintained contact with their net of informants and collaborators operating in assigned areas by the use of couriers.

C. INTELLIGENCE CENTER INSTALLATIONS.

14. Normally, the apartments selected by Intelligence personnel for their use and for the use of the Party Committees in general (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 5, paragraph 14b) belonged to individuals who were in no way connected with the Communists and who, if possible, were State employees, Domobran or Ustasha Officers, etc. It frequently occurred that the owner of the premises was actually not aware that his residence was being used for illegal meetings of this

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nature, as a member of his family, being a Party adherent, could entertain fellow Communists without arousing undue suspicion. During the early part of the war, the following addresses in Sarajevo were used for Intelligence Center meetings:

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15. All of these apartments had to be equipped with two entrances, as well as a safe place of concealment for a telephone, compromising documents, etc. The main intelligence center used at this time was located in the residence of Dr. [REDACTED] and it contained a large number of intelligence files. The actual room used for meetings of this nature was situated inconspicuously between the dental laboratory and reception chamber of [REDACTED]. The principal courier center operated out of the apartment of [REDACTED].

D. INTELLIGENCE CENTER PENETRATION AGENTS.

16. In 1941, [REDACTED] ("Pavle"), who was working for the GESTAPO unit stationed in Sarajevo, was simultaneously an informer of the Intelligence Center for the KPJ City Committee of Sarajevo. At least ten additional Communists in Sarajevo were charged with the penetration of the GESTAPO. Members of the KPJ Central Committee for the Province of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as CEMIC Brad and CEMIN Dabne of OZNa are familiar with all phases of these attempts.

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17. The Italian OVRA Detachment stationed in Mostar was penetrated on behalf of the Communists by [REDACTED]. The Italian Consular representative in the same city, [REDACTED], rendered periodic reports of the activities of the Italian intelligence unit to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (lnu).

18. The Deputy Commander of the Italian occupation troops in Mostar, a Captain (nu) who was an OVRA Officer as well, was actually a member of the Communist intelligence net operated in that area by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], who is in

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Rome at the present time, could reveal the identity of the Captain.

19. The Italian Intelligence service in Mostar was further penetrated by [REDACTED], a businessman from Sarajevo. [REDACTED] had contacts with Italian Officers in Mostar, Kalinovik and Nevesinje, and he reported all information he obtained in this manner to members of the local Intelligence Centers.

20. An Albanian employed in the Italian Consulate in Sarajevo was at the same time employed by the Italian espionage service, but nevertheless he gave reports on all of the information which he obtained to [REDACTED], a member of a local Communist Party unit and a personal friend of his.

E. TECHNICAL - POLITICAL COURSES.

21. Two Technical - Political courses (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 6, paragraph 15) were given to instruct members of the Intelligence Centers. One was held at Sokolac, near the Romanija Mountains, and the other in the elementary school building located on Pasica Nikole Ulica in Sarajevo. The following individuals lectured on pertinent subjects to those attending the classes given at Sokolac:

22. Instructors at the Sarajevo course included:

- Lectures on Party history.
- Lectures on street fighting and equipment utilization.
- Lectures on document falsification.
- Lectures on jiu jitsu.

23. Potential Intelligence Center personnel residing throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were sent to Sokolac, while only those agents assigned to tasks in Sarajevo could attend the lectures given in that city. The following members of the Communist Party are known to have attended the course given in Sokolac:

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[REDACTED]

Approximately 60 other individuals attended this course. All were given cover names while going to the classes and no one was allowed to reveal his true identity to any fellow student.

24. The following members of the Communist Party attended the course given in Sarajevo:

[REDACTED]

Approximately 5 or 6 additional Intelligence Center candidates were present at the classes given in Sarajevo. The use of the school building in Pasica Nikole Ulica was made possible by the fact that the Director of the school, LJUBUNCIC Hasan, was a member of the Technical - Political course.

25. The preceding individuals include only those Communist Party members who attended the first course given in each location. These Intelligence classes were in operation until 1943 and one course lasted from one to six months, depending upon the amount of material presented. Each was held in a different location in the Sokolac and Sarajevo areas to avoid attracting the attention of police authorities; however, at one time in 1942, security precautions were not sufficiently enforced and Ustasha police apprehended all of the participants at the course in Sarajevo. This action was brought about by the arrest and subsequent interrogation of GALOSEVIC (fnu), the Secretary General of the KPJ for Sarajevo, who revealed all information he had in his possession when questioned by the authorities in power.

F. REORGANIZATION OF PARTY INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

26. During the latter half of 1941, when Party Intelligence Centers were divided into four sections (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 7, paragraph 18), personnel assignments were

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made in the following manner:

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- 1. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the Sarajevo KPJ City Committee.
- 2. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of (contained in) the KPJ Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 3. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Eastern Bosnia.
- 4. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Bosanska Krajina.
- 5. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Herzegovina.
- 6. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Sarajevo.
- 7. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the military espionage section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Visegrad-Foca.

27. The following individuals were placed in charge of the counter intelligence sections in the designated Intelligence Centers:

- 1. [REDACTED] - Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center contained in the Sarajevo KPJ City Committee.

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PERIC Vlado

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center contained in the KPR Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

JAKSIC Rade

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center contained in the KRJ Provincial Committee for Eastern Bosnia.

MILICEVIC Zigorica

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Bosanska Krajina.

BOYKA Milenko

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Herzegovina.

2. RABIC Nebojsa

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Sarajevo.

POSTVIO Boro

- Responsible for the CI Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Visegrad-Poca.

28. The following individuals were placed in charge of the Technical sections in the designated Intelligence Centers:

POPULAR AUTO

- Responsible for the Technical Section in the Intelligence Center of the FPJ Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

ATLANTIC

Responsible for the Technical Section in the Intelligence Centers contained in all other of a/m KPJ Committees in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Technical Section Headquarters, from 1941 until February 1942, was located in the apartment of [REDACTED] in the vicinity of the sports arena, Sarajev.

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29. The following individuals were placed in charge of the Courier sections in the designated Intelligence Centers:

 - Responsible for the Courier Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina.


 - Responsible for the Courier Section in the Intelligence Center of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Herzegovina.

G. EXECUTIVE TROJKA PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.

30. Members of Executive Trojka's attached to the KPJ Intelligence Centers on various Party levels (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 6, paragraph 16) were mainly responsible for the implementation of all liquidation activities ordered by the Party. The following Officers served as the Chief of all executive Trojka's operating in the Sarajevo area during the indicated periods:

 - 1941  
- 1942  
- beginning of 1944.

31. "Desetars" (officers responsible for the direction of ten (10) Trojka's or thirty (30) men) included the following individuals in 1941:

  
There were approximately 5 or 6 additional Desetars operating at this time; however, Source does not remember their names.

32. The following individuals were members of Executive Trojka's in the Sarajevo area between 1941 and 1945:

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33. The following individuals were leaders of the various Intelligence Trojka's operating in Sarajevo and vicinity between 1941 and 1944:

- from 1941 until 1942.
- from 1941 until 1944, including service in OZNa.
- from 1941 until 1944, including service in OZNa.
- from 1941 until 1944, including service in OZNa.
- from 1941 until 1942.
- from 1941 until 1944, including service in OZNa.
- from 1941 until 1944, including service in OZNa.
- from 1943 until 1944, including service in OZNa.

34. The following individuals were leaders of the various Intelligence Trojka's functioning in the Foca - Visegrad - Cajnice - Gorazde - Kalinovik regions:

- Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army, from 1941 until 1942.
- April 1941 until December 1941 Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate Italian Intelligence units operating in a/m area: 1942 until 1943

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- Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army; 1943 until 1945 Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the pro-Allied Moslem groups in Sarajevo.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1942 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate Chetnik units operating in a/m area; 1942 Intelligence Center informant in his Partisan unit.

- 1941 until 1942 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate Chetnik units operating in a/m region as well as the Rogatica - Sokolac area.

- 1941 until 1942 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army; 1942 until 1944 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Moslem groups in Sarajevo.

- 1941 until 1942 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Chetniks; 1942 until 1943 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the GESTAPO; assigned to a post in Serbia in 1944; special informant for OZNa in Sarajevo on the anti-Communist activities of local Serbs in 1945.

35. The following were leaders of various Intelligence Trojka's operating in the Tuzla - Gradacac - Gracanice area:

- 1941 until 1942 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army; 1942 until 1943 incarcerated; 1943 until 1944 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army; 1944 served as a special informer for OZNa while in the Partisan Army stationed in Belgrade.

- 1941 until 1943 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha Army and the Moslem groups in Gracanice; 1943 until 1946 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the pro-Allied Moslem groups.

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36. The following were leaders of various Intelligence Trojka's operating in the Bijelina - Samac - Brcko area:

[REDACTED] - Serving from 1941 until 1943.

[REDACTED] 1941 until 1943 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha militia; 1943 until 1944 Chief of Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Moslem SS Division attached to the German occupational force.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Chetniks and the anti-Communist Serb element.

37. [REDACTED] was Chief of the Intelligence Trojka's assigned to penetrate the Ustasha General Staff stationed in Sarajevo and Zagreb.

38. The following individuals were members of the Intelligence [REDACTED] operating in Sarajevo:

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1942 in Sarajevo; later in Banjaluca.

[REDACTED] - 1942 until 1945 in Sarajevo and Travnik.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1944 in Sarajevo; later became an OZNa Officer.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the Ustasha unit in Sarajevo.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the Ustasha unit in Sarajevo; was later made an OZNa Officer.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1943 used to penetrate the GESTAPO; liquidated by the Communist Party in the latter area.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the Ustasha police unit in Sarajevo.

[REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the Ustasha.

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- ✓ [REDACTED] - 1941 until 1943 used to penetrate the Italian Intelligence Service; 1943 until 1944 used to penetrate the Allied Intelligence Service; 1944 became an employee of OZNa.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the Ustasha Military Police.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - 1941 until 1945 used to penetrate the GESTAPO and the Chetnik Intelligence.

39. The following individuals were members (or leaders) of the Executive Trojka's attached to the Intelligence Centers and later to OZNa in the Sarajevo area:

- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served with the Intelligence Center Trojka's and later with OZNa from 1942 until 1944.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1945.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1942, at which time he was arrested.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1945.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1945.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1942 in Sarajevo, then was assigned the same type of work in Belgrade.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1942 in Sarajevo, then was assigned the same type of work in Belgrade.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1945.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1943 in Sarajevo, then was assigned the same type of work in Split.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1943, at which time he was incarcerated.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1942 in Sarajevo, then was assigned the same type of work in Mostar; in 1944 and after was working in Dubrovnik in the same capacity.

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- [REDACTED] - Served from 1941 until 1942 in Sarajevo, then was assigned the same type of work in Banjaluca until 1945.

The majority of these individuals were leaders of the Executive Trojka's and hence were in a position to know the identity of the other two members of his group, as well as some of the other Trojka components.

H. OZNa ORGANIZATION COMMISSIONS.

40. The following members of the Communist Party were responsible for the original organization of OZNa in the KPJ Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 11, paragraph 26):

- [REDACTED] - Secretary of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.

41. The following members of the KPJ Central Committee for Croatia were included in the OZNa Commission for that Party unit:

- [REDACTED] - Secretary of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.

42. The following members of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Herzegovina were included in the OZNa Commission for that Party unit:

- [REDACTED] - Secretary of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.

43. The following members of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Bosanska Krajina were included in the OZNa Commission for that Party unit:

- [REDACTED] - Secretary of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.  
[REDACTED] - Member of the OZNa Commission.

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44. The following members of the KPJ Provincial Committee for Eastern Bosnia were included in the OZNa Commission for that Party unit:

- ✓✓✓ [REDACTED]
- Secretary of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.

45. The following members of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Cazinska Krajina were included in the OZNa Commission for that Party unit.

- ✓✓✓ [REDACTED]
- Secretary of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.
  - Member of the OZNa Commission.

I. FOREIGN OZNa OPERATIONS (1944 - 1945).

46. The following individuals were employed by the Yugoslav Intelligence Service in Bari, ITALY in 1944 and 1945 (see Ref. No. S-5163, page 19, paragraph 49):

- ✓ [REDACTED]
- Member of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA prior to 1941; left that country to avoid being persecuted by the German occupational authorities; since he was Jewish; was in Bari when the Allied Armies arrived and eventually became an informer for both the British and the American Intelligence Services and was also in contact with Apostolides of Rome; at the same time he was working for OZNa and maintained direct contact with Central OZNa in Belgrade; left Bari at the end of 1945; is now a special informer of Central OZNa in Belgrade.

- ✓ [REDACTED]
- Transported to Bari for recuperation with a shipment of wounded Partisans; prior to being wounded, he served as an Intelligence Officer in the Partisans and was a member of a Partisan Intelligence Center; did not return to JUGOSLAVIA, but was assigned to various positions in the Yugoslav Military Mission in Bari, as a cover for further intelligence activities; among his

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informants at this time were two daughters of a Slovene family who were also in contact with American Intelligence Officers; Source has seen several reports written in English which [redacted] obtained in this manner; upon returning to JUGOSLAVIA he was placed on OZNa's payroll, but was given no official position in the Intelligence unit so as not to compromise his cooperators in Bari.

- Member of the Yugoslav Military Mission stationed in Bari and worked for the Chief of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service in that area at the same time; upon his return to Sarajevo, he became a special informer for the Federal OZNa Detachment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

(NU)

- Captain in the Partisan Army; Political Commissar; Assistant Chief of the Legal (Pravna) Section of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Bari; Chief of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service in Bari; maintained direct contact with Central OZNa in Belgrade.

- Native of Split; Jewish; member of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Bari; penetrated Allied intelligence services in that area through her contacts with Yugoslav Jewish refugees; maintained a net of informants in Taranto, including one [redacted] (fnu), the President of the Jewish community in Taranto in 1945 and a resident of Milan in 1946; is at present employed by OZNa in Split; [redacted] (fnu), a Jew, normally residing in Rome or Milan, made regular trips to Bari with intelligence reports for [redacted] [redacted] may be residing in Trieste at the present time.

47. The following individuals worked for OZNa in ITALY during and immediately after the war:

["Krsto"] - Chief of all OZNa agents operating in ITALY: from Montenegro; affected with tuberculosis and was in:

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a TB sanitorium in Rome in 1945; member of a Partisan Intelligence Center in Montenegro, taken prisoner and placed in an Italian concentration camp; after being liberated by the Allies, continued his intelligence activities and received directives from [REDACTED] to organize a foreign OZNa unit in ITALY; returned to JUGOSLAVIA in 1945 or 1946 and is at present an agent of the counter intelligence section of Central OZNa in Belgrade.

- 3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)
- [REDACTED]
- Badly beaten when GLUNCIC, the Yugoslav Consul in Naples, was murdered in 1947 by a Chetnik work battalion; assigned the mission of penetrating the English Intelligence Service by gathering information from personal acquaintances in the British Army and from Yugoslav Jews employed by the British Intelligence Service; was in contact with [REDACTED]; at present working in the Yugoslav Embassy in Rome.

(NU)

- Female; Jew; native of Zagreb; employed as the main interpreter of the Yugoslav Mission in Rome in the summer of 1945; speaks excellent English; plump; quite attractive; came from a rich family; maintained contacts with [REDACTED] employed by Zagreb Federal OZNa upon her return to JUGOSLAVIA; came back to Rome in the same year and is believed to be there still.

(NU)

- Female; employed in the package distribution section of the UNRRA Office located in Via Toscana, Rome; maintained contacts with [REDACTED] and when the latter returned to JUGOSLAVIA, she was in direct communication with Central OZNa in Belgrade through the use of couriers; paid her informants with UNRRA packages; journeyed to Belgrade in 1945 and it is believed that she contacted [REDACTED] at this time; returned to Rome and obtained a Yugoslav passport in 1946; made another trip out of ITALY, however it is not known where she was still

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in Rome in September 1946 and is believed to be there still since she is married to an Italian; is regarded as one of the most important OZNa functionaries in ITALY.

48. The following individuals were dispatched from Sarajevo to foreign countries for the purpose of accomplishing assigned OZNa missions in 1945:

- Used to penetrate the Ustasha from 1941 until 1945; served as a Special Informant for the Federal OZNa of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1945; in the same year dispatched to Istanbul, TURKEY, as a Commercial Attache to the Yugoslav Embassy in that city.
- Special Informer for the Federal OZNa of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1944; sent to TURKEY as a Cultural Attache in 1945.
- OZNa Officer; assigned to the Yugoslav Embassy in SWITZERLAND.

J. USE OF OZNa AUXILIARY ORGANS (COMMUNIST PARTY).

49. The following incidents are indicative of the close cooperation existing between Communist Party and OZNa personnel (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 10, paragraph 28):

a. In Vienna, it is a normal practice for OZNa Officers and their informants to meet in apartments owned by Austrian Communists rather than in buildings housing any overt Yugoslav mission, as it is suspected that all of these installations are watched by interested intelligence authorities. Units organized by OZNa in Vienna for the purpose of kidnapping undesirable elements are frequently composed of members of the Austrian Communist Party and Austrian Police agents in addition to the Yugoslav leaders. A group of this type was charged with the abduction of [REDACTED] in 1945, but the entire plan failed.

b. OZNa Officers transmitted reports to YUGOSLAVIA by means of the W/T set belonging to the Austrian Communist Party unit in Vienna from May 1945 until the arrival of the Yugoslav Military Mission later in the same year.

c. An important figure in the Austrian Communist Party organization, [REDACTED] (fnu), who normally uses her maiden name in all of her activities, is actually a delegate

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from OZNa to the Party in Austria. This individual is responsible for the selection of Austrian Communist Party members to be trained for OZNa missions. (Date of information: October 1947) (Sub-source: [REDACTED], an OZNa Captain assigned to the Counter Intelligence Section of Central OZNa in Belgrade, one of the first organizers of OZNa in Vienna and Austria in 1945.)

d. The Secretary of the Austrian Communist Party in Feldkirchen (French Zone) is also a Special Informer of the local OZNa unit. (Date of information: October 1947)

e. An Italian woman (nu), residing in Rome, while attempting to obtain the release of her husband from a concentration camp in JUGOSLAVIA enlisted the services of an acquaintance who also happened to be an Italian OZNa informant. The latter individual endorsed the woman's formal application for an audition with [REDACTED], the Yugoslav Consul attached to the Military Mission, requested that her case be given special consideration and signed this statement with his OZNa cover name. [REDACTED] was not in a position to understand the full implications of the cover name, hence he referred the matter to [REDACTED] and the latter severely criticized the informant for using his secret name on correspondence not pertaining to intelligence reports, as well as for attempting to exploit his covert connections with OZNa.

f. In June 1945, when the recently appointed Chief of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service in EGYPT (nu) was scheduled to contact an OZNa Officer from Trieste in Venice, the Yugoslav Mission in Rome could not furnish adequate transportation. To assist this individual, the Italian Communist Party unit in Rome supplied a vehicle and a reliable driver, one [REDACTED] a former Partisan Brigade Commander, to accompany the future envoy to Venice.

Press:

50. The following OZNa Officers were responsible for the control of the Press within their indicated units, in 1946: (See Ref. No. S-5172, page 11, paragraph 32)

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- City OZNa of Sarajevo
- Rural District OZNa for Sarajevo.

51. The Secretary General of the Journalists' Association for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, [REDACTED], representing the entire press in the Republic, is in contact with OZNa. In view of the fact that OZNa is

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also the Chief Editor of "Oslobodzenje" and a member of the Cultural Commission of the KPJ Central Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina, directives given to him by OZNa are widely disseminated and effectively enforced.

52. [REDACTED], Editor of "Borba", is responsible to OZNa for the control of all newspapers and periodicals printed in Belgrade.

53. Directives which the OZNa authorities issue to the journalists pertain mainly to the press campaign which should be initiated to induce the general population to accept without question contemplated overt police activity. As an example, if OZNa agents decide to arrest priests or monks, the press should commence a series of articles criticising current clerical activity so that when the arrests do take place, the masses will regard the measure as being one of necessity.

Personnel Referents:

54. The following OZNa Officers were responsible for the control of the Personnel Referents within their indicated units in 1946 (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 12, paragraph 34):

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- City OZNa of Sarajevo.
- Rural District OZNa for Sarajevo.

Personnel Section of the Presidency of the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- Rural District National Committee.

Public Prosecutors:

55. The following OZNa Officers served in 1946 as Assistant Public Prosecutors for the indicated units (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 14, paragraph 42):

[REDACTED] Captain - Federal Prosecution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[REDACTED] (fnu) - Public Prosecution for Rural District of Sarajevo.

(LNU) [REDACTED] - Public Prosecution for the city of Sarajevo.

Control Commissions:

56. The following OZNa Officers are members of the

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the Federal Control Commission for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 14, paragraph 43):

(Inu)

K. PARTY CELLS WITHIN OZNa.

57. [REDACTED], the Party Secretary for the Federal OZNa of Bosnia and Herzegovina, controls all Party Bureaus and cells contained in OZNa units on lower echelons within the same Republic (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 19, paragraph 55). The Party Bureau of Federal OZNa in Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of the following members:

[REDACTED] Secretary

58. The purpose of this bureau is to ascertain that all higher OZNa Officers in the Republic are complying fully with the prescribed Party line. Two other KPJ Political Bureaus exist for the purpose of controlling the Communist activities of subordinate OZNa Officers and of OZNa employees (typists, clerks, etc.). The exact composition of these two groups is unknown, but both are directed by BJEDIC Dzemal, and the latter in turn is responsible to the KPJ Central Committee for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

59. Inasmuch as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are members of the KPJ Central Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina, they do not belong to the Party organization in OZNa. OZNa couriers and KNOJ guards are not members of the OZNa Party units, but are adherents of the various Communist cells in the KNOJ or normal Party Committees to which they would belong were they not connected with OZNa.

L. COURSES FOR OZNa OFFICERS.

60. The organization and composition of the permanent intelligence course given by the Federal Life Department of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 20, paragraph 57) will be discussed fully at a later date.

61. The following Intelligence Officers attended the course which was sponsored by Central OZNa in Belgrade in 1945 (exact location of the school is unknown).

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62. The following OZNa Officers attended the highest Intelligence course sponsored by OZNa and held in RUSSIA in January 1946:

(NU) The Deputy Chief of VI Army OZNa.

These three individuals, all of whom were residing in Sarajevo prior to being selected for specialized training, were issued Russian uniforms bearing their respective ranks in the Intelligence Service before leaving the latter city. From Sarajevo they proceeded to Belgrade where they joined other OZNa authorities and they all departed to RUSSIA (exact destination unknown).

M. OZNa INFORMERS.

63. As a result of their outstanding achievements in the Communist Party, their cooperation with Intelligence Center personnel and their high degree of reliability insofar as the Party cause is concerned, the following individuals were selected by OZNa Officers to be Special Informers (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 21, paragraph 65). These individuals are highly regarded within the intelligence circles and many of them possess more authority than actual OZNa employees, although none are members of OZNa.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on the activities of high Moslem priests; living in Sarajevo.
- Sarajevo City OZNa; residing in Traunik.
- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on economic conditions (commerce and business); residing in Sarajevo.
- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Socialist activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina;

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reports on the activities of high Moslem priests; residing in Rogatica.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Ustasha activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Ustasha activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA; reports on Socialist Party activities; residing in Belgrade.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Ustasha activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on the activities of high Moslem circles; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA and Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on activities of prominent, rich, Serb families who cooperated with the Partisans during the war since the latter were supported by the Anglo-Americans; most of these individuals do not possess Communist sympathies, but all are well-known throughout the area; residing in Belgrade and Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on same type of activities as SARAC Zahim; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on same type of activities as SARAC Zahim; residing in Banjaluka.

✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Ustasha activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Zagreb City OZNa; reports on Croat Peasant Party (HSS) activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo Rural District Committee OZNa; reports on Serb reactionary and Chetnik activities; residing in Sarajevo.

✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo Rural District Committee OZNa;

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reports on Croat Peasant Party (HSS) and Moslem activities; residing in Vares.

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Tuzla.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on activities within the Ministry of Industry for the Republic; residing in Sarajevo.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on activities in high society circles of Sarajevo; residing in Sarajevo.

- Federal OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA; reports on Chetnik activities; residing in Belgrade.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Catholic and Ustasha activities; residing in Sarajevo.

- Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA; reports on activities in the University of Belgrade; residing in Belgrade.

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on activities in high Serb circles; residing in Banjaluka.

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on the activities of high Serb circles; residing in Banjaluka.

64. The following individuals are also special OZNa informants; however, intelligence agents do not consider them to be as essential as a/m personalities:

- City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on Serb Moslem activities; residing in Sarajevo.

- City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on Ustasha underground activities; residing in Sarajevo.

- City and Rural District Committee OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on counter intelligence problems; residing in Sarajevo.

- ("Mak") - City OZNa; reports on activities of government employees working in Sarajevo; residing in Sarajevo.

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- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on the economic situation with special reference to assets obtained illegally by Jews during the war; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on Serb clerical activity and pro-Allied Serb sympathizers; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on pro-Chetnik elements; residing in Foca.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Croat Peasant Party (HSS) activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Serb clericals and Chetnik elements; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on economic problems; possible sabotage attempts; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Croat Peasant Party (HSS) activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Moslem activity; at present residing in Istanbul, TURKEY.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Serb anti-Communist activity; at present residing in Rogatica.
- X ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Moslem activity; residing in Foca.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo Rural District Committee OZNa; reports on Moslem activity; residing in Foca.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on Jewish activity; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - City OZNa for Sarajevo; reports on Moslem activity; residing in Sarajevo.

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65. The following individuals are regular OZNa informers

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(not special informers), but are nevertheless considered to be of some importance in intelligence circles:

- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Chetnik elements and Serb clerical activity.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on government employees working in Sarajevo; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on electrical plant activity and possible sabotage attempts; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Serb anti-Communist youth; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on the national women's organization, "Kolo Srbskih Sestara"; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Catholic priest activity; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Croat reactionary groups; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Croat Peasant Party activity; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on the current activities (overt and covert) of government employees who are known to have collaborated with the occupying forces during the war; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo Rural District Committee OZNa; reports on Chetnik elements; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on high Serb commercial circles; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Serb reactionaries; residing in Sarajevo.
- ✓ [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Croat

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reactionaries; residing in Belgrade.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Chetnik elements; residing in Sarajevo.

- Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Foca.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Moslem activities; residing in Sarajevo.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on activities in high Moslem circles; residing in Sarajevo.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on the activities of government employees in Sarajevo; resides in Sarajevo.

- Federal OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA; reports on Chetnik activities; residing in Belgrade.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on the activities of Jews who obtained illegally large amounts of money and assets during the war; residing in Sarajevo.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on merchants' activities; residing in Sarajevo.

- Sarajevo City OZNa; reports on Serb reactionary activity; residing in Sarajevo.

66. All of the foregoing individuals are by necessity members of the Communist Party; however, this particular adherence is not publicized in many cases. In this respect, whereas some OZNa informers are known to the general public as being confirmed Leftists, many others overtly number in the ranks of the anti-Communists. For example, [REDACTED] is normally characterized as being a definite reactionary, and many regular Party members are not aware that she is actually a Communist. This situation obviously enables the individual informant to operate with the greatest degree of accuracy and efficiency. It is pointed out that OZNa informants in various circles who are in no way compromised travel with their particular group out of their assigned area whenever it is deemed advisable that they do so. In this manner, were a Moslem circle to journey from Sarajevo to Dubrovnik for the summer months, the OZNa informants contained therein would naturally go with his friends and continue to report on their activities to his intelligence contact in Sarajevo.

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OZNa agents working in Dubrovnik would also be contacted by OZNa Sarajevo and informed of the existing conditions. Many OZNa special informants possess all of the qualifications required of OZNa Officers, but since it is believed that these individuals may be used more advantageously as reporters rather than as agents, they are not inducted into the Intelligence Service.

N. TROJKA'S DEPENDENT UPON OZNa.

67. Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with Headquarters in Sarajevo, employed a Trojka composed of the following three individuals to accomplish various foreign missions in 1945 (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 26, paragraph 83):

- 1. [REDACTED] - Leader of the Trojka; former leading gangster in Sarajevo; converted to Communism while serving a prison term.
- 2. [REDACTED] - Member of the Trojka; farmer.
- 3. [REDACTED] - Member of the Trojka, turner.

All three of these individuals are normally employed in their civilian capacities in Sarajevo; however, Source knows that they have been dispatched to GERMANY (by airplane), CZECH-OSLOVAKIA, AUSTRIA, HUNGARY and GREECE to complete assigned tasks given to them by OZNa authorities. During these travels, the trio used forged documents and assumed names. The nature of their missions is unknown.

68. In 1946, a group composed of residents of Sarajevo met frequently in the Hotel EUROPA for the purpose of learning French and English, as well as the history, culture, art, songs, etc., of both countries. These individuals stated that their motives were purely personal curiosity, but since all were in contact with OZNa, it may be assumed that they were actually preparing for an assignment in FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN or the UNITED STATES. The following were involved in these gatherings:

- 1. [REDACTED] - Captain in OZNa (only a few individuals are aware of the fact that he maintains this position.
- 2. [REDACTED] - OZNa Special Informer.
- 3. [REDACTED] - OZNa Informer.

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69. Source is of the opinion that groups similar to the one mentioned above existed in the capitals of other

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Federal Republics and that they were probably more numerous in Sarajevo, but he is unable to furnish additional precise information.

O. FOREIGN OZNa INFORMANTS.

70. The following individuals are used as informants by OZNa agents operating in the indicated countries (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 24, paragraph 74):

- Special Informer in Istanbul, TURKEY.
- Special Informer in Istanbul, TURKEY.

- Special Informer in Cairo, EGYPT.

- Special Informer in Rome, ITALY.
- Informer in Rome, ITALY.

- Special Informer in Innsbruck, AUSTRIA.
- Informer in Bludenz, AUSTRIA.
- Special Informer in Innsbruck, AUSTRIA.
- Informer in Innsbruck, AUSTRIA.
- Informer in Bludenz, AUSTRIA (now in Paris).

P. OZNa INTERROGATION METHODS.

71. The following illustration of the type of psychological strategy used by OZNa Officers and interrogators while completing an assigned mission indicates the nature of the activity of which current Yugoslav intelligence Service personnel is capable (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 30, paragraph 97). This incident occurred while Source was the Political Commissar of the "Unska Operativna Grupa" Partisan unit, which was the equivalent of a Division.

72. In the beginning of 1944, the Headquarters of this Division was being subjected to constant bombing attacks by German units and the weakest points along its front were frequently surrounded and challenged by German troops. As a result of this situation, it became apparent that a German spy was located someplace in the Division and was reporting to the enemy authorities on the vital statistics of the Partisan unit. To ascertain the identity of the individual in question, [REDACTED] a counter intelligence specialist in Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina, was sent as a delegate to the unit and was openly regarded as a general observer to avoid arousing undue suspicion.

73. Since the Counter Intelligence Section of OZNa was aware that the Germans normally used carrier pigeons to forward messages from one unit to another, [REDACTED] requested the Division OZNa Chief to instruct a platoon of KNOJ soldiers

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which was at his disposition to shoot all pigeons seen in the vicinity of the Division Headquarters. Within a short period of time following this order, a written report indicating the exact position of the Division was found on one of the pigeons killed by the KNOJ troops and, judging from the preciseness of the information contained in the message, it was evident that only a member of the Headquarters Staff could have dispatched the note. To narrow down the field of suspects, [REDACTED] had the Division OZNa Chief send all members of the Headquarters Staff a letter which required an immediate answer. (The captured report was written with a typewriter and signed with a cover name in ink.) Simultaneously, members of the Division OZNa unit thoroughly checked all typewriters used in the Headquarters and it was eventually ascertained by close comparisons that the report had been written on the machine assigned to the Division Economic Section. (It is to be pointed out that the handwriting of General [REDACTED] the Commanding Officer of the Division, was also controlled as well as the typewriters which were at his disposition, and no one with the exception of a minimum number of Divisional OZNa personnel knew the nature of [REDACTED] mission in their area.)

74. As a result of the handwriting analysis and the accessibility which each Staff Officer had to the Economic Section typewriter, the greatest amount of suspicion fell on Major [REDACTED] the Division Intelligence Officer. At this point, [REDACTED] contacted Source (the Division Political Commissar) and requested that he order the arrest of [REDACTED]. However, [REDACTED] was a member of the KPJ Political Bureau in the Division, and this was the only unit which could authorize local apprehensions. It was not believed advisable to convene the Bureau and discuss the case of [REDACTED] in his presence, consequently Source refused to initiate arrest proceedings without having obtained the approval of the KPJ Regional Committee for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

75. [REDACTED] radioed to the Regional Committee for further instructions and he was requested to report to [REDACTED] at the Committee Headquarters for the purpose of presenting all concrete evidence of [REDACTED] complicity to higher Party members. After having received a conclusive demonstration that [REDACTED] was guilty of espionage, [REDACTED], who at that time was the Political Secretary of the Regional KPJ Committee, gave his approval for [REDACTED] arrest, but specified that Source was to be present at all interrogations of the traitor to ensure that the latter individual would not be beaten by his questioners.

76. [REDACTED] then returned to the Division Headquarters, arrested [REDACTED] and approximately ten of his contacts or

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associates. [REDACTED] was interrogated both day and night, relative to his personal background history and various minor errors which he had committed while serving with the Partisans; however, at this time no mention was made of his suspected espionage activities. Meanwhile the individuals arrested together with [REDACTED] were also questioned by other OZNa Officers and eventually one of the prisoners, a woman, stated that she had once been entrusted by a Croat Moslem Captain who was the Assistant Chief of a German SS Division Intelligence unit to bring the pigeons to [REDACTED]. With this information, [REDACTED] was able to contact the Moslem SS Captain by using a pigeon and [REDACTED] cover name, and in this manner he arranged for a meeting between the two individuals to take place on the outskirts of Bihac. When the Moslem Captain appeared at the appointed hour, an OZNa executive Trojka captured him and escorted him to the Partisan Division Headquarters where he was also incarcerated and interrogated.

77. The SS Intelligence Officer at first refused to admit that he had ever been in contact with [REDACTED] but when he was confronted with the female courier who identified him as being the man who gave her the pigeons to bring to [REDACTED], he indicated that he was ready to cooperate with his OZNa interrogators. During this time, [REDACTED] was continually questioned and kept in a state of psychological pressure, but no insinuation was made which would indicate that the Partisans knew of his contact with the enemy.

78. When [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] was willing to discuss his espionage activities, he questioned him for six hours without pausing, still skirting the principal topic. At the end of this period, another OZNa Officer was admitted into the interrogation room and this individual brought a typewriter with him. [REDACTED] gave the machine to [REDACTED] and commenced to dictate material of inconsequential importance. Eventually [REDACTED] repeated the intercepted message which [REDACTED] had dispatched to the SS Captain and both OZNa Officers were able to note the obvious reaction of [REDACTED] to this move. The prisoner was then confronted with the entire facts which had been established to prove that he was a spy, but [REDACTED] refused to acknowledge his guilt. [REDACTED] then interrogated the woman and the SS Captain one by one relative to their contacts with the prisoner, and even upon hearing this evidence [REDACTED] continued to state that he was being falsely accused.

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79. Finally [REDACTED] employed a successful ruse. The original incriminating document had been well preserved, but [REDACTED] was unaware that the OZNa agents had it in their possession. Consequently, [REDACTED] typed 10 reports identical with the intercepted message, using the Economic Section

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typewriter, and then requested [REDACTED] to sign all ten with the cover name he used on the original. [REDACTED] then folded each piece of paper in the same manner as the master copy, and placed the latter document in with the ten facsimiles. [REDACTED] handed the combined group of eleven reports to [REDACTED] and informed him that while he had signed ten, the spy had signed the eleventh. Since the prisoner insisted that he was not a spy, it should be easy for him to separate the ten copies which were recently made from the original. Before accomplishing this task, [REDACTED] admitted his guilt.

80. Bearing in mind the fact that prior to the war [REDACTED] was a school teacher by profession, and had no intelligence or interrogation experience, this incident attests to the high quality of OZNa agents which the Communist Party is capable of developing.

Q. PENETRATION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST GROUPS WITH THE USE OF MEMBERS THEREOF.

81. In Sarajevo in November 1945, several large trials were conducted against a group of Croat anti-Communists after it had been proven that the latter individuals were in contact with the Krisarji, that they possessed arms and that they had extra keys to the apartments of OZNa Officers and prominent Bosnian Communists. Approximately 50 of the reactionaries so indicted were shot without being given a public trial and the remainder (another 50) were sentenced to long periods of incarceration. OZNa authorities were able to discover this well-developed anti-regime net and apprehend all of the principal leaders through the use of coerced informants within the underground movement (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 22, paragraph 68).

82. In August 1945, OZNa agents in Sarajevo obtained copies of anti-Communist pamphlets being printed in that area and preliminary investigation revealed that apparently a strong anti-Communist movement was coming into existence in Bosnia. [REDACTED], who was still in the Counter Intelligence Section of Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned the task of penetrating and neutralizing the subversive movement.

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83. Within a short time, [REDACTED] discovered that the pamphlets had been printed in the Ministry of Commerce for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and basic investigations resulted in the identification and apprehension of the guilty group of publishers. All of these persons were inexperienced members of the underground organization and they were quickly persuaded to reveal pertinent details relative to their illegal activities. [REDACTED] then informed each prisoner separately that he was destined to be shot,

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but that this sentence would be commuted if the individual would return to his underground group, state that he was released from jail because he refused to give any damaging evidence concerning his subversive activities, and at the same time render reports on the functions and plans of this movement to OZNa. All of the arrestees accepted this proposal and arrangements were made for their release. This mass recruiting of informers, each unknown to the other, in addition to serving OZNa authorities as a valuable source of information pertaining to the underground movement, also enabled the intelligence personnel to control the reports and activities of each confidant through contact with his associates.

84. Following the release of these individuals, Party and SKOJ leaders within the Ministry of Commerce were told by [REDACTED] of the KPJ Regional Committee to report to Federal OZNa. Here, these individuals were directed to induct the former prisoners into the Party mass organizations and assign them specific tasks therein. This move would serve not only to give the new OZNa pawns increased prestige within their subversive group (underground leaders would believe that they were penetrating the Communists) but would also indirectly indoctrinate them with Communist tenets. [REDACTED] stated that he did not intend to pardon the prisoners, but this temporary respite was needed to uncover the entire underground network.

85. Through the use of these informants and an accurate, comprehensive compilation of all facts obtained, the entire underground movement existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1945 was destroyed approximately three months after it was first uncovered.

#### R. LIQUIDATION ACTIVITIES.

86. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities in the Spring of 1945, [REDACTED] elements directed by General [REDACTED] concentrated their forces in Bosnia and captured the town of Fojnica. Future plans called for a series of attacks in Serbia where the population was known to be anti-Communist, and it was hoped that in this fashion a national uprising could be commenced which might call for international intervention and the subsequent ousting of the Communist Government. OZNa authorities were informed of these intentions and the Yugoslav Partisan Army was directed to vitiate the [REDACTED] operations. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were dispatched to Sarajevo to lead the Partisan counter attack and over four KNOJ Divisions were deployed in Bosnia. At the Sutjeska River the opposing forces met and the main Chetnik troops were quickly overcome. Several thousand, including [REDACTED] managed to escape, and over 5000

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[REDACTED] were taken prisoner. This battle was never mentioned in the press and the KNOJ troops who participated therein were not permitted to discuss their movements.

87. It was at first believed that the prisoners were to be transported to Sarajevo in the UNRRA trucks used by the KNOJ forces, but [REDACTED] speaking in behalf of the Central Committee of the KPJ, ordered the immediate liquidation of all of the captured [REDACTED]. The following OZNa Officers who were stationed in Sarajevo at that time directed the executions:

Major [REDACTED]  
Major [REDACTED]  
Captain [REDACTED]

88. Two Battalions composed of Serb and Bosnian troops were selected from the KNOJ Divisions to perform the actual shooting, and Source was later informed by [REDACTED] that the [REDACTED] were shot near the Sutjeska River and their bodies were thrown into the current.

S. FALSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE.

89. Source states that when OZNa authorities procured documents containing lists of German or Ustasha Officers or informants, names in addition to those already mentioned were occasionally inserted in order to compromise various pro-Allied elements who were both enemies of Communism and Fascism (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 33, paragraph 107). In this manner, the name of [REDACTED] the Moslem Minister in the Royal Yugoslav Government, was added to the list of local German Consular confidants by Captain [REDACTED] of Sarajevo City OZNa and in the subsequent trial, [REDACTED] was sentenced to six years' incarceration, although in reality he had never been in contact with the German officials.

90. The proprietor of the "Avia" airplane parts factory (nu) was accused of being an Ustasha collaborator by Communist authorities and to prove these statements, the necessary documents were forged by an official of the Sarajevo City OZNa (probably [REDACTED]). The individual in question was later tried and sentenced to death, although at no time during the war had he worked for the Ustasha.

91. In 1944 (after the Yalta Conference), OZNa agents prepared several lists of "pro-Communist" elements (actually Allied sympathizers), then arranged so that this information would come into the hands of the Gestapo. It was known that the German intelligence authorities normally executed all

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individuals with Communist tendencies and it was believed that in this way the Party could arrange for the elimination of various potential enemies without being involved in the process of so doing. Lists of this type were compiled by OZNa underground authorities located in all of the major Yugoslav cities. [REDACTED] was responsible for this task in Sarajevo.

T. USE OF ANTI-COMMUNISTS WITHOUT ARRESTS.

92. [REDACTED], a journalist from Sarajevo, was invited to OZNa Headquarters one evening in August 1945, confronted with various bits of evidence testifying to his collaboration with [REDACTED] and the Croat Peasant Party as well as his contacts with the Allies. [REDACTED] was then given the alternative of being arrested, tried and sentenced or else entering into the employ of OZNa. He chose the second proposal.

93. [REDACTED] stated that she would work for OZNa in September 1945 after being accused of assisting the Chetnik movement. [REDACTED] who was in contact with anti-Communist elements in EGYPT, also accepted OZNa employment in preference to incarceration when the intelligence authorities indicated that they were aware of his covert activities.

94. All of these three individuals were dismissed by their interrogators within a few hours after they had been summoned to the OZNa Office. It is pointed out that only those persons who do not possess definite anti-Communist sentiments are approached in this manner, as OZNa authorities believe that all ideological Party enemies are to be eliminated by incarceration or liquidation.

U. COMMUNIST COOPERATION WITH THE GESTAPO AT ALLIED EXPENSE.

95. In 1944, a group of Ustasha functionaries who were actually in sympathy with [REDACTED] and the Croat Peasant Party initiated proceedings for a coup d'etat against [REDACTED] and the conclusion of a separate peace with the Allies. This was to be done by encouraging the Anglo-American forces to land in Croatia and eventually occupy JUGOSLAVIA.

96. OZNa authorities were informed of this proposal through various informants in the Ustasha movement and to counteract this measure, [REDACTED] of Central OZNa for Croatia was dispatched to Zagreb, where he was to contact both the Gestapo and the Ustasha Intelligence Service through OZNa confidants in the organizations and inform these authorities of the contemplated move. [REDACTED] furnished documents to both the Germans and the Ustasha giving concrete

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details of the organization and future actions of the pro-Allied unit. As a result of this denunciation, [REDACTED] the Ustasha Minister of War, and [REDACTED], another Ustasha Minister, were arrested and executed. In addition, the entire pro-Allied section in the Ustasha forces was disbanded and rendered inefficient.

V. THE USE OF TORTURE.

97. Physical torture, as employed by OZNa authorities, is a studied scientific process about which an entire book of directives exists (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 32, paragraph 103). Although the general opinion in JUGOSLAVIA is that OZNa prisoners are not tortured, [REDACTED] once informed Source that in effect [REDACTED] had issued a directive forbidding the beating of prisoners and calling for the immediate punishment of any OZNa Officer accused of initiating such an action. In practice, however, it is not always possible to abide by this order but, in any case, lower OZNa Officers must adhere strictly to these regulations, since they are supposed to perfect their methods of interrogation and psychological torture. If the prisoner cannot be induced to cooperate by skillful interrogation and if the OZNa authorities believe that he is in possession of information vital for the satisfactory completion of OZNa operations and mission, the arrestee is assigned to higher OZNa Officers for attempted exploitation. The latter individuals at first attempt to use advanced psychological ruses, but if these fail to produce satisfactory results, the prisoner is finally subjected to merciless physical torture. Definite instructions pertaining to methods to be employed have been compiled by Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA and it is pointed out that OZNa agents torture their prisoners only for the purpose of forcing them to reveal the desired information and never for sadistic pleasure. In this manner, the beating of the arrestees is not curtailed until the individual in question either cooperates with OZNa or dies as a result of the wounds inflicted.

98. It frequently occurs that individuals who have been condemned to death in a public trial are returned to OZNa for additional interrogation prior to being executed, and in many cases prisoners are still alive after it has been announced to the general public that their sentence has been fulfilled. Obviously, questionings of this nature are conducted in the greatest of secrecy and many OZNa agents are unaware of this activity.

99. If OZNa authorities are certain that a specific prisoner is an espionage agent, then measures are enacted to ensure that the individual in question is brought to a public trial as soon as possible. Through the OZNa organs

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in the Public Prosecution (Assistant Public Prosecutor) and the judges (who rely on Party orders), the death sentence is requested and obtained. Within a short while the individual is proclaimed to be dead, but in reality he is being subjected to a detailed interrogation by OZNa agents.

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100. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Catholic priests who were leaders of the Ustasha terrorist organization in 1945, were later apprehended and incarcerated by OZNa authorities, but they both refused to disclose any valuable information while being interrogated. Since the arrest of these clericals had been given wide publicity and their trial was to be public, physical torture was an impossibility. After the trial, at which both were condemned to death, they were returned to Sarajevo City OZNa agents and placed in detention cells located on the third floor of the OZNa Headquarters building. According to a statement made at a later date by [REDACTED], the two priests were forced to cooperate fully with their OZNa interrogators, although while they were being successfully questioned the local papers announced that their sentence had been executed. It is not known when or if they were actually killed.

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101. [REDACTED] also informed Source that [REDACTED], [REDACTED] assistant and the Ustasha Ambassador to Berlin, was held for six months by OZNa authorities after it was officially announced that he was dead. It is believed that he was incarcerated either in Zagreb or in Belgrade. By the same token, Source states that probably General [REDACTED] was also reinterrogated in detail after he had been condemned to death.

102. Whenever individuals are arrested without publicity (such as in the case of foreign agents, etc.) and if psychological torture is not successful in obtaining factual admissions, physical beatings are commenced immediately. Since the public does not know that these people are in jail, they need not be given an open trial. After obtaining the required amount of information, or when it appears that the individuals will not cooperate, OZNa agents arrange for the prisoners to be killed. Examples of this practice are numerous.

W. OZNa FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES.

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103. Source was able to supply the following various illustrations of the manner in which OZNa authorities obtained funds to finance their operations (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 35, paragraph 116).

104. In the Summer of 1945 when Source was Chief of the Personnel Section of the Ministry of Commerce for the

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(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Secretary of the KPJ Political Bureau contained in that Office, he was once informed at a Bureau meeting by [REDACTED] another Party member and the President of the Office for the Administration of Requisitioned Property, that Sarajevo City OZNa discovered over 25,000 English pounds (gold) in Misirbin Ulica, Sarajevo. This money had belonged to a Jewish family and [REDACTED] stated that according to Party directives, all "requisitioned" material of this nature is to be placed at the disposition of the Office for the Administration of Requisitioned Property and is not to be taken directly by OZNa authorities. Source presented the problem to the next higher Party Bureau and COLAKOVIC [REDACTED] was quite surprised to hear that [REDACTED] knew of the incident. [REDACTED] stated that while, according to State regulations, the gold should be given to [REDACTED] Office, at the same time OZNa requires operational funds and Party leaders frequently supply the Intelligence Service with monetary values that may be used to finance its various missions. In this particular instance, [REDACTED] explained, the gold will be used for OZNa assignments abroad. [REDACTED] was informed that he should refrain from entering into further discussions of this affair, and [REDACTED] stated that matters of this nature should never be discussed openly at Political Bureau meetings.

105. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and while he was there the Deputy Chief of Sarajevo City OZNa, also entered the establishment. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] frequently came to her store [REDACTED]

about these incidents and he was told that OZNa frequently requisitions or uncovers large quantities of valuable stones which are converted into cash and the proceeds are placed into the OZNa fund.

(b)(1) 5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
106. When [REDACTED] visited the UNITED STATES in 1945, he collected a large amount of money from various American Yugoslavs and he was ordered by the Communist Party to place these funds at the disposition of [REDACTED], a Captain in Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA who was working in the UNITED STATES at that time. [REDACTED] did not give the money to [REDACTED] as directed, and as a result of this negligence, [REDACTED] did not have sufficient capital to accomplish one of his assigned missions. [REDACTED] returned to JUGOSLAVIA with the donations and according to [REDACTED], Party authorities punished him for his disobedience.

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107. In 1945, an OZNa Captain (nu) and his German driver were ambushed and killed by a group of Krizarji led by one [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]

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Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina journeyed immediately to the scene of the incident when they were informed of the attack. Later [REDACTED] told Source that the Captain was transporting OZNa funds from Banjaluka to Sarajevo at the time of his death and that the Krizarji did not discover the ten kilograms of gold and jewels which were concealed in the vehicle.

108. [REDACTED] a member of [REDACTED] General Staff, was captured by the Partisans in May 1945 and a large quantity of gold and other monetary valuables were found on his person. Upon the reception of this information, [REDACTED] of Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina was immediately dispatched to obtain the money, although in theory all captured items of this nature should have been placed at the disposition of the Office for the Administration of National Property. [REDACTED] the Political Commissar of the Partisan Brigade which was responsible for the capturing of SOKOLOVIC, related this incident to Source and further stated that he was ordered by General [REDACTED] to give the gold to OZNa rather than forward it through regular channels. [REDACTED] received no receipt for the amount he turned over to [REDACTED].

109. In 1947, [REDACTED] an OZNa Captain working in Salzburg, AUSTRIA, gave [REDACTED] an informer of his, 50,000 Schillings to finance a trip to Paris. In the latter city, [REDACTED] was to contact various elements of the Royal Yugoslav Committee and obtain requested information and documents for [REDACTED].

X. RANK AND POSITION IN OZNa.

110. Many instances exist which confirm the allegations that the official positions of OZNa Officers are not dependent upon the respective ranks of these individuals (see Ref. No. S-5172, page 37, paragraph 122). Captain [REDACTED] commands Major [REDACTED] and other OZNa Majors as well. Major [REDACTED] directs the activities of Colonel [REDACTED], Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED], Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] and other OZNa Officers having a rank higher than his. Additional specific examples of this situation will be brought out in a later report.

Y. OZNa AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

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111. The following OZNa Officers are responsible for controlling the activity of enemy intelligence services in the indicated units:

- [REDACTED] - Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- [REDACTED] - Sarajevo City OZNa.

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~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Sarajevo City OZNa.  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Sarajevo Rural District OZNa.

112. A profound study of the operation and procedures of enemy intelligence services is obligatory for all OZNa counter intelligence Officers. Source once saw ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ reading a mimeographed report (which he believes was over 150 pages in length) on the British intelligence system; however, the exact contents of this document is unknown.

113. In 1946, at least two or three NKVD Officers were residing at the Hotel EUROPA in Sarajevo. These authorities were in daily contact with ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ of Federal OZNa for Bosnia and Herzegovina and ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ of Sarajevo City OZNa, but the exact nature of their relationship is unknown.

114. In August 1945, an Albanian was arrested by OZNa agents in Sarajevo. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ stated that the individual in question was a British espionage agent and that OZNa had followed his movements in both ALBANIA and BULGARIA through information supplied by the Albanian Intelligence Service.

Z. CONTACT BETWEEN ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ AND OZNa AGENTS ABROAD.

115. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ the first OZNa organizer in AUSTRIA, returned to JUGOSLAVIA upon completing the first phase of his mission and spent five hours in close conference with ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~. Among other things, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ was asked to comment on the expected outcome of the 1945 Austrian elections. The latter stated that the Austrian anti-Communist element had succeeded in identifying the Russian occupation forces as the personification of the Communist ideology and as a result of this situation, hopes for a Leftist victory were at a minimum. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ replied that the Austrian Communist Party is quite strong and censured ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ for his defeatist attitude.

116. In May 1945, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and another OZNa Officer from Zagreb were dispatched on a confidential mission to NORWAY and SWEDEN. Before leaving JUGOSLAVIA, both envoys were directed to report personally to ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ for the purpose of obtaining specific directives and assignments.

117. At the end of May 1945, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ was sent on a special mission to RUMANIA in order to prevent the American Ambassador in the latter country from organizing an expedition to JUGOSLAVIA for the purpose of obtaining ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ gold hidden in the mountains. Before departing on his assigned travels, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ reported to ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and received specific directives which were to be followed during his sojourn abroad.

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118. In June 1945, [REDACTED], the Chief of the Yugoslav espionage service in ALBANIA was ordered by [REDACTED] to return to JUGOSLAVIA and report to [REDACTED] at a specific hour. Following this conference, [REDACTED] returned to ALBANIA.

119. In August 1945, [REDACTED] (fnu) and [REDACTED] journeyed to Belgrade from ITALY by plane for the purpose of reporting to [REDACTED] on the Italian situation. These two individuals remained in JUGOSLAVIA for only one day, then they returned to their assigned locations in ITALY.

120. [REDACTED] of OZNa in Zagreb was sent to SWITZERLAND on an intelligence mission in August 1945. Before leaving JUGOSLAVIA, he contacted [REDACTED] to receive the full particulars of his assignment.

121. In December 1945, [REDACTED] stated to source that he had been working for OZNa in Trieste and that he had returned to JUGOSLAVIA to inform [REDACTED] personally of the results of his mission.

122. [REDACTED] who was sent to GERMANY on a mission for OZNa, returned briefly to JUGOSLAVIA in August 1945 for the purpose of reporting directly to [REDACTED]

123. Additional information pertaining to the organization and composition of the principal OZNa Detachments in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the process of preparation and will be forwarded through regular channels when completed.

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC.

APPROVED

[REDACTED]  
Chief, CIC - TRUST.

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ISD NO. <u>3144.0101</u>	<del>TOP SECRET</del>	COUNTRY <u>Yugoslavia</u>
MIS NO.		
REPORT NO. <u>CI Rpt. J-32</u>	WDGS - INTELLIGENCE REPORT	I. O. NO.
SUBJECT: <u>Organization of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service</u>		
FROM: <u>ID LUCOM APC 757</u>	REFERENCES:	
EVALUATION: <u>C-3</u>	DATE OF INFORMATION: <u>April 1948</u>	DATE OF REPORT: <u>12 May 1948</u>
INCL <u>One</u>	PREPARED BY:	SOURCE:

SUMMARY OR SID REPORT:

A revised organizational chart of the Yugoslav IS, according to additional information obtained from Yugoslav refugees, particularly from the report of a former Yugoslav Royal Army colonel, is attached.

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Date 11 Nov 1952

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REPORT NO. CI Rpt.J-32  
PAGE NO. 1

Organization of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service

The following additional information concerning the organization of the Yugoslav IS was obtained from reports of Yugoslav refugees, particularly from the report of [REDACTED] (see CI Evaluation Report No. J-10).

1. The "OZNA" (Odelenje za Zastitu Naroda) was not incorporated into the "UDB", but still is the IS Department of the Ministry of Defense. It is sub-divided into two sections: Intelligence; Counterintelligence.
2. The "OZNA" intelligence section which corresponds to the "GRU" of the General Staff of the SA is in charge of military intelligence abroad. It cooperates with the III Section (Foreign Division) of the "UDB".
3. In cooperation with the II Section (Military Division) of the "UDB", the "OZNA" counterintelligence section is in charge of surveillance of the Yugoslav Armed Forces. It has agents within the troop units and headquarters down to companies.
4. A Col. [REDACTED] is the chief of the "OZNA". [REDACTED] is presumably identical to a [REDACTED] who was a lieutenant colonel of the cavalry and chief of the secret section of the Yugoslav General Staff before World War II.
5. A revised organizational chart of the Yugoslav IS is attached.

1 Annex.

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NO. 18-2364  
CIC LOG

TITO  
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
of the KPJ

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR  
Minister: [REDACTED]

UDB

Chief: Minister of the Interior  
Lt. General [REDACTED]  
Deputy [REDACTED]

Advisory  
Council

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

OZNA

INTELL. DIV.

COUNTERINT. DIV.

I. CIVIL DIVISION  
Chief: [REDACTED] Col.

II. MILITARY DIVISION  
Chief: [REDACTED] Major General

III. FOREIGN DIVISION  
Chief: [REDACTED] Col.

IV. POLITICAL DIVISION

V. EXECUTIVE DIVISION  
Chief: [REDACTED]

CENTRAL-UDB  
Chief: [REDACTED] Col.

UDB for the city  
BELGRADE  
Chief: [REDACTED]

UDB for the  
PROVINCIAL  
GOVERNMENTS

ECONOMIC -UDB

UDB  
SERRA  
Minister of  
INTERIOR

UDB  
BOSNIA-  
HERZEGOVINA  
Minister of  
Interior

UDB  
SLOVENIA  
Prime Min

UDB  
MONTENEGRO  
Chief: [REDACTED]

UDB  
MAZEDONIA

UDB  
BELGRADE  
Col.

UDB  
Vojvodina

UDB  
KOSOWO and  
METOCHTEN  
KOS

CODE SECTION

PERSONNEL SEC

MIL. MISSIONS

ARMY HQ.

DIVISION HQ

BRIG HQ

ROT HQ

BT HQ

COMP HQ

Section in  
charge of a  
county

Section in  
charge of a town

Section in charge  
of a borough

Section in charge  
of a street

Section in charge  
of a house

Section in charge  
of a rural  
community

Section in charge  
of a village

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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
16 April 48

Ref. No. S-5172

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: OZNa Organization, Composition, Functions  
and Methods in JUGOSLAVIA and Abroad.

RE : Theoretical Practices Involved.



1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Data contained  
herein is intended to augment and compliment details included in an  
earlier report [REDACTED] (Ref. No. S-5163, SUBJECT:  
Development of the Intelligence Network of the Communist Party of  
JUGOSLAVIA for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; dated  
12 April 1948), and to facilitate comprehension of the following material  
it is suggested that the former summary be used as reference. Comments  
and evaluation from higher Headquarters would be appreciated. Evalua-  
tion C-3.

COMMISSION FOR THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE KPJ

2. The Commission for the Intelligence Section in the Central  
Committee of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA is responsible for all  
intelligence activities conducted in the Federal Republic of JUGOSLAVIA.  
This branch is commonly known as the OZNa or Intelligence Commission of  
the Central Committee of the KPJ, and before it was established, [REDACTED]  
and [REDACTED] were in charge of the Intelligence commitments of  
the Central Committee. When Party officials decided to form OZNa, this  
responsible group was also founded at the same time and it was given the  
the assignment of preparing a list of qualifications upon which the  
selection of OZNa personnel would be based. The original composition of  
this Commission, which has not been altered, included the following  
Party members:

- 1. BROZ Josip (TITO) - Political Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the KPJ.
- [REDACTED] - Organizational Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the KPJ.
- [REDACTED] - Member of the Polit Bureau of the

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Central Committee of the KPJ.

- Member of the Polit Bureau of the Central Committee of the KPJ.
- Member of the Polit Bureau of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

3. Inasmuch as leaders of the Central Committee of the KPJ did not want to permit the OZNa organization to develop without Party supervision (although it is fundamentally composed of only reliable Communists), the principal functions of this Intelligence Commission were to impart to OZNa the general line of policy to be followed. Directives of this nature were normally given to OZNa leaders by [REDACTED], the Chief of OZNa and a member of the Intelligence Commission. The latter unit receives regular reports pertaining to OZNa operations in progress and is responsible for the initiating of new orders. As an example, the Central Committee of the KPJ announces that the Five-Year Plan must go into immediate effect and at the same time, the Commission is requested to instruct OZNa to investigate and report any proceedings which would hamper the execution of the Plan or prevent it from developing as it should. As far as the practical duties of OZNa are concerned, only [REDACTED] is responsible for issuing detailed orders to the intelligence unit. [REDACTED] normally assists him in this assignment, as he has been appointed as [REDACTED] successor by the Central Committee of the KPJ in the event that the latter dies or is killed. For this reason, [REDACTED] was given the title of Minister Without Portfolio in the Federal Government, so that he may replace [REDACTED] when the latter accompanies TITO abroad.

Only [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] may contact OZNa leaders as official representatives of the Intelligence Commission. OZNa Officers do not necessarily know about the existence of the Commission and under no circumstances are they permitted to initiate contact with personnel of this group.

4. In addition to a mass decision of the Central Committee or personal orders of TITO, the Intelligence Commission is the only organ which may censure [REDACTED] or control his OZNa directing activities. In practise, however, this control is almost non-existent, since [REDACTED] represents such an authority in the Central Committee and in OZNa that he commands respect from such Communists as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Nothing can take place within the OZNa organization without [REDACTED] knowledge and approval, and his intelligence and working capacity enables him to execute capably all of his functions. [REDACTED] is simultaneously the highest Party authority in OZNa and the Chief of both Internal and Foreign Intelligence Service. All phases of the Yugoslav Intelligence activities are centralized under his command.

5. The Intelligence Commission of the Central Committee of the KPJ

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is responsible in theory only to the Supreme Congress of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA (a body of leading Communists which nominates the members of the Central Committee). Since this latter group has not held an official meeting since 1920 (the Vukovarski Congress of the KPJ), this chain of command is indeed purely theoretical. In actual practise, as a result of the supreme authority of the KPJ Central Committee in the Yugoslav Government, the Intelligence Commission is dependent upon no higher office. (Source states that it is his personal opinion that the Intelligence Commission of the KPJ is controlled by the corresponding group in the Bolshevik Communist Party.

#### ORGANIZATION OF OZNA (CENTRAL OZNA)

6. Central OZNa is divided into three main sections which, due to the specific functions of each branch, are almost completely separated and are organized internally along quite different lines. These groups include Military OZNa (which is entirely centralized), Civilian OZNa and Foreign OZNa.

7. In all three of the above sections, there exists among other functionaries a cadre of Officers engaged only in counter intelligence activities. All individuals working in this particular field are responsible to [REDACTED], who is the Chief of the counter espionage mission in JUGOSLAVIA in addition to his general position as head of OZNa. Counter intelligence agents are governed in their actions by the specific OZNa unit to which they are assigned, but they are also required to maintain close contact with members of their field serving in the other sections. In this manner, Civilian OZNa Counter Intelligence Officers are expected to cooperate with Military OZNa Counter Intelligence personnel, etc., however, this situation does not apply to the other divisions within OZNa. Counter Intelligence operations are normally not discussed with other OZNa members and only the OZNa section commander is completely informed as to the activities of the counter espionage agents at his disposition. In short, it may be said that the counter intelligence officers compose an elite intelligence unit within the OZNa organization.

8. All OZNa sections are responsible to [REDACTED] who is the Director of all three groups as well as the counter espionage units contained therein. It is pointed out that [REDACTED] is without a doubt the leader of all intelligence activities, as a result of his large working capacity and his deep personal interest in the satisfactory development of OZNa assignments. Source states that agents sent abroad on missions frequently are required to report to [REDACTED] personally upon their return to JUGOSLAVIA. In addition to his favorable personal qualifications, [REDACTED] remains the outstanding OZNa Chief, due to his official position in the intelligence network and his Party functions (KPJ Organizational Secretary), and there is no doubt that he is the key figure in all intelligence operations in the Yugoslav Government.

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~~SECRET~~MILITARY OZNA (COUNTER ESPIONAGE SECTION)

9. Source is familiar with three sections of Military OZNa, including the Counter Espionage Division. Although this latter unit operates in the Army, it is not responsible to ordinary military OZNa channels, but is directly dependent upon the Counter Espionage Central in Belgrade. This section, which exists in all Armies and Divisions and which is directed by the Counter Intelligence Central of the Military OZNa Department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, is responsible to Central OZNa Counter Intelligence. It is pointed out that the files of the Counter Intelligence section of Military OZNa (as with other CI sections), are completely separated from other OZNa archives. Ciphers, codes and informants used by the counter espionage units are always different from those employed by other units of Military OZNa, and are not to be disclosed to regular Military OZNa personnel. The counter espionage section was not assigned a number, and concerted efforts were made to minimize its existence in the Army and Division OZNa groups. Chiefs of the Counter Intelligence Sections in Military OZNa were normally also in command of the specific Military OZNa unit; however, all activity of a general intelligence nature was usually supervised by the second in command, leaving the Chief free to perform and direct his clandestine counter intelligence missions.

I SECTION OF MILITARY OZNA

10. The I Section of Military OZNa was characterized as being responsible for military security in 1945 and 1946. Functions of this unit may be divided into two parts: economic and military security. Economic commitments of this branch included:

- a. Supervision of the proper functioning of the Army supply agencies, such as bread factories, Army clothing production, etc.
- b. Anti-sabotage preventive measures for the military supply departments.
- c. Selection of military warehouses and the maintenance of security control to ensure that these locations would not become well known to the general public.
- d. Control of the use of military supplies and ascertaining that proper and equal distribution will be made in all cases.
- e. Selection of qualified cadres to supervise the economic procedures at military institutions. (Economic security OZNa personnel designated to act in this capacity would be responsible for reporting any subversive deeds conducted by military personnel responsible for warehouses, supply points, etc.)

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Military security OZNa has the following functions:

- a. Control of the capacity, functioning and production of arms and ammunition factories.
- b. Selection of proper locations for these industries.
- c. Selection and control of personnel employed in armament factories, including the assurance that these individuals would not discuss their activities with outsiders. Elimination of all potential sabotage or security threats from these installations.
- d. Maintenance of strict security as to the nature and amount of war material emanating from foreign countries (mainly RUSSIA) and effecting a similar control of military equipment sent abroad (mainly to ALBANIA and GREECE) by JUGOSLAVIA.
- e. Selection of arms and ammunition warehouses and the maintenance of strict security control to ensure that these locations do not become well known to the general public.
- f. Education of military specialists and the control of the curriculum in all Officers' Training Schools in order to ascertain that the specialists are properly divided in all arms and services.
- g. Organization and responsibility for proper execution of all security measures in effect during Yugoslav Army maneuvers.

11. It is pointed out that Military Security OZNa personnel do not initiate the planning of the preceding functions, but are responsible for all operations proceeding in a satisfactory manner. As an illustration, the intelligence agents do not decide that maneuvers will take place, but once such an order is given, OZNa issues instructions pertaining to who may keep cameras in their possession, which areas are considered to be suitable for use, and other matters of an intelligence interest.

## II SECTION OF MILITARY OZNA

12. The II Section of Military OZNa is commonly known as the Political Branch, and it is characterized as being the largest and most widely deployed of all Military OZNa groups. Military OZNa detachments as such exist down to the Brigade level of the Yugoslav Army and informers are located throughout the Army organization. In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the intelligence mission, Military OZNa has been

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divided into Sub-Sections on an Army level. In this manner, Brigade and Division OZNa Officers are responsible for the accumulation of all types of information, but Army intelligence officers collect only data which applies to their assigned field. Source states that at least the following Sub-Sections are in existence:

a. One responsible for the political reliability and sympathies of regular Yugoslav Army Officers. This branch issues efficiency ratings, suggests transfers, demobilizations, and proposes necessary punishments for delinquent officers.

b. One section with the same commitments for drafted Yugoslav Army Officers. These two groups collaborate closely.

c. A third section controls the political activities of the Yugoslav soldiers and attempts to segregate undesirable elements. In this connection, when an individual who is considered to be unreliable from a Communist point of view is inducted into the Army, his personal history background as compiled by Civilian OZNa is forwarded to Military OZNa to facilitate his supervision during his Army career. This section is also responsible for reporting any soldiers who maintain contact with subversive elements in the local civilian population.

13. It is pointed out that Military OZNa controls only the political activities of the Yugoslav Officers and Soldiers, while their technical and military abilities are supervised by the Political Commissars.

#### FOREIGN OZNA

14. The direction of Yugoslav-sponsored espionage activities in any foreign country is the responsibility of the senior OZNa Officer residing in that State. This individual bases his actions and those of his subordinates on instructions received from Central OZNa Headquarters in Belgrade. The counter intelligence sections of foreign OZNa units are not operated in this manner, however, and functions of this nature in any foreign state are under the direct control of OZNa Belgrade. In this connection, Central OZNa Counter Intelligence Headquarters may dispatch agents to any locality outside of JUGOSLAVIA without being required to give previous notification of their mission to the OZNa Chief in the country involved. In general, foreign OZNa is not organized along the precise lines followed by the domestic intelligence service and the extent of its structure and divisions is dependent upon the basic conditions and problems existing in each country. For example, OZNa in AUSTRIA maintains a section which deals only with the activities of Yugoslav refugees and their contacts with the homeland, while in ENGLAND it is imagined that this particular branch is non-existent.

15. The OZNa Chief in any foreign country is normally a member of the counter intelligence section of foreign OZNa in order to enable him

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to direct counter espionage activities in his particular area. Admittedly it would be difficult to conceal counter intelligence activities abroad from the Chief of an OZNa foreign mission; consequently intelligence authorities have ruled that the two duties be combined. Complete organization of foreign OZNa is not known to Source; however, he was able to furnish the following information relative to several of the departments.

16. One section is concerned only with the activities of Yugoslav citizens abroad, whether they be political refugees or official representatives of the Yugoslav Government. Agents assigned to these tasks are required to develop detailed information relative to the political affiliations, cliques; reliability, contacts with anti-Communist groups, channels of communication with JUGOSLAVIA, etc., of the Yugoslav emigration. This section also directs political and intelligence penetration of the refugees by discovering which individuals maintain communication with resistance movement leaders in JUGOSLAVIA or with well-known anti-Communists living in exile and then by inviting these people to work for OZNa. Those who accept these offers remain in their refugee circle and are charged with disclosing all information pertaining to the organization and direction of this unit. Others, who desire to return to JUGOSLAVIA, are promised complete immunity from political or criminal persecution if they remain abroad for a specified length of time and render reports to OZNa representatives in that country. Frequently OZNa leaders in foreign states attempt to bribe prominent members of Yugoslav anti-Communist organizations to enter the Yugoslav intelligence service and relatives of OZNa informers abroad who are still residing in JUGOSLAVIA are often encouraged to "escape" from the latter country and join their kin so that both may work for OZNa. In the latter case, OZNa authorities will provide for the upkeep of personnel so recruited. Yugoslavs who departed from that country prior to the war, but who have retained a nationalistic faith in the government, albeit Communist, are carefully exploited by the intelligence agents, and if during the interim they have become citizens of a foreign state, all possible means are employed to induce them to work for OZNa. Couriers plying between the various anti-Communist Yugoslav refugee organizations are special targets for OZNa recruiting attempts.

17. A second section is responsible for the control of foreign nationals residing in JUGOSLAVIA, with especial emphasis placed on the surveillance of diplomatic representatives, newspaper correspondents, foreign workers in JUGOSLAVIA and members of various foreign economic, political or military missions. Foreign business firms maintaining trade connections with domestic offices are also supervised. Communist penetration of all of these groups is always attempted, especially if the unit in question represents an official mission of a foreign state and the normal type of agents (family members, acquaintances, official contacts, women, etc.) are habitually used for this purpose. To accomplish the mission of this section, the background and current political tendencies of every member of the families of official foreign representatives in JUGOSLAVIA is thoroughly checked to ascertain whether or not there

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exists the possibility of enlisting the services of one or more of these individuals in the Yugoslav intelligence system. If direct penetration appears to be impracticable, an indirect approach through relatives or friends is attempted, and those who appear to be willing to volunteer, but who are not Communists, are paid for their information. If official members of the representative's family cannot be induced or forced to serve OZNa, the personal employees of these individuals (maids, drivers, etc.) are also requested to volunteer their services if it is believed that results obtained will be satisfactory.

18. The counter espionage section of Foreign OZNa is responsible for all phases of direct political, military and economic espionage activities abroad. This unit is better organized, more widely deployed and considered to be more conspirative than the groups previously discussed and it is dependent upon directives received from OZNa Counter Espionage Central Headquarters in Belgrade. The Chief of the Counter Espionage Section in any foreign country also directs the missions performed by the two a/m groups in the same area.

19. OZNa Counter Intelligence is interested in the following information:

- a. Military data pertaining to armament advancements, locations of Army installations, troop deployment and morale, etc.
- b. Political information indicating expected trends or decisive actions of the government of the country involved; general details relative to the current political situation; backgrounds of state employees; secret agreements made with other foreign powers; type of police activity; strength of the police force, etc.

20. Counter Espionage Sections of Foreign OZNa are further divided into special groups which are assigned the task of penetrating the intelligence service of the foreign state. It is pointed out that the major part of the counter intelligence mission abroad is accomplished with the use of agents dispatched from Belgrade, charged with a particular assignment and instructed to return to JUGOSLAVIA upon the completion thereof. Other Foreign OZNa activities are conducted by resident agents.

21. Direction of all phases of Foreign OZNa operations is the responsibility solely of [REDACTED]. He controls the transfer of foreign OZNa personnel and the recruitment of new agents. It is believed that [REDACTED] normally receives advice and instructions for suggested missions from the Commission for the Intelligence Sections of the KPJ.

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CIVILIAN OZNA

22. Civilian OZNa in JUGOSLAVIA was divided into at least the following sections in 1946:

The Economic Section employed only a small number of agents, and it is believed that this group was composed of various sub-units, the exact functions or names of which are unknown. In general, it was observed that Economic OZNa agents were charged with the following tasks:

- a. To control or preclude anti-Communist or sabotage interference with economic production.
- b. To control construction projects which are of an economic or strategic importance, such as railway bridges, roads and factories.
- c. The control and security of personnel and freight rail traffic.
- d. Control of state administrative employees insofar as their work capacity and bureaucracy is concerned.

23. Agents in each of these sub-sections are normally responsible to their section Chief, but to facilitate operations, they may come in direct communication with the Economic Branch at the Central Civilian OZNa Headquarters. As another means of simplification of the mission, the Economic Section of Civilian OZNa always has one intelligence officer working in the state Control Commission and frequent contact is maintained with the personnel referents of the various construction and economic institutions.

24. The counter intelligence section of Civilian OZNa is charged with discovering and apprehending foreign (enemy) intelligence agents operating in JUGOSLAVIA. Direction of this group is centralized in that the counter espionage unit of the Federal OZNa organizations is responsible to the same unit in Central OZNa Headquarters and not to the Chief of the Federal Civilian OZNa. In lower intelligence echelons (Federal and Rural District OZNa), the counter espionage section is not highly developed; however, certain agents are given counter intelligence duties in addition to their other functions.

25. Another section of Civilian OZNa is concerned with combating political espionage in JUGOSLAVIA. This is the most overt of all OZNa sections and the identity of the agents is normally known by the local population. Source is unfamiliar with the internal structure of this section, but he states that it performs the following functions:

- a. Control of all political parties in JUGOSLAVIA with the

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exception of the Communist Party (including all those which collaborate and those which are opposed to the KPJ).

- b. Control of the public administration apparatus.
- c. Control of all political personalities and their activities.
- d. Control of terroristic or anti-Communist military activity in JUGOSLAVIA.
- e. Control of all organizations in JUGOSLAVIA (including Party mass groups, Cultural Societies, Sport Clubs, etc.).

26. Source does not exclude the possibility that each of the a/m fields of Political OZNa activity may be organized into a special section of Central Civilian OZNa. It is pointed out that all statements pertaining to the organization of OZNa as outlined above admittedly fail to present a clear or complete picture, as Source was unable to supply the missing details.

#### OZNA AUXILIARY ORGANS

27. In addition to regular informants who are always given assigned tasks or missions, OZNa authorities also have the right to call upon Communist Party and depending mass organization members for assistance and cooperation in any undertaking of great importance or wide scope. The potential contributions of these Leftists to the advancement of intelligence activities are treated in detail in the ensuing paragraphs.

#### a. Communist Party Members:

28. Although the Communist Party is normally regarded as the only source of OZNa Officers and informants, this organization, as a political body, is frequently used by OZNa authorities as an indirect means of obtaining information. To illustrate, during the large-scale apprehension of Chetniks and Crusaders in newly "liberated" territory during the war, OZNa officials in Rural District and City KPJ Committees (or higher) issued directives to the political secretary of the particular group calling for complete cooperation of all Party members in the identification and incarceration of all "subversive" elements. These orders were passed to lower Party forums for action, and in this manner, adherents of the smallest Communist cell received instructions which were designated to facilitate the accomplishment of the OZNa mission, although the specific purpose of the requested activity was never indicated on the directive involved. Consequently, it may be said that whenever OZNa personnel are unable to accomplish their tasks through the use of recognized informants, Communist Party members in general are employed to obtain the required information; however, the latter individuals are not always aware that they are working for OZNa. In this connection, Party members are educated along alertness (Budnost) lines

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and they are instructed to report any potential Party enemy. As a result, each Communist is made to feel that it is his obligation to inform the Party of any suspected reactionary and the designated individual within the cell in turn forwards all information received to his OZNa contact. Obviously, from the financial point of view, information procured through these sources was obtained with a minimum of expense and, at the same time, owing to the background of the informants it was safe to assume that the details submitted were generally reliable.

29. Communist Party organizations in foreign countries are normally the largest single source of OZNa informants and frequently OZNa officials are completely dependent upon the intelligence gathering facilities of Communist Parties abroad. In AUSTRIA, for example, OZNa officers transmitted reports to JUGOSLAVIA by means of the W/T set belonging to the Austrian Communist Party unit in Vienna, from May 1945 until the arrival of the Yugoslav Military Mission later in the same year.

b. SKOJ:

30. Cooperation between SKOJ and OZNa follow a pattern similar to that of KPJ assistance measures. SKOJ members are frequently used in overt actions sponsored by OZNa, such as raids and arrests and outstanding SKOJ adherents are normally organized into OZNa Trojka's for the purpose of conducting special intelligence missions or acts of terrorism.

c. Mass Organizations:

31. Mass organizations controlled by the Communist Party, such as the Liberation Front, the Syndicates, etc., cooperate fully with OZNa officials whenever it is necessary to do so. It is pointed out, however, that only the leaders who are members of the KPJ may control these movements and be aware that certain activities of the members of the group are undertaken as a result of a request emanating from OZNa channels. Normally the actual adherents do not realize that they are being used for intelligence purposes.

d. Press:

32. In every Intelligence Section of OZNa there is one Officer who is responsible for the local press, and in Federal OZNa units, Chiefs of the press departments maintain direct contact with the editors of all of the local newspapers. These connections are considered to be important, so that vilification campaigns may be initiated against certain prominent political personalities scheduled for arrest by OZNa before the actual apprehension occurs. At the same time, actions of questionable motive already accomplished by OZNa may be justified through a series of articles in the daily papers and anti-Communist organizations or individuals may be severely attacked and criticized by the same means. News of this nature is either written directly by the OZNa Officer, or else it is passed to him for approval prior to being published.

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33. Newspapers are always controlled by the OZNa Officer responsible for identical problems. In this manner, the Serb newspaper in Sarajevo is censored by the OZNa authority who is responsible for Serb reaction in the city. In general, newspaper editors and reporters serve as OZNa informers and, if this is not the case, they are still strictly controlled by the intelligence service.

e. Personnel Referents:

34. Personnel referents (the Personnel Officer attached to the administrative section of Yugoslav Government offices) are controlled by OZNa authorities and this former group of individuals plays an important part in the Yugoslav home espionage system. Personnel referents in all high government offices are nominated by the Central Committee of the KPJ and they in turn appoint the personnel staff of subordinate national agencies. Personnel branches in key state bureaus are selected by the organizational secretary of the KPJ Central Committee in conjunction with the Committee member responsible for OZNa activities, who is simultaneously the Chief of OZNa. The names of individuals so proposed are then submitted to the Central Committee meeting in full session for final approbation prior to actual appointments. In general, it may be said that personnel referents are Communists in whom Party leaders have the greatest confidence. In this connection, according to the nature of the mission of these administrative authorities, it is impossible for them not to collaborate directly or indirectly with OZNa officials.

35. All prospective state employees must be screened by OZNa through the personnel referents prior to being hired. Although the individuals involved do not realize that their work applications and background connections are reviewed by intelligence personnel, such is definitely the case, and only after OZNa authorities have approved of the request may the man be accepted into the contemplated position. Other administrative matters, such as pay increases, transfers, bonuses, etc., must be favorably commented upon by OZNa before they may be placed into effect.

36. In every OZNa Department or Intelligence Section there exists one or more OZNa Officers who maintain direct contact with the personnel referents for the purpose of controlling their work and imparting to them pertinent directives. In the beginning of 1945, OZNa Officers were in direct communication with every administrative authority responsible for personnel in all public offices throughout JUGOSLAVIA. Later this practice was curtailed (in August 1945 in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and at present OZNa representatives are in contact only with personnel referents working in the highest Civil officer. (The Personnel Department of the Presidency of the Federal Government for each of the Federal Republics.) At least one OZNa Officer is employed under a cover position in this Department at all times. Personnel referents for the various Federal Republic Ministries forward all intelligence information to a/m Personnel Department and at the same time they control the activities of all other personnel staffs dependent upon their particular

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Ministry. In this fashion, direct contact with OZNa authorities is not maintained in any of the lower echelons, but the Presidency Personnel Department serves as the connecting link between OZNa and the personnel referents.

37. This procedure should not be interpreted in such a way that it would indicate that the personnel referent working in a bigger city does not come in direct contact with local OZNa authorities. Such collaboration is maintained, but the personnel referent is responsible only to higher officials in his working field. However, at the same time, OZNa in the same city may give the senior personnel official instructions for specific activities on the local scene. In general, though not always, direction of the personnel staff is centralized in various localities, so in any village or town the highest ranking personnel referent maintains contact with an OZNa official stationed in that area, and disseminates intelligence instructions received from the latter individual to his subordinate personnel staff.

38. The personnel referents of the Komandne Ustanove (Government institutions of primary importance) are always Communists of high reliability and trustworthiness. In order to emphasize even more their influence within their unit, these individuals are normally elected Party Organizational Secretary for the Communist cell, composed of elements from their particular office. In this connection, only Party or SKOJ members may be employed in lower echelon personnel departments or sections. Personnel referents generally supply OZNa authorities with information of the following nature:

(1) General data pertaining to the successful or unsuccessful mode of operation of the factory or institution where the administrative authority is employed.

(2) Degree of efficiency and accuracy with which a specific project was accomplished. Who was responsible for delays or sabotage during the completion of the task. (This is mainly controlled by Economic OZNa.)

(3) All information pertaining to the background and activities of the personnel employed under the Administrator's supervision. Special emphasis is placed on their working abilities and capacities, the effectiveness and alacrity with which they execute Party directives, political activities and outside contacts.

f. Public Prosecutors:

39. People's Prosecutors ( ) exist in every city, village, students' home, workers' block, Kwart and in all areas covered by the National Front. These individuals are appointed to their positions only after their names have been suggested and cleared by OZNa authorities; however, all overt action in this respect is done through the Party

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organization in the area or institution involved. Inasmuch as these officials represent a valuable source of information for OZNa officers and, in addition, they are in a position to implement punitive action suggested by the intelligence representatives, it is obvious that only those with reliable Communist sympathies, well-trained in the Party ideology, are to be appointed to such posts.

40. People's Prosecutors are controlled and advised in their official actions by the Public Prosecutors, who are in the services of the State administrative system. Meetings of representatives from these two groups occur frequently in any given area for the purpose of imparting directives to the subordinate unit. Public Prosecutors responsible for larger regions, such as a Rural District, Province, City, etc., are automatically members of the respective Party Committee. Assistant Public Prosecutors are always former OZNa Officers or else they are still employed by the intelligence service and are assigned to their job merely for the cover it affords.

41. People's Prosecutors are not paid for their services and, in addition to their contact with the Public Prosecutor, they are required to maintain communication with an OZNa official on the same level. In this manner, the village People's Prosecutor imparts directly pertinent intelligence details to the village OZNa confidant and People's Prosecutors in other civil groups act in a similar fashion.

42. The Public Prosecutor's assistant (the OZNa Officer), in compliance with the Party line, does not attempt to control the activities of his superior (who is a member of the local Party forum); but mainly serves as a coordinating link between the intelligence and prosecuting fields. The Public Prosecutor receives his instructions from the respective KPJ Committee, but since all Party Committees contain an OZNa representative who is Chief of the corresponding OZNa unit, only those orders which are agreeable to the Party and to OZNa as well are forwarded to the Prosecutors.

g. Control Commissions:

43. In theory, Control Commissions are government organizations, but in practice the President of a Control Commission on any given level must also be a member of the corresponding KPJ Committee, responsible for Control Commission activities. In addition, another member of the Control Commission must be an intelligence officer drawn from the Economic Section of OZNa. These Commissions are charged with making formal, open denunciations to the Public Prosecutor for suggested action. OZNa representatives are always previously informed of all contemplated arrests of this type through the Officer in the Commission and, in certain cases, OZNa initiates precautionary measures to ensure that the accused party will not escape before he is taken into official custody. Economic OZNa is normally given the task of supervising these activities.

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44. Conclusions:

Undoubtedly other OZNa Auxiliary Organs, such as the Department for Denunciations and Protests (Odelenje Za Tuzbe I Zalbe) also function, but Source was unable to furnish additional precise information on this subject. It is pointed out that the intricate organizational system of OZNa in no way serves as a ballast to the intelligence operations and activities, but rather ensures their ultimate success. Party organizations which are well organized and coordinated are capable of directing entire intelligence nets with little or no outside assistance, and with the use of these groups, OZNa functions are greatly facilitated, information received emanates from reliable sources and operational expenditures are at a minimum.

OZNA PERSONNEL

45. (The following information was obtained by Source while he was a member of the KPJ Rural District Committee for Sarajevo. This Committee had received directives from the Central Committee of the KPJ and from RANKOVIC Aleksander calling for the selection of OZNa personnel on a local level and all members participated in the ensuing discussions.)

In 1944, the OZNa Organization Commission contained within the KPJ Central Committee initiated a letter of directives which was designed to impart full instructions to all addressees for the selection of OZNa personnel. This memorandum was signed by RANKOVIC Aleksander in the name of the Central Committee of the KPJ and was distributed to all Regional (or Central), Provincial and Rural District KPJ Committees. The latter Party units were responsible for choosing OZNa representatives to operate in both liberated and occupied areas, consequently it may be said that all OZNa personnel were originally selected by the Communist Party.

46. Special screening commissions were organized in each of the higher KPJ Committees for the purpose of selecting reliable Communists for service with OZNa. The names of individuals so designated were then presented to the Party Committee meeting in full session, and the abilities, as well as the potential opportunities of each candidate were completely discussed by all Party members present before a decision was reached. Lists of accepted personnel were sent through channels (higher Party Committees) to the Central Committee, and this unit issued the final statement regarding the advisability of placing each individual on active status in an intelligence network.

47. The importance of OZNa Officers may be judged only through the examination of their past political activities. Since the Communist Party was illegal in JUGOSLAVIA until the Leftist Government was officially recognized after the war, members with OZNa connections were as a rule completely disassociated with normal Party functions, and as a result of these circumstances, the general public was frequently under the impression that the Party intelligence unit was composed of common criminals,

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second-rate Communists, etc. In practice, this supposition was proven to be completely erroneous, and it is a known fact among Party members that OZNa personnel have been drawn from the elite of the Communist ranks. As a substantiation to this statement, in August 1945, DJILAS Milovan, while representing the Central Committee of the KPJ at a Party conference in Sarajevo, declared that OZNa was currently composed of approximately half of the Communists active in JUGOSLAVIA prior to 1941 and these individuals are regarded as the most able and reliable men and women that the Party has educated in JUGOSLAVIA.

48. The Central Committee of the KPJ drew up the following principles for the selection of OZNa Officers:

a. Pre-war Communists who have successfully accomplished all tasks given to them by the Party leaders, who are known to be able to cope with and to control any given situation in compliance with the Party line and who have become popular in their Party work among subordinate Communists and the general population as well, should be given primary consideration for acceptance into OZNa.

b. Individuals possessing the greatest amount of Party spirit, who have developed a sense of discipline, responsibility, and who maintain correct relations with superior and subordinate Party members, should be favorably considered. This group also comprises those Party adherents who have always followed the Party line and who have never formed, or were members of, a fractionalist unit operating against the announced interests of the Communist policies.

c. Special attention should be given to the class origin of the proposed personnel. Proletarians and small land-owners should receive first preference and if the use of other individuals is required, they must be so indoctrinated as to believe that the bourgeois must be annihilated, physically if necessary. In this respect, the political background and sentiments of the family of the proposed OZNa Officer should be taken into consideration and it should be ascertained whether or not any of his close relatives are active Communists or if they have been classified as enemies of the people. These findings should be used as a criterion for acceptance or non-acceptance into OZNa, regardless of the contact or lack of contact which the candidate is currently maintaining with the individuals involved. By the same token, Communists whose families are residing abroad (with the exception of those living in RUSSIA) are not to be admitted into OZNa. The sole exception to this regulation is made in the event that relatives were sent abroad to propagate Communist doctrines, or when it may be proven beyond a doubt that the persons in question possess definite Leftist sentiments. In general, Party members whose families suffered physically or materially during the war because of their Communist activities should be favorably considered for assignment with OZNa.

d. Pronounced antipathy for all Party enemies is another

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important basis for the selection of OZNa Officers. Individuals who were wounded, incarcerated, tortured, condemned to death, etc. by Germans or Quislings during the war and who have consequently developed a deep hatred for these or any other opponent of Communist practices are believed to represent good OZNa material. The same classification also applies to Communists who viewed the results, or witnessed, destructive enemy action, such as mass killings, burning and looting of villages, etc., as such first-hand experiences normally create a tendency towards bitter reaction to any group threatening the advancement of the Communist cause.

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e. Communists who have been thoroughly indoctrinated with Marxist principles should also be given primary consideration, as they will complete their assignments and conduct themselves at all times in accordance with the Marxist point of view. However, it is important to note whether this education was obtained by personal initiative or through attendance at a Communist-controlled course, for if the former case is true, it is possible that the individual has developed certain theories which are in discord with the overall Party line. The individual's selection of Party literature should also be reviewed and it should be ascertained whether or not he is in possession of material written by [REDACTED] or other fractionalists. Finally, the type and number of Party schools attended, as well as results obtained in the completed courses, should play a part in the final decision.

f. Communists who held previous Party functions, especially intelligence appointments, and who proved to be capable in the execution of their assigned duties, should be given priority in the selection of OZNa Officers.

g. Reprimands and punishments meted out to Party members by their superiors should be reviewed and, in the event of a derogatory past, the candidate will not be favorably considered for appointment to OZNa.

h. Communists who have been known to use their initiative to procure beneficial developments or changes in the Party line should be given priority over the more conservative elements.

i. Special preference should be given to those Communists who have devoted their entire life to the advancement of the Party cause. Personal weaknesses in a candidate's private life, such as an excessive fondness of the opposite sex, definite inclination towards alcoholism, etc., should be seriously weighed while preparing the final decision.

j. It should be ascertained whether or not a candidate is aware of his personal shortcomings, and if he is attempting to eliminate faults prejudicial to his work.

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k. Previous reputation within the Communist hierarchy should be taken into account, and individuals who have already been indicated as

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superior Party members should be given favorable consideration.

1. Women will not be selected as OZNa Officers except under unusual circumstances.

m. Finally, the proposed candidates' personal interest in intelligence activities should be considered.

49. Much of the preceding information pertaining to the background requirements of OZNa Officers could be obtained from the KPJ questionnaire of the individual involved, and thus a certain amount of preliminary investigation was eliminated. After it was adjudged that according to his records a prospective candidate had satisfied the various entrance regulations, he was interviewed by the Secretary of the OZNa Organization Commission in the KPJ Committee to which he belonged, informed of his contemplated transfer and requested to state whether or not he would accept his new position. If at this time the individual declared that he did not wish to enter the intelligence service, he was not forced to be transferred to OZNa, and at no time in the future could he revoke this decision. Those who were satisfied with their proposed assignment were taken into OZNa, but it is stressed that no one was obliged to enter this service.

50. After the various KPJ Committees forwarded their selections to the KPJ Central Committee's Commission for OZNa Organization and this latter unit had approved the selections, the Communist Party was no longer involved in the further education and training of the new OZNa Officers.

SELECTION OF OZNA AUXILIARY PERSONNEL

51. The foregoing procedures applied only for the selection of OZNa Officers. Auxiliary personnel, such as typists, clerks and other administrative officials, were appointed by the local KPJ Committee with the approval of the newly nominated OZNa Officers, and it was not necessary to notify the KPJ Central Committee of these transfers. Individuals so designated were accepted for employment if they could fulfill the following requirements:

- a. All must be members of the Communist Party (candidates and SKOJ adherents were not acceptable).
- b. It was recommended that at least half of the auxiliary personnel be chosen from among the ranks of the female Party members.
- c. All must be reliable, discreet and ingenuous.
- d. Class origin should be taken into account.
- e. All must be without deep sentiments and must display the proper attitude against the enemy.

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f. Party members who have relatives employed in OZNa should be given primary consideration.

g. No individual may be accepted if any member of his family has been classified as politically unreliable.

52. In general, the Auxiliary personnel are permitted to handle all material which passes through their particular OZNa Office. Exceptions to this procedure are normally made in the case of directives and official compilations emanating from higher OZNa offices and directed to lower units for instructional or informational purposes.

#### EDUCATION OF OZNA OFFICERS

53. In May 1944, at the same time that OZNa personnel were being selected, a group of NKVD Officers commanded by General [REDACTED] (lnu) were dispatched to JUGOSLAVIA for the purpose of patterning the educational program of OZNa Officers along lines similar to those used for the training of intelligence agents in RUSSIA. General [REDACTED] the NKVD Officers and those OZNa Officers selected by the Central Committee of the KPJ to serve in Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA, collaborated on the preparation of material pertaining to the technical studies of the police methods used by the NKVD and these individuals also agreed upon the internal structure and the general functions to be developed by the new intelligence unit. The education of OZNa Officers was divided into two fields, one concerning Party theory and the other relative to OZNa procedures.

54. OZNa possessed self-contained Party units which were not connected with other Communist organizations. Members of an OZNa cell did not attend large Party conferences, but the Chief of OZNa on any level served as a link with the corresponding Party Committee, since through his position he was a representative of both organizations. Secretaries of Party cells in OZNa were responsible to the immediate higher OZNa Party Committee. In this manner, an OZNa District cell Secretary did not report to the KPJ District Committee, but to the Party Secretary of Rural District OZNa.

55. Party organization in OZNa is based on a system of cells and Political Bureaus. Each OZNa Command from the District to the Federal Department contains a number of Party cells, the Secretaries of which are members of the Party Political Bureau for the same OZNa unit. The latter individuals are responsible to the Secretary of the Party Political Bureau on the next higher level in OZNa; that is, the Party Political Bureau Secretary for District OZNa is dependent on instructions received from the Party Political Bureau Secretary for Rural District OZNa, and the same chain of command is in effect until Central OZNa Headquarters for JUGOSLAVIA has been reached.

56. OZNa auxiliary personnel maintain another Party organization not connected with regular units. The Secretaries of these cells are respon-

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sible to the Secretary of the OZNa Officer Party Political Bureau on the same level. In general, OZNa Party cells function in accordance with identical principles as those governing normal KPJ cell activity; however, the principal task of these former groups is to encourage OZNa Officers to devote their entire life to the execution of their duties and to curtail all forms of personal relaxation.

57. OZNa Officers are given professional (intelligence) education by means of the following programs:

- a. Each Federal OZNa Department conducts a permanent intelligence course at its Headquarters.
- b. Another permanent class is sponsored by Central OZNa Headquarters for JUGOSLAVIA and is given in Belgrade. This is a specialized course and only OZNa Officers on Rural District and Federal levels are permitted to participate.
- c. Highest level OZNa courses are conducted in RUSSIA.

58. It is believed important to note that all instructors at these courses (including the two held in JUGOSLAVIA) are Russian Officers. Strict security is maintained as to the exact locations of the various schools, the type of material presented and the identity of the students. In general, however, OZNa Officers are required to be thoroughly familiar with all technical equipment employed by police agencies, such as the obtaining of fingerprints, the use of ciphers and secret inks, the value of photographic evidence, the use of disguises and the proper use of all possible types of weapons. The past and current methods of foreign intelligence services are carefully studied and the use of modern sciences, with special emphasis on psychology, is given serious consideration. The NKVD furnishes a large amount of material and information imparted to Yugoslav OZNa Officer students, and the success of the intelligence program is due mainly to the conscientious efforts of the Russian instructors.

59. Courses conducted by the Federal OZNa units are of a general educational nature, and at least one member of every District OZNa is required to attend these classes. All types of espionage activities are treated superficially and the fundamental purpose of the school is not to produce trained intelligence specialists, but to familiarize the students with the basic requirements and functions of this field.

60. Section heads for Rural District and Federal OZNa Offices receive detailed training at the Intelligence Course presented by Central OZNa in Belgrade, and only individuals maintaining these positions are permitted to attend the school. Classes are composed of various sub-courses which treat each phase of the intelligence activities in great detail, and all OZNa specialists, with the exception of the counter espionage agents, are educated in Belgrade.

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61. The most advanced intelligence courses are held in RUSSIA and are conducted primarily for those OZNa Officers who have been designated to become specialists in the counter intelligence field. Only members of the various Federal OZNa Offices and of Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA are eligible to attend these classes, and those who do are ensured of a successful future in the intelligence service. Strict security is required of all personnel journeying to RUSSIA for this purpose and each individual is cautioned not to inform anyone of his new assignment or of his ultimate destination.

62. The Federal OZNa course lasts for six months, the Central OZNa class is of a year's duration, and advanced training in RUSSIA extends over a two-year period. A normal scholastic day includes from 14 to 16 hours of classes and supervised study, and this program is in effect also on Sundays. On official Communist Party holidays, however, there are no required assignments to be fulfilled. Students at each course (excluding the one in RUSSIA, with which Source is unfamiliar) were divided into sections known as studying circles, and the daily schedule included eight hours of lectures, four hours of informal discussions of the material covered (this may be in the form of debates, group study, etc.) and two hours of practical work, such as jiu jitsu, boxing, etc.

63. Each study circle (Kruzak) appoints one individual to direct the work of the students and lecturers attached to the course visit each group to supervise the activity conducted therein. Students at each course also comprise a Party cell unit and Communist activities are conducted in a normal manner, but they are never permitted to hinder the program of the intelligence classes. Party meetings are held mainly to give all students full details of recent international developments and the accepted Party line pertaining to each change is also outlined at this time.

64. Finally, it is pointed out that each student at these courses receives a classification upon the completion of his studies, and this evaluation of his potentialities plays an important part in determining his future career as an OZNa Officer.

#### OZNA INFORMERS

65. OZNa informers are classified according to the branch of the intelligence service which employs them and the various contacts of the civilian, military or foreign OZNa are further subdivided into those who serve for ideological reasons and those who are coerced to produce informative reports. Communist sympathizers or Party members who consider it their duty to assist OZNa agents are segregated into Special Informers or Activists (Specialni Informatori or Aktivisti) and Informers (Informatori). The identity of informants of any type remains one of the best-kept of OZNa secrets, and at all times the intelligence agency is required to be especially watchful in order not to compromise these individuals in any way. Informants are regarded as being the eyes, ears and secret hands of OZNa in JUGOSLAVIA as well as abroad, and only through its net of confidants

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was OZNa able to expand its activities and espionage circles so swiftly and effectively during the past four years.

66. To obtain ideological informants, the OZNa Officer consults Party organizational charts to determine which of the Communists possess potentialities that, when properly exploited, would be of value to the intelligence agent. Confidants are selected according to the mission requirements of the OZNa authority and in this manner the agent responsible for the control of Moslem anti-Communist activities would normally select a Musselman faithful to the Party cause and not too badly compromised in local Moslem circles. OZNa informants who are members of the Communist Party are not permitted to discuss their intelligence connections with other members of their Party cell and while completing the bi-annual questionnaire required of all Communists they are to refrain from stating that they are in contact with OZNa authorities.

67. Commencing with the KPJ Rural District Committees (or the City Committees for the capitals of the various Republics), and proceeding to higher Party echelons, a file of OZNa informers within the Party is kept available for the reference of all Committee members. Information of this nature is received through the KPJ Secretaries in OZNa who are in contact with the Rural District or City Party Committees; however, the latter units are not informed of the type of work in which the particular OZNa confidant is engaged, nor is his illegal OZNa name made public to normal Party members. All ideological informants are obliged to sign a statement (Izjava) in which they promise to report all that they know, maintain strict secrecy in all of their intelligence activities, obey all orders and, furthermore, they declare that they may be punished (possibly with death) for any infraction of these rules.

68. Informants who do not work for OZNa because of their Party ideology, do so because of coercion or the promise of money. Many anti-Communists who are arrested on various charges are so afraid of the possible outcome of their period of incarceration that they agree to furnish OZNa with information in exchange for their freedom. Owing to their position in "reactionary" groups or foreign intelligence services, these individuals, when properly exploited, are considered to be more valuable than many of the Communist informers. Confidants who work for monetary remuneration are employed only, if they are capable of furnishing valid and pertinent information. It is pointed out that not everyone willing to be a paid OZNa informer is hired in this capacity.

69. Informants falling into the latter two categories are required to forward their reports to OZNa in written form, and the first information submitted in this manner must be signed with the correct name of the confidant. At a later date, coerced or mercenary informants who prove to be valuable assets to the intelligence system are given cover names to be used when reporting. OZNa alone is responsible for the control of confidants who are not Party members, and these individuals are not obliged to sign an Izjava, nor must they obey all orders.

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Informants of this type are not punished if they fail to work in the proper manner, but in the event that they commit serious breaches of security, they are sentenced to death.

70. According to OZNa regulations, at least two informants must be used by the intelligence agent to develop information on any assigned case. In this fashion, each informant, as well as his reports, may be controlled and it is an understood fact that the identity of one confidant will not be revealed to any of the others. The control of these informants is a matter of detailed interest to OZNa authorities. The activities of each individual so employed are subject to the daily scrutiny of other OZNa confidants working in the same organization, and the contents of reports from any informant are never immediately accepted as factual by the OZNa Officer. Information contained therein is normally checked through other sources, but if the OZNa representative has complete confidence in his contact, this procedure is not necessary. However, the intelligence agent is responsible to his superiors for the accuracy of the report submitted by him and signed with his name, consequently valid details become a prerequisite for a successful OZNa career.

71. Each OZNa Officer maintains a net of informants, the number of which is not prescribed, but is dependent upon the requirements of the current situation. OZNa employs the system of individual work, that is, each confidant knows only the OZNa representative with whom he is in contact. No informant must know the identity of any other OZNa contacts, nor are these individuals banded together in cells, Trojka's, Petorka's or other Party work divisions. At no time should OZNa informants enter intelligence offices or billets and meetings between confidants and agents are held in public places for a short duration of time. During these contacts, the informant submits his written report, the OZNa Officer issues short directives and the two part as soon thereafter as is practicable.

72. Special informers are those members of the Communist Party who were proposed to be OZNa Officers but who failed to meet the required prerequisites (see OZNa Personnel), hence they could not be accepted. The main advantage obtained by the use of these individuals is the fact that while they primarily are employed by OZNa, they are also active in Party organizations. Party leaders are aware of the dual assignments of such persons and to facilitate the accomplishment of their intelligence mission, overt Party tasks are reduced to a minimum. Special informants are permitted to read OZNa directives which are especially prepared for them and pertain to their line of action. By means of these orders, general intelligence instructions for a certain section are presented in such a way that the informants may obtain information concerning OZNa policies, personalities, methods, as well as the overall political picture affecting their particular branch. Special informants are frequently used to replace OZNa Officers as contact men with normal informants and in such cases a system of passwords or prearranged meeting places are employed to preserve the identity of the special confidant involved. As an illustration, the OZNa authority will notify his informant that a man answering a certain

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description will meet the confidant on a given day in an indicated spot, and the informant will pass his report to the stranger when the latter addresses him with a remark pertaining to the weather.

73. Special informants are obliged to fulfill all instructions which they receive from OZNa agents, consequently they are also known as activists. However, OZNa authorities ascertain that these individuals will not be used in missions which would compromise them as being collaborators of the intelligence agents. Special confidants are not permitted to give personal directives to regular informants, but they may transmit orders emanating from OZNa personnel to these individuals. Special informants do not possess sufficient authority to engage new OZNa contacts, as the identity of all confidants must be preserved as much as possible, hence they are allowed only to meet such individuals as are specified by the regular intelligence agents.

74. OZNa informants abroad work on approximately the same basis as those in JUGOSLAVIA, and are divided into the same general categories. Communist informants are obtained through local Party organizations, but background information on these individuals is not revealed to the foreign Party unit, as is the case in JUGOSLAVIA proper.

75. Ideological informants residing abroad also sign statements attesting to their loyalty to OZNa, and both these individuals as well as all other types of confidants must write their first reports in their own handwriting and sign them with their full name. Later, when the good faith of these individuals is established, they are given illegal names to be used when submitting reports. Foreign informants who are not members of the Communist Party must give a written document to their OZNa contact in which it is stated that in the event of treason to the intelligence service, the person involved understands that he will be punished in accordance with regulations of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA and not with those of the foreign country. This declaration is required since non-bolshevik Communist Parties (Italian, French, Austrian, etc.) do not have a death sentence, while the others (Russian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, etc.) do.

76. OZNa confidants in foreign countries under no conditions may participate in overt intelligence actions organized by Yugoslav agents in that particular state. These tasks are assigned to KPJ members formed into Trojka's in JUGOSLAVIA and sent abroad to accomplish a specific mission. OZNa Officers and informants never meet in the presence of a third individual, and all official Yugoslav installations are avoided. Many of these contacts are maintained in the apartment of the confidant or else public locations are used. Special informants frequently collect the reports and in such cases, OZNa authorities prefer that the two individuals come from entirely different business and social circles in order to lessen the chances of identification.

77. Only OZNa authorities may invite someone to journey abroad

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to work for the Yugoslav intelligence service, and in no case may other Yugoslav Officers or civilians be used. Consequently, anyone who appears to be recruiting for volunteers to serve OZNa must necessarily be a member of that organization, as no one else has the authority to perform this action.

78. The personal files of OZNa informers working abroad are not kept in the country involved, and foreign OZNa Officers are obliged to memorize the identity and addresses of their contacts. Information of this type is to be found only in the archives of Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA, which is located in Belgrade.

79. Military OZNa informants are composed of those individuals who are actual members of the Yugoslav Armed Forces and civilians who are employed by Military OZNa agents in JUGOSLAVIA and abroad. Military personnel who are used as OZNa confidants are normally Civilian OZNa contacts passed to the military intelligence authorities upon their entrance into active service. Conversely, OZNa informants recruited while serving in the Army usually continue to work for Civilian OZNa upon their discharge. Intelligence contacts within the Army are required to report on the activities of reactionary or unreliable elements in the same units and to ascertain what connections these individuals maintain with foreign espionage nets, native underground groups and other enemies of the Communist regime.

80. Civilian informants of Military OZNa authorities are normally to be found in the various government offices which control military activities, in foreign military missions, in ammunition factories, etc. In foreign countries, Military OZNa confidants are used to obtain information pertaining to the military organization and personnel of the country concerned, the activities of the Yugoslav Military Mission in that particular state, and other like matters. Work assignments and procedures for all Military OZNa contacts are similar to those used for civilian OZNa informants at home and abroad.

81. Only the following categories of OZNa Officers may develop their own intelligence nets:

- a. Those who are responsible for the development of the intelligence service in a particular phase of government activity.
- b. Heads of the various OZNa sections and departments.
- c. Party Secretaries for the OZNa Communist cells.
- d. Officers assigned to special missions.
- e. Others who obtain the specific permission of Chiefs of OZNa Sections commencing on the Rural District levels and

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proceeding upwards.

82. In this respect, OZNa interrogators may not have personal informants, but must rely on information developed by intelligence colleagues who are responsible for the field in which the prisoner was active. OZNa Officers used as couriers are also not permitted to maintain a net of confidants.

TROJKA'S DEPENDENT UPON OZNa

83. Groups composed of three Communists and known as "Trojka's" are often used by OZNa authorities to perform any overt intelligence or terroristic actions in which intelligence personnel do not want to become specifically involved. OZNa Trojka's were organized as early as 1944, although Trojka's used for other purposes existed before this date. After the liberation of JUGOSLAVIA, these units were generally replaced by KNOJ as the new executive organ of the intelligence service, and since 1945, OZNa-Trojka's have been used only in cases when it was necessary to liquidate Chetnik or other anti-Communist leaders, and to accomplish assigned missions in foreign countries.

84. Members of current OZNa Trojka's must be reliable adherents of the Communist Party and must not be OZNa informants. These trios are used to perform a given task (abduction, liquidation, theft of documents) within a given period of time, and upon the completion of this mission, each individual returns to his normal professional and social life. Trojka members are not connected in any overt way with intelligence activities and all attempts are made by these individuals to avoid being identified as OZNa employees. When given a specific job, the three Trojka members are interviewed collectively by an OZNa Officer, then dispatched. Trojka adherents never know the complete details which necessitated or are connected with the action they are to accomplish, and are only supplied with relevant material pertaining to their actual operation. In this manner, if a Trojka member is apprehended, he would be able to reveal only his specific mission (e.g., an abduction), the identity of the other two components of his group, and the OZNa Officer who gave him his task. The underlying reasons which prompted such an action, as well as the identity of other intelligence personnel, could not be obtained from these individuals. Missions which are to take place abroad are normally assigned in JUGOSLAVIA, and contact with all persons residing in the foreign country concerned is discouraged while the Trojka is in operation.

85. The same Trojka may be used at different intervals for a variety of tasks, and these units are generally composed of the same individuals in order to ensure that each member is well acquainted with his specific job and is able to work in harmony with his two companions. Most Trojka adherents are physically strong and they must be courageous. Many served with the Partisans during the war.

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86. Trojka's were frequently sent into the mountainous regions of JUGOSLAVIA to liquidate prominent anti-Communist leaders and guerrilla chieftains. To accomplish missions of this nature, the trio usually pose as guerrillas or reactionaries, become completely identified with the anti-regime movement, perform their assignment at an opportune moment, then return to civilian life. OZNa Trojka's functioning abroad frequently state that they are police agents of the foreign country, to facilitate their task.

87. OZNa authorities place much interest in the proper supply and operation of the Trojka's, as it is a common belief that in the event of war, the Trojka's could be used as a successful and effective terroristic and sabotage unit.

OZNA MODUS OPERANDI

88. All OZNa methods and activities are based on the theory that any contemplated action may be undertaken only if the results obtained will benefit the Communist cause and if it will be in accordance with the current Party line. Orders for liquidations, arrests, interrogations, etc., are issued by OZNa authorities only if they will conform with the above prerequisites, and the intelligence agents are subject to punishment if they perform overt acts disregarding these principals. As a result of this situation, it is easy to understand why a crime punishable by death in 1944 could be regarded as a minor incident the following year, and why two people may receive entirely different sentences after being convicted of the same offense. Consequently, although OZNa claims to perform only the required acts of justice, such deeds in reality do not exist in the intelligence procedure. Serving the cause of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA is of paramount importance to the intelligence agency; justice, humanity and legality are of secondary interest.

89. To combat Party enemies, OZNa authorities have established espionage nets in all public, private, governmental and social institutions in order to control effectively the activities of each individual as well as those of a given organization. The principal reason for such a widely developed informant circle is to permit the OZNa personnel to be cognizant of all actions and sentiments of the Yugoslav citizens and to enable them to punish all persons believed to be guilty of committing the current definition of crime, as prescribed by the Party line.

ARRESTS (PREPARATIONS)

90. In compliance with directives received from the Central Committee of the KPJ, OZNa Officers must make arrests in such a manner that the

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masses will believe that the intelligence unit is a necessary organization designed to defend the interests of the people, the State, peace and justice. In order to ignite these sentiments in the general population, Communist Party members, following instructions issued by the OZNa authorities, commence a definite propaganda campaign to prepare the masses for any contemplated action. Through the use of emphasis of inherent feelings, such as the need to condemn those who collaborated with the occupying forces, the common desire to live in peace and attain prosperity, all arrestees may be presented to the populace as enemy assistants, warmongers or economic saboteurs. If there is absolutely no basis for any of these accusations, and the individual in question must be arrested, such actions are normally conducted in secrecy.

91. Arrests by OZNa authorities may be divided into two categories, those which indicate that simultaneously a detailed investigation will be commenced against the person involved and those which represent the last phase of an assigned case, in which instance the intelligence agent will be in possession of all material available which pertains to the subject. There is a tendency to use the second method in normal operations, as in such cases the arrestee may be judged only a minimum amount of time after he has been apprehended. (In these instances, the masses have already been prepared for the proper reaction.) The first method is used normally only in time of war, or if the citizen to be arrested attempts to escape from the country.

Arrests:

92. The belief of many Leftists who were arrested during the anti-Communist regime in Royal JUGOSLAVIA is that the power of apprehension represents a dangerous weapon in the hands of any authority. Contrary to this notion, OZNa Officers perform an arrest only when it is absolutely necessary, as the Communists who were imprisoned prior to 1941 normally passed their period of detention studying Marxist principals and literature and upon their release they numbered among the most reliable of all Communists. In order to preclude current arrestees from developing into fervid anti-Communists, OZNa authorities divide their arrestees into several categories. An attempt is made to separate those who are definitely opposed to the Communist regime and who cannot be converted to the Communist faith, from those who are discontented with current rules and regulations, but who are not ideological enemies of the Communist state. In this connection, whenever a large group of individuals is arrested, the OZNa Officer in charge immediately segregates the incorrigible element from the others for interrogation purposes. Thus those who are wavering in their acceptance or rejection of the Communist tenets are not confined with confirmed "reactionaries" and hence are not subjected to anti-Leftist propaganda.

93. When OZNa authorities decide that an arrestee is a definite anti-Communist and hence a menace to the security of the country, the individual in question is sentenced to death. If actual proofs sub-

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stantiating these statements exist, the prisoner is placed at the disposition of the Public Prosecutor (who is in contact with OZNa) and the maximum amount of punishment is requested. If no tangible evidence is available, OZNa agents often forge the amount required for a successful trial. In the event that the OZNa representative believes that the arrestee is in possession of a vast amount of information and if the latter refuses to divulge his knowledge, even after being subjected to psychological experiments and torture, the use of physical violence is employed. In such cases, the prisoner is always eventually shot and under no circumstances is he placed on public trial after being tortured.

94. Arrestees who are not classified as confirmed anti-Communists are subjected not only to detailed interrogations relative to their past "reactionary" activities, but attempts are also made to recruit these individuals as new OZNa informers. During preliminary questionings, the OZNa interrogator makes specific references to the crimes of the offender and indicates that such action against the Yugoslav State constitutes a major offense, the ultimate result of which will be death or a lengthy period of incarceration. While the arrestee is in the process of assimilating those statements, his interrogator offers him the magnanimous compromise of freedom in exchange for periodic reports on the activities of the subversive organization of which he is a member. Many accept such offers, and eventually receive their freedom, which is procured at various intervals thereafter. Some arrestees, after signing a statement that they will work for OZNa, are reported as being absolved of all guilt of their original offense and are released immediately. Others are tried and adjudged to be innocent and still others are sentenced to a short period of detention, then pardoned and set free. All must sign the required OZNa informant Izjava (Statement) with their real names and ensuing reports are also submitted with the signature of the confidant so that the individual may be compromised at a later date if he does not work in the proper manner. The necessity for this action, however, seldom occurs.

95. The families of those individuals to be released are contacted by OZNa authorities in most cases and are notified that although their relative was guilty of the most severe crimes against the State, OZNa appreciates the various personal problems which would arise if the arrestee were to be incarcerated or executed, consequently, as a favor to the family, detention will be reduced to a minimum amount of time. In this way, OZNa obtains the reputation of being just and considerate of others, but under no circumstances is anyone informed that the prisoner will work for the intelligence agency.

96. By using methods of this type, OZNa authorities have the following advantages:

a. Individuals previously working against the Communists are now actively serving the interests of the Party.

b. The family of the arrestee was prevented from becoming

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anti-regime, and perhaps was instilled with certain sympathies and respect for the Communist cause.

c. An example of OZNa justice was presented to the masses.

d. The subversive movement involved is successfully infiltrated, while at the same time its leaders believe that their security is excellent, since OZNa was not able to obtain its organizational or personnel structure, even though a member, or more, of the same was arrested.

#### INTERROGATIONS (PREPARATIONS)

97. All OZNa interrogations are based on well-studied methods which are almost invariably successful. OZNa Officers are given definite training in the art of detailed questioning and assignments of this nature follow a prescribed pattern. (Source obtained the following information from an OZNa textbook belonging to KOVACEVIC Stole.)

98. Before an OZNa interrogator speaks with a prisoner, he must study carefully all available material pertaining to Subject, such as his social life, his family, the subversive or espionage movement to which he belonged, etc. Consequently the questioner must spend several days previous to an important interrogation in the OZNa archives, gathering all of the necessary data. When the interrogator completes his study of the Subject's background, he begins to converse with the prisoner. It is pointed out that the first point the OZNa Officer is required to establish is the motive (such as money, revenge, fear, fanaticism, ideological beliefs, etc.) which prompted the arrestee to work for the underground movement. Furthermore, it must be ascertained to what extent the prisoner is attached to this organization and what he is prepared to sacrifice for it (such as freedom, discrimination or persecution against his family, torture or life). (It must be added that at this point, the textbook stated that only Communists are willing to give their lives for their ideals, while no other individuals have such strong tenets.) The weaker side of the prisoner must be found, and the OZNa interrogator must view the entire situation from the eyes of his subject and not try to convince the latter that only the Communist way of life is possible. In this manner, it is believed that a certain degree of compatibility will exist between the two individuals and the arrestee will be more inclined to discuss his activities with what he believes to be a sympathetic listener. The degree of the Subject's intelligence capacity, as well as his ability to lie or distort the truth must be established before detailed interrogations are commenced and the arrestee's weaknesses (love, attachment to his family), habits (smoking, drinking), and extent of his physical endurance must be clearly known to the interrogator. When the OZNa authority is in possession of all of this information and when he has a definite idea of what may be obtained with the use of certain tactics, the serious questioning begins.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS USED DURING INTERROGATIONS

99. Based on the long experience of NKVD and, to a lesser extent, of OZNa, it becomes clear that all individuals lose their ability to control themselves psychologically and hence are more inclined to tell the truth after a prolonged period of mental strain. Hence the prisoner's tendency to avoid making true, compromising statements is weakened after several hours of intense interrogation. OZNa Officers are aware of this fact, and normally the first few hours of the detailed questioning are devoted to obtaining information which has no specific value for OZNa. The arrestee, not knowing of this preliminary play, prepares his logical defense while answering the questions presented to him. Later, when he is too tired to think fast and make logical combinations of truth and imagination, he is requested to supply definite information relative to the subjects in which OZNa is interested. To obtain these details, the interrogator confronts his prisoner with the most precise information relative to the activities and contacts of the latter individual (or else he indicates that he possesses this data if in reality it is missing) in order to make him feel insecure, if he has not already admitted his complicity. While one OZNa Officer commences the general interrogation which is directed towards the point of psychological exhaustion, a second OZNa official enters the room at the turning point in the questioning, as it is believed that the presence of a third, unknown individual will make the prisoner even more uneasy and disturbed, hence more likely to tell the truth. The entrance of another OZNa Officer after a prolonged interrogation always indicates that the questioning is approaching a culminate, dangerous point. The newcomer as a rule does not talk, but observes, and this behavior is believed to give the arrestee a decided sense of fear and insecurity.

100. It is the belief of OZNa authorities that no one can resist all methods of psychological torture and when pressure of this type (sometimes only artificially created by means of skillful interrogation) becomes too great, the biological laws of self-preservation will influence the Subject and he will not risk his life to save a friend, an organization or an idea. Although the prisoner may believe that he would rather die than betray his particular cause, OZNa works under the supposition that when such an alternative is actually presented to the individual by attacking his weaker characteristics, the Subject will choose cooperation instead of death. Therefore, one of the principal points in any OZNa interrogation is to make the arrestee feel that his position is absolutely hopeless and his entire future rests in the hands of his questioner. These conditions are obtained by exaggerating the guilt of the prisoner, by indicating the severe consequences of legal action, by informing the Subject that the logical consequence of his action is capital punishment, etc. The prisoner is always advised that the worst part of the interrogation is still to come and merely the fear of the unknown assists in persuading the arrestee to tell the complete truth. Since the degree of personal resistance varies, the interrogator must decide at which moment the Subject is ready to confess everything and which methods should be used to hasten this time.

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101. In order to weaken the Subject's resistance, the interrogation may be continuous for days and nights. Food is poor, but sufficient quantities are normally available. In the event that the prisoner confesses, his rations are improved and he may receive parcels from outside. The use of mechanical psychological means (bright lights, etc.) are avoided, so the prisoner will know that only the OZNa Officer's superior knowledge and verbal force will be used to obtain true statements. Proofs of the Subject's guilt are never shown to him until he is about to make his complete confession and normally he is questioned by only one officer at a time. Interrogations usually take place at night, but preparatory talks customarily occur in the daytime. Once the prisoner indicates that he will cooperate, questioning is conducted in the morning, since OZNa authorities believe that at this time the individual's mind is fresh and he can best remember all that he knows or has done. Throughout the period of interrogation, the prisoner cannot maintain contact with the outside world, and OZNa Officers take great precautions to keep this regulation in effect, since it is considered that lack of communication with one's family and lack of knowledge of current world events considerably depresses the prisoner's mind. At times, however, when it is believed that correspondence from without would influence the prisoner favorably (such as a letter from his wife when he is about to confess), OZNa authorities permit or occasionally insist that such contact be commenced.

102. At times the practice of having the secretary of the OZNa interrogator "advise" the prisoner is employed to further convince the individual that his case is hopeless. In this manner, the OZNa Officer leaves the room for a short period and the typist (normally a woman), acting upon prearranged instructions received from the questioner, gives the Subject suggestions as to his proper behavior (favorable to the OZNa mission), or informs him that his current position is definitely hopeless. During the interrogation, the prisoner is kept in an isolated cell, but if he confesses, he is allowed to sleep in the same room with other detainees. Care is taken, however, to ensure that no one in his new room will influence him to such an extent that he will cease to cooperate with OZNa.

103. When psychological interrogations and torture do not convince the prisoner that he should cooperate with the intelligence agents, and when the latter believe that the Subject actually has a great deal of essential information at his disposal, physical torture is applied to obtain the desired results. Pain inflicted in this manner is reported as being unbearable and Source has heard several OZNa Officers state that they had never known of a prisoner who would not confess everything after being subjected to treatment of this type. During the entire torture proceedings, the OZNa authority stresses the fact that the individual may yet be saved or even released if he indicates that he will cooperate.

104. Throughout the interrogation, the initiative lies in the

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hands of the OZNa Officer, but once the prisoner starts to cooperate, he is permitted to expand on his points without undue direction, as in this manner the largest amount of information may be obtained.

Judicial Trials:

105. Although OZNa has in the past frequently conducted large liquidation programs without the use of court trials, and continues to do so on a small scale, there exists a current tendency to give all activity of this type as much of a legal atmosphere as possible. At present, secret executions are performed only in cases which preclude a public trial, such as the apprehension of foreign national spies, and in the event that the unruly attitude of a prisoner invites his murder. In general, it may be said that all OZNa arrestees are eventually passed to judicial authorities for proper penal procedure. Before this action takes place, however, the Public Prosecutor has been directly informed by OZNa of the verdict he is expected to render and the judges, through Communist Party, are also notified of the correct Party line to follow in each instance. The fact that an individual revealed all information that he had at his disposition does not indicate that he will escape being sentenced, for the most important point to OZNa, and hence the Public Prosecutor, is whether or not the person may be used as an informer, and if he agreed to that proposition. So it may happen that prisoners who cooperated completely with their interrogator are nevertheless condemned to death because they are considered to be too compromised within their subversive organization to be used for further exploitation or because the movement itself is regarded as entirely ineffective or entirely destroyed.

106. Individuals who confessed everything and who promised to work for OZNa upon being released, if considered to be of high importance, receive a small sentence, or are even freed immediately. It is to be remembered that public trials are used only to give OZNa actions a legal basis and not to render an unbiased decision as a result of the impartial presentation of all evidence involved. Judicial actions are dependent upon OZNa instructions and the final sentence must be delivered in compliance with directions received from OZNa authorities.

Falsification of Evidence:

107. Whenever OZNa authorities believe that an individual represents a potential security threat to the Party or the Communist cause, but there is no tangible evidence available on which to base legal action, OZNa agents falsify evidence to obtain the desired results. Action of this type varies in each case concerned, and no definite set of rules is followed. However, discovering "witnesses" to any act of subversion, espionage or sabotage is not difficult, since any Party member is a potential testifier, if he is instructed to do so.

Use of Anti-Communists Without Arrests:

108. When a person is considered to be lacking in moral strength

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and if he is active in an anti-Communist organization, he is secretly arrested or called into the OZNa Office, shown complete evidences of his guilt, and promised that he will nevertheless be released if he signs the OZNa Izjava. Owing to the weak character of these individuals, they are normally immediately recruited as coerced OZNa informants, and thus intelligence agents have procured a new contact within a reactionary organization without attracting the attention of the leaders of the latter movement in any way. If persons who are first approached in this manner refuse to cooperate with OZNa, they are subjected to the normal interrogation process as outlined above and their case will eventually come to trial.

109. In order to ensure continued success with the use of such scientifically psychological methods, OZNa cadres are especially trained along these lines. Source knows that the following problems, among others, are studied by OZNa interrogators and Officers: (It is pointed out that not all intelligence agents may attend these courses, and that they are given mainly for higher echelon OZNa Officers or others who are in a position to benefit JUGOSLAVIA through the use of this information.)

- a. Study of general psychological problems.
- b. Psychoanalysis.
- c. Actions and reactions of the individuals's subconscious mind.
- d. Detailed study of various psychological complexes (fear, love, hope, etc.) and how these complexes may be further developed.
- e. In addition, OZNa interrogators are obliged to attend courses tracing the history of the political parties, foreign intelligence services which OZNa must control, etc.

#### OZNA REPORTS AND COURIER SYSTEM

110. Every OZNa Officer must submit written reports to his superiors pertaining to the results obtained while accomplishing an assigned mission. If a particular task is detailed or cannot be completed within a normal period of time, statements of progress are to be forwarded to higher commands at opportune intervals. An OZNa Officer normally presents his report to his Head of Section and this individual in turn sends the information to the Department (or Opunomocstvo) Chief. The directors of OZNa Offices on any given level report to the head of the immediate higher OZNa unit, but no information is available as to the nature of these memoranda. Reports to higher intelligence Headquarters are written on a special type of paper and sent in envelopes used only by that particular Office. Each OZNa Opunomocstvo has a special set of rubber stamps at its disposition and each Headquarters uses a different type of ink.

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111. OZNa couriers are always the same individuals. Official intelligence mail is always received from the same person and is always given to the same contact at its destination. The addressee of any OZNa report is always notified when the particular courier has left the point of origin of the report to deliver it. Documents of this nature are placed in a special pouch and are handled only by the sender and the receiver. The courier involved is not permitted to know what his pouch contains, nor is he to open it en route. OZNa couriers normally possess a special type of identity card and are issued travel orders specifying where they will journey on any assigned route. (In 1945, OZNa courier Identity Cards were green in color and bore the inscription "Kurirska Legitimacija".)

112. The identity of OZNa couriers in foreign countries normally cannot be ascertained by anyone not intimately involved in this routine procedure. In general, however, official Yugoslav military or diplomatic couriers are not employed by OZNa, but frequently Embassy employees, wives of Yugoslav diplomatic representatives abroad, etc., are used for this purpose. Normally OZNa couriers operating outside of JUGOSLAVIA have diplomatic passports to facilitate their passage with the intelligence material, but exceptions to this rule are known.

113. In JUGOSLAVIA, regular OZNa couriers are drawn from the ranks of KNOJ, but special couriers must be OZNa Officers. All individuals so employed must be members of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA.

114. OZNa couriers working abroad normally maintain contact with Kanali (Channels). This term is given to certain Communist Party members in the various foreign countries who are used as receivers for couriers who were unable to deliver their correspondence in accordance with the prearranged agreement. Foreign couriers and Kanali are given a set of passwords and signs of recognition, and any individual who approaches the Kanali and identifies himself properly with the use of these words, will be given unlimited assistance in any field of projected activity. Passwords are changed approximately once a week and, in addition, another word is used to identify the current month.

115. OZNa Officers working in foreign countries are responsible for taking care of the financial expenditures of the Kanali and informing these individuals of password changes, etc. Kanali are dependent upon their Foreign OZNa contact for all directives pertaining to their role in the Yugoslav intelligence service abroad.

#### OZNA FINANCIAL EXPENDITURES

116. In addition to a certain amount of Party funds set aside to finance intelligence missions, OZNa receives monetary support from the three following sources:

- The budget of the Ministry of War.
- The budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- The budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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117. The source of OZNa confidential funds is centralized. This means that Federal Republic OZNa does not receive money to be used for operational purposes from the Federal Ministry, but from Central OZNa in Belgrade. Central OZNa is the only intelligence unit which receives appropriations of this nature direct from the Ministries involved. OZNa Officers and overt debts are paid through money obtained from the Federal Ministries and expenses of this nature are not centralized, hence they may be settled on a local level. In general, OZNa expenditures in JUGOSLAVIA are quite small, since approximately 90% of their informants are members of the Communist Party who consider it their duty to volunteer information and are hence not paid. In foreign countries, however, confidants are paid more regularly, since many are not members of the Communist Party and are working only for monetary remuneration.

118. Each OZNa Command (Opunomocstvo) contains one Officer who is responsible for financial matters in addition to his other duties. The Officer so designated may issue money only upon receipt of a written request from the Chief or the Assistant Chief of the OZNa Command. Confidential expenditures of OZNa Officers are not controlled, since intelligence authorities believe that their agents are completely reliable and hence not apt to misappropriate state funds. OZNa Officers must sign a receipt indicating that they have received a certain amount of money to be used in accomplishing their mission, and these statements are kept by the OZNa Finance Officer. Informants to whom the money is given must also acknowledge same by means of a written declaration. This latter practice is not used to control the OZNa agent, but to give the confidant the feeling that he may be compromised if at any time his work fails.

119. If an OZNa Officer is obliged to travel and his orders state that he is entitled to operating funds, he may receive money from any OZNa Office in JUGOSLAVIA or abroad. Central OZNa issues orders of this nature which are valid throughout JUGOSLAVIA and in foreign countries as well. Federal OZNa offices may also give directives of this nature which are normally recognized only in the particular Republic, but may be honored in other sections of JUGOSLAVIA if necessary. Frequently, when OZNa Officers are sent abroad on a secret mission, their travel orders do not contain their true names nor do they state that they may obtain money from OZNa units in foreign countries. In such cases, a prearranged system of passwords is used to identify the intelligence agent.

120. OZNa has at its disposition large sums of money and Source is of the opinion that any amount would be given without hesitation to individuals possessing what OZNa considers to be valuable information. Every intelligence agent on an assigned mission is entitled to obtain enough money to cover his official (confidential) expenditures, but he never receives additional sums as a reward for his excellent work.

121. Source does not believe that OZNa is financed in its operations abroad by Yugoslav commercial or economic firms operating in the areas concerned, since he knows that OZNa special couriers normally carry

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the pay and allowances of foreign OZNa agents when they travel to countries where these individuals are located. However, Source states that while conversing with MILICEVIC Bude, the latter stated that a foreign espionage service operating in JUGOSLAVIA was being financed by a commercial agency in Zagreb and that OZNa was functioning abroad in the same way. Additional particulars relative to this incident are not known.

#### RANK AND POSITION IN OZNA

122. The official positions of OZNa Officers is not dependent upon their respective ranks, and frequently lower ranking OZNa Officers are placed in charge of Officers with a higher grade. In 1944, when Officers were first inducted into OZNa, they were given ratings not according to their abilities or to their past performance in the Communist Party, but only according to the official position to which they were appointed. As an example, if a member of the KPJ Regional Committee was placed as Chief of OZNa for a Division, he was given only the rank of Major, since the OZNa Officer on any level could not be of a higher grade than the corresponding Political Commissar. However, owing to the Party background of this individual, he exerted a considerable amount of influence within the Division and he often commanded officers of higher rank who were not members of the Communist Party. In this respect, if the person in question was appointed to a different position in Civilian OZNa, he could immediately receive the rank of Colonel, if the position warranted it. Consequently, the importance of an OZNa Officer may be definitely judged only when his previous Party career is known.

123. Within an OZNa unit, the rank of the different intelligence agents receives no considerations other than those required by formality. This situation becomes obvious whenever OZNa Officers change their official positions. To illustrate, if the Chief of an OZNa Section in a Department of a Republic whose overt activities entitle him to the rank of a Major is transferred to another job which requires more formal authority (such as a Military mission abroad), he automatically is promoted to a higher grade, for example Colonel, thus jumping one rank and twelve years of service.

124. Once an Officer is given a rank in OZNa, he can lose it only by punishment received from a Military Court. This means that the mythical Colonel of the preceding paragraph may be returned to JUGOSLAVIA and given an intelligence position of lesser importance than the one he was previously occupying, but he would retain his rank. To the general public, this individual would appear to be quite influential, although to his OZNa superiors his grade would be negligible and he could be commanded by a lower ranking Officer holding a higher position in the intelligence service.

#### LENGTH OF SERVICE FOR OZNA OFFICERS

125. According to Source, who obtained the following information from a conversation with General Ugljesa DANILOVIC of OZNa, an OZNa Officer is destined to remain forever in the intelligence service. OZNa personnel may be assigned to other Party functions or to other State

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Departments or mass organizations (syndicates, military missions, foreign commercial missions, etc.) but they do not lose their status in the intelligence unit. In fact, OZNa agents so employed are paid according to their position in the intelligence hierarchy, irrespective of whether their newly assigned overt post entitles them to more or less money than they were previously receiving. If OZNa Officers commit grave mistakes, if they become involved in affairs which are detrimental to the Party cause or if there is reason to doubt their loyalty to the Communist Government, they are not dismissed or released from service, but merely disappear from public and private life by means of secret liquidations.

#### PAY OF OZNA OFFICERS

126. OZNa Officers are not paid according to the rank they hold, but according to their official position within the intelligence unit. In this connection, a Head of an OZNa Section, who is a Major, may be paid more than a Colonel who is working in his Section.

127. In 1945, all KPJ Committees received a letter of directives signed by TITO and RANKOVIC and stating in substance that all Communists must appreciate the position in which the State has placed them and that their official pay should not be considered as a reward for their duties, but as a means to facilitate the accomplishment of their assigned missions. This memorandum also advised all Communists, especially those in OZNa, to be prepared to sacrifice anything to support the State which they have established.

#### OZNA AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

128. All foreign intelligence services, with the exception of those operated by Communist-controlled states, are considered by OZNa to be enemy units. Special Sections exist in Central OZNa and Federal OZNa Departments which contend only with the procedures of enemy intelligence services. Personnel assigned to these sections study the methods, the internal organization, etc. of these groups, based on material which is given to OZNa for informational purposes by the NKVD and other Communist espionage services. These OZNa counter intelligence agents first review the theoretical structure of the enemy intelligence service in order to become thoroughly acquainted with the type of work these foreign agents perform, then they obtain sufficient practical information to stifle their activities in JUGOSLAVIA, and abroad if possible. In this connection, the personnel, channels of communication used, organization, intelligence centers, etc. of the enemy intelligence service are of particular interest to OZNa.

129. OZNa agents also operate in countries which are directed by a Communist-controlled government, mainly in assistant or advisory capacities to personnel of the domestic intelligence system. Obviously OZNa does not attempt to exterminate these services, but Yugoslav intelligence personnel do control the activities of other Communist intelligence units to a certain extent. The relationship between OZNa and the intelligence

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sections of other Communist Parties is identical with the official positions of the Communist Parties in the Communist International. In this connection, while OZNa operates in BULGARIA and HUNGARY and is permitted complete access to any information which these countries may possess, agents of the latter two intelligence services are not informed of the activities of OZNa in their respective countries. This situation is due to the fact that the KPJ is second in the Communist International, while the Bulgarian Communist Party rates third and the Hungarian unit is sixth. Correspondingly, the Russian intelligence organization operates in JUGOSLAVIA (as well as other Communist countries), and although OZNa chiefs are aware of the existence of these units, the Yugoslav intelligence personnel are not informed as to the nature of the Russians' work, nor of the identity of their confidants.

130. OZNa's fight against enemy espionage services operating in JUGOSLAVIA follows a plan of action identical with that used to exterminate elements considered to be subversive to the Communist regime. The main method used to accomplish this task is the infiltration of enemy intelligence systems with personnel actually working for OZNa.

PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS OF OZNA

131. OZNa leaders are interested only in obtaining full information pertaining to matters of a political nature. Common crimes (theft, murder, etc.) if they are without political background, are not dealt with by the intelligence personnel. In JUGOSLAVIA, OZNa pays special attention to activities of the following nature:

a. Political activities and personalities of all non-Communist parties or groups, including organization, future intentions, strength, and contact with foreign countries.

b. Identification and elimination of enemy espionage personnel and nets operating in JUGOSLAVIA. Obtaining evidence against and controlling the activities of all individuals who are in the service of enemy espionage services, as well as those who could be potential agents for movements of this type.

c. Control of the economic plans of the Yugoslav State and identification of actual or potential saboteurs.

d. To preclude unreliable or subversive elements from penetrating State Offices, including the Liberation Front and other mass organizations which are directed by the Communist Party.

e. To provide security coverage for Yugoslav military personnel and to exclude all enemy espionage services from operating within the Yugoslav Army.

f. Procure information of a military, political and economic nature for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the General Staff of the

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Jugoslav Army and the Political Bureau of the KPJ.

132. In foreign countries, OZNa must accomplish the following missions:

a. Discover all political and intelligence activities of the enemy intelligence service which are directed against JUGOSLAVIA. (This includes members, methods, channels of communication used, etc.)

b. Develop information pertaining to the activities, formations and strength of the foreign political parties.

c. Obtain economic information relative to foreign industry and business concerns.

d. Report on military installations of foreign countries, including potentialities and intentions of the military leaders.

e. Control the contacts and activities of all Yugoslavs who migrated from their native land as a result of their opposition to the Communist government.

EXTENT AND STRENGTH OF OZNA CONTROL IN JUGOSLAVIA

133. During a meeting of higher KPJ leaders which took place in Sarajevo in September 1945, [REDACTED], the Organizational Secretary of the Central Committee of the KPJ and the Chief of OZNa, attempted to answer the frequent question of many Communists as to why OZNa was being enlarged since the Yugoslav Government was Communist controlled. [REDACTED] stated in substance that only those who were unfamiliar with the international situation and capable of under-estimating the enemy could ask such a question, as the perfection of OZNa and the benevolent assistance of the Soviet Union permits JUGOSLAVIA to regard her enemies through a microscope and be fully aware of the subversive acts which are being attempted against the Eastern bloc. In addition, the correct policy of the KPJ Central Committee, which enabled the intelligence service to develop in an efficient manner, permitted the formation of an organization capable of blocking all moves of the enemy in JUGOSLAVIA and abroad. In this connection, the Communist regime need not fear any activity initiated by anti-Communist movements and its inherent intelligence unit (OZNa) is considered to be able to contend with and destroy any revolutionary group attempting to threaten current security. Consequently, OZNa will play a great role in the post-war offensive against the reactionaries and, owing to its organization and backing, it will always emerge victorious.

134. Source's opinion of OZNa, which was formed as a result of personal discussions with intelligence agents and leaders, as well as the official opinion held by the Communist Party, is that its force and control in JUGOSLAVIA is quite extensive and not to be underestimated. Owing to its heritage received from the pre-war underground intelligence

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sections of the Communist Party and pertinent advice and assistance from RUSSIA, as well as its characteristics of large-scale preciseness, Source believes that foreign OZNa is a successful organization, the operations of which must be taken into serious consideration at all times.

135. In addition to these positive factors, OZNa is further strengthened by the weakness and uncoordinated activity of the anti-Communist element in JUGOSLAVIA and abroad. According to [REDACTED] an OZNa specialist on anti-Communist movements, Yugoslav reactionary groups plan on too wide a program while they are still in the embryonic stage, and all efforts fail as a result of poor organization. (In this respect, if a subversive movement would limit its first activities to ensuring that all members are reliable and prepared to revolt at the proper time instead of immediately undertaking overt action against the Communist Government, it is believed that such a unit would be successful in gaining power at a later date.)

136. Source states that the weakest feature of OZNa is that the intelligence personnel do not seriously consider that an underground group, using methods of conspiracy similar to those of the Communist Party could be formed in JUGOSLAVIA and could attract adherency and support from a large majority of the population. At present, only the illegal activities of enemy espionage nets (the formation of anti-Communist political groups, etc.) are being given detailed attention and the possibility of the existence of an underground political organization in JUGOSLAVIA is not given undue attention. Consequently, it is indicated that a completely secret political movement, developed properly with the correct choice of personnel, would be able to outmaneuver OZNa, and eventually overthrow the present government.

137. Another mistake made during and right after the final phase of the war, was the mass liquidation of political opponents of the Communist regime, as sponsored by OZNa. Although since that time Party officials have attempted to popularize OZNa by terming it the just defender of the people's rights, many individuals still fail to accept this presentation of the intelligence service, and normally OZNa authorities and functions are highly unpopular with the average man in JUGOSLAVIA.

138. Additional information indicating specific references and definite examples of implementation of the OZNa theoretical operations, as outlined above, is in the process of compilation and will be submitted through normal channels in the near future.

APPROVED: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC

Chief CIC TRUST

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
PRIESTS UNITED STATES TROOPS  
APO 209, U. S. ARMY

12 April 48  
Ref. No. S-5163

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

HQ TRUST  
CONTROL No. 845

SUBJECT: Development of the Intelligence Network  
of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA  
for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and  
Herzegovina.

RE : Period from 1921 until 1946.

1.

Evaluation C-3.

INTRODUCTION

2. Inasmuch as Source was not directly connected with UDBa activities at any time during his Communist career, and due to the fact that by its nature the Intelligence Section of the Yugoslav Government functions in a conspirative and strictly controlled manner, complete details pertaining to this phase of Communist activities were impossible to obtain. It is pointed out, however, that while an UDBa authority may possess minute facts relative to his particular assignment, he is not officially in a position to obtain information concerning other fields of intelligence operations, but Source, through his contacts with UDBa representatives on a personal as well as on a Party basis, was able to garner a large number of general facts characterizing the intelligence service, in addition to procuring a deep insight for many of the UDBa functions and problems. Source was taken into the confidence of several of the UDBa officials, since he was regarded as being completely reliable and was well-known for his co-operation and illegal Party activities prior to the war. Source, who was a member of the Rural District Committee of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA for the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had access to various Party directives destined to control and direct UDBa actions, as did all other members of the same Committee.

3. While the following information pertains only to the history of UDBa functions and organizational methods in the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is quite likely that the intelligence service in the other Republics of JUGOSLAVIA, as well as abroad, operates in a similar manner.

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HISTORY OF OZNA

4. When overt Party development was prohibited in JUGOSLAVIA in 1922, all Communist activities were continued through the use of clandestine and underground methods. In order to ensure that the Party would have a successful future and to obtain advance knowledge of contemplated police actions directed against the illegal formations, Communists were detailed to penetrate the Royal Yugoslav Police organization as well as the leading political factions. Through the technical secretaries of the higher Party committees (Central, Regional and Rural District), Intelligence Sections (Obavestajne Sekcije) were initiated for the purpose of controlling the activities, progress or failure of other Parties and although these units were of a temporary nature, they were able to furnish fairly accurate advance knowledge of forthcoming political policies and police movements.

5. After the Communist Party ceased to function as a legal organization, Leftist propaganda destined for distribution in JUGOSLAVIA was printed in FRANCE and in RUSSIA and was carried illegally into the former country. In addition, it was necessary to maintain contact between the several KPJ Regional Committees by the use of couriers and finally, the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA, as a member of the Third Communist International, was required to procure directives from the Party Headquarters in Moscow and to pass pertinent details to Communist leaders in neighboring states (mainly ITALY). As a result of these commitments, the use of many couriers was essential and, during the first year after the outlawing of the KPJ, an appreciable number of these individuals were apprehended and incarcerated by the Royal Yugoslav Police. To combat this situation, stable Intelligence Commissions (Obavestajne Komisije) were established by the Party in 1923 and, as a general rule, the Chief of a given intelligence commission served simultaneously as the Technical Secretary of the same KPJ Committee. These Commissions existed only in the Central, Regional and Rural District Party units and were charged specifically with the following tasks:

- a. Maintenance of clandestine courier channels with bordering states (directives emanating from the Communist International were obtained in Vienna, and were passed on to Party leaders in Sofia and Athens).
- b. Transporting the Party newspaper "PROLETAR" and other Party propaganda from FRANCE to JUGOSLAVIA.
- c. Organization of a courier service which would operate between the Central Committee of the KPJ and the various Regional Committees.
- d. Selection and education of couriers so employed and outlining the methods and routes to be used.

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6. In addition to these permanent Commissions, temporary Intelligence units were placed into operation whenever Party Congresses were called and detachments so employed were responsible for the security coverage of the area and of the individuals participating. These missions were activated only when Party officials deemed it necessary and not all Party Congresses were so controlled.

7. In 1925, approximately half of the members of the Central Committee of the KPJ as well as over 100 other Yugoslav Communists were arrested and sentenced to lengthy periods of confinement in the Sremska Mitrovica Prison. Uncompromised intelligence commissions were entrusted at this time with procuring and maintaining contact with detained Party members and the ensuing results of this assignment were fairly successful. In 1927, the Central Committee of the KPJ organized Party political courses in Prague and the various Intelligence Commissions were responsible for the safe passage of Communists from JUGOSLAVIA to CZECHOSLOVAKIA and return. In 1929, as a result of police persecution, the Central Committee of the KPJ moved to Paris and Intelligence Commissions were required to furnish reliable couriers to keep the Central Committee abreast of Party developments in JUGOSLAVIA. In 1934, the KPJ expelled all PETKOVCI factionists from its ranks and Intelligence Commissions were charged with the execution of approximately 100 Communists who were condemned to death by the Central Committee of the KPJ, in compliance with instructions received from the Third International in Moscow. Later in 1934, DZAKOVIC Djuro, the Secretary of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA was killed in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslav border and consequently all Intelligence Commission personnel were substituted with what were considered to be more reliable Party members.

8. In 1937, Yugoslav police and naval authorities apprehended an illegal shipment of Communist volunteers who were already en route to SPAIN and in Slovenia, over 200 additional Leftists were detained while they were preparing to leave the country. As a result of these mass arrests, Party authorities were forced to reorganize completely their intelligence network, and with the advent of TITO in 1938 the use of Intelligence Sectors (Obavestajni Sektori) became an integral part of KPJ activity in the Central, Regional and Rural District Committees. The principal difference between the Intelligence Sectors and the Intelligence Commissions lay in the fact that whereas in the latter unit the Chief, in addition to his intelligence responsibilities within the local Party organization, could also be placed in charge of other Communist activities, but since the Intelligence Sector was elevated to a level equal with that of other phases of Party work, the Intelligence Chief in any higher Party Committee (Central, Regional or Rural District) was in charge solely of cultivating and expanding his information net. The main commitments of the Sectors were essentially the same as those of the Commissions, but individual assignments were made only after a general discussion of the problem involved had occurred at a meeting of the Party Committee and a definite plan of action had been formulated. Activity at this period was mainly of a defensive nature and was directed

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towards the elimination of police infiltration and factionists from the Party organization.

9. In April 1941, when war was declared in JUGOSLAVIA, Communist Party members were mobilized and all those who refused to obey Party directives were subject to the death penalty. Intelligence Centers (Obavestajni Centri) were formed for the purpose of obtaining widespread coverage in all fields of activity and the earlier intelligence units were used only in cases when the development of the illegal Party program was hindered in any way. Until this time, the KPJ did not maintain a trained intelligence cadre and with the exception of those members of the Central, Regional and Rural District Committees who were responsible for the Intelligence phase of the Party program, no Communist had been subjected to indoctrination material of this nature, nor had special emphasis been placed on this field of activity. Agents were recruited from Party members on a lower level than the Intelligence Chief and were required to possess only an appreciation of the need for strict security, native intelligence and complete fidelity to the Party cause.

10. The organization of the Intelligence Centers brought about the following changes in the Party information functions and responsibilities:

- a. Centers were no longer characteristic of only the Central, Regional and Rural District Committees, but were introduced into all Party units down to and including the Commune Committee.
- b. A special cadre of professional KPJ intelligence personnel was formed.
- c. Intelligence activities were centralized. In this manner, the Intelligence Center of any given KPJ Committee was directly dependent upon and responsible to the Center of the immediately superior Party unit and all directives were received through Party channels. Personnel assignments and problems of discipline, however, were controlled by the Committee in which the Center was contained.

11. Intelligence Centers of KPJ Commune Committees were known as OOC (Opcinski Obavestajni Centar) and in City KPJ Committees on the same level, the unit was called ROC (Rajonski OC). District Committee Centers were known as SOC (Sreski OC) in Serbia and KOC (Kotarski OC) in Croatia. Rural District Committee Intelligence units were called OKOC (Okruzni OC) and City Committees on the same level contained Centers called OPOC (Oblasni OC) and the Regional Committee Centers were known as POC (Pokrajinski OC). Finally, the Central KPJ Committee Intelligence Center was known as COC (Centralni OC).

12. Whereas earlier Party intelligence units were used mainly to protect Communist activities and personalities from police action, the

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new Centers were active in all fields of political, military and economic espionage. Since all political parties in JUGOSLAVIA which were not openly associated with the Italian or German occupational government were deprived of their leaders and hence were unable to render valid assistance to the anti-Axis elements in the population, one of the first tasks of the Intelligence Centers was to procure information relative to contemplated reprisals to be conducted against Yugoslavs who were not Party adherents but who did not intend to collaborate with Fascist and Nazi authorities. For example, if the Ustasha Police were preparing to arrest a Serb leader, KPJ penetration agents in the Ustasha were able to advise the individual of his forthcoming fate and with the help of the KPJ Forged Document Section, the man was given proper papers and was escorted out of the danger area. During all phases of such an operation, the person concerned was informed on numerous occasions that the Communist Party was sponsoring his escape and activity of this nature proved to be quite valuable in obtaining additional Party members and sympathizers.

13. In this same manner, pertinent information was obtained relative to the Jewish persecution program and many Hebrews were assisted in escaping to safer areas in return for monetary contributions to the Communist cause. While Intelligence Centers were active in a number of fields, their general functions may be divided into two sections:

- a. An overall strengthening of the Communist Party for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of the Party program (courier service, acts of sabotage, information concerning the Quisling and occupation troops, counter-espionage activities, etc.)
- b. The organization of Partisan units with an accompanying effective intelligence service.

14. The Chiefs of the Intelligence Centers were for the most part political or organizational secretaries of the various KPJ Committees, and although their nominations and placements were directly controlled by higher ranking Communist authorities, it may nevertheless be said that the Intelligence Centers exerted a great influence on many Party activities, such as sabotage, killings, etc., since the Intelligence Chief was almost invariably consulted before any deed of this nature was initiated. It is not possible, however, to draw a clear line of distinction between the Party and the Intelligence Centers, since all members of the latter units were selected for their belligerence and reliability. A breakdown of Intelligence Center responsibilities reveals that the following missions were given primary attention:

- a. Procuring and furnishing well concealed apartments for members of the underground.
- b. Preparation of secure spots for illegal meetings.

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- c. The freeing of incarcerated Party members and sympathizers.
- d. Organization and protection of the KPJ courier service.
- e. Organization and direction of acts of sabotage and protection of individuals engaged in such activities.
- f. Security coverage and protection for Party arms and ammunition warehouses.
- g. Penetration of enemy intelligence services.
- h. Preparation of forged documents and Identity Cards.
- i. Organization of courier service between Partisan formations and Party underground units in different cities.
- j. Obtaining information for Partisan units which enabled the latter to conduct successful military operations (such as the route of enemy ammunition trains, prominent Quislings or enemy Officers, etc.).

15. In order to procure a sufficient number of well trained personnel to form the cadres of the Intelligence Centers, "technical-political" courses were organized in the larger cities of JUGOSLAVIA and in Partisan controlled areas. Instructors were obtained from the existing intelligence specialists and courses which covered the following subjects were presented to the personnel attending the classes:

- a. Street fighting tactics.
- b. Document and official stamp forgeries.
- c. Use of codes and passwords.
- d. Methods of copying documents.
- e. Comprehensive study of the "Trojka" system.
- f. Proper behavior of Party members were they to be captured by the enemy.
- g. Jiu-jitsu, knife and pistol fighting tactics.

16. At this time, Intelligence Centers were organized as "Trojkas", or three-man groups, and they ceased to be merely a separate unit within the Party cell. Communist regulations of a stricter nature than those applying to ordinary Party members governed the activities of the intelligence agents and minor breaches of security or non-compliance with existing directives normally resulted in severe punishment. During

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this period, the Intelligence Centers may be characterized as the Party within the Party, and quite frequently other Communists were completely unaware of the identity of intelligence agents and their specific missions. Centers operating with various Partisan units did so in absolute secrecy and members of these units were known only to the leaders of the KPJ Committee functioning within the military formation. Partisan Intelligence Officers were nominated by the Center, and while the official duties of these individuals was a matter of general knowledge, only Intelligence Center agents were aware of the formers' connections with the Center.

17. Simultaneously, members of "Petorkas" (five-man terroristic group operating clandestinely in occupied areas, sponsored by the Partisan forces and not directly dependent upon Party directives), responsible for intelligence activities, were appointed to their positions and were directed in their actions by Intelligence Center personnel without being aware of the latter's true position. Only Intelligence Officers in higher units, such as a Company in the city Kvart or a Battalion in the city Rajon, to whom Peterka members were subordinate, maintained contact with the closest center and on many occasions were also members of the Party Intelligence Center.

18. In order to facilitate the general operational procedure, intelligence centers were divided into several sections as early as 1941. The first division of this nature consisted of only two branches, namely, underground intelligence activities in occupied areas and the control of liberated territory. This type of commitment proved to be impractical, however, owing to the uneven distribution of assignments, as one Center was compelled to combat foreign espionage, arrange for document falsification, plan executions, etc., while the other branch normally received assignments of a negative nature. To correct this situation and to provide for the training of intelligence specialists, later in 1941 Party Intelligence Centers were divided according to the type of activity performed and four sections were established along the following lines:

- a. Military espionage and control of the political inclinations of Partisan fighters.
- b. Foreign espionage units, charged with penetrating and reporting on the activities of the Gestapo, the British Intelligence Service and local Quisling intelligence groups.
- c. The Tehnicna Sekcija (Technical Section) responsible for the issuing of required documents necessary for the successful completion of Partisan, sabotage or intelligence missions in occupied territory.

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- d. A Communication Section which maintained liaison between Intelligence Centers and which supervised the KPJ courier service.

19. None of the Intelligence Center agents were obliged to forward written reports of their activities or findings to their immediate superiors, however, higher Intelligence Headquarters made compilations of verbal information received, and consequently intelligence files were maintained by the Communists during the war. The exact location of these archives was a well-guarded secret, and Source, despite his commanding position in the Party hierarchy, was at no time able to obtain definite details pertaining to this matter. Intelligence Centers were never referred to in Party directives and all non-intelligence adherents of higher Party units who knew that such Centers existed, were prohibited to discuss this phase of Communist activity by orders of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

20. In 1943, international developments morally and materially bolstered TITO and the Yugoslav Communist Government. ITALY capitulated and the majority of the Italian occupational troops in JUGOSLAVIA were ordered to surrender themselves and their weapons to Partisan units; Allied press and radio propaganda after the Teheran conference called for the complete support of Partisan units; German offensives failed and large areas of JUGOSLAVIA were occupied by Partisan troops. As a result of these advancements, the necessity of an executive organ to implement Intelligence Center activities became apparent. Until this time, intelligence agents or informants were used to perform the required activities in their field or, in cases of large scale operations, reliable Partisan and, in some instances, entire fighting units, were placed at the disposition of the Center. In 1943, the new Communist policy included the annihilation of Chetniks and Chetnik sympathizers, individuals with pro-Ally sentiments, foreign elements considered to be an obstacle to Communist advancement (Volksdeutsche, Hungarian minorities, rich landowners, etc.) in order to enable the Party program to advance with a minimum amount of resistance and difficulty. Since the general KPJ attitude towards the identification of Intelligence Center personnel remained to be one of strict security, special military units were organized to work under the direction of the Intelligence agents and to carry out their instructions. The structure and composition of these fighting groups did not differ in any way from normal Partisan organizations and the duties of the Commanding Officers, Political Commissars and other leading individuals were essentially identical with those of earlier Communist formations. One basic difference, however, lay in the fact that Party or SKOPJ adherence was a prerequisite for service in the newly formed units. Immediately after the activation of these groups, they were officially attached as "relief companies" (Fratace Oete) to various Partisan Headquarters but in reality they were under the direct control of the KPJ Intelligence Centers. Political Commissars of these Companies were automatic members of the Intelligence Centers.

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21. In early 1944, these Companies became well-known by the local population as a result of their police actions (apprehension of Partisan deserters, destruction of Ustetnik villages, arrest of subversive, i.e., anti-Communist, elements, etc.), and on many instances they were referred to as "Gendarmes" (policemen), a highly unpopular term in JUGOSLAVIA. To curtail this trend and to avoid a complete compromise of the basic functions of these units, Party officials redesignated the Companies as PPK (Protiv Pete Kolone - Against the Fifth Column) in Bosnia and Croatia, whereas in Slovenia they were identified as VDV.

22. As a parallel growth with the PPK, "Trojkas" (not to be confused with Intelligence Service "Trojkas") were organized in enemy occupied cities by the Communists for the purpose of implementing orders received from the Intelligence Centers. These units were responsible only for the execution of directives obtained from Intelligence agents and they were not required to plan forthcoming activity or to gather incidental information. At this same time, the Intelligence Centers were more efficiently organized and two additional sections were included in the general composition. The exact duties of these new groups are unknown; however, it is suggested that the Counter Espionage Section was possibly divided into Internal and Foreign branches.

#### THE FORMATION OF OZNA

23. During the Yalta Conference which took place in April 1944, it was decided that the AVNOJ, which at that time was dominated completely by the Communists, would be recognized as the official Yugoslav Parliament and it would be outwardly reorganized so as to include uncompromised democratic elements. At this time it became evident to Party leaders that the Communists would be able to control the Yugoslav Government and to represent the Yugoslav population following the cessation of hostilities, and that the final defeat of GERMANY was imminent. Other political factions, sensing that the war was nearing an end and determined to combat the impending Communist control, at this time commenced a program of revival reorganization from the period of stagnation caused by the strict German and Quisling control. The HSS (Croat Peasant Party), which was supported by an estimated 80% of the Croatian population, 60% of the Dalmatian residents, 50% of the Bosnians and 30% of all Herzegovinans; the Serb Democratic Party; the Serb Agricultural Party; the Serb section of the Radical Party and the Slovene Clerical Party, began to plan new policies and recruit new members throughout all areas of JUGOSLAVIA. Discussions centering around the type of post-war government for JUGOSLAVIA and appropriate leaders in each instance were common in the different political circles and many Axis collaborators indicated their desire to cooperate with Allied units, foreseeing the eventual collapse of GERMANY. The Croat Domobran Army, which had not participated in wide-scale massacres as had the Ustashi, believed that they would escape Allied reprisals if they associated themselves with the ~~Ustashi~~ movement, and ~~Ustashi~~ Slovene Domobran Army became affiliated with the Slovene

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[REDACTED] in preparation for an Allied occupation. As a result of this general situation, political leaders believed it possible to obtain the support of the masses and to defeat the Communist machine at future elections.

24. In order to retain their control of the Government, Party leaders were obliged to place special emphasis on the Intelligence service and to create from it a capable and reliable organization which would be able to cope with the varied problems presented by the activity of other political groups. It was resolved that the existence of this unit would not be concealed from the general public, but certain aspects of its commitments, as well as the identity of many of the agents, should not be publicized. The new KPJ Intelligence organization was known as the "Section for the People's Defense", or OZNa. To advise and direct preliminary operations, the Communist International Headquarters in Moscow dispatched an NKVD specialist to the Central Committee of the KPJ. This individual, a General Valerij (lnu) proved to be quite efficient in his assigned task, and it is claimed that one month after his arrival in JUGOSLAVIA, OZNa units were in operation throughout the country.

25. The Central Committee of the KPJ organized a special commission composed of Committee members for the purpose of choosing OZNa organizers from adherents of lower (Regional and Provincial) Committees. This group contained the following Party representatives:

BROZ Josip ("TITO") - Secretary of the OZNa Organizational Commission of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

[REDACTED] - Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

[REDACTED] - Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

[REDACTED] - Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

[REDACTED] - Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

[REDACTED] - Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ.

This Commission initiated a Direktivno Pismo (letter of directives) for lower KPJ Committees instructing the political secretaries how and who to select as OZNa representatives and employees. This letter was signed by [REDACTED] and was dispatched to the various addressees on Regional, Provincial and Rural District KPJ Committee

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levels who in turn appointed OZNa officials in compliance with the orders received. Following their official selection, these individuals obtained practical and operational directives from [REDACTED] and the NKVD general and thus the KPJ Committees' leaders, while being completely responsible for the choosing of the OZNa personnel, were not advised of the functions and assignments of the new intelligence agents.

26. The following general directives pertaining to OZNa operations emanated from the Central Committee of the KPJ and were transmitted from the KPJ Regional Committee to the Rural District Committee in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All members of the latter Committee, including Source, had access to this material.

a. All Regional (Provincial or Rural District) Committees must form OZNa Commissions composed of Party members, and these appointments will be confirmed by the immediately higher KPJ Committee. These Commissions will be responsible for the local implementation of instructions contained in the Letter of Directives. Commission adherents must include the Political Secretary of the given KPJ Committee, its Organizational Secretary, two reliable Party members who are well acquainted with their fellow Communists and two representatives from the Plenum of the given KPJ Committee.

b. The following prerequisites will govern acceptance into the OZNa Commissions: Women will be admitted to OZNa only as auxiliary forces or to perform administrative duties; all OZNa personnel must be members of the Communist Party of JUGOSLAVIA and fulfill other personal requirements delineated in the Letter of Directives.

c. The Corps of National Defense (KNOJ) should be organized from members of the PPK (VDV), from outstanding Partisan troops who are also Party adherents, from Party candidates and from SKOJ personnel. One KNOJ Division will be assigned to each Federal Republic, each Province will maintain a Brigade, Rural District Committees will have a Battalion at their disposition and a KNOJ Company will become part of each District Committee.

d. Intelligence Centers, despite their productive past, ceased to exist. However, most members of the OZNa Commissions had had previous intelligence experience within the Centers and in practically every case the Political Secretaries who served as Intelligence Center chiefs became leaders in the OZNa units.

e. Members of the Central or Regional Committees who are destined to become OZNa officials must proceed to the immediate lower Party echelon and personally supervise the formation of OZNa in the Provincial Committees. Upon the completion of this instruction, Provincial Committee members become responsible for OZNa organization on the Rural District level and the District Committee OZNa is to be founded.

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in continuation of the same program. Members of higher Party forums who organized OZNa on lower levels are to be known as the delegates for the formation of OZNa.

27. A similar letter of Directives was dispatched by the Central Committee to Party units functioning in the Partisan Army. For operational reasons, it was impossible to include all of the leading Communist fighters into OZNa, but the newly formed Partisan intelligence groups were materially strengthened by placing OZNa agents already assigned to various Party Committees with the Army intelligence. The number of OZNa personnel sent to Partisan locations to resume their intelligence activities depended upon the size of the area covered by the particular fighting formation.

OZNA BECOMES A REALITY (SPRING 1944 - SPRING 1945)

28. Immediately after the formation of OZNa and throughout its embryonic stage, Party directives incessantly reminded the leading OZNa representatives of the important role which the Intelligence unit was destined to play during the development of the Communist Party. These individuals in turn were instructed to inform other Party members and, through them, the adherents of the Communist controlled mass organizations, of the need and mission of OZNa. In this connection, the Party and its various appendages initiated a campaign to popularize the OZNa mission and employees. Overt OZNa representatives were characterized as the most active anti-Fascists who were performing their current duties in a commendable and just manner and through Communist rulings, all Party members and sympathizers were ordered to cooperate explicitly with the OZNa Committee members, although at the same time it was emphasized that OZNa is merely a part of the Communist Party and is directly dependent upon the will of the Party leaders.

29. As a result of certain OZNa-sponsored undertakings and the amount of power with which the organization was apparently endowed, several members of the higher Party Committees requested a definite statement as to the exact status of the intelligence agency. RANKOVIC Aleksander, the head of OZNa and the Organizational Secretary of the Central Committee of the KPJ, in reply, stated in one of his Letters of Directives that OZNa is merely a unit which executes certain orders received from the Communist Party and represents the Party interests in one phase of the struggle towards supremacy. It was also pointed out that OZNa interests are Party interests and each Party member was invited to assist the intelligence agents whenever possible.

30. To obtain a more efficient and objective control of the intelligence unit, a Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA was organized and was divided into six departments (Odelenje), one for each of the Federal Republics. OZNa personnel in any given Republic were normally drawn from Party members residing in the area concerned, although such was not always the case. Each Department was further divided according to the Party

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structure in the individual Republic. Departments contained two Regional Commands (Pokranjinsko Oponomocstvo) in Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija Regions) and one in Croatia (Dalmatian Region). These Commands were further broken down into Provincial Commands (Oblastna Oponomocstvo) following the same system used by the Party. By the same token, Rural District Commands (Okruzno Oponomocstvo) operated in the area covered by the Rural District Committees, District Commands (Sresko or Kotarsko Oponomocstvo) controlled the District Committee territory, and Commune Commands (Obstinsko Oponomocstvo) were set into action wherever Commune Committees existed.

31. Owing to the basic principal that OZNa was to be organized in as many areas as possible, formations of the following types existed:

- a. OZNa units in the Partisan Army.
- b. OZNa units in liberated areas.
- c. OZNa units in occupied territory.

The basic intelligence units were organized along identical patterns and principals in all of the foregoing sections, with the sole exception that in the Army and in liberated areas, the OZNa units were publicly identified as such. In general, the Officials were known to the public, but the informants were not; however, in occupied territory, for obvious reasons, all intelligence authorities and contacts were required to maintain strict security in regards to their fundamental mission.

#### OZNa UNITS IN THE PARTISAN ARMY (NOV AND POJ)

32. OZNa was organized according to the following principals in all Partisan units from the Company to the Corps:

a. Intelligence responsibilities in the Partisan Army were centralized at Corps level. In this manner, a Brigade OZNa Officer was not responsible to the Party Committee (Civilian) OZNa representative functioning in the same area with the Brigade, but to his immediate superior in the intelligence field of the Army, i.e., the Division OZNa Officer. The latter, for his part, reported only to the Corps OZNa authority, however, this individual was dependent upon directives emanating from the Federal (Civilian) OZNa center of the Republic in which the Corps was deployed.

b. One OZNa Officer was assigned to each Partisan Company and was also a member of the Company Party cell. This individual was charged with organizing and developing a net of informants in each Platoon of his Company and he was responsible to the Battalion OZNa Officer.

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c. OZNa organization on the Partisan Battalion level was directed by the OZNa Officer, who was an automatic member of the Battalion Party cell. This authority was responsible to the Brigade OZNa Commander (OZNa Opunomoccenik).

d. The OZNa Command (OZNa Oponomocstovo) in the Partisan Brigade was composed of the Commander of the Brigade OZNa detachment and one or more assistants. One of the latter individuals was designated as the Assistant Commander (Pomocnik Opunomocenika) and the others were known merely as OZNa Officers. This Command was in charge of all OZNa activities being developed within the Brigade and was responsible to the OZNa Division Command.

e. The OZNa Partisan Division Command (Oponomocstvo) was headed by the OZNa Divisional Commander (Divizijski Opunomocenik), and it contained his Assistant, as well as several OZNa Officers. The Commander was a member of the Division KPJ Political Bureau and was responsible to the Chief of the Corps OZNa unit.

f. OZNa Headquarters in the Partisan Corps functioned in the same manner as in lower echelons and the OZNa Commander was responsible to the head (Nacelnik) of the Federal OZNa Detachment.

33. OZNa Officials assigned to military units were authorized to develop their activities without interference on the part of the Partisan Commanders. An OZNa section did not exist in any of the KNOJ groupings, due to the fact that the formations were composed exclusively of selected Party members and hence it was not considered necessary to control their actions and contacts. The rank of the OZNa Commanders was always one grade lower than that of the Political Commissar for the same unit. The Company OZNa Officer was a Second Lieutenant, the Battalion Intelligence Officer was a First Lieutenant, the Brigade OZNa Commander was a Captain, the Division OZNa head was a Major and the Corps OZNa official was a Lieutenant Colonel.

34. The OZNa units in the Partisan formations maintained close contact with the civilian intelligence groups functioning in the same area and as a rule the only difference between the modus operandi of the Military and Civilian OZNa lay in the difference in the fields of operation. The Military OZNa Detachments concentrated on military espionage and counter-espionage, while the civilian counterpart was interested mainly in gathering information of a political and economic nature. It is pointed out that both OZNa groups were instructed to obtain all information available pertaining to foreign espionage operations in JUGOSLAVIA.

35. Special emphasis was placed upon the development of an efficient OZNa organization in Rear Command areas of the Yugoslav Partisan Army. In each operational zone of a Partisan Corps, the Rear Command was divided into Provincial and Rural District Units and these were identified as a section of the garrison formations of the Partisan troops deployed

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in that area. City Commands and Mobilization Centers were dependent upon the Rear Commands and the latter Headquarters were also in charge of the military programs conducted in the basic training battalions (Pripremní Bataljoni) for recently mobilized troops. In all sections of the Corps Rear Command, including the basic training battalions, OZNa officials operated either overtly or with the use of a cover position. If OZNa activities were openly identified as such, Intelligence Commanders (Opunomocnik) were assigned to larger Partisan units and an OZNa Officer carried out the intelligence commitments in smaller fighting units. In localities where OZNa operated on a clandestine basis, the City Commander's assistant and the Chiefs of the Personnel Section of the Rear or City Commands were normally OZNa agents and were responsible for the completion of their given intelligence mission in addition to their regular duties.

36. Since all potential recruits for the Partisan Army were obliged to be processed through Rear Command screenings, it became obvious that OZNa units in these Commands should be capable of conducting an effective and thorough background investigation of each soldier. On the basis of OZNa recommendations, the Rear Command compiled a personal file for each Partisan, and it was a known fact that troops with derogatory or questionable backgrounds were assigned to critical combat areas where chance of survival was low.

37. In Partisan formations operating in occupied territory (prior to 1943 only this type of resistance activity existed), OZNa was organized as a covert movement with a Command (Opunomocstvo OZNe) contained in each Partisan Detachment (Odred). For the average Communist soldier, this unit was merely a section of the local Partisan Headquarters with obscure functions, but the Command maintained a net of informants in every battalion and company. Since these OZNa officials were in a position to have daily contact with the enemy, their reports were of especial importance to the rear areas, inasmuch as they contained information pertaining to German and Quisling units, as well as an account of any liquidation activities undertaken.

#### OZNA UNITS IN LIBERATED AREAS

38. OZNa units operating in liberated areas during the war contained the largest number of active agents and was considered to be the backbone of the intelligence organization. It was not believed necessary to conceal the location of the different OZNa offices, nor was the identity of the personnel employed therein regarded as a secret. These individuals were for the most part former members of the dissolved Intelligence Centers or else old Party members who had held important positions in the Communist hierarchy prior to the war.

39. Party and OZNa organizations in the liberated territory were closely associated at all times. The head (Nacelnik) of the Federal

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OZNa Department was an automatic member of the Central (or Regional) KPJ Committee and the chief (Opunomocenik) of the Provincial OZNa Command (which was dependent on the Regional OZNa Department) was required to be an adherent of the Provincial Committee of the KPJ. Rural District OZNa Commanders were at the same time members of the Rural District Committee and District OZNa chiefs were members of the corresponding (District) Party committee. Commune OZNa commands were few in number, but whenever they existed, the Chief was a member of the KPJ Commune Committee.

40. In addition to these public OZNa officials, a cadre of intelligence officers engaged in other fields of activity also supplied Communist authorities with detailed information relative to situations and personalities in their particular field. In this manner, the various National Committees, the Liberation Front and other mass organizations were successfully penetrated and controlled by the Party's intelligence net. In compliance with strict security directives, the identity of informants in different organizations, institutions and societies were at no time to be disclosed to anyone not directly connected with the individuals involved.

#### OZNA UNITS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

41. Owing to the nature of their mission, OZNa representatives assigned to occupied areas were required to maintain absolute secrecy as to their existence and purpose. Partisans and normal Party members were unaware that another Intelligence network was functioning in addition to the unit contained in the Partisan Detachments (see above) and that this service was operating in accordance with directives similar to those governing OZNa procedures in the liberated areas. OZNa units in occupied territories did not fall under a centralized command but were dependent upon orders received from the intelligence detachments located in Communist controlled territory. The organizational structure of these two groups was essentially the same, with the exception that OZNa in occupied territory was forced to operate with a maximum amount of security precautions. However, once the area became liberated, the covert organ was automatically transformed into a full-fledged intelligence machine, endowed with the identical functions, rights and power as other OZNa units in freed zones. Civilian OZNa detachments deployed in occupied territory maintained contact with adjacent military commanders and the latter individuals were supplied with military intelligence material designed to facilitate their operations. Other information obtained of a political, economic, counter espionage, etc., nature, was forwarded to the higher OZNa Headquarters located in the Liberated territory.

#### THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF OZNA

42. In liberated areas, the OZNa executive organ was the KNOJ troops. In order to ascertain that these soldiers were completely efficient and that operations were carried out in strict compliance with

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instructions received from the Intelligence agents, the control of KNOJ was also centralized. The KNOJ Corps Headquarters, which was ostensibly under the command of the Yugoslav Army General Staff (to preclude public identification with OZNa), was actually dependent upon the Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA. This Corps Headquarters had six KNOJ Divisions at its disposal (one for each of the Federal Republics) and these Division Commands were always located in the same area as the Federal OZNa Headquarters. Whereas de jure their activities were governed by the KNOJ Corps Command, de facto they were at the complete disposition of the local Federal OZNa Office.

43. KNOJ Divisions contained as many Brigades as there were Provinces (or Regions as in Serbia and Croatia) in the Federal Republic to which they were assigned. These Brigades were automatically deployed in the same area where Provincial OZNa Commands were located and it was understood that they would be used only by the Provincial (or Regional) OZNa Headquarters. Brigade strength depended upon the number of Rural Districts in the Province (or Region) and the number of Battalions contained in a KNOJ Division was equal to the number of Rural Districts in the specific Province (or Region). Battalion strength corresponded with the number of Districts in the Rural District, and Battalion Headquarters were situated in the same locality as the District OZNa Offices. In certain cases when the OZNa District Command was further divided into Commune Offices, KNOJ Platoons were placed at the disposition of these intelligence sections.

#### ORGANIZATION OF KNOJ

44. A fundamental difference between the organization of the Yugoslav Army and that of KNOJ was the elimination of the political section from the latter group. Party and military sections were developed in a normal manner, but since all KNOJ soldiers were either KPJ or SKOJ members or candidates, political indoctrination courses designed to inculcate ordinary troops with Communist sentiments were superfluous in this case. Another basic contrast between the two military formations was that in KNOJ, the Commanding Officer of any unit had a greater importance than his Political Commissar as the former was in charge of executing orders calling for liquidations, arrests, searches, etc., while the latter was only responsible for supervising the Party education of the troops. Consequently, Party authorities invariably selected a more reliable Communist to command a KNOJ outfit than to serve as a political commissar, although in regular Partisan formations the opposite procedure was generally in effect.

45. Party authorities paid detailed attention to the background of KNOJ soldiers and they normally attempted to obtain workers or poor farmers for the organization. In cases when it was impossible to fill the unit quota with individuals of this type, it was necessary to accept Party members of a higher financial level who had been thoroughly screened to ascertain that they would have no scruples in persecuting the class

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of which they had once been members. KNOJ members were not mobilized by the State, but were theoretical volunteers. However, in many cases they were ordered by Party officials to enlist in KNOJ.

FUNCTIONS OF KNOJ

46. KNOJ units were responsible for the implementation of the following orders:

- a. To perform all arrests which OZNa officials are not in a position to make.
- b. To annihilate all enemy military units located in Partisan territory. This included the Chetnik units in the mountains and Ustasha.
- c. To protect OZNa Headquarters locations (OZNa Commands are guarded exclusively by KNOJ troops) and give security coverage to OZNa personnel whenever instructed to do so.
- d. To protect the more important Government offices (Ministries, Party Committees, etc.) and to render security coverage to leading governmental personalities.
- e. To give security coverage to all public gatherings of a political nature when ordered to do so by OZNa officials and to disperse political meetings which are not being conducted in accordance with Party policies.
- f. To serve as couriers for OZNa, or in exceptionally important cases when an OZNa Officer acts as courier, to accompany him in the capacity of guard.
- g. To act as couriers plying between KPJ Committees.
- h. To act as guards of Yugoslav Embassies in foreign countries.
- i. To be prepared to follow all instructions issued by OZNa at any time or in any place.

ORGANIZATION OF TROJKAS

47. OZNa's executive organ in occupied territories were known as "Trojka's" and those "Trojka's" which were used as an organ of the Intelligence Trojka (see above) were attached to OZNa after the Intelligence Centers were dissolved. Trojka members were obliged to belong to the KPJ or SKOJ or be KPJ candidates, however, in practice a large majority of these individuals were drawn from the ranks of SKOJ. A Trojka was always composed of the leader (Vodza) and two additional members, and in

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order to avoid the unit's being compromised, Trojka members were excluded from regular Party activities. Each Trojka was a self-contained SKOJ (or, in some cases, KPJ) cell and the leader also acted as the Party Political Secretary. To accomplish his duties, he was required to maintain contact with the Desetnik for the purpose of receiving orders and directives for future activities. The Desetnik were OZNa officers or informants operating in occupied territory and were responsible for the controlling of ten Trojkas. These individuals were prohibited from participating in any overt acts sponsored by the Trojkas as a safeguard for their identity and they in turn were responsible to the OZNa official in charge of all Trojkas in his area of jurisdiction. In addition to these functions, the Desetnik was the Party superior of the Trojka leader.

#### FUNCTIONS OF THE TROJKAS

48. Trojkas did not participate in Partisan inspired activities conducted against the occupying forces or, for that matter, in any of the terroristic movements sponsored by the Party in general. Petorka units were used for this purpose and the Trojkas were concerned only with the fulfilling of the strong-arm requirements of OZNa. Instructions from the Intelligence unit included:

- a. The abduction of important enemy espionage agents from occupied areas and their delivery to proper authorities in the liberated territory.
- b. The liquidation of dangerous (anti-Communist) elements.
- c. The liquidation of Party members who failed to comply with the Communist directives.
- d. The liquidation of any individual who was in a position to compromise the Partisan movement, such as deserters, escaped prisoners, etc.
- e. Special duties designed to protect Party leaders whenever they journeyed to the occupied territory.
- f. Other functions directed by OZNa whenever an unusual occasion required immediate attention.

#### OZNA ACTIVITIES ABROAD

49. Owing to the fact that several OZNa officials were given a civilian status and assigned to various military missions or other Partisan units operating outside of JUGOSLAVIA, and since many trusted Party members who returned from abroad were immediately taken into the ranks of OZNa, Source believed that Partisan intelligence units were functioning in foreign territory, at least as early as the Summer of 1944.

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This supposition was strengthened by various comments ~~including the statement that foreign OZNa operated~~ including the statement that foreign OZNa operated under the guise of Legal Sections attached to various Partisan missions, thus avoiding the suspicion of the Allies and of the general population. In ITALY, for example, the Legal Section of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Bari served as a Yugoslav foreign espionage center during the war, although to all outward appearances this Office was in no way connected with intelligence activities.

REORGANIZATION OF OZNA (MAY TO DECEMBER 1945)

50. Since one of the principal characteristics of any OZNa unit was its ability to adapt itself to conditions existing in a specific locality, each detachment did not function in an identical manner. This situation was especially noticeable during the war, at which time the intelligence agency was in a constant state of evolution and development. The greatest reorganizational improvements occurred in May 1945 and provisions were made to contend with the following problems:

a. Actual combat against German and Quisling troops was terminated and as a result of the cessation of hostilities, the Partisan Army lost a great deal of its political importance. Communist leaders could no longer use the achievements of the military organization to popularize the Party program, yet they were nevertheless forced to prepare a definite campaign to ensure complete victory at the national elections. Consequently, OZNa units operating within the Army were depopulated and most of the Military OZNa Officers were transferred to Civilian (Federal Departments) intelligence units.

b. When the Communist controlled government of JUGOSLAVIA became recognized abroad as a sovereign state, many OZNa agents were placed on a diplomatic status and sent to countries where Yugoslav foreign service representatives were honored. Special interest was given to the organization of an intelligence network designed to operate within each of the diplomatic missions and appropriate cover functions were assigned to OZNa Officers so engaged.

c. State administrative offices had to be organized and all public officials whose loyalty to the Communist cause was in any way doubted were removed from office. OZNa officials were in charge of supervising purges of this nature and, owing to the original instability of the Government, most of this work had to be expedited.

d. Organization of governmental offices for the Federal Republics was a main problem of the Party, since these bureaus had heretofore been non-existent. All personnel employed therein had to be selected and screened by OZNa.

e. The Party no longer encountered difficulties in maintaining

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contact with all areas of JUGOSLAVIA and OZNa was therefore in a position to centralize completely its Command. In so doing, various problems arose and had to be solved.

f. Since the Narodna Zastita (National Militia) was created after the final liberation, OZNa authorities were able to devote themselves entirely to political activity and were no longer obliged to undertake additional assignments as was necessary prior to the consolidation of the State power.

#### CHANGES IN OZNA UNITS IN THE JUGOSLAV ARMY

51. OZNa Detachments operating in the Yugoslav Army after May 1945 were reorganized for the purpose of contending with the following considerations:

a. As a result of the development of Partisan formations into regular Yugoslav Army units, Corps Headquarters was reorganized to include six Armies and consequently the Corps OZNa Command, which had previously been the highest military intelligence office, ceased to exist. These groups were combined into Army OZNa bureaus and were no longer dependent upon the Federal OZNa Detachments operating in the various Republics (Odeljenje) as had been the case. Instead, they were the formal responsibility of the OZNa Section of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, and in practice they were controlled directly by Central OZNa Headquarters for JUGOSLAVIA.

b. OZNa Officers or Commanders were no longer attached to Companies and Battalions of the Yugoslav Army and these units henceforth contained only informers (Obavestajci) of the intelligence officials. Nets of this type normally contained a main informer (Glavni Obavestajac) and several sub-sources. These principal informants were drawn from the Party cell in the Company or Battalion, and Company contacts were not responsible to Battalion authorities, but submitted reports directly to the Brigade OZNa Officer.

c. Brigades were the lowest Army units to contain an OZNa Officer under the military reorganization program and the principal duties of this individual were to develop, direct and control OZNa informants in the companies at his disposition. The Brigade Intelligence Officer was a member of the KPJ Brigade Committee and was responsible to Division OZNa authorities for the proper execution of his assigned tasks.

d. Division OZNa Headquarters was composed of several types of intelligence specialists and it contained a Commander (Opunomoćenik) in addition to two or three OZNa officers. The OZNa Commander was a member of the Division Staff and of the Division KPJ Bureau, and was responsible to Army OZNa authorities.

e. The Army OZNa unit comprised the Chief (Nacelnik), his

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assistant (Pomoćnik Nacelnika) and several OZNa Officers. While in the Division, the OZNa unit was known as a Command (Opunomoćstvo); in an Army, it was classified as a Department (Odeljenje) and the Chief of this Department is always a member of the Army General Staff and of the Army KPJ Political Bureau. In addition to these functions, OZNa Army Chiefs are occasionally placed in charge of an Army Intelligence Department (Obavestajno Odeljenje); however, this situation occurs infrequently. The OZNa Department is responsible for supervising the operations of intelligence units in Army and Division Rear Commands as well as in other military or semi-military institutions which are controlled by the Army, such as training schools, airport installations, etc.

f. The OZNa Department in the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army is composed of the Chief, his assistant and a large number of OZNa Officers. This Department controls all OZNa organizations in the Yugoslav Army, Navy and Air Force, and is directly responsible to the Central OZNa for JUGOSLAVIA.

g. OZNa files exist only in Divisions and higher Army echelons. Lower units render only verbal reports to their superior organizations.

h. Unit Commanders did not control the activities of the OZNa Officers and OZNa was not established in KNOJ outfits.

i. As a normal rule, the OZNa Officer in a Brigade held the rank of Captain, the OZNa authority in a Division was a Major, and a Lieutenant Colonel was head of the OZNa Department in the Army. This tendency was not true in every case, however, and it is known that several Majors have commanded OZNa Departments on an Army level.

j. Since 1945, Military and Civilian OZNa units have developed in a definitely contrasting manner. This development is due not only to the respective difference in the fields of activities, but the internal structure of the two groups also fails to follow a conforming pattern. However, a direct exchange of information is functioning at all times between the two organizations and the maintenance of close liaison is considered to be a necessity.

ky. Rear Commands ceased to be responsible for the education of newly mobilized soldiers, and hence OZNa units in these areas lost much of their previous importance. City Commands were abolished and basic training Battalions were dissolved, consequently many of the OZNa commitments were eliminated.

l. Partisan Detachments were disbanded after the war and, as a result, OZNa units attached to these groups were also assimilated by other organizations.

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CHANGES IN OZNA IN THE LIBERATED TERRITORY

52. After the cessation of hostilities, OZNa in JUGOSLAVIA existed only in Liberated areas and this organization became known as the Civilian OZNa. In order to cope successfully with the existing situation, it was reorganized according to the following channels of responsibility:

a. Provincial OZNa Commands, with the exception of those in Kosovo-Metohija (Federal Republic of Serbia) and Dalmatia (Federal Republic of Croatia) were abolished.

b. Commune OZNa Commands (Opunomocstva) were established throughout JUGOSLAVIA and in larger cities, a City OZNa unit was founded to operate in conjunction with the Rural District OZNa detachment already covering the area in question.

c. Owing to the ease with which liaison could be effected, it was possible to centralize all channels of OZNa control. Whereas in 1944, OZNa units were forced to rely on the Party Committee to which they were attached for advice or instructions on any contemplated action, in 1945 OZNa became completely independent of any KPJ Committee. During the latter year, Communist leaders announced that OZNa and Party units on any level would collaborate in any matters of mutual interest, but that neither organ would direct the activities of the other. Only on the highest plane does the Party (Central Committee of the FLRJ) officially control OZNa operations, but it is pointed out that since all OZNa Commanders are simultaneously members of a corresponding KPJ Committee, coordination of Party and OZNa interests is practically inevitable.

d. In 1945, Civilian OZNa Detachments were increased by the inclusion of many Military OZNa personnel into their ranks and, at the same time, Party members with reliable backgrounds were mobilized into this service.

CHANGES IN THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF OZNA

53. The Executive Organ of OZNa continued to be the KNOJ troops, and since the Provinces and Regions were abolished, KNOJ Brigades were assigned to each Rural District. KNOJ Companies were normally located in each District, although Battalion Headquarters occasionally operated from the larger of these territorial divisions. The organization and functions of KNOJ remained the same as in 1944 (see above), and since all territory was liberated, Trojkas, the executive organ of OZNa in occupied areas, was consequently abolished.

OZNA ACTIVITIES ABROAD AFTER MAY 1945

54. OZNa activities abroad were organized in various manners after the cessation of hostilities; however, in general it may be said that the

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composition and functions were in no way as minutely controlled as corresponding assignments in JUGOSLAVIA. The units were normally obliged to operate in accordance with conditions existing in each foreign state, and hence no definite plan could be formulated to govern all possible circumstances. It may be said, however, that additional emphasis was placed on espionage operations abroad, and as a rule Commissions for the Identification of War Criminals were composed of OZNa Officers. Yugoslav diplomatic representatives were also entrusted with the organization of OZNa activities and in every Yugoslav Legation, Consulate or Embassy, there existed at least one OZNa authority.

55. OZNa commissions abroad are not fundamentally endowed with executive organs and in case units of this type (Trojkas) are needed, they are organized in JUGOSLAVIA and dispatched to the requesting authority in the foreign country. Foreign OZNa organization is based on the individual system of work which is taken from the Party theory. This means that a reliable OZNa authority, operating abroad, is permitted to maintain contact with a large number of informants without being required to organize these individuals into groups or cells. In this manner, he is forced to maintain strict control of his informants and he must not reveal the identity of any of them to any other person. This method of operation is acknowledged to be the most conspirative system inherent in the Communist Party.

56. Additional information pertaining to this subject is in the process of compilation and will be submitted through normal channels in the near future.


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Special Agent CIC

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Chief CIC TRUST

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HEADQUARTERS  
970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

D-10643

APD 757  
2 April 1948

SUBJECT: Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti

TO : Commanding Officer  
CIC Region IV  
APO 407-A, US Army

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 4 of letter, your headquarters, subject: UIB - Udrusenje Drzavne Bezbednosti, requesting this headquarters to place an evaluation on the information contained in the report forwarded by referenced letter.

2. Further reference is made to the Department of the Army report inclosed by letter, this headquarters, subject and file as above, dated 10 February 1948. The Department of the Army report was unevaluated; however, it is believed that the information contained in the report is reliable.

3. Higher headquarters has been requested to place an evaluation upon the information submitted in your report referred to above.

4. This headquarters has no information confirming the allegation that the UIB and OZNA are two separate and distinct organizations. All information on subject at this headquarters indicates that UIB replaced OZNA.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL ERSKINE:

EARL S. BROWNING, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
S-3

Telephone: FRANKFURT 6202  
Lt. [REDACTED]

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D-10643

Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti

2 April 1948

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1 Hqs R & A 2 April  
970th Branch 1948  
CIC  
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1. Attached hereto is NOIC, CIC Region IV, dated 27 February 1948, subject: The Yugoslav Political Police, UDB - "Udrusenje Drzavne Bezbednosti".

2. Particular attention is invited to Paragraph 2 of inclosure wherein it is alleged that UDB and OZNA are two separate and distinct organizations.

3. It would be appreciated if your headquarters could furnish an evaluation of the information contained in this report.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl: a/s

SCF/bjj/6202

Copy 3 of 3

GEORGE E. FOXMAN  
Lt. Colonel Inf  
Deputy Commander

Classification <del>Controlled</del> (or changed) to	
<del>Secret</del>	By Authority of <u>SCF</u>
<u>Pl. Torrey</u>	<u>Hubert N. Amode</u>
Date <u>20-5-52</u>	Capt. Inf.

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV  
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

RMP/rws

APO 407-A

12 February 1948

IV-3042

SUBJECT: Conditions Inside Yugoslavia

TO : Commanding Officer,  
970th CIC Detachment,  
Headquarters EUCOM,  
APO 757, US Army

1. Reference is made to an MOIC, this headquarters, subject: UDBA (Udruzanja Drzavne Bezvednosti), file 4477, dated 5 February 1948, in which an article published in the Yugoslavian newspaper "SLOGA," 25 January 1948, written by a Dr Lazar RASOVICH, regarding the UDBA and/or OZNA is discussed.

2. P-0017-IV-HQ was assigned to contact Dr RASOVICH and to obtain any and all information which he might be able to give regarding the status of affairs in Yugoslavia.

3. Herewith is submitted an MOIC, subject: Dr Lazar RASOVICH, file 3042, dated 10 February 1948.

4. Inasmuch as little is known about Dr RASOVICH and no confirmation of the information given by him is available, the evaluation of F-6 is approved as given by the reporting agent.

*Ellington D. Golden*  
ELLINGTON D. GOLDEN  
Lt Col AC  
Commanding

Munich Mil 2995 - 2996

1 Incl: MOIC, file and subj as above,  
dtd 10 Feb 48 (tripl)

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV  
970TH CIC DETACHMENT

IV-3042

APO 407-a  
10 February 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Dr. Lazar RASOVICH.

RE : Positive Intelligence from Yugoslavia.

1. Reference is made to MOIC, dated 5 February 1948, Subject: UDDBA - "Udruzenje Drzavna Bezbednosti", former OZNA, Re: Personalities, signed by this Agent.

2. As previously reported, P-0017-IV-Hq. was assigned to contact Dr. Lazar RASOVICH. On 7 February 1948, P-0017-IV-Hq. interviewed Dr. RASOVICH, and the following information is forwarded.

a. Background:

Dr. Lazar RASOVICH is a lawyer from SREMSKA MITROVICA, Yugoslavia, born on 24 June 1888 in MOMC, district of Montenegro, Yugoslavia. A graduate of the BELGRAD university, faculty of law. Doctor's degree obtained at the university of ZAGREB (Croatia), Yugoslavia. As a student he wrote articles for "Srbo Bran", "Obzor", and "Pokret", all of them leading Serbian newspapers. From 1919 to 1928 leading editor of the Serbian newspaper "Srbija". He was a member of the national radical party (Narodna Radikalna Strana), a royalist political party. In 1932 Dr. RASOVICH opened a law practice in SREMSKA MITROVICA. At the beginning of the German-Yugoslav war he was arrested by the Croatian Ustashis and held in captivity in the concentration camp KOPRIVNICA in Croatia. He escaped from the Croatian camp and lived in hiding in German-occupied Serbia. Between 1915 and 1940 he wrote four (4) books on Yugoslav politics. According to his own statement made to P-0017-IV-Hq., he escaped from Yugoslavia on 1 October 1947, after he was warned by his friends that he be arrested by OZNA for being a known Serbian nationalist. He went to Italy, and on 28 December 1947 with a German transport came to Germany. His present address is MUNICH, Luitpold-Kaserne, barrack #6, room #120. Dr. RASOVICH is presently writing for the Yugoslav newspapers "Sloga" and "Zivot i Rad", both legally printed in the American Zone of Germany. Furthermore he is presently engaged in the writing of a nationalistic Yugoslav pamphlet "Tragedija Jugoslavije" (The tragedy of Yugoslavia).

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

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b. The present situation in Yugoslavia:

According to Dr. RASOVICH the Yugoslav central government is absolutely in Communist hands. The actual boss of Yugoslavia is the Soviet Union, which is controlling the administration through her embassy in BELGRAD. The present Yugoslav administration is directed by the central government in BELGRAD, headed by Marshall TITO. Yugoslavia administratively is divided into the republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzogewina, Montenegro and Macedonia. In addition to these national republics are two autonomous districts, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The prime minister for the national republic of Serbia is Dr. [REDACTED]. His closest co-workers are [REDACTED] the minister of education, [REDACTED] the minister of agriculture, [REDACTED] the minister of finance, and [REDACTED] (nick-name "Tempo"), the minister of interior and the chief of UDBA for Serbia. The prime minister for the national republic of Bosnia and Herzogewina is [REDACTED]. His closest co-workers are [REDACTED], the minister of interior and chief of UDBA for Bosnia and Herzogewina (according to Dr. RASOVICH, [REDACTED] is an illiterate), and [REDACTED] the minister of transportation. The prime minister for the national Croatia republic is Dr. [REDACTED]. His closest co-worker is [REDACTED], the president of the Croatian House of Representatives. The prime minister for the national republic of Slovenia is [REDACTED]. His closest co-workers are [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], both leading Communist politicians in Slovenia. The national republic of Montenegro is administrated by [REDACTED], the representative of Montenegro in the central government in BELGRAD. (According to Dr. RASOVICH, [REDACTED] is a personal friend of STALIN). His closest co-worker is [REDACTED], the prime minister of the national republic of Montenegro. The leading political figure and prime minister of Macedonia is [REDACTED].

c. The Yugoslav Army:

According to Dr. RASOVICH, the Yugoslav army has approximately four-hundred-thousand (400000) men. The whole army is divided in general into the Southern army with headquarters in SKOPLJE, OHRID, and STRUMICA, and the Northern army with headquarters in ZAGREB, LJUBLJANA, and KARLOVAC. The Southern army geographically is covering the areas towards Greece, the Northern army the areas towards TRIEST and Austria. The Yugoslav army is armed with weapons of Russian origine. According to Dr. RASOVICH the soldiers are poorly dressed and badly fed. Most of the soldiers are young peasants, and their attitude is anti-Communistic. Each company has a political commissar, whose responsibilities are the political education and the political security. The most known generals in Yugoslavia are Col. General [REDACTED] (an ex-NCO of the Yugoslav Royal Army), Col. General [REDACTED], and Col. General [REDACTED] (a former law student).

d. UDBA:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) The UDBA (Udruzenje Drzavna Bezbednosti) is the political police in Yugoslavia. UDBA is a division of the ministry of interior and is headed by [REDACTED], the minister of interior of the central government in BELGRAD. His closest co-workers are Major General [REDACTED] (an ex-NCO in the Yugoslav Royal Navy), Major [REDACTED], Major General [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. The central office of the UDBA is in BELGRA but each national republic has a UDBA Headquarters in their own capital. UDBA field-offices are located in all major Yugoslav cities. According to Dr. RASOVICH the UDBA is controlling a large informant net, and UDBA informants can be found even in the smallest villages. Furthermore UDBA is charged with the security of military installations, and a detachment is assigned to each army division. The UDBA detachments with the army maintained the old name OZNA.

e. Morale of the Yugoslav Population:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) According to Dr. RASOVICH, the general attitude in Yugoslavia is anti-Communist. The political morale is very low. People are afraid to talk and have set their hope in a coming war between the East and West. The greatest part of the population sympathizes with the Western democracies.

f. Underground Organizations:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) In Serbia, Bosnia, Herzogewina and Montenegro the remains of the Tschetnik armies of General [REDACTED] are fighting in the mountains against the TITO regime. The Tschetniks are attacking villages and are killing Communist leaders. According to Dr. RASOVICH, in October 1947 an armed Tschetnik group escaped from Yugoslavia to Italy, and Dr. RASOVICH was told by the commanding officer of this unit, one [REDACTED] that his group in the year of 1947 hanged seven (7) OZNA informants. In Croatia and Slovenia the organization "KRIZARI", the remains of the Croatian Ustasis, are also fighting against the TITO regime.

g. Recruiting of Volunteers for Greece:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) These so-called "volunteers" are recruited by the Communist party of Yugoslavia. There were rumors in Yugoslavia that these units are organized and under the command of the generals [REDACTED] and Kosta NADJ. There were talks that General NADJ was wounded at his right arm when fighting in Greece.

3. AGENT'S COMMENTS:

According to P-0017-IV-Hq., Dr. RASOVICH is a reliable

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Yugoslav nationalist, but his knowledge on the present Yugoslav internal affairs is not too high. It is believed by this Agent, that Dr. RASOVICH told everything he knows.

b. P-0017-IV-Hq. stated, that Dr. RASOVICH has no knowledge about the activities of the KOMINFORM in BELGRAD, but referred to the KOMINFORM as "KOMINTERN"; furthermore that his knowledge on the internal set-up of the Communist party of Yugoslavia is very poor. When talking about the leading personalities in the Communist party of Yugoslavia, he always repeats the names of leading personalities of the UDBA as mentioned in this report.

c. This report is forwarded as a matter of interest mainly for research purposes.

Source: P-0017-IV-Hq.  
Sub-Source: Dr. Lazar RASOVICH

Evaluation: B-2  
F-6

APPROVED:

Special Agent, CIC  
External Case Officer

Special Agent, CIC

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (G)

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IV-3042 Dr Lazar RASOVICH dtd 10 Feb 48 (Contd)

INDEX OF PERSONALITIES AND IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS:

Dr Lazar RASOVICH

UDBA

KOPRIVNICA (Croatian Concentration Camp)

Luitpold Kaserne MUNICH

✓ Marshall TITO

✓ Dr [REDACTED]

✓ Dr [REDACTED]

✓ Col General [REDACTED]

✓ Col General [REDACTED]

✓ Major [REDACTED]

✓ Major General [REDACTED]

✓ Major General [REDACTED]

✓ General [REDACTED]

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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HEADQUARTERS  
970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

REC'D 16-2  
CPI 16-2  
EG  
EF  
ANSWERED 194  
FILE: 1550.1  
0/7 3532

D-10643

APD 757  
10 February 1948

SUBJECT: UDB - Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti / *Sch*

TO : All Regions

1. Inclosed herewith, in duplicate, is a report from the Department of the Army, subject: UDB - Organizations and Functions, undated.

2. Although there are references in the report to UNRRA, inst. of IRO, the report is a fairly recent publication. One copy of this report first arrived at this headquarters in September 1947. Permission was requested to allow reproduction of the report for distribution to CIC regions and sub-regions. Authorization has now been received from the Department of the Army for the reproduction and dissemination of a limited number of copies of this report, provided no dissemination is made below CIC regional headquarters. The Department of the Army stated that the nature of the report is such that distribution outside the continental limits of the United States must be greatly restricted.

3. It is desired that all operational personnel and agents assigned to the Yugoslav field become familiar with the inclosure.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL ERSKINE:

*Earl S. Browning Jr.*  
EARL S. BROWNING, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
S-3

1 Incl a/s

Lt REED/ehb/6202

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REGION V. 66.CIC Det  
*Elmer T. Neighars 1st Lt.*  
16 Jan 51

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page 1 of 1  
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PERSONALITIES:

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Same

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

- [REDACTED] Head of the political UDB NR
- Colonel [REDACTED] - Head of the criminal department of the political UDB NR
- Major [REDACTED] - Probably the chief of the Aliens Section of the political UDB. NR
- Lt. Col. [REDACTED] - Probably the chief of the local UDB for the city of Belgrade, attached to the Political UDB. NR
- Colonel [REDACTED] - Chief of the provincial UDB in SERBIA NR
- [REDACTED] Chief of the provincial UDB in CROATIA NR
- General [REDACTED] - Former chief of the provincial UDB in SLOVENIA NR
- General [REDACTED] - Present chief of the provincial UDB in SLOVENIA NR
- [REDACTED] - Chief of the provincial UDB in BOSNIA NR
- [REDACTED] - Chief of the provincial UDB in MONTENEGRO NR
- [REDACTED] - Chief of the provincial UDB in MACEDONIA NR
- General [REDACTED] - Formerly identified with the provincial UDB in VENEZIA GIULIA NR
- + Br. [REDACTED] - Reported to be the chief of the UDB in the ROME, ITALY area, officially a member of the Health Office of UNRRA. NR
- + Lt. Col. [REDACTED] - Reported to be a UDB chief in AUSTRIA NR
- Dr. [REDACTED] - Communist leader in AUSTRIA NR
- [REDACTED] - Communist leader in AUSTRIA NR
- + Major [REDACTED] - Reported to be a UDB chief in AUSTRIA NR
- + Major [REDACTED] - Reported to be a UDB chief in AUSTRIA NR
- + [REDACTED] - Reported to be a UDB chief in AUSTRIA NR
- [REDACTED] - Reported to be a UDB chief in AUSTRIA NR
- + Colonel [REDACTED] - Originally the head of the Yugoslav Military Mission in AUSTRIA NR
- + Lt. Col. [REDACTED] - Present head of the Yugoslav Military Mission in AUSTRIA NR
- + Colonel [REDACTED] - Head of the War Booty Commission (Front organization of UDB in AUSTRIA) NR
- [REDACTED] - Head of the Yugoslav Political Investigation Squad, AUSTRIA NR
- [REDACTED] - Head of Centroprom in AUSTRIA NR
- [REDACTED] - President and general secretary of the "Association des Yougoslaves en France" NR
- Colonel [REDACTED] - Reported to be a chief of UDB operations in France NR
- [REDACTED] - Reported to be a chief of UDB operations in France NR
- [REDACTED] - A UDB chief in PARIS NR
- [REDACTED] - A UDB chief in PARIS
- [REDACTED] - A UDB chief in PARIS

V-1550.1  
94 V-3534  
10 Feb 48

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PERSONALITIES

USC 552 (b) (7) (C) - [REDACTED] - Latest reports indicate that SUBJECT is the head of UDS in Switzerland. SUBJECT is also Counsellor of the Yugoslav legation, in Bern. NR

- [REDACTED] - First secretary of Yugoslav Legation in Switzerland and is also known as a UDB personality. NR

- [REDACTED] - Commercial Attache at Yugoslav Legation in Switzerland. SUBJECT is also the head of the technical Section of UDB. NR

- Capt. [REDACTED] - Yugoslav Military Attache in Switzerland and head of the Military Section of UDB. NR

- [REDACTED] - Reported to be UDB District chief of Bern, Switzerland. NR

+ [REDACTED] - Consul General at Yugoslav Consulate in Zurich. SUBJECT is also known as a UDB personality. NR

+ [REDACTED] - Reported to be UDB chief for Zurich and Basel. NR

+ [REDACTED] - Important Communist organizer and propagandist and UDB personality. SUBJECT is also Consul General in Geneva and has been reported to be one of the three regional chiefs for UDB Switzerland. NR

+ [REDACTED] - Reported to be UDB chief for Prague, CSR NR

USC 552 (b) (7) (C) - [REDACTED] - Yugoslav Military Attache in Prague, is said to be a dangerous UDB agent, alleged to procure Czech passports for UDB agents employed by the Komintern. NR

- [REDACTED] - Yugoslav minister to Portugal and believed to be UDB chief in Portugal. NR

- [REDACTED] - Attached to Yugoslav Mission in London, is reliabilityreliably reported to be the head of UDB in the UK. NR

+ [REDACTED] - Official Secretary of Yugoslav Embassy is stated to be political commissar in the embassy. NR

- [REDACTED] - Yugoslav Military Attache in Sofia, is UDB chief for Bulgaria. NR

- [REDACTED] - On the staff of the Yugoslav legation in Ankara is reported to be a special TITO agent, in charge of all Yugoslav agents in the Middle East. NR

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- [REDACTED] - Secretary at the Yugoslav Embassy in Brazil is reported to be UDB chief for South America. NR

USC 552 (b) (7) (C) - Dr. [REDACTED] - Listed as Counselor in the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington D.C., is in charge of UDB activities in USA and Canada. NR

- [REDACTED] - UDB personality connected with Dr. Slavko ZORE. NR

- [REDACTED] - UDB personality and Dr. ZORE's assistant for Canada. NR

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV  
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

FCS/rws

APO 407-A

10 February 1948

IV-4477

SUBJECT: UDBA "Udruzenje Drzavne Bezbednosti"

TO : Commanding Officer,  
970th CIC Detachment,  
Headquarters EUCOM,  
APO 757, US Army

1. Submitted herewith is an MOIC, subject and file as above, dated 5 February 1948, reporting that the OZNA has been changed to the UDBA.

2. The source of this information cannot be properly evaluated inasmuch as it was extracted from a Yugoslav newspaper published in MUNICH (M49/Y 85) and little is known about the author, Dr Lazar RASOVICH, other than that he is a recent arrival, allegedly from Yugoslavia. The source of the author's information was not disclosed.

3. Investigation of Dr Lazar RASOVICH will continue.

*Ellington D. Golden*  
ELLINGTON D. GOLDEN  
Lt Col AC  
Commanding

Munich Mil 2995 - 2996  
(Capt Pyle) *✓*

1 Incl: subj and file as above,  
dtd 5 Feb 48 (3 copies)

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV  
970TH CIC DETACHMENT

APO 407-a  
5 February 1948

TV - 4477

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE.

SUBJECT: UDBA - "Udruzenje Drzavne Bezbednosti",  
former OZNA.

RE : Personalities.

1. Upon orders received from S-3, Headquarters, Region IV, the following information re Subject is forwarded herewith.

2. On 4 February 1948 P-0017-IV-Hq. informed this Agent, that an article under the heading "Organizacija Titove OZNA-E" was printed in the 25 January 1948 edition of the Yugoslav newspaper "SLOGA".

a. The literal translation of said article is as follows:

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) "The Organization of TITO'S OZNA.

TITO'S OZNA changed its name to UDBA - "Udruzenje Drzavne Bezbednosti" (Organization of the State Security). The present chief of UDBA is the minister of interior [REDACTED] 34 years of age, a former tailor.

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) The chief of operations (Izvršna Centralna UDBA) is major general [REDACTED], a native of KOTOR, Yugoslavia, 32 years old, a former NCO in the Yugoslav Royal Navy and an active member of the pre-war Yugoslav Communist party. He joined the partisans in 1941, where he was a leading personality in TITO'S general staff together with [REDACTED].

5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) The chief of the political department of the UDBA is major [REDACTED] 30 years old. Last year he completed a NKVD course in MOSCOW. He is a native of Montenegro. He is known as a brutal interrogator, who personally tortures and mistreats political prisoners.

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5 USC 552 (b) (7) (C) The chief of the criminal department of UDBA is [REDACTED], a native of Montenegro, very intelligent.

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and a graduate of the BELGRAD university, faculty of law. He lectured at the PARIS university, the Sorbonne.

The main advisers of the UDBA are:

██████████ the president of the Slovenian State (Predsednik Pokrajinske Vlade u Sloveniji), who is highly trusted by ██████████ and is considered to be TITO's successor. It appears that he came into the UDBA upon a special request of ██████████, and his job is to control the activities of the members of the Communist party.

██████████, a colonel and the minister of transportation. A graduate of the BELGRAD university, faculty of theology. He was an officer in the international brigade during the Spanish civil war. For a short time he worked as a laborer in MARSEILLE. He is known to be an excellent organizer.

██████████, major general and ambassador to Bulgaria, 36 years old, a graduate of a business school in ZAGREB (Croatia), Yugoslavia. He is a fanatic Communist, has no relatives, no friends.

██████████, major general and political commissar with the second Yugoslav army in ZAGREB (Croatia), Yugoslavia. He finished two grades of grammar school and before the war has been a travelling salesman. A personal friend of TITO, a fanatic enemy of all churches and the clergy. He is responsible for the arrest of the Croatian archbishop ██████████.

██████████, political commissar for Slovenia and Italy, an organized pre-war Yugoslav Communist. Civilian occupation laborer. He is known to have been personally involved in many political assassinations.

The above mentioned personalities are the central figures of the present UDBA."

b. Investigation revealed that the article mentioned in paragraph 2 a of this report was written by one Dr. ██████████ a lawyer from BETSCHKEREK, Yugoslavia, who left Yugoslavia some time in October 1947 and through Italy arrived in Germany some time in November 1947. He presently lives some place in the vicinity of MUNICH.

### 3. AGENT'S COMMENTS:

a. "SLOGA" is an authorized Yugoslav newspaper in the

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American Zone. The responsible publisher is [REDACTED]  
The publishing office is located in MUNICH 38, Kemnatenstrasse  
#27, Tel. 360-734.

b. P-0017-Iv-Hq. was assigned to contact Dr. RASOVICH  
and to obtain from him all possible information on the present  
Yugoslav political, economic and military conditions as well as  
all possible information on Dr. RASOVICH'S background and present  
activities.

c. Upon receipt of further information a progress  
report will follow.

Source: [REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC

Evaluation: A-1

Sub-Source: Yugoslav Newspaper  
"SLOGA"

F-6

APPROVED: [REDACTED]

Special Agent, CIC  
External Case Officer

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC

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IV-4477 UDBA "Udruzenje Drzavne Bezbednosti", former  
OZNA dtd 10 Feb 48 (Contd)

Personality Index and Impersonal Index

UDBA (Udruzenje Drzavne Bezbednosti)

OZNA

SLOGA, a Yugoslav Newspaper

TITO (Marshall)

[REDACTED]

NKVD.

[REDACTED]

Dr. Lazar RASOVICH

[REDACTED]

8 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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CIC PIR  
SGR/r  
[Signature]

HEADQUARTERS  
970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

APC 757

2 February 1948

D-10643

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Intelligence

TO : Commanding Officer  
CIC Region IV  
APO 407-A, US Army

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

1. Reference is made to paragraph 5 of letter your headquarters, subject as above, file IV-4477, dated 27 December 1947, wherein a request was made for a Central Registry check on individuals listed in paragraph 2a of the MOIC forwarded.

2. A search of Central Registry revealed the following information on these individuals:

a. [Redacted] (D-169688), born [Redacted], occupation - barber and locksmith; address - MOSCOW, Hotel Sowjetakaja. [Redacted] was listed as a Soviet agent by RSHA IV-A-1. The information contained in the Wanted List on other individuals heretofore has been found reliable.

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

b. [Redacted] (D-195208), Form 350-PM, signed by [Redacted], Captain, GMP, Public Safety Officer, Military Government, Detachment E-213, MUNICH, issued 11 April 1947, states that [Redacted] was born [Redacted], single, a mechanic whose present residence is [Redacted]. [Redacted] was a French prisoner of war in GRENOBLE (A32/J62) France, and had no Kennkarte upon his arrival in MUNICH on 18 August 1947.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL INSKEEP:

EARL S. BROWNING, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
S-3

lt [Redacted]/rk/7400

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JAN 15 1948

1st Ind

Intelligence Division, General Staff, United States Army, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.,

TO: Commander-in-Chief, European Command, APO 757, c/o Postmaster, New York, New York

1. Reference letter was answered by 1st Indorsement, dated 20 October 1947, document number 6435-122 (copy inclosed). It was transmitted under courier number 8835.

2. Indorsement referred to in paragraph 1 above was receipted for by Capt. James M. Smith, Ass't Adjutant General, Headquarters, European Command, 27 October 1947.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

1 Incl  
As stated

*T. F. Morris*  
T. F. MORRIS  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Group

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By authority of the Director  
of Intelligence, WDGS

By *MB* Date *13 Jan '48*

319.1 (CID/CPS/CIS)

1st Ind

Intelligence Division, General Staff, United States Army, Department of the  
Army, Washington 25, D. C., 20 October 1947

TO: Commander-in-Chief, European Command, APO 757, c/o Postmaster, New  
York, New York

1. Authorization for the reproduction and dissemination of a limited  
number of copies of subject report is granted providing no dissemination is  
made below Counter Intelligence Corps Regional Headquarters.

2. It is realized that subject report would be of value to sub-regions,  
CIC, and it is regretted that further dissemination cannot be made. However,  
the nature of the report is such that distribution outside the continental  
United States must be greatly restricted.

3. Copy of subject report reclassified from SECRET CONTROL to TOP  
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FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

1 Incl  
As stated

R. F. ENNIS  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Group

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UDB-ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

UDB (Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti; Administration of State Security) is the new term for OZNA (Otsek Zastite Naroda; Section for Protection of the Nation). It is the intelligence and police system operating inside and outside the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The functions are to safeguard the present regime in Yugoslavia and to promote the spread of Communism at home and abroad. All important positions in UDB are filled by members of the Yugoslav Communist Party and in a few instances by members of the Soviet Intelligence Services with which the functions of UDB are closely correlated.

UDB appears to be one of the most aggressive intelligence systems not only in Yugoslavia, but in Central and Southeastern Europe. Its aggressiveness and probably also its efficiency are enhanced by the familiar proselytizing zeal inherent in Communist institutions and also by the unusual quality of its personnel. Politically, the Yugoslav Communists in UDB are internationalists lacking the qualification of expediency that has been observed among the more mature and cautious Russian Stalinists. They are predominantly young, brazen, unscrupulous, and quite capable people trained in the practical school of underground and guerrilla warfare. In less than three years, since the Tito regime was established, the UDB network of espionage, propaganda, and repression has grown to its present formidable size. It is considered that the type of its agents, the methods used, and its concentration in various trouble spots in Europe make the UDB more effective and more dangerous than the Soviet MGB and MVD.

OZNA, the predecessor of UDB, was organized in the summer of 1944 by Colonel LEBEDEV, Soviet Military Attache in Belgrade before World War II, out of GOC (Glavni Obavestajni Centar; General Information Center), originally set up in 1942 by the Partisan General Staff. The GOC was organized on a geographic basis with provincial sections POC (Provincial Information Center) and local MOG (Communal Information Center).

The present UDB, while retaining the former federative set-up or organization on the basis of component provinces, has grown into a complex national and provincial intelligence and police system with a variety of agencies at home and abroad working on a well-defined plan for communizing the country. Rigidity of UDB organization, its extension through all phases of governmental activities, and its ruthless methods have produced the country's most powerful institution. For all practical purposes, the UDB in Yugoslavia is the backbone of the Communist police state, while abroad it represents a network of zealous agents whose proselytizing motives are probably stronger than the search for intelligence.

The UDB, or former OZNA, has been referred to as the agency responsible to no one, excepting its chief, the 28-year old General [REDACTED] a former journeyman in a taylor shop specializing in Turkish male costumes. By placing a fervent young Communist in charge of every functional and geographic bureau of the political police system, [REDACTED] has been able to organize a system of bosses and gangs, all dependent upon him, and thus all fearing him, the most powerful man in the country. It is said that Tito himself has to yield to [REDACTED] in matters of repression, concentration camps, slave labor camps, and executions.

In theory, the UDB is a section of the Ministry of Interior which is headed by [REDACTED]. The responsibility of [REDACTED], at least nominally, is to the Council of Ministers headed by TITO. The Council of Ministers, however, is subservient to the Politbureau or to the "Forum of the Communist Party", the country's ruling committee of five: TITO, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. Although the formal line of responsibility thus makes [REDACTED] and his UDB subject to the rulings of the "Forum", his own membership in that cabal, and his preponderant influence

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and all powerful police system single out his authority over other high government officials. Moreover, the regimes' decrees for the Communization of the country enable the UDB to exercise control over every important ministry of the government. The Economic Branch of the UDB, for instance, is in direct control over the Ministries of Industry, Transportation, Commerce, Mines, Agriculture and Forestry, and Reconstruction. In addition, the UDB has a network of formal agencies as well as cells of secret agents to cover every office and shop in the government.

The Soviet MVD and MGB apparently maintain some form of supervision and control over UDB by their system of missions and agents. In addition to the regular Embassy, the Soviets continue to maintain in Yugoslavia a group of military and technical missions. The MVD and MGB technicians, supervisors, and instructors may be attached to any or all of these Soviet missions. Reports refer frequently to instructors and technicians attached to UDB, both in national offices as well as in the provinces. Some of these Soviet agents have been reported leaving the country, but recent information refers to Soviet liaison teams in various provinces. Their overall head is probably Major General [REDACTED] Soviet M/A in Belgrade since March 1947, who has possibly replaced General GUDUROV, reported serving in that capacity in December 1946.

In the direction of foreign activities, the UDB receives some guidance from the "Foreign Affairs Group" ([REDACTED]), who act in consultation for the "Forum of the Communist Party" on all important foreign matters.

B. BASIC ORGANIZATION

The Central Office of UDB in Belgrade comprises three major divisions: (1) Civilian, (2) Military, (3) Foreign or International. In addition, the Militia, an executive arm of the UDB, under direct control of General [REDACTED] maintains a national office in Belgrade, although its active participation in policing the country through rural gendarmerie and the city police makes its functions with the UDB felt primarily in local government below the county and district level. KNOJ (Korpus Narodne Obrane Jugoslavije; Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia), whose 9 divisions contain the elite troops in the service of the regime, likewise, serves as an executive arm of the UDB. The Headquarters of KNOJ are in Belgrade at 17 Brace Jugovica ulica, adjacent to the main UDB jail. Its CO is Major General [REDACTED], and its Political Commissar is [REDACTED]. Although under direct control of the Ministry of National Defense, KNOJ is employed locally by the UDB, much in the same way as the MGB in Russia uses MVD. Moreover, KNOJ, the armed force whose personnel has been carefully screened by the Communists, has been used as the recruiting source for UDB personnel. These recruits from KNOJ become agents and members of the "Troika" and "Desetorka" teams for espionage, sabotage, and other subversive work.

Another important basic factor in the structure of the UDB is in its relation to the Communist Party. As the national UDB is in service of the top-ranking Communist General [REDACTED] and the "Forum of the Communist Party", so is every local sub-division of the UDB at the disposal of the respective local secretary of the Communist Party. It may be said, therefore, that the UDB is the executive arm of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

An important reorganization of the UDB took place in the summer of 1946. It was at that time that the old name OZNA was discarded for the new one. Moreover, the functional reorganization of the main branches was established to run parallel with its geographic structure. Its strength, according to the new organization, was reported to be as follows: Civilian, 60,000; Economic, 8,000 (added to the Civilian group); Military 5,000; Foreign, 3,000; Militia, 45,000; Prosecutors, 1,200; total, 122,200. The total number of the Russian specialists, instructors, and supervisors throughout the country is reported to be 5,600.

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C. CIVILIAN UDB

The Civilian UDB is divided into three sections: (1) Political, sometimes called Central or National, whose directorate and functional organization center is located in Belgrade; (2) Federal, which maintains in Belgrade only a coordinating office for provincial emissaries and a provincial UDB office in the capital of every province; (3) the Economic UDB, called also the "Auxiliary UDB". The chief purpose of the Civilian UDB is in the maintenance and perpetuation of the existing regime. Although primarily a civilian establishment, its national and local leaders and bureau chiefs are almost invariably uniformed men, with ranks similar to those of the Army. Its main office is located at Obilicav Venac 2, and some of the offices are attached to the old "Glavajaca" jail, Belgrade. The chief of the Civilian UDB is a Montenegrin, General [REDACTED]

The Political UDB, organized on a national basis is headed by a Montenegrin, [REDACTED] while its Criminal Department is under another Montenegrin, Colonel [REDACTED]

The primary function of this internal political intelligence agency is surveillance of the activities of all underground political parties and personnel. Its Political Espionage Section maintains such bureaus as: Report, Information, and Agitation and Propaganda. The chief of the International Espionage Center, another section in UDB, is reported to be a Soviet MGB man.

The Aliens Section, located at King Peter Street, opposite the National Bank Building, supervises aliens in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavs associating with them. This H.Q. is used also as a jail for aliens. The chief is probably a Major [REDACTED]

The local UDB for the city of Belgrade, attached to the Political UDB, is probably under Lt. Col. [REDACTED], a Montenegrin. This branch is similar to local UDB in provincial cities, although it is not placed under the control of the Federal UDB to which all local units are responsible. Its main prison is in the barracks of the former Royal Guards, although six other jails of this local unit are reported in operation for the city of Belgrade alone, in addition to the well known concentration camp on Cigania Island on the Danube.

The Federal UDB represents the provincial structure within the framework of the national UDB. A small central office, reported to be headed by a Russian, is located in Belgrade. It maintains an emissary, responsible to General [REDACTED], for each of the six "People's Republics" and for Venezia Giulia. The central office coordinates the policies for the provinces and supervises their execution. The emissaries employ national agents whom they despatch to their respective provinces for coordination of such activities as: (1) political check on civilian and military personnel; (2) control of foreign missions within the country; (3) counter-espionage on national territory.

The functions of the provincial UDB are uniform in all provinces, with the exception of Macedonia and Venezia Giulia (Yugoslav occupied Zone B). Each provincial UDB is headed by the Minister of Interior of the respective province who, in turn, is responsible to the steering committee of the Communist Party of the province. Among the uniform sections in the provincial UDB, the following offices are reported:

1. Surveillance of armed units
2. Internal Counter-espionage
3. Political surveillance of civilians
4. Control of returned person (displaced personnel, prisoners of war, etc.)

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5. Internal espionage
6. Militia
7. Public prosecutors
8. Jails, prisons, and concentration camps

In Macedonia, the functions of the provincial UDB include also:

1. Control of NOF (Narodno Oslobodilni Odbor: National Liberation Committee)
2. Macedonian propaganda
3. Outfitting of guerilla bands for Greece (Skoplje and Monastir posts)
4. Teams and agents for Greece (Andarte and Yafka cells).

In Venezia Giulia, where the pattern of organization is analogous to that of Slovenia, the following functions are reported in addition to the normal ones:

1. Pro-Slav propaganda
2. Confiscation of Italian property
3. Repression of opposition
4. Formation of terrorist SI and sabotage teams ("Treikas", "Desetorkas"; teams of 3 and 10.)
5. Espionage against Allies.

In general, Venezia Giulia UDB, which is directed from UDB Slovenia rather than from Belgrade, is reported to be the most active of all UDB units in Yugoslavia. It has at its disposal the largest number of personnel and the largest financial subsidies. The organizations through which the UDB of Venezia Giulia operates are located in both zones A and B. The following political and economic organizations are listed as concentration centers for UDB personnel and activities in all of Venezia Giulia and particularly in Trieste:

1. UPCIS (Ufficio Politico Collegamento Italo-Slavo: Political Office of Italo-Slav Unity.) It originated with the intelligence section of the Garibaldi Division (Servizio segreto d'informazioni) during the war. It is an intelligence, counter-intelligence and propagandist body with branches particularly in Friuli.
2. FUAD (Fronte Unico Antifascista Democratico; Antifascist Democratic Front).
3. UISDA (Unione Italo-Slovena Donne Antifasciste: Union of Italo-Slovene anti-Fascist women). This organization is predominantly Slovene and serves in many instances as an auxiliary to the "People's Militia".
4. NARODNA MILICIJA (People's Militia). Recently reorganized to include only the most trusted members who are all subjected to a period of political indoctrination. This armed political police group receives all schooling in zone B, while its operations are in both zones. It contains regular members, reserve members, and action squads. One of its sections, called the Criminal Police, has a number of judges who are empowered to pass secret sentences. The People's Militia provides recruits for various political organizations and for UDB.
5. "CITTADINO BASE" is the Political office of the giulian Communist Party with the HQ in Trieste. Its functions are political and military espionage, and all of its activities are linked up with UDB.

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6. UIVOD (Uvozni-Izvozni Zavod: Import-Export Institute). An active commercial organization directed from Ljubljana with agencies in all important Giulian centers. It serves as a cover for many UDB agents.

7. CENTROPROM (Centralni Promet; Central Traffic). A similar economic and financial institution, directed from Ljubljana for operations in Trieste and Gorizia, also serving as a cover for UDB.

8. KUNI (Komisija za Upravljanje Narodne Imovine: Commission for Administration of State Properties). This is a war booty commission, reported to be used as cover for UDB agents.

9. JURIS. This is an organization of assault units and teams, reported to be directed by Russians and Yugoslavs. Its tasks are to perform terrorist acts and sabotage in accordance with the instructions from UDB. Members of "Juris" units are given numbers prefixed by the letter "K". Their Hqs in zones A and B are mobile.

The Economic UDB This branch of UDB, organized functionally on a national basis, works in many respects independently of the Civilian UDB and is responsible for its functions directly to General [REDACTED] or, in matters of effecting communization, to the Economic Council of Ministers which in turn is responsible to the Forum of the Communist Party. Its importance has grown with the advancement of communization of industries and collectivization of land, in the development of which the Economic UDB served as a most effective instrument. With the assumption of state control over all agencies of production and distribution, it has reached into all fields of economic and financial activity. The Economic UDB controls the production of industries; it fixes the prices of all products in accordance with the program of collectivization, and controls the material existence of the people. No ministry or public services can take action without its authorization, and all economic transactions within Yugoslavia are subject to its approval. Moreover, the Yugoslavs cannot travel abroad without the permission of this section.

The organization of this powerful branch of economic policing is even more centralized than that of the Political UDB. The chief of the Economic UDB is Lt. Col. [REDACTED].

The organization of the national office of the Economic UDB is illustrative of the centralizing forces of the new Yugoslavian system of government, despite its being a "Federation Republic", composed of six autonomous provinces. The Belgrade office is organized on a functional basis for the whole of the country, and the functional bureaus are in control of the economic life of the provinces. The following bureaus have been reported to be operating in the Economic UDB:

1. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
2. Institutions
3. Factories
4. Food supplies and storages
5. State national personnel
6. Retail prices of food and clothing
7. Banking.

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Each of the bureaus is run as a controlling agency on a national basis; but for carrying its policies into effect, it engages the local UDB as well as its central agents. Thus all banks, economic institutions, and factories are controlled and policed from Belgrade. All employees of the national government, regardless of their location in provinces, are policed through this nationwide apparatus which has its central and local agents and spies in every office.

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#### D. THE MILITARY UDB

The head of the Military branch of UDB, Major General [REDACTED] (alias: TEMPO), is a disciplinarian and able officer, though his Communist record and Partisan activities during the war make him an outstanding terrorist. His two assistants, Generals [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Brothers, are in regular Army command; but the three together constitute the UDB Council for the Army. They are all Montenegrin, all known as rabid Communists who distinguished themselves in World War II through their warfare against anti-Communists.

The UDB Council for the Army is responsible for the political and intelligence policies and Communist control of the Army. Because of its separate position, the Military UDB may be considered as the branch most independent of General [REDACTED], the overall chief of UDB. Its policy, however, conforms strictly with the general UDB policy; i.e. carrying on the process of control, communication, and elimination of opposition to the regime through the armed forces.

The Military UDB contains two main divisions: (1) the Special Internal UDB and (2) the Special Foreign UDB. In addition, there is a separate Naval UDB, whose activities parallel those of the Special Internal Military UDB.

The structural organization of the Special Internal Military UDB parallels the organization of the Yugoslav Army. The HQ of each of the six armies has a UDB specialist and an office. A corresponding UDB unit is attached to each military unit from battalion up, while companies and platoons, or other small units, have political commissars. The primary function of these offices and commissars is to control the political attitude of the rank and file. The UDB office attached to the army, corps, division, brigade, or regiment has the power to remove and liquidate any army personnel under suspicion. It has been reported that the provincial UDB office is in control of the Military UDB of the army or corps stationed in the province.

The functions of the Special Foreign Military UDB are similar to those performed by the military intelligence unit of a regular army. It conducts, in addition, political espionage and gathers intelligence on political refugees. It conducts a section for propaganda in such border provinces as Macedonia, Slovenia, and operates schools for sabotage and intelligence teams.

A special security police attached to Foreign Military UDB is the TVP (Titova Varna Policija: Tito's Security Police) which locates and identifies persons working against Tito, either in Yugoslavia or abroad. The TVP reports to the Foreign Military UDB, which may through its own tribunal, pronounce sentences and penalties.

The organization of teams and squads trained and equipped by the Special Foreign Military UDB is of interest. These have been reported both in Macedonia and Slovenia. The YAFKA cells in Macedonia are operated for subversive work and guerrilla instigation in Greece; the "Troikas" and "Desetorkas" are for Venezia Giulia and Friuli, directed from Zone B. The schools for both have been located at Pisino, Istria, and in communities north of Trieste. The "Troika", a team of 3, may be used for intelligence or sabotage work; the "Desetorka", a group of 10, is an operational squad for sabotage or commando type of operation. The agents, whether in teams or individually, include leaders, administrators, permanent agents, confidants, informers, investigators, and provocateurs.

#### E. LOCAL UDB

The local UDB is controlled by the provincial Ministry of Interior. The chiefs of the provincial UDB, or the Ministers of Interior, are identified by autonomous provinces, as follows:

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1. Serbia: Colonel [REDACTED]
2. Croatia: [REDACTED]
3. Slovenia: General [REDACTED] recently replaced General Ivan MACEK
4. Bosnia: [REDACTED]
5. Montenegro: [REDACTED]
6. Macedonia: [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]: chief now unknown; both General [REDACTED] and General [REDACTED] were formerly identified with this office.

The county or district UDB offices are responsible not as much to the provincial UDB as to the local CP secretaries and committees. City police or rural gendarmerie, combined at present into the National Militia, constitute the executive part of the county or district UDB. Where their aid in carrying out repressive, police, and intelligence or propaganda measures is insufficient, the local UDB obtains support from the KNOJ (Korpus Narodne Obrane: Corps of National Defense) which is employed for UDB Purposes on a local rather than a national basis.

A further local subdivision of the UDB is the commune. Every commune maintains a militia detachment in service of the UDB. The thoroughness of the nationwide UDB is in reality based upon this communal organization. The UDB office of every rural or municipal commune maintains an elaborate set of identification records of the population. These records, called the "Karakteristika", are a means of control and surveillance of the people's political orientation and activities; the records are used for purposes of intelligence and repression, and must be at the disposal of any of the variety of UDB agencies in the country.

The commune, however, is not the last and smallest UDB unit. For purposes of supervision and propaganda, the communal UDB maintains agents or teams in villages and in city precincts; agents or cells in factories, offices, and even schools and other institutions.

F. INTERNATIONAL (FOREIGN) UDB

In the recent reorganization of the UDB, the International (or Foreign) UDB apparently received more attention than any other branch. Its central office in Belgrade is responsible to General [REDACTED] as well as to the Foreign Affairs for the Forum of the Communist Party, the real government of Yugoslavia. The executive chief of the Foreign UDB is unknown to this office.

The main sections reported as separate bureaus in the central office of the International UDB in Belgrade are: (1) Political Intelligence, (2) Military Intelligence, (3) Counter-espionage, (4) Couriers, and (5) Special (Combat) Operations. In addition, a geographic subdivision of the central office in Belgrade maintains a special section with desks for individual foreign countries. At the present time, the strongest desks are reported to be Italian and Austrian; and the greatest concentration of UDB agents is reported to be in Italy. The main office of the International UDB maintains close liaison with the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet satellite diplomatic and military missions.

There are two main channels for despatching UDB agents to foreign countries: (1) the diplomatic representations, Red Cross, and economic and cultural missions; (2) Military, UNRRA, and other missions to countries which do not as yet maintain normal diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. The UDB agents and teams operating in the first group have, for the most part, diplomatic immunity, with privileges of pouch service, couriers, and code communication. In the second group, which includes representations in Bulgaria (although the country maintains normal diplomatic relations), Albania, Austria, and Zone A of Venezia Giulia, where the

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Yugoslavs maintain military missions, the UDB has been cooperating with armed detachments of the KNOJ and specially trained operational teams of intelligence and sabotage groups.

The functions of Foreign UDB are reported to be as follows:

1. Maintenance of contacts with revolutionary movements
2. Control and liquidation of anti-Communist emigrants or refugees from the regime
3. Preparation of unrest and assistance in liquidation of local opponents to revolutionary movements
4. Military espionage
5. Maintenance of underground channels with Yugoslavia
6. Control of diplomatic personnel assigned to foreign countries

In Albania and Bulgaria, the Foreign UDB, assisted by its KNOJ detachments, has been reported conducting searches and arrests for escaped Yugoslav nationals.

There seems to be no uniform pattern of UDB organization in foreign countries, and a short review of the network of the various outposts may be helpful in understanding the intricacy of operation as developed in the rather short time since 1944, when Foreign UDB agencies were established.

#### UDB in Italy

The UDB Italy is divided into three main groups, whose chief components are as follows:

1. North Italy, with most intense UDB activities, is entrusted primarily to Slovenes. The UDB group operates also in Zone A of Venezia Giulia, where the directives are obtained mostly from UDB Ljubljana, Slovenia.
2. Central Italy, with intensity of operations centered upon Rome, is entrusted largely to Croats, Dalmatians, and even former Ustasha members.
3. South Italy, with activities centered upon Eboli and other camps of displaced persons, is controlled mostly by Serb UDB agents.

The following are reported to be the main UDB objectives for Italy:

1. Political and military espionage against the Allies in Italy.
2. Identification of Allied and Italian intelligence organizations and personnel.
3. Collaboration with the Italian CP.
4. Surveillance of political parties and individuals opposed to Tito's regime and of refugees in general.
5. Buying and dispatching raw materials, vehicles, and other commodities from Italy to Yugoslavia.

The head of the UDB for Rome area is reported to be Dr. [REDACTED], officially a member of the Health Office of UNRRA.

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The leaders and agents are attached to various legitimate agencies which serve as cover, as, for instance, UNRRA, Red Cross, TANJUG, and other commercial and diplomatic agencies. Much of the UDB activity is directed by the Yugoslav Delegation in via Quintino Sella, Rome. The Yugoslav Legation to the Holy See includes a political commissar of the CP. Other concentration points of UDB in Italy are Padua, Milan, Bologna, Ancona, Naples, Bari, and Taranto.

#### UDB in Austria

While the original OZNA for Austria maintained a central post under Major (now Lt. Col.) [redacted] attached to the Yugoslav Military Mission in Vienna (Russian Zone), there seem to be at present two independent posts of UDB for Austria, Vienna and Salzburg, both accountable directly to Belgrade or to the Ljubljana UDG. In addition, the Slav communities of Carinthia (South of Klagenfurt and Voelkermarkt) are a focal point for a large number of pro-Slav organizations which are directed by UDB under Communist leaders, Dr. [redacted] and [redacted], representing both German Communists and the Slavs. The present leaders of UDB Vienna and Salzburg are not known. The following officers stationed in Austria have all been reported as UDB chiefs: Lt. Col. [redacted], Major [redacted], Major [redacted], a certain [redacted], and most recently [redacted].

The UDB Vienna Liaison section is reported to be in contact with the MVD. Chief of the Operations Section, [redacted] has a score of agents operating in various front organizations. Among the leading front organization is reported to be the Yugoslav Military Mission, headed originally by Colonel [redacted], and at present by Lt. Col. [redacted]. The offices of this mission, however, were originally devoted to the problem of restitution of properties, and it may be that only a section of this office is actually engaged in UDB work. The War Booty Commission, another front organization for the UDB, is headed by a Colonel [redacted]. The Yugoslav Political Investigation Squad, headed by [redacted], and Centroprom, headed by [redacted] are both reported as agencies used by UDB for its activities.

#### UDB in France

The stronghold of the UDB in France today seems to be the "Association des Yougoslaves en France". This originally patriotic organization of the pre-war Yugoslav students and residents in France, is reported to have at present about 2,500 members in Paris and in various parts of France. During the war, the Communists penetrated the society and have it, at present, under complete control. Its active president and general secretary is [redacted]. The locals of the organization are active in Dept. de la Moselle, region of St. Etienne, region of Toulouse, Dept. du Pas de Calais, and Dept. du Nord. Most of the funds of the organization are supplied by the Yugoslav Legation.

Other covers used by the UDB are the Legation itself and the consulates, and the Red Cross. Its most important contacts are with the French CP, the CADI, the AVER (L'Association des Volontaires de l'Espagne Republicaine), and the Soviet agents in France. Recruiting for International Brigades is reported to be an added activity of the UDB office attached to the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris. [redacted], a young UDB Colonel, reported recently in Toulouse, Perpignan, and Lyon, is said to be one of the leaders in this recruiting program preparing for a Communist uprising in Spain.

A considerable list of names has been received of alleged leaders and important personalities in the UDB for Paris and France. Colonel [redacted] and a certain [redacted] (apparently Soviet) have both been reported as chiefs of UDB operations in France; while for Paris, the UDB chiefs previously named are: [redacted] and [redacted].

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UDB in Switzerland

The UDB in Switzerland appears to operate chiefly through the Yugoslav Legation and Consulates, and the International Red Cross. Reports on alleged UDB agents in this area are comparatively numerous; many of the same names continue to reappear with periodic frequency. In June 1946 OZNA was said to have 65 people working for it here. Although UDB personnel is said to change about every three months, this apparently does not apply to the major agents or section chiefs, as some of these have been reported working in this capacity for almost a year. Their major objectives are surveillance of and intelligence on Yugoslav nationals, as well as on Anglo-Americans. Reports indicate that UDB in Switzerland is fairly well organized, operating on both a functional and regional basis. The main centers are Bern, Geneva, and Zurich.

Though there have been conflicting opinions and some doubt on the actual head of UDB in Switzerland, latest reports indicate that [redacted] Counsellor of the Yugoslav Legation in Bern, is generally accepted to be Chief. Other well known UDB personalities are: [redacted], Captain [redacted], and [redacted].

[redacted] First Secretary of the Legation, is described as intelligent and "dangerous". [redacted] Commercial Attache at the Yugoslav Legation, is head of the Technical Section of UDB, and is said to be the most gifted and active UDB figure in Switzerland. Capt. [redacted] Yugoslav Military Attache, is head of the Military Section of UDB in Switzerland and is considered a "dangerous" agent by a reliable liaison agency. [redacted] is reported to be UDB District Chief for Bern; he is linked with [redacted] as an important Communist organizer and propagandist. [redacted] is Consul General at the Yugoslav Consulate in Zurich. [redacted] has been reported to be UDB chief for Zurich and Basel. [redacted] Consul General in Geneva, has been reported to be one of the three regional chiefs for UDB Switzerland.

UDB Chiefs for Other Countries and Areas

The UDB chief for Prague, Czechoslovakia, is reported to be a certain [redacted] a lawyer who was unknown before the war. [redacted] Yugoslav Military Attache in Prague, is said to be a dangerous UDB agent, alleged to procure Czech passports for UDB agents employed by the Komintern. The UDB Chief for Portugal is believed to be [redacted] the Yugoslav Minister to Portugal, who is a known Communist and Russian sympathizer. [redacted], who is attached to the Yugoslav Mission in London, is reliably reported to be the head of UDB in the United Kingdom. [redacted] official Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, is stated to be Political Commissar in the Embassy. [redacted] Yugoslav Military Attache in Sofia, is UDB chief for Bulgaria and coordinator for Yugoslav-Bulgarian affairs in Macedonia. [redacted] on the staff of the Yugoslav Legation in Ankara, is reported to be a special TITO agent, in charge of all Yugoslav agents in the Middle East. [redacted] Secretary at the Yugoslav Embassy in Brazil, is reported to be UDB chief for South America.

Dr. [redacted], listed as Counselor in the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, D.C., is in charge of UDB activities in the United States and Canada. On matters of general policy he is reported to conduct liaison with the Soviet Embassy; while on immigration problems he probably depends largely upon cooperation with Yugoslav organizations, and particularly upon [redacted] assistant for Canada is [redacted] another counselor attached to the Embassy to study labor problems; [redacted] is reported to travel frequently through Canada.

While UDB posts are reported to exist in a number of other countries, no conclusive information is available on the present chiefs for the following countries: the Netherlands, Hungary, Albania, Greece, and Egypt.

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EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TITLES

UDB - Uprava Drzavne Bezbednosti: Administration of State Security  
Other titles used for the same organization:  
UDB - Ured Drzavne Bezbednosti: Office of State Security  
UDV - Uprava Drzavne Varnosti: Administration of State Security  
UDS - Uprava Drzavne Sigurnosti: Administration of State Security  
UDBA - same as UDB

QZNA - Otsek Zastite Naroda: Section for Protection of the Nation; replaced by UDB

KNOJ - Korpus Narodne Otbrane Jugoslavije: Corps of National Defense of Yugoslavia

Narodna Milicija: National Militia - Police in cities, gendarmerie in rural communities

GOC - Glavni Obavestajni Center: General Information Center - first Partisan intelligence organization, established in 1942

POC - Provincial Information Center - local subdivision of GOC

MOC - Communal Information Center - local subdivision of POC

Forum of the Communist Party - the Politbureau of Yugoslavia

MGB and MVD - Soviet intelligence and police agencies

NOF - Narodno Oslobodilni Odbor: National Liberation Committee

Troika, plural Troiike - intelligence, sabotage, or other special operational teams of three people

Desetorka - squad of 10; 3 Troiike and 1 leader

UPCIS - Ufficio Politico Collegamento Italo-Slavo: Political Office of Italo-Slav Unity; operating in Venezia Giulia and Friuli

FUAD - Fronte Unico Antifascista Democratico: Anti-fascist Democratic Front, Communist controlled political organization operating in Venezia Giulia.

UAIS - Unions Antifascista Italo-Slovena; Anti-fascist Italo Slovene Union, recently replaced by FUAD

UISDA - Unions Italo-Slovena Donne Antifasciste: Union of Italo-Slovene Anti-fascist Women, an aggressive political group reported as auxiliary to UDB and Militia

Cittadino Base - Political office of the Giulian Communist Party

UIVOD - Uvozni - Izozni Zavod: Import-Export Institute, commercial organization controlled from Ljubljana, used as cover for UDB

GENTROPROM - Centralni Promet: Central Traffic, economic and financial institution, directed from Ljubljana, used as cover for UDB

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- KUNI - Komisija za Upravljanje Narodne Imovine: Commission for Administration of State Properties, a war booty commission, reported to be used as cover for UDB
- JURIS - an organization of assault teams directed by Slovenes and Russians
- CADI - Centre d' Action et de Defense Des Immigres: Center of Action and Protection of Immigrants (French Communist outfit)
- AVER - L'Association des Volontaires de L'Espagne Republicaine: Association of Volunteers of Republican Spain (Communist controlled group in France)
- UPS - Union des Patriotes Sovietiques: Union of Soviet Patriots
- TVP - Titova Varna Policija - Tito's Security Police, a special unit of the Foreign Military UDB
- TANJUG (or TANYUG) - Telegrafaska Agencija Jugoslavije: Yugoslav Telegraph Agency
- YAFKA - Local section, committee, cell, or H.Q. in Macedonia, established for promotion of unrest in Greece.

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HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND  
Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence

71320

*Call*  
*88320*

APC 757, US Army  
30 December 1947

319.1 (GID/OPS/CIS) 0211A

SUBJECT: Tracer Letter (UDB - Prava Drzavne Bezbednosti)

TO : Director of Intelligence  
General Staff, US Army  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, dated  
17 September 1947, subject: UDB (Prava Drzavne Bezbednosti).

2. It would be appreciated if this office could be  
informed when the 45 copies of above report may be expected,  
or one copy of report and authorization for its reproduction  
for distribution to CIC regions and sub-regions, as requested  
in referenced letter.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

*W. L. Rainford Lt. Col. FIA*  
for W. L. FAGG  
Col., GSC  
Executive

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HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND  
Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence

319.1 (GID/OPS/CIS)

17 September 1947  
APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT: UDB (Prava Drzavne Bezbednosti)

TO : Director of Intelligence  
War Department General Staff  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Reference is made to War Department report (Secret Control) subject: UDB - Organization and Functions, which was recently received in this headquarters and has since been returned to the War Department.

2. It is requested that this office be furnished forty-five (45) copies of referenced report, or one copy of report and authorization for its reproduction for distribution to CIC regions and sub-regions.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

W. L. FAGG  
Col., GSC  
Executive

Maj. GSC

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REG AGN #291

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100-2004

**INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP**

(Classification)

**HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER**

FILE NO: D-10643

SUBJECT: UDB (prava Drzavne Bezbednosti)

DATE: 10 September 1947

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	Hqs 970th GIC Det	Ops Br	10 Sept 1947	<p>1. Recently a War Department report (Secret Control) was distributed in this headquarters, subject: UDB - Organization and Functions. UDB is the successor of OZNA, the Yugoslav intelligence and police system which operated inside and outside Yugoslavia. Permission was sought from War Department Detachment to have reproductions of the report made for the purpose of furnishing copies to regions and sub-regions.</p> <p>2. Mr. [REDACTED] of the War Department Detachment advised that the one report which was distributed was the only copy of this report in the European Command and it was returned to the War Department. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that permission for reproduction of this report would have to come from the War Department.</p> <p>3. It would be appreciated if the War Department were requested either to furnish this headquarters with forty-five (45) copies of referenced report or to furnish a copy of the report and authorize its reproduction by this headquarters for distribution to GIC regions and sub-regions.</p> <p>3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)</p> <p>for JOHN L. INSKEEP Lt. Colonel, Cav. Commanding</p>
	SCR/bjj/Tel:6202			

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV  
970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment

HJ/faf

APO 407-A  
US Army

27 December 1947

IV-4477

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Intelligence

TO : Commanding Officer  
970th CIC Detachment, EUCOM  
APO 757, US Army

1. Attached is MOIC, this headquarters, Subject: Yugoslav Intelligence Service in Germany and Austria, file IV-4477, dated 19 December 1947.
2. Attention is called to Paragraph 2 which gives a list of agents working for the Yugoslav Intelligence Service in Germany and Austria.
3. It is requested that Central Registry check on individuals listed and send us a report on any information on hand on individuals mentioned in Paragraph 2,a, MOIC attached.

*Ellington D. Golden*  
ELLINGTON D. GOLDEN  
Lt Col AC  
Commanding

Munich Mil 2995 - 2996  
(Mr. John)

1 Incl: MOIC, file and subject as  
above, dtd 19 Dec 47 (3)

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION I  
870th CIC Detachment

CSH/

APO 407/A  
US ARMY

Ref.No.: 4477

19 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Intelligence Service in Germany and Austria.

1. Informant X-3077-IV-K furnished the following list of agents working for the Yugoslav intelligence service in Germany and Austria.

2. a. Agents working in Germany.

Yugoslav Nationals:

	born in:
1. [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]	"
3. [REDACTED]	"
4. [REDACTED]	"
5. [REDACTED]	"
6. [REDACTED]	"
7. [REDACTED]	"

German Nationals:

	born in:
1. [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]	"
3. [REDACTED]	"
4. [REDACTED]	"
5. [REDACTED]	"
6. [REDACTED]	"
7. [REDACTED]	"
8. [REDACTED]	"
9. [REDACTED]	"
10. [REDACTED]	"
11. [REDACTED]	"
12. [REDACTED]	"
13. [REDACTED]	"
14. [REDACTED]	"
15. [REDACTED]	"
16. [REDACTED]	"

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

6 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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b. Agents working in Austria:

Yugoslav Nationals:

	born in:
1. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]

German Nationals:

	born in:
1. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
9. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
10. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
11. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
12. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
13. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
14. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
15. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
16. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
17. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
18. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
19. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
20. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]
21. [REDACTED]	" [REDACTED]

c. Informant stated that it had not as yet been possible for him to obtain the exact locations of individuals listed in paragraphs a and b.

3. AGENT'S COMMENTS:

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a. X-3077-IV-K has been directed to attempt to secure additional data on individuals in paragraphs a and b and, mainly to obtain their present locations in Germany and/or Austria.

b. Recommend that central registry and Region IV registry check be made on all individuals listed.

Source: X-3077-IV-K

Eval: B-2

APPROVED:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent CIC

3 USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

Region V Sub-Region Weiden  
APO 225 US ARMY

REC'D 20-11 1947  
BISTR  
CPI  
NAS  
ANSWERED  
FILE: 1550 194

File: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 4 November 1947

SUBJECT: Techniques of Penetration by OZNA Agents

TO : Commanding Officer, 970th CIC Detachment,  
Region V, APO 225, US-Army


Attn: ~~Mr. SHEPANEX~~

- ☐ MOIC, this office, Subject above, dated 24 October 1947, is forwarded for your information.
- ☐ SRI, this office, Subject above, dated \_\_\_\_\_, is forwarded for your information.
- ☐ Your attention is directed to Par. \_\_\_\_\_ of attached report.

REMARKS:

1. Although the MOIC deals in generalities, a detailed elaboration of techniques and identities contained herein, is being obtained by S/A

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§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)



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§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

Incl.: \_\_\_\_\_

Spezial Agent, CIC

Tel.: \_\_\_\_\_

Commanding \_\_\_\_\_

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HEADQUARTERS

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

Region V, Weiden Sub-Region

AP0 225

US Army

24 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: OZNA agents.

TO : Commanding Officer, 970 CIC Det, Region V, Weiden Sub-Region

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED (OR CHANGED) TO	BY AUTHORITY OF
<del>SECRET</del>	LT. COL. E. M. McDERMOTT
REGION V - 66 CIG Det	16 Jan 51
Elmer T. Hughes 1st Lt.	

1. The following report dealing with OZNA agents is submitted on information received in this office from [REDACTED]

2. a. The 3d International, headquarters at Moscow, issued in the spring of 1947 orders that all countries which are under the Soviet influence and have DPs in Germany are immediately compelled to build up groups of well trained and instructed communists. The purpose of these groups is to infiltrate into the DP camps as refugees and to spread communist propaganda. One of the primary aim of these groups of agents, consist of enticing the DPs to return to their respective countries. This program was instituted because the greater majority of the DPs express their intention to emigrate to the USA, Canada, Belgium, Holland, France and England. These communist agents usually travel together with the DPs emigrating to the previously named countries, organizing strikes and creating unrest there. After having completed their mission, they return to Germany and start all over again with another transport of emigrants.

b. The OZNA agents work secretly, but were instructed to report immediately to the local Communist Party of the said country in case the situation becomes critical or dangerous for them. Otherwise, they have to remain unknown.

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c. Since the spring of 1947, approximately 3000 well trained and experienced people have been sent into Germany and Austria for that purpose, and most of them are young people with excellent knowledge in underground work. They infiltrate with regular papers into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France. From these countries they enter the US zone and the British zone illegally, posing as persecuted refugees from Yugoslavia. They receive instructions as to what to say in case they are caught. They procure their identity papers on the black market or through the local Communist Headquarters in which locality they are operating.

Page 1 of 3 pages

cont. 2 of 2 pages

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

Region V, Weiden Sub-Region

APO 225

SUBJECT: OZNA agents (Continued)

US COMMUNICATION CANCELLED (OR CHANGED) TO	
<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	
BY AUTHORITY OF	
LT. COL. E. W. MCDERMOTT	16 Jan 51
REGION V, WEIDEN SUB-REGION	
Elmer T. Dugan, 1st Lt.	

d. These 3000 OZNA agents have been divided as follows:

- (1) British zone: approximately 300 men
- (2) US zone : approximately 1300 men
- (3) French zone : 1100 men
- (4) France : 100 men
- (5) Belgium : 150 men

e. Approximately one (1) month ago, a group of 150 OZNA agents came to Germany by way of the Danube river. They split up immediately upon their arrival in German territory into groups of three (3) each (Troika), and begin to operate. It is believed that this was already the 6th or 7th group which entered Germany that way.

f. The headquarters which direct and dispose of the agents are located in PARIS, France. Couriers are dispatched in all directions from there. The excuse given to explain their intensive travelling is black market. Adding machines, typewriters and automobiles are the 3 items which are mostly bought by them in the US zone, and this is done on a large scale. These agents travel on papers issued by TITO's Military Mission in Paris or Munich. They are also in possession of the necessary stamps for the purpose of falsifying documents.

g. While travelling by train, these agents are in possession of papers issued by TITO's Military Mission in Paris or Munich, impersonating members of the said Mission. They also have papers certifying that they are members of the US Press. The trains used by them are either the military or civilian trains running between Munich and Paris, Paris and Cologne or Paris and Frankfurt.

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h. When travelling by automobiles, which are bought in Germany, the OZNA agents are in possession of falsified identifications representing them as members of the US press or as members of the newspaper "American Srbobran". They also identify themselves as members of the "American Grave Registration". Sometimes, they operate with forms used by the French Government for its guards at Baden-Baden.

1. To enter France, these agents cross at first the border of the French occupation zone at Ulm-an der-Rodau, (AVAILABLE) From

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HEADQUARTERS

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

Region V, Weiden Sub-Region

APO 225

US Army

SUBJECT: OZNA agents (Continued)

the French zone they pass into France at two (2) crossing points:

- (1) over a bridge near Strasbourg, France, or
- (2) on a boat across the Rhine river, near Strasbourg.

g. To enter Belgium, they travel by automobiles from Cologne to Bruxelles, Belgium. This is done always in company of a Belgium officer in uniform

h. All the papers in possession of these agents are issued on Yugoslav names. However, none of them are real names.

i. Only a very few of the OZNA agents talk the English language.

3. AGENT'S NOTES AND COMMENTS: This agent is of the opinion that more of the above information will follow from the same source in short time. Request that any special EEI desired by Headquarters should be forwarded to this agent.

Evaluation: B-6

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

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S/Agent CIE

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LT. COL. E. M. McDERMOTT	
REGION V. 82 CIC Det	
16 Jan 51	
Elmer T. Neighars 1st Lt	



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HEADQUARTERS  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
OPERATIONS SECTION  
A.P.O 512

file D10643  
13 October 1947

SUBJECT: Some Important Functionaries of OZNA in Yugoslavia

611-8G-1B

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

1. Attached hereto is a seven-page list with background particulars of important officials and functionaries of OZNA today in Yugoslavia. The usefulness of this list will be greatly increased if considered in close relation with the other papers on OZNA previously submitted by this office and which come from the same source of information. They are, in fact, component parts of an integrated study.
2. The information contained in the attached catalogue of names was furnished to this Agent by Yugoslav Royalists who were members of the anti-Communist squad of the Belgrade Police Force before and during the early stages of the war. The sentiments of the Informants are still violently anti-Communist.
3. Attention is especially invited to the Agent's Note at the end of the list on page 7.

§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

  
Special Agent, CIC

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SOME IMPORTANT FUNCTIONARIES OF OZNA IN JUGOSLAVIA

§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)  
§ USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

The Minister of the Interior of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia and the Chief of OZNA Centrale and through it of all the OZNAs is [REDACTED]. He is a lieutenant general of the Partisans, a member of the Presidio of the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, a member of the Federal Parliament, a member of the Parliament of the Federal Republic of SERBIA, a member of the executive committee of the Yugoslav Popular Front. He uses also the false name of [REDACTED] is a Serb, born in the town of [REDACTED] near Belgrad. By profession a tailor he never actually worked as such, for even as a young man he occupied himself entirely with politics. Is now about 42 years old, married, and the father of a baby son. Even at an age almost juvenile he was already a member of the Communist Party, and as a functionary of the Party at the age of 18 years he worked especially along the line of labor unions, and also on the organizational and propagandistic activity of the Party. Before the war he was political secretary of the regional committee for Serbia, and as such he became shortly before the war the organizing secretary of the central committee for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Before the war sent to prison several times on the charge of spreading Communist propaganda and in engaging in Communist activity, at the time of his arrest in 1936 he succeeded in escaping to Russia. There he studied in Moscow at the University of Sverdlovsk. In 1940 he re-appeared in Belgrad, and as the person directing the Party propaganda he was discovered by the police. In October of the same year at the Communist Party conference in Zagreb his paper on "The labor Union Question" was read. The German occupation and the war of 1941 caught him in complete illegality at Belgrade. There he remained for a certain time after June 22, 1941 at the orders of Tito and commanded the clandestine Communist activity. In July of the same year he was discovered by the Germans when he was trying to sabotage the Belgrad radio station. At the moment of being arrested he was wounded and taken to the hospital. A short time afterward he was spirited away from the hospital by a Communist terroristic group. Being free, he took to the hills, and from that day he was always with Tito, [REDACTED], and others in the region of Serbia.

In the guerrilla warfare he was a member of the Yugoslav Partisan general staff, a member of the first and second committees of Yugoslav anti-fascists, and in 1944 became one of the ministers in the cabinet formed by Tito. In August 1943 together with Tito and [REDACTED] he established OZNA whose chief he became with the rank of Partisan Lieutenant General. He remained in this post as well as member of the executive committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party even after the Communists gained complete control of the government. When at the beginning of 1946 OZNA ceased to be under the Ministry of National Defense and passed under the control of the Ministry of the Interior he became the Minister of the Interior. Here in this new post he is reorganizing OZNA into a modern and powerful secret police, always defending his work in Parliament. The Yugoslav Communists consider his greatest accomplishment to be the capture of General Draza Mihailovic and the liquidation of the guerrilla movement of the latter in Serbian territory.

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[REDACTED] is one of the seven men who control the destinies of Yugoslavia. Is known to be a perfect organizer, a fighter, and a revolutionary. Is considered one of the best conspirators of the Yugoslav Communist Party. Not especially intellectual, nor does have an exceptional record as a student. Devoted a hundred percent to the Soviets, and the moving spirit in the new revolutionary methods being used in Yugoslav politics. In 1945, 46, and 47 he made trips with Tito to Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, and the capitals of the other satellites of the Soviet Union, and assisted in the formulating of pacts of a political and military nature.

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Partisan Colonel, assistant of the Minister of the Interior, and first assistant of the Chief of OZNA, [REDACTED]. Deputy in the federal Serb parliament, member of the executive committee of the Popular Front of Serbia.

Nationality Serb, born at [REDACTED] in eastern Serbia, about 45 years old, pharmacist assistant by profession, that is, worker in a pharmacist's laboratory in Belgrad. Does not have any diplomas from schools. Member of the Communist Party from the year 1929. As such he held various posts of importance in the hierarchy of the Party in Serbia. Before the war his work along the line of the trade unions, and in organizing private employees for the fight against the regime of the day through its instrumentality of the labor union known as "Botic". Worked also for the so-called "Aid for the People", which was the collecting of money for the work of the Party. Being thus a very important figure in the Party, he was arrested and sentenced a number of times. The war in 1941 found him in Belgrad in hiding and engaged in clandestine Party activity. He then had the post of secretary-general of "NOF" for Serbia, which was the People's Credit Agency for the Liberation. He was thus a kind of general cashier. In the first months of the German occupation he was at Belgrad, but discovered he fled to western Serbia, where he worked in collecting money for the Communist struggle. In the beginning of 1941 he went to Bosnia where he became the Secretary for financial affairs at the Headquarters of the Partisans. Also became a member of the first AVNOJ in 1942 at BIHAĆ and of the second in 1943 at JAJCE. In addition to being all this, although he was not a soldier by profession he took part in the guerrilla warfare and became a Partisan Colonel. He has been a part of OZNA since its foundation in August 1943. He is considered as one of the first and most important collaborators of [REDACTED] even though his title is only "Assistant of the Minister of the Interior." After the war he visited the Soviet Union and other countries that are satellites of Russia, always charged with an important mission. Being one of the oldest members of the Party, he enjoys the esteem and confidence of the regime. A good organizer and a great fanatic for the Party he is considered somewhat weak on the intellectual side.

Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Serbia, Chief of OZNA for the Serbian republic, executive head of OZNA central, deputy to the national parliament, deputy to the Serb parliament, member of the executive committee of the Popular Front of Serbia, member of the regional committee for Serbia of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

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Nationality Serb, about 30 years old, born at [REDACTED], the center of western Serbia, of a poor family of the working class. Before the war was a second-year student of agronomy at the University of Belgrad. A member of the Communist Party since 1938 which Party he entered when he was still a student in the gymnasium. Arrested many times as the organizer of Communist propaganda in the agriculture college of the University of Belgrad. Before the war was a member of the regional committee of UZICE. After 22 June 1941 organized guerrilla groups in western Serbia and was their political secretary. When Tito had organized the first Soviet Republic at UZICE, [REDACTED] became the Chief of Police in this Republic, arresting and shooting a great mass of the democratic elements of the population. After the end of this republic he became the secretary of the II Corps Division of the Proletariat. As such he took part in numerous engagements and attained the rank of Partisan Colonel. After the entrance of the Partisans in Belgrad in October 1944 he became the head of the executions that took place in that period and subsequently. Known to be an executioner with a heart for the business and a sadist, he has personally tortured many of those arrested. Relatively

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young he is in the full confidence of the regime, and by reason of his participation in the Communist struggle to power he is uncompromised. In view of the fact that he did not belong to the ranks of regular soldiers or even of professional police he has learned his speciality very well, busying himself during the Communists' struggle to power with investigative and police-like activity.

\* AVNOJ is a Yugoslav abbreviation for ANTI-FASCIST COUNCIL OF THE JUGOSLAV PEOPLE

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Partisan Colonel, at present one of the chiefs of divisions of OZNA central. In 1945 and 1946 was directing Section B of OZNA central, organized especially with the aim of combatting Anglo-American activity in Yugoslavia and known also under the name of the 'Anglo-Saxon Section'. [redacted] is a deputy in the national parliament, and also in the Montenegro parliament. He is member of the executive committee of the Popular Front of the Federal Republic of Montenegro.

About 30 years old, Montenegrin origin, Serb nationality. Before the war student of law at the University of Belgrad. Known as one of the leaders of the Communist movement at that University when he was a student there. As such, several times arrested by the Belgrad police and sent back to his native town. At the outbreak of the war he was the organizer of the Communist youth for Montenegro. About the middle of July 1941 he organized together with the Communists the so-called 'insurrection of July'. He headed the revolution and became the member of the regional committee of the Communist Party for Montenegro and also a member of the Partisan headquarters command. Active in the organizing of OZNA from the day of its birth. With the entrance of the Partisans in Belgrad in October 1944 he became one of the Division Chiefs of OZNA central, and remains at this post even today. A specialist who is well known for being a persecutor of the democratic and pro-Anglo-American Yugoslavs throughout Yugoslavia. Intelligent and exceptionally zealous. Knows well the Marxist theory and one of the defenders of the radical and revolutionary line in the politics of present-day Yugoslavia. It is he who signs all papers for all persons freed from prisons and concentration camps of OZNA.

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[redacted] called [redacted]

Partisan Colonel, In the early days of OZNA Chief of OZNA for the cities of NIS and LESCOVAC, later went to become a part of the OZNA central of Belgrad. Today he is one of the chiefs of the Corps Divisions of OZNA central of [redacted]

Nationality Serb, origin Montenegrin, born at [redacted] in southern Serbia, about 30 years old. Before the war studied at the University of Belgrad, but his studies were only a cloak for covering his activity as a propagandist for Communism whose propaganda he headed at the University. A member of the Party for 15 years, as such he was arrested many times and sent back to the place of his birth and family. A little before the war he was on the provincial committee for the province of Leskovac. Immediately after 22 June 1941 he took to hiding and with his comrades of this province he began to organize Communist groups in Toplica and Jablanica. As political commissar of these groups he was many times wounded and decorated, finally becoming a Partisan Colonel. Is a fanatic Communist, a good organizer and speaker. Notorious as an executioner. He is never for a compromise, but for the strictest interpretation of the revolutionary line of politics.

[redacted]

Chief of the Directive Division of the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia, at least [redacted] ally one of the organizers and

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Chiefs of OZNA Central.

Serb born at [REDACTED], 48 years old, married, holds diploma in law. Before the war of 1941 he was chief of the Division for the Security of the State in the Royal Ministry of the police officials of the old regime who still holds an important post. As to his politics before the war, he took very little interest in political matters, but was known to sympathize somewhat with the Left and moreover to be extremely materialistic. As chief of the Division for the Security of the State, partly for reasons of solidarity but more by reason of bribes he promised to repatriate the Yugoslav Communist volunteers who returned from the Spanish Civil War after having taken refuge in France during 1939 and 1940 after the failure of the Communists in Spain. He effected the repatriation of many of these Communists. After the insurrection of 22 June 1941 he was to be found at Belgrad sympathizing with the Left. Being so corrupt, he was no longer accepted by the police, and under the influence of his son who was a Communist he entered the ranks of the Communists. In consequence he was arrested in Belgrad, and in 1943 was deported by the Germans to forced labor in Vienna. In Vienna he remained until May 1945, energetically spreading Communist propaganda in the camps of the Yugoslav laborers. After the liberation he returned to Yugoslavia, and put himself at the disposition of the new regime.

At first he organized the new police system, and then as an expert and political exile he was assumed by OZNA central of Belgrad for the position that he has at present.

Was not known to be a party member nor a functionary of the Communists, but owes in large part his son who was noteworthy in the Communist struggle to power the place that he occupies today in the new regime. Considered a good police expert, but is soft and corruptible, and without doubt will be let go as soon as the new regime succeeds in training its own police experts.

Partisan Colonel, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA. Chief of OZNA for the Republic of BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA, member of the executive branch of the Popular Front of the same republic, member of the regional committee of the Communist Party for the same republic, deputy in the national parliament and also in the parliament of the above mentioned republic.

About 35 years old, nationality Serb, Orthodox religion, of Bosnian origin. Before the war studied agronomy at the University of Belgrad, but did not finish the course, for he was too much occupied with political activity and in diffusing Communist propaganda. Member of the Communist Party from the year 1936, and as such recognized at the University. Arrested many times, sent back to his home town, and interned on account of his propagandizing at the University.

On 22 June 1941 he was in Bosnia where he organized the Communist Partisan warfare and headed it. Became the member for Bosnia and Herzegovina at Partisan headquarters command, member of the first and second AVNOJ (see p.2, footnote). Took an active part in the Partisan struggle, was decorated several times, and finally reached the rank of Partisan Colonel. From the day that the Partisan Communists took over the government, in May 1945, he was in Bosnia and Herzegovina as Minister of the Interior, deputy in Parliament, and head and organizer of OZNA. Fanatic Communist, energetic, incorruptible, and a follower of the revolutionary line in the new Yugoslav policies.

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[REDACTED]

Partisan Colonel, deputy in the parliament of the Republic of Montenegro, member of the executive committee of the Popular Front of the above republic. Official title is 'Assistant of the Public Minister of the Federal Yugoslav Republic.'

Nationality Serb, born in the province of [REDACTED] in Montenegro, bachelor, 36 years old. Before the war received a diploma in law from the University of Belgrad. Became member of the Communist Party a short time before the war, but already a long time before the war he was known as an activist of the Party and an organizer of Communist propaganda at the University of Belgrad. As such, arrested many times and persecuted by the police. The war of 1941 found him in his native province of Montenegro where with other Communists he organized the Communist insurrection. As a legal expert he was a member of the court-martial and an investigator in the Partisan units in Montenegro and Serbia. Later, he became the political commissar for these units, and finally after taking an active part in the struggle and being decorated various times he became a Colonel.

After the entry of the Communist Partisans in Belgrad he became one of the investigators and Chiefs of OZNA central in Belgrad in addition to being Assistant to the Public Minister. His work with OZNA is conducted in the strictest secrecy. He is neither a military or police expert, but a strong intellectual. In the hierarchy of the Party he has not attained a brilliant career, but meanwhile he is a trustworthy person, a fact which explains his high position at present in the state.

[REDACTED]

Lieutenant General, one of the Chiefs of OZNA central and a director of the work of OZNA abroad.

Serb, about 46 years old, profession engineer, diploma received at Paris before the war. A conspirator and member of the Yugoslav Communist Party of long-standing. Delegate of the Central Committee of Yugoslav Communist Party, he lived many years abroad and principally in PARIS. Member of the Russian secret police GPU at Paris during the period 1935-39. In this capacity he took an active part as an officer in the Spanish Civil War, and effected the clandestine entry into Spain of Yugoslav Communists, and after the failure of the Communist effort in Spain, their repatriation in Yugoslavia. He did all this working in close collaboration with Tito who participated in the Spanish Civil War as an important functionary of the Yugoslav Communist Party. (Tito was at that time secretary-general of the central committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party.) According to all the information collected, during the German occupation, the guerrilla warfare, and the Communist struggle in Yugoslavia he remained in Paris in the greatest secrecy while he organized the Red Maquis and the Communist Yugoslavs who happened to be in France. During the Communist struggle in Yugoslavia his name never occurred once in the lists of the combatants or the leaders of the fight.

During the first half of 1945 he was promoted by Tito to the rank of General and head of the Yugoslav Military Mission in France. At the beginning of 1946 he appeared in the French Zone of occupation in Austria with the pretext of looking for Yugoslav war criminals, and thus he had an opportunity of organizing OZNA and espionage, but soon compromised he was expelled by the French authorities and re-

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returned to Yugoslavia. There he became the chief of the Army Engineers Corps on the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and the secret director of OZNA abroad. In the beginning of 1947 he was sent as a diplomatic functionary by Tito to Brazil with the assignment of organizing OZNA and the Communist propaganda among the emigrants and natives of BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, PARAGUAY, and other countries of Latin America. At the same time by order of GPU, of which he is an old member, he was supposed to unify the work of the agents of OZNA and GPU with an aim of provoking Communist revolutions in those countries and of blocking the influence of the United States.

is recognized as an international spy, adventurer, and swindler. However, he is very important as an expert and perfect organizer of OZNA outside of Yugoslavia. Very materialistic, in fact so much so, that in the presence of a large enough bribe his ideological faith in Communism could be weakened. Knows many languages including Russian and French. Often makes trips to Moscow.

called ' ' among the Partisans.

Major General, commandant and head of OZNA for Slovenia, deputy in the federal parliament of Yugoslavia, deputy in the parliament of the republic of Slovenia, member of the executive committee of the popular front of Slovenia.

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Nationality Slovene, born in the , Communist before the war. From June 1941 he was at the head of OSVOBODILNA FRONTA (Committee for the Liberation). Member of the Headquarters Command of the Partisans for Slovenia. Took part in the Partisan struggle around Trieste and along the Slovene coast, and attained the rank of Major General despite the fact that he was not an officer by career. Member of the Central Committee of the Slovene Communist Party, after the conquest of power by the Communists he organized OZNA in Trieste and in Zones A and B. Even today OZNA in those regions is under his command.

Known as a good organizer and investigator, a fanatic Communist, and a man whom the regime trusts implicitly. Notorious for his persecutions of the democratic elements and their liquidation in Slovenia.

Partisan Major. Chief of the executive section of the OZNA Central of Belgrad.

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Serb, born at in Montenegro, about 34 years old, bachelor, diplomas from schools, profession customs-house employee and trader. Communist already before the war, and as such arrested and roughly handled a number of times. Before the war a functionary of the Communist Party for the province of NIKSIC.

Immediately after the Communist insurrection of 22 June 1941 he headed the insurrection in his native province. In the Partisan group JEZERO SARANSKI he was a member of the Court-martial and an investigator. In 1942 and 1943 he brought about the liquidation of all his political enemies in his home province. He is notorious, therefore, as an executioner. With the Partisans of Montenegro he participated in all the struggles of the Partisan guerrilla warfare. He was decorated, and finally reached the rank of Major in the Partisan army. After the entrance of the Partisans in Belgrad, thanks to his experience as an executioner he became the OZNA chief in charge of executions and liquidations in Belgrad. In that post he accomplished the liquidation in mass of the democratic elements and enemies of the regime,



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and in many cases he himself personally tortured and killed those arrested. A Communist fanatic, and as such an instrument of regime, but without any important place in the hierarchy of the Party.

██████████ called ██████████ among the Partisans.

Partisan Major and Chief of Section II of the OZNA for Croatia. Nationality Serb, born at ██████████, about 35 years old. Before the war graduated in law, and was a Judge in SIBENIK. Married a Communist dressmaker. Of his immediate family he has only his mother. As a member of the Communist Party he was arrested and punished many times before the war. Had the function of Secretary and member of the regional committee of the Party for Dalmatia.

Immediately after 22 June 1941, that is, after the Communist insurrection in Yugoslavia which was closely linked with the entry of Russia into the war against Germany he joined the Communist Partisans, and became the Political Director of the Partisan Brigade of SIBENIK. Did not take part in the struggle, but worked on the organization of the population for the fight and on Communist propaganda behind the front.

After the conquest of the government by the Communists, and after the organization of the OZNA of Dalmatia he became one of the first functionaries and organizers of it. Under his direction is ██████████ Chief of OZNA for the city of ZAGREB.

Very intelligent, a good organizer, and a man trusted by the regime. One of the leaders of the Serbian Club in Croatia he enjoys great respect from the Dalmatian Communists.

\*\*\*\*\*

END OF LIST ENTITLED: SOME IMPORTANT FUNCTIONARIES OF OZNA IN YUGOSLAVIA

(The original from which this translation was made bears the date of June 10, 1947)

NOTE OF TRANSLATOR

With regard to the activity of ██████████ (see P. 5 above) in South America there is confirmation in the Italian press of quite recent date. I quote from IL TIRRENO, published at Leghorn, from the issue of 10 October 1947 which carries an article under the date line of 9 October, Santiago, Chile.

"A Second communique sent out yesterday evening informs that the Yugoslav government has created in South America a vast Communist net of espionage and sabotage organized by Yugoslav diplomatic agents in Argentina. The centrale of the organization with its headquarters at ROSARIO, Argentina was probably established by the General ██████████, who arrived in Chile last November to participate as special envoy of Tito at the installation of Gonzales Videlas as president of the Republic. According to the Chilean government the principal objectives of ██████████ organization are the following:

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1. Create in South America a resistance movement against the United States.
2. Establish in Latin America Communist cells under the appearance of an association of "Friends of Yugoslavia."
3. Prepare through strikes and other means (witness the recent coal miners strike in Chile) for the sabotage of the industries of Latin America that are important for the United States."

(End of Translated quotation)

It will be observed that the objectives thus expressed tally very closely with those expressed a number of times in the two previous papers on OZNA translated and submitted by this Agent.

(The translation of the above MSS from the Italian was made by [REDACTED], Special Agent, Counter Intelligence Corps, 428 Detachment, APO 512)

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to Vol. 4

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HEADQUARTERS  
970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

D-10643

D-10643 (CIC/B-3/OPS)

APD 757

1 July 1947

T-2318

SUBJECT: Entry of Yugoslavian Intelligence Agents into  
Austria and Germany

TO : Commanding Officer  
430 CIC Detachment  
United States Forces in Austria  
APO 777, U.S. Army

1. Inclosed herewith for your information, is MOIC, Sub-Region  
KAUFBEUREN, CIC Region IV, dated 13 June 1947, file: IV-K-1302.2, sub-  
ject as above.

JOHN L. INKEEP  
Colonel, Cavalry  
Commanding

1 Incl: as stated

Telephone: FRANKFURT 7400  
Lt. [REDACTED]

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COL [REDACTED] ERSKINE, BY [REDACTED]  
1ST LT, HQ 66TH CIC DET, 14 JULY 1950

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HQ CIC Reg. IV

HEADQUARTERS

Received

SUB-REGION MEMMINGEN

DATE: 17 JUN 1947

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV

INITIALS: *ceo*

File No.: IV-K-1302.2

APO 407-A

13 June 1947

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

T-2204

TO : C. O., Counter Intelligence Corps Region IV, 970th  
CIC Detachment, APO 407-A, US Army  
ATTN: Operations Officer

1. Transmitted herewith is MOIC, Headquarters, Sub-Region Kaufbeuren, CIC Region IV, dated 13 June 1947, Subject: Entry of Yugoslavian Intelligence Agents into Austria and Germany.

2. Forwarded.

Special Agent, CIC  
Commanding

Incl:  
a/s

REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL BY AUTHORITY OF  
COL D. G. ERSKINE, BY *[Signature]*  
1st Lt, HQ 66TH CIC DET, 14 JULY 1950

Operation CROWN

1st Ind

JHA/lr

Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment, APO 407-A, US Army, 23 June 1947

TO: CO, 970th CIC Detachment, EUCOM, APO 757, US Army

1. Inclosed investigation reveals the close cooperation between the Communist parties in Yugoslavia and Austria. Your attention is also invited to Exhibit "A" which contains a list of alleged OZNA personalities in the US Zone of Germany and Austria.

2. It is recommended that a copy of this report be forwarded to CIC Vienna.

*[Signature]*  
DALE M. GARVEY  
Lt. Col., Inf.  
Commanding

Munich Mil 2995 - 2996  
(Mr. *[Redacted]*)

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HEADQUARTERS  
SUB REGION KAUFBEUREN  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV

13 June 1947

File No.: IV-K 1302.2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: Entry of Yugoslavian Intelligence Agents into  
Austria and Germany

RE : Operation CROWN

1. On this date, at the direction of the officer in charge, this Agent interviewed Informant P-17-IV-K concerning the names of OZNA (UDB) intelligence agents in the American Zone of Germany and their means of entry into Austria and Germany from Yugoslavia.

2. Informant reports that there is a close collaboration between the Communist Party of Austria, the OZNA, and the P.O.O.F. (Pokrajnski Odbor Oslobodilne Fronte sa slovensko Korosko - Border department of the Freedom Front for Slovenes in Kärnten). This collaboration is used for the delivery of material and Agents into Austria and Germany and is evident in the following ways:

a. Money, propaganda and weapons are sent from the Yugoslavian side to the Austrian side for the so-called "storm cells" of the KPÖ along the Austro-Yugoslavian frontier. Small deliveries are made under the cover of UNRRA packages; larger quantities are sent across at night with trucks.

b. Both the KPÖ and the P.O.O.F. aid in the border crossing activities of OZNA agents and provide papers or sufficient cover for the American or British Zones of Austria and for the American Zone of Germany. The following three OZNA agents were recently smuggled across the border into Austria in this manner and provided with papers as Yugoslavian Displaced Persons: (See Also ANNEX "A")

c. In the sector LAWAMÜND-BLEIBURG-EISENKAPPEL-ROSENBAACH, the KPÖ is particularly active. The KPÖ Landesleitung KÄARNTEN and KLAGENFURTH reportedly has radio communication with the Sekretariat of the KPJu-L.R.S. (People's Republic of Rumania). This radio communication is

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used for the transmission of instructions as well as for Agents reports.

d. There is continuous propaganda for the P.O.O.F. and a portion of the weapon deliveries mentioned above in paragraph 2a are earmarked for this organization, which has been formed into brigades. The First Brigade is reported in the area KLAGENFURTH-BLEIBURG-VÖLKERMARKE, with its staff and headquarters in KLAGENFURTH.

3. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. Evaluation of source and information: B-3

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APPROVED:

Special Agent, CIC  
Commanding

Special Agent, CIC

Incl: 1. ANNEX "A", OZNA Personalities in American Zones of Germany and Austria.

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ANNEX "A", OZNA Personalities in American Zones of Germany and Austria

*Vol. A*

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- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - OZNA Agent recently smuggled over border into Austria from Yugoslavia. Possesses papers showing him as a Yugoslavian DP.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ fnu - Yugoslavian Major in SALZBURG. Either is an Agent himself or has contact directly to OZNA. Possesses a Czechoslovakian identity paper in the name of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ fnu - OZNA Agent presently in the American Zone of Germany. Allegedly a dangerous man. Personal description: medium height, strong and heavy figure, dark blond hair.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - Female OZNA Agent reportedly in the American Zone of Germany at present; has Austrian papers; personal description: born ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~, medium height, dark blonde hair, blue eyes, speaks several languages.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - see personality ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ above.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - OZNA Agent recently smuggled over border into Austria from Yugoslavia. Possesses papers showing him as a Yugoslavian DP.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - OZNA Agent recently smuggled over border into Austria from Yugoslavia. Possesses papers showing him as a Yugoslavian DP.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - OZNA Agent smuggled over Austro-Yugoslavian border early in April 1947; allegedly in the area of MUNICH (M49/Y85); has various index cards and identity papers in his possession, under name of ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ (Austrian identity papers) or ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - see personality ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ above.
- ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ - female OZNA Agent of considerable ability; presently reported in the American Zone of Austria or in Bavaria; personal description: about 29 years old; dark hair, medium height, not good looking.

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COL D. G. ERSKINE, B. *Sh. Vortin*  
1ST LT, HQ 66TH CIC DET, 14 JULY 1950

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3 USC 552 (b) (7) (D)

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MOIC, File IV-K-1302.2, dtd 13 June 47 *Vol. A*

ANNEX "A", OZNA Personalities in American Zone of Germany  
and Austria - page two.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - female Agent of OZNA; reportedly has been  
active for the past several months in the  
American Zone of Germany; possesses Czech-  
oslovakian papers; medium height, dark hair,  
blue eyes, elegant appearance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - see personality ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ above.

Page  $\frac{2}{2}$  of  $\frac{2}{2}$  pages  
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IV-K-1302.1

~~SECRET~~

SUB REGION KAUFBEUREN

IV-2467, Yugoslav Intelligence  
OZNA

1st Ind

JHA/lr

Headquarters, Counter Intelligence Corps Region IV, 970th CIC Detachment,  
APO 407-A, US Army, 17 June 1947

TO: CO, KAUFBEUREN Sub-Region, CIC Region IV, APO 407-A, US Army

Forwarded for your information.

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

BY ORDER OF LT. COL. GARVEY:

USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

fa

Special Agent, CIC  
S-3

Munich Mil 2995 - 2996  
(Mr. [REDACTED])

Incl: n/c

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**COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
HEAD-QUARTERS  
FLORENCE DETACHMENT  
ZONE FOUR  
APO 612**

Case No. 531-303-57

28 May 1947

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:**

**SUBJECT:** Article in the "BASLER NACHRICHTEN". (Swiss daily, 22 May '47).

**RE :** Yugoslav Secret Police.

1. An article in the "BASLER NACHRICHTEN", dated 22 May 1947, under the heading "Aims of the Yugoslav Secret Police", came to the attention of this office and is herewith transcribed for your information.

2. The author of the article claims that the "BASLER NACHRICHTEN" received information with regard to the reorganization of the OZNA. According to the above mentioned article, following the Russian example, a change in the set up of the Yugoslav Secret Police was deemed necessary. In fact, the UPRAVA DRZAVNE BEZBEDNOSTI (i.e. State Security), commonly known as the UDBA took over recently, under General [REDACTED] the functions of the OZNA.

(a) The activity of the UDBA is supervised by General KUDRA-SANI from his Headquarters in BELGRADE. This activity extends well beyond Yugoslavia, expanding throughout the territories of Albania, Venezia Giulia, and Italy.

(b) In the Venezia Giulia area missions of the UDBA are carried out by special terrorist squads known as the I.I.E. Members of these squads openly declare: "Should our cause be lost - we have orders to demolish everything and kill everyone."

(c) A meeting, attended by all the members of the Liberal Front of Zones A and B, was held at SANTA CROCE in AIDUSSINA. Major NARINIC came expressly from LUBIANA to be present at the meeting and to make a speech.

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(d) In his speech, among other things, Major NARINIC stated the following: "The Yugoslav Army is taking up its position in the GORIZIA area. From these positions the Yugoslav Army will be able to control the city and be informed as to the movement of Italian troops in that area. My purpose is to recruit men for the setting up of civilian armed forces. It not being possible to penetrate these territories in uniform - we will organize bands of civilians who will

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

operate from here. Same as Yugoslavs and Bulgarians along the Greek frontier, these men will do sabotage and carry on guerilla warfare.

(b)(7)(c)

(e) Major [REDACTED] further continued: "For the above mentioned purpose the Communist Party in collaboration with the Commandant of 4th Army have decided to set up centers in GORIZIA, MONFALCONE, and other areas."

(f) "Men attached to these centers have been given orders to give every possible assistance to guerilla members and to furnish all necessary information. The executives will be members of Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Greek guerilla bands. These executives, in turn, will be supervised by a Russian officer. Every commune will be split up into four sections under COs of Giulia Region guerilla battalions."

(g) "Italians, naturally, will claim that our sabotage activity is infiltration of foreign troops. Thus we must act with the greatest possible caution." The Major wound up his speech with a salute to Marshal TITO, STALIN, and the "heroic" Red Army who is the liberator of humanity and, also, of the Giulia Province.

3. The article in the "BASLER NACHRICHTEN" claims that the aims of the UDBA, formerly GEMA, in Italy are the following:

(a) Close contact with the Italian Communist party in preparation for a revolution in this country;

(b) Providing instructors for the organization of a Communist militia in Italy;

(c) Close surveillance of Italian administrative agencies, and, when possible, infiltration into same;

(d) Ditto for Allied agencies and organizations;

(e) Furnishing arms and weapons;

(f) Sabotaging Polish and Yugoslav emigration from Italy to countries other than their native ones.

4. According to the article, <sup>388</sup> threads of this secret web lead to the Yugoslav Legation in ROME. This Legation is working in close collaboration with the Bulgarian Legation. Matters of greater importance are referred by these Legations to the Russian Embassy in ROME.

5. Due to an indiscretion it has been possible to get a sidelight on an episode that took place between UDBA agents, Soviet officials, and the Italian communists. The Soviet officials and the Slav agents bore the Italian Communists a grudge for their not having taken a firm stand against the Church. In their defense the Italian Comm-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

nists claimed that any anti-clerical movement in a country so profoundly catholic could make but little headway. They (the Italian Communists) suggested renouncing for the time being against any open attacks against the Church and concentrating their attacks on individual members of the clergy.

6. The fact that the anti-clerical press had not obtained the desired effect was also discussed by the Russians, Slavs, and Italian Communists. Concerning any action of the Communists against the Vatican as such, the Soviet officials had to admit that it would have but little success. Due to the above mentioned reasons the Russians thought that it appeared advisable for the Soviet Union to launch their attack on an international basis.

~~Special Agent, CIE.~~

APPROVED:

~~Major, Inf.~~  
Supervising Agent, Zone 4

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(Translation)

D-10643

FY-148

"BASLER NACHRICHTEN" (Thursday, 22 May '47)

Aims of the Yugoslav Secret Police

(b)(7)(C)  
We have been informed in writing of the following: patterning on the Russian example of the present date a change of the Secret Police of Yugoslavia set up is necessary (the Secret Police known up to now as the OZNA). Recently the UDBA (Uprava Drazavne Bezbednosti), meaning in Italian: State Security, took over, under the direction of General [REDACTED] the work of the OZNA. He (Gen. [REDACTED]) runs the organization from his Headquarters in BELGRADE. The activity of the UDBA extends beyond Yugoslavia, expanding throughout the whole of the Albanian territory, Venezia Giulia, and in Italy.

In the Venezia Giulia the work is done by special patrols, called K.K.K.XXX Members of this terroristic group openly declare: "Should our cause be lost - we have orders to ruin and kill everything and everyone".

(b)(7)(C)  
A reunion was held at SANTA CROCE in AIDUSSINA in which all the members of the Liberty Front of Zones A and B of Venezia Giulia participated. For this reunion Major [REDACTED] came purposely from LUBIANA. Among other things he mentioned in his speech the following: "The Yugoslav Army is taking up their positions in the neighborhood of GORIZIA, from where they are able to control the city and be informed of the movement of Italian troops in the city. My scope is to elect men for the organization of civilian armed forces. As it is not possible to enter these territories in uniform, we will form groups of civilians, who, maintaining their base here, will be able to do sabotage and guerilla warfare, following the Yugoslav and Bulgarian example as carried out XXX along the Greek frontier for the purpose of giving Greece a really democratic government. For this reason the Communist Party, collaborating with the Commandant of 4th Army, have decided to set up centers (Hqts) in GORIZIA, MONFALCONE, and other areas. Men attached to these centers have orders to hide the guerilla-fighters and to furnish all necessary information. The executives will be members of Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Greek guerilla bands. They will be controlled by a Russian officer. Every commune will be split up into four sections under the "Commander of Guerilla Battalions of the Giulia Region".

The sabotage activity which we will carry out, naturally, will be defined by the Italians as an infiltration of foreign troops. Thus we must act with the maximum of caution.\*\*\* The Major ended up his speech with a salute to Marshall TITO, to STALIN, and to the heroic Red Army, who is the liberator of humanity and also of the Giulia Province.

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The aims of the former OZNA, now UDBA, in Italy are the following:

1. Preparing in close contact with the Italian K.P.D. (Communist Party) of a revolution in Italy;
2. Sending instructors to organize the future Communist militia in Italy;
3. Furnishing arms and weapons;
4. Close surveillance of Italian administration and, possibly, infiltrating in the same;
5. Ditto for Allied organizations;
6. Sabotaging Polish and Yugoslav emigration (from Italy) to countries other than their native countries.

Threads (webs?) of this secret net are to be found at the Yugoslav Legation in ROME which is closely collaborating with the BULGARIAN Legation. For really very important decisions advice will be asked of the Russian Embassy.

Thanks to an indiscretion an episode that took place between UDPA agents, Soviet officials, and Italian Communists ~~xxxx~~revealed the following: the Soviet officials and the Slavs were down on the Italian Communists because they (the Italian Communists) had not taken a firm stand in their fight against the Church. The Italian Communists defended themselves by saying that the anti-clerical movement in a country so profoundly Catholic as Italy could make but slow headway. They suggested renouncing for the moment against attacking the Church itself and concentrating on elaborating what they had against clerical individuals. The fact that the anti-clerical press had not obtained the desired effect was also brought up. Concerning any action of the Italian Communists against the VATICAN, the Soviet officials had to admit that it would have a very insignificant effect. For all these reasons it appeared advisable ~~for~~ for the Soviet Union to launch their attack on an international basis.



~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS  
970TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
EUROPEAN COMMAND

HQ Reg. IV  
ved.  
12 JUN 1947  
000

D-26779 (CIC/S-3/OPS)

AP0 757  
11 June 1947

SUBJECT: OZNA (Jugoslavian Intelligence Agency)

TO : Commanding Officer  
CIC Region IV  
APO 407-A, US Army

1. Reference is made to MOIC, Sub-Region MEMMINGEN, CIC Region IV, dated 27 May 1947, subject: O.Z.N.A. - Yugoslavian Intelligence Agency, and to your request for additional information contained in the 1st Indorsement to letter, Sub-Region MEMMINGEN, CIC Region IV, dated 28 May 1947, file number: IV-K-1302.1, subject: Letter of Transmittal.

2. Information at this headquarters on subject organization is considerably dated and probably would not be of value to you. Higher headquarters has been requested to furnish additional data on this organization and any information received will be forwarded to your region.

3. Paragraph 2 (f) of referenced report states that [REDACTED] is an OZNA agent. Attached for your information is a copy of War Crimes Screening Section report on one [REDACTED]. It is believed to be possible that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are one and the same.

4. Your attention is invited to the fact that this case has been downgraded to Secret.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL INSKEEP:

1 Incl: as stated

Telephone: FRANKFURT 7400  
Lt. [REDACTED]

for [REDACTED]  
EARL S. BROWNING, JR.  
Major, Infantry  
S-3

10643  
OPERATION  
OZNA

CIC  
No. 26779  
JUN 11 1947

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(Classification)

## INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

FILE NO: D-26779 (CIC/S-3/OPS)

SUBJECT: OZNA (Yugoslavian Intelligence Agency)

DATE: 11 June 1947

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	Hqs. 970th CIC Det	Ops Br	11 June 1947	<p>1. Transmitted herewith is MOIC, Sub-Region MEMMINGEN, CIC Region IV, dated 27 May 1947, subject as above.</p> <p>2. The inclosed information was obtained from informant who has established contact with anti-TITO forces in Yugoslavia and the report pertains to the recent re-organization of OZNA.</p> <p>3. It would be appreciated if your branch could furnish this headquarters any additional background information on subject organization.</p> <p><i>for</i> <b>JOHN L. INKKEP</b> <i>my An</i> Colonel, Cavalry Commanding</p>
1 Incl: as stated SCH/bjl/Tel: 7400				
2.	Ops Br ODDI	Hq 970th CIC Det	16 June 1947	<p>1. Reference paragraph 3, Minute 1, above, your attention is invited to the attached War Department Detachment Intelligence Reports.</p> <p>2. Request return of attached reports as expeditiously as possible for return to the Research and Analysis Branch.</p> <p><i>for</i> <b>RICHARD D. WENTWORTH</b> Colonel GSC Chief, Operations Branch</p>
4 Incls:				
<p>1. As stated above w/d.</p> <p>2. Intel Rpt, External Survey Det, ROME, subj: [REDACTED]</p> <p>3. Intel Rpt, External Survey Det, ROME, Subj: OZNA, Org and Functions.</p> <p>4. Intel Rpt, External Survey Det, BERN, dtd 23 Dec 46, subj: UDBA formerly OZNA.</p> <p>Telephone: 6426 (Major [REDACTED])</p>				<p>393</p> <p><i>for</i> <b>RICHARD D. WENTWORTH</b> Colonel GSC Chief, Operations Branch</p> <p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 JUN 1999 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P</p>
0758				<p>returned to Ops 23 June 47 scr</p> <p><del>SECRET</del> (Classification)</p> <p>26746</p>

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HEADQUARTERS

SUB-REGION MEMMINGEN

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS REGION IV

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO  
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BY AUTHORITY OF MAJ GEO B

File No.: IV-K-1302.1

GIN, BY

APD 407-A  
27 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE

SUBJECT: O.Z.N.A. - Yugoslavian Intelligence Agency

1. Reason for report: Informant P-17-IV-K has established contact with anti-Tito forces in Yugoslavia and has forwarded the following report concerning the recent reorganization of the O.Z.N.A., which has taken place during the past six months.

a. (Comments: Reference is made to U S F B T SIS, dtd 7 Dec 46, par. 11, in which it is reported that the OZNA has changed its name to the UDB (Uprava Drzavn Bezbednos)). Evaluation C-3). Informant's report does not indicate that this name change has taken place; this however is not to be construed that the namechange has not taken place.

2. Informant reports that the OZNA at present consists of three departments:

Administrative Department  
Political Department  
Foreign Department

a. The administrative department is concerned exclusively with the administration problems such as the administration of the civilian police (Miliz), control of the work of the M.O. (former local administration), as well as city and county administration committees, passport methods, control of food ration cards, card indexes, and general overall administrative control. Due to the present reorganization and decentralization there exist in each of the three federated republics - Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia - their own administrative department (UPRAWNI). These are, however, purely fiction, since the directive from the Ministry of the Interior dated 17 January 1947, which stated that all decrees of the administrative department of the OZNA cannot be carried out without the permission of the Ministry of Interior. Due to these directives, all federative administration departments are overburdened with work, because the newer personnel is not in the position to meet present emergencies nor able to bring reports to completion for presentation to the Ministry. As a result, the administrative department is completely disorganized. Of the older officials, 75% were either outright released and pensioned, or arrested. Replacements were based on party adherence rather than ability.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(MOIC, Re OZNA, dtd 27 May 47, File No. IV-K-1302.1, cont.)

b. The political department is concerned with the propagandizing in the Army, in official offices, in schools and similar institutions. In addition they are also charged with the censorship of the press, education of political commissars, school methods, and supervision of various special courses and schools. Until March 1947 the political department had the Political Police under its control; this organization has now been placed completely under the executive Committee of the Yugoslavian Party.

c. According to reports which have not been checked, the Political Police are directly under the Ministry of Interior. Leading figures are men, who are unknown old Communist Party followers and who are in no way compromised by connections to former illegal political work.

(Comment: Source here assumes that these newly appointed leading personalities of the Political Police come from the Soviet MVD, and were trained and lived for a considerable period in the USSR.)

d. The foreign department is concerned with military and political intelligence in foreign countries. In this work close cooperation exists between the OZNA and the Soviet MVD, Soviet Military Missions, as well as Soviet Repatriation Offices. Yugoslavian Intelligence activity at present is concentrated on Italy and Austria. The foreign department of OZNA works from the following main offices into the British Zone of Austria:

(1). MARIBOR, with branches in GRAZ, LEOBEN, and JUDENBURG.

(2). LAIBACH, with branches in KLAGENFURTH, VILLACH, WELBERG, BILBURG, and EISENKAPPEL.

e. The work of these offices of the foreign department fall generally into the following pattern:

(1). Propaganda in favor of the annexation of the Province of Carinthia (Kärnten) to Yugoslavia. The Austro-Slovenes and the KPO play a certain role in this propagandizing.

(2). Organization of small sabotage groups, who attach themselves to the Austro-Slovenes or to the KPO. These groups are organized according to the traditional Communist three man groups.

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(3). Surveillance and reporting of British troops and troop movements, and above all clarification of the British Intelligence Service.

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(MOIC, Re OZNA, dtd 27 May 47, File No. IV-K-1302.1, cont.)

f. Informant reports that, in the beginning of April 1947, two OZNA Agents were allegedly sent into the American Zone of Germany, in order to take up contact with American Intelligence Agencies. The following are the two agents:

- (1). [REDACTED] cover name [REDACTED]
- (2). [REDACTED] cover name [REDACTED]

Both agents possess large sums of money, are well-dressed, and speak English, French and German.

3. AGENT'S NOTES:

a. Evaluation of source and information: B-3.

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC

APPROVED:

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC  
Commanding

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COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
ZONE ONE - APO 512  
U.S. ARMY

28/7/47  
D-16643 021 "A"  
20 May 1947  
SOI g-1008

Z-660

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

SUBJECT : OZNA Organization in Ajdovscina (Aidussina), Zone "B"

1. The following information has reached this Office through Informant IG-2001, a resident of Zone "B". Evaluation unknown.
2. The Regional OZNA in Ajdovscina which has jurisdiction over the Slovene part of Zone "B" is divided into Districts, as listed below:

<u>Postojna District</u>	(J1687)
<u>Ajdovscina District</u>	(H9299)
<u>Idrija District</u>	(C6923)
<u>Tolmin District</u>	(C7932)
<u>Kozina-Herpelj District</u>	(H9268)
<u>Ilirska Bistrica District</u>	(J1864)
<u>Koper District</u>	(H7862)

These districts are sub-divided into sub-Districts. Ajdovscina is divided into two sub-Districts, Vipava and Ajdovscina. It is not known how the other districts are sub-divided. It is reported that the only actual organized OZNA in Zone "A" exists in the proximity of the Morgan Line for the purpose of controlling black-market activities, courier and other illegal activities. Especially well-organized is OZNA in the BRJE area (north of Comeno) where the border guards (KNOJ) and National Security Agents cannot exercise a strict and efficient control on the Morgan Line due to the difficult terrain in that area. Other contacts in Zone A are maintained directly through the agents of the Regional OZNA or of the Ministry of Slovenia OZNA Section. Point 770 is responsible to Point 24 OZNA in Ljubljana.

3. The organizational plan of OZNA in Ajdovscina is as follows:

Regional OZNA in Ajdovscina: Known as T 770 (point Tocka 770)

Chief of T 770: "[redacted]", major, from Ilirska Bistrica, 190 cm. tall, black hair, thin build, and a mechanic.

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COL D. G. ERSKINE, BY Elmer J. Loma  
HQ 65TH CIC DET, 14 JULY 1950

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DATE 160505Z 05-2003

2nd in Command, T 770: ANDRAZIC, Anton, "Mirko", born 1899 in Domzale, Schoolteacher, brown hair, full face, thin build, and wears no rank.

Regional OZNA, Ajdovscina, T 770, includes a section called II Section. This section has seven sub-sections each of which control the work of seven districts as listed below; with the following named individuals controlling the work of the corresponding district:

"Vojka"	in charge of <u>Ajdovscina</u> District
"Zitko"	" " " <u>Postojna</u> District
"Bozo"	" " " <u>Tolmin</u> District
"Zdenko"	" " " <u>Kozina-Herpelj</u> District
"Cvetka"	" " " <u>Ilirska Bistrica</u> Dist.
	" " " <u>Koper</u> District

(It is not known who has charge of Idrija District)

T 770 has one Criminal Investigation Section. Their chief interests are crimes of a political nature, murders of political functionaries, and on some occasions problems which the National Security cannot solve. Chief of the Criminal Section: " ", height, 175 cm; heavy build; small mustache; usually well-dressed.

Photographer: " " (fmu), from Vipava; former proprietor of a photo shop in Vipava; married, height 165 cm; black hair, ruddy complexion.

Agents for Criminal Section: " " and " " who is called the Tehnicni Preiskovalec or technical investigator.

The Criminal Section has two typists, names unknown

The T 770 Administrative Section elaborates and distributes all incoming information. Administrative personnel include three women and two men. (Names unknown)

T 770 (Regional OZNA Ajdovscina) has three so-called instructors whose exact function in the organization is not known. Informant is led to believe, however, that they direct operational activities such as arrests, infiltrations, and act as advisor on some occasions. These instructors include:

" " from Sevnica, near Maribor.  
 " " from Idrija, a Lt; his sister " " is an administrative employee  
 " " from Ljubljana

T 770 transportation facilities include:

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2 trucks; one is used for carrying out arrests and another for the

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E 770 transportation facilities include: (cont.)

- 1 bus: used for excursions and large transportation of arrestees.
- 3 automobiles
- 7 motorcycles

4. Organizational plan of District OZNA in Ajdovscina.  
Point T 22, is as follows:

- a. Chief of Point T 22: [redacted] born [redacted] from [redacted] on Yugoslav Austrian border, carpenter; single, height 175 cm; brown hair, thin face; ruddy complexion; wears no rank; mole on nose; previously served in KNOJ; graduated from the First Intelligence Course in Belgrade from 1/4/1945 to 7/8/1945.
- b. 2nd in Command T 22: [redacted] born [redacted]; from [redacted]; farmer, single; height 170 cm; brown hair; small mustache; fat face; wears no rank; graduated from the Second Criminal Investigation Course at KNOJ Station in Maribor.
- c. Agents: [redacted] "Ivo"; 22 yrs of age; from [redacted] first floor; in charge of the Ajdovscina sub-District, height 160 cm; dark hair; fat face.  
[redacted] born [redacted] from [redacted] student; in charge of the Vipava Sub-District; height 170 cm; black, curly hair.

d. Transportation facilities for T22 include:

- 1 automobile
- 2 motorcycles

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e. Office of T 22 has one telephone which is connected directly with "[redacted]" (covername for T 770). T 770 telephones are connected to the Ajdovscina civilian exchange.

f. Headquarters of both T 22 and T 770 are located in the former CCRR (Carabinieri Reali) barracks in Ajdovscina.

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5. Point T 22 (District OZNA Ajdovscina) has an intelligence net extending into Zone "A". The sub-district of Vipava is in charge of the organization of intelligence in the area called BRJE which includes the villages of Vrh, (J1980): Preserje, Rihenberg, and Kodrovi. A Third Resident controls this area, who was one [REDACTED] became ill and was replaced by [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] former secretary of KP cell #2 in Rihenberg; former C.O. of the Ljubljana OZNA jail; a member of the Partisan Gradnik Brigade since June 1943; went to the Intelligence Course in Belgrade; was at one time stationed at Point T 24, Ljubljana; was in constant contact with one [REDACTED] who gave him reports on the KP secretaries of the Komen District; possesses three revolvers; and possesses a book called ALIBI which is a book of instructions for OZNA personnel.

6. Informants (OZNA) for the BRJE area include:

- a. Rihenberg: [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] resides at [REDACTED] farmer, secretary of KP cell #1 in Rihenberg and of the 6th SKOJ cell.
- b. Preserje: [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] resides at [REDACTED] home of [REDACTED] schoolteacher; graduated from Political Course for KP secretaries; ex-political secretary of SKOJ in the College at Ljubljana; ex-member of the District Committee of SKOJ for Kojško District.
- [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] resides at [REDACTED] UAIS Secretary for Preserje; KP organizer, during the winter of 46-47 OZNA meetings were held in his home.
- c. Kodrovi: [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] chauffeur; slovene; Resident of Martini; arrested in 1943 by the Germans and taken to Prussia from where he escaped in 1944; member of Ajdovscina Town Command in 1945 and later transferred into KNOJ (II sub-section of reconnaissance unit); demobilized and transferred into the T 22 intelligence net; a fanatic communist; known to have killed several persons on the Yugoslav Austrian border.

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7. The following named individuals are to be OZNA "pumps":

- a. [REDACTED] resident of Britof; born [REDACTED] farmer; finished the 7th elementary class in school; head of the propaganda commission for Rihenberg; poor eyesight

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- b. [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] resident of [REDACTED] Slovene; former; finished the 7th elementary class in school; Sindicati Unici secretary for Preserje; SKOJ member; lauded for courage at Preserje and Dol by OZNA (VOS).

8. There are two members of T 770 who are known to be information gatherers in Zone "A". In the Gorizia area, the OZNA representative is reported to be:

"[REDACTED]"; height, 180 cm; thin face; brown hair, married resides in Ajdovscina; supposedly often seen in Gorizia at the Bar Kadermac in Piazza Vittoria, Gorizia; originally from Ljubljana. In the city of Trieste, there is supposedly one "[REDACTED]" who makes regular reports to T 770. In March 1947 "[REDACTED]" was in contact with one [REDACTED] who is from Birsi near Rihenbergl.

9. In a conversation between [REDACTED] (Chief, T22) and [REDACTED] (who is in control of operations in BRJE area), the following points were brought out in regard to OZNA organization in the FREE STATE OF TRIESTE: All present OZNA commitments in Trieste would be taken over by the KP. Only on special cases would agents be sent into Trieste.

10. On a district level, OZNA is able to cover the population by means of a widely organized intelligence net. Following is the chain of Command existing in the OZNA Intelligence net for the Ajdovscina (Aidussina) District, also officially called Point T 22:

First Residents:	Chief of T 22, in Command of the District; Second in Command, or Aid to the Chief.
Second Residents:	Agents in charge of sub-Districts
Third Residents:	Agents who collaborate information with Second Residents. Third Residents are divided into three categories:  1st Category---Confidants 2nd Category---Informants 3rd Category---"Pump" (Individuals who, sometimes unknowingly supply information)

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a. The Chief of T 22, or the Chief of District OZNA, is, according to OZNA hierarchy language, called the First Resident (Prvi Rezident). On the same level of the First Resident is the Chief's aid (namestnik). The Chief and Aid know all secrets of the District OZNA operations. They do not work as agents but merely submit reports and recommendations, based on information submitted to them, to the Regional OZNA Headquarters, officially called T 770.

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by an old OZNA informant from the same village of the "pump," or by the KP cell secretary. This report is submitted to Point T 22. If Point T 22 approves the recommendation and the report, the confident then swears the new informant into the organization in this manner:

"I...(name)....., am conscious of the difficult situation at hand and it is my duty to fight a political battle against all traitors, reactionaries, belogardisti, and egotist's desire for personal advancement rather than general advancement of the Party (KP). I state that I shall be assiduous and obedient to my superiors and I shall work for the people. I am aware that if I should compromise myself I shall be punished by KP measures. I am duly informed that I shall never divulge the intelligence net and I shall never tell for whom or with whom I work. From this date I shall impartially work for the VDV."

14. After performing his duties as an informant and rendering good reports, the informant is considered for the position of confident. He is sent to an intelligence school and if he graduates from this school, the informant takes the following oath:

"I swear to be a conscientious worker and to combat the reactionaries, and those egotists desiring personal gain rather than the betterment of our Party, and followers of secret organizations. I shall never betray the principles of secrecy, never pose as an OZNA member, and never compromise my informants. On the occasion of my withdrawal or dismissal from the OZNA organization, I shall never disclose the fact I was an OZNA member or disclose any information concerning those who worked with me." The foregoing statement is signed with address and date of birth disclosed on the sworn statement. This oath is administered by a First or Second Resident. Three pictures of the newly sworn confident are included with the oath; one full face, one profile, and one rear view photo of the individual.

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15. When an OZNA informant or a Resident has sufficient information regarding a suspicious person, they submit a report, called IZJAVA (statement) to the District OZNA (T 22). If the information warrants an arrest, District OZNA issues this warrant and the arrest is carried out, usually by KNOJ or National Defense. In many instances, another IZJAVA is submitted after the arrest to District OZNA concerning the arrestee. Interrogation of arrestee does not take place in OZNA Offices. Measures are taken that an arrestee cannot obtain any information concerning location of their offices or any properties located within OZNA Office premises. Two persons conduct all interrogations on the arrestee, one who interrogates, and the second acts as

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as a guard and watches all psychological effects of interrogation on the arrestee. Primary interrogation is focused on breaking prisoner's moral strength and it is during this primary interrogation that the prisoner is made aware that OZNA has all information concerning his activities. In many cases the primary interrogations are usually sufficient to "break" the prisoner due to the great amount of minute details which are obtained by OZNA prior to an arrest, and secondly due to the great fear which is imbedded by OZNA upon the population. If a second interrogation takes place, the prisoner is usually beaten. If this procedure does not "break" the prisoner, he is sent to Higher Headquarters. It is reported that it is not known of any actual torture procedure that takes place at Point T 22.

16. OZNA is in close cooperation with every political and economic organization. The party members of these organizations are responsible to OZNA for accurate reports on the morale of the civilian population, administrative errors in the different organizations, political corruption, etc. In addition to this, the local Communist Party cell of the villages must report accurate political occurrences in their particular area. The junior body of the Communist Party known as SKOJ is also obliged to submit regular reports of their activities as well as the situation in their area. In this manner OZNA is in constant receipt of reports from practically every second or third person in Zone "B". In the Ajdovscina area there are five communes in which are local bureaus of the Communist Party. These units are responsible for detailed reports on the attitude of the population towards the FLR Yugoslavia. If some individual is reported as adverse to the policy of the government, he is removed and deprived from membership in the UAIS, and segregated from the "good population", consequently he is unable to attend social functions, is commonly known among the population as an unreliable character, and he is prevented from associating with the rest of the population.

17. The original report is forwarded to the District OZNA (T 22) and any possible copies that have been made must be destroyed. If there are any items in the report that may be of interest to KNOJ Intelligence or the NZ (National Security), a copy of the report is sent to each of the a/m organizations. KNOJ is primarily interested in information dealing with the military while NZ is interested in information of black market operations, contraband, etc.

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18. Rank is of no importance in the OZNA organization. Some officers wear their rank. It is noted however, the individual in charge of a specific case is entrusted with the authority necessary for completion of his mission, regardless of the rank he holds.

19. Utmost importance is stressed on not compromising OZNA personnel. If a confident comes to District OZNA, he is not allowed to enter the office during the day. If the Second Resident (Agent) contacts him at his home, the meeting will not take place within the home. They will contact each other in a wooded area, or drive off

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together in an automobile. Confidants are forbidden to have any official credentials or documents in their homes. It is also the responsibility of the Confident to guard the identity of his informants. Confidants cannot talk to informants personally. Messages are sent by safe courier. It can be noted that it is reported that during the last two years not one OZNA informant has been compromised by an informant in the BRJE area. In written reports, the name of the place from where the report is written is disclosed by using the first letter and last letter of the name. For example, the name of BRJE would be BE in a report. Names of informants or Third Residents are changed in reports. First and last are changed in all reports and signed by this falsified name. The false name must be approved by the District OZNA and is, if accepted, carefully booked.

20. The following is the administrative system which was in force in 1946 in the Intelligence Center of the First Battalion, Second Brigade, KMOJ. Since at that time the Intelligence Centers were a part of Military OZNA, it is believed that this information is also true for the present OZNA bookkeeping:

- |                               |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| a. <u>RUKOVODNIK</u>          | In this book is listed the daily schedule   |
| b. <u>TELEFONSKA KNJIZICA</u> | All incoming and outgoing telephone orders and reports are entered in this book   |
| c. <u>RADIJSKA KNJIZICA</u>   | All incoming and outgoing wireless reports are entered in this book   |
| d. <u>DELOVODNIK</u>          | Two of these are kept; one for incoming and one for outgoing reports. The date, subject, informant's name, and the file number are kept in this book. |
| e. <u>PREGLEDNICA</u>         | This is a short resume of finished cases  |
| f. <u>KARTOTeka</u>           | This book contains names filed from reports in alphabetical order, which are usually suspect cases.   |

21. The following are names of various OZNA personalities as obtained from informant:

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- a. [REDACTED] born [REDACTED], farmer and bar owner; organizer of KP and SKOJ; OZNA informant of Rihenberg; went to KMOJ Intelligence Course in Ljubljana in April 1947.

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- b. [REDACTED] from Preserje; sister of [REDACTED], born [REDACTED] OZNA "pump" and courier from PISCANEC to T 22.
- c. [REDACTED]; born [REDACTED], farmer, from Vrtojba; formerly had direct contact with T 22 in summer of 1946; reported as being employed in the District cooperative in Ajdovscina.
- d. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED], had contacts with EGOM, in March 1946; presently in Trieste employed in a butcher shop on Via Giulia.
- e. [REDACTED] OZNA "pump"; born [REDACTED], from Rihenberg; member of XVII Brigade Intelligence Platoon.
- f. [REDACTED] born [REDACTED]; from Cinkri (Zone "B"); OZNA courier during period of June 1946 to August 1946, between BRJE and T 22; KP member; presently employed in Ajdovscina.

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIC

APPROVED:

[REDACTED]  
Supervising Agent  
CIC - Zone One

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APPENDIX ONE

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TRANSLATION FROM SLOVENE:

Ajdovscina 24 April 1947

Headquarters T 22 Ajdovscina  
Secret, #345/47 I.

Subject: Drafting

To : All members of the Intelligence Net T 22

The Regional Command of UDV in Ajdovscina has notified us that:

1. The Command of the UDV for Ajdovscina started the drafting of volunteers for Marshal TITO's Headquarters from its own members. All members who are interested must present themselves in our office not later than 25/5/47. They will have with them the recommendations of the KP, two photographs, birth certificate, soldbook, and OZNA identity card. The course for the draftees will take place in Belgrade commencing 15 June 1947.

2. The Ministry of Slovenia (Section UDV) sent to us the forms for the drafting of volunteers who would go into the political struggle against the armed bands in the area of the Julian Alps, Karavanke and Pohorje. All who are conscious of present duties are invited to present themselves in our office as soon as possible and in large numbers. All additional directives will be given in this office.

Chief, T 22  
(Signed: [redacted])

Stamp:  
POOBELASISTIVO UDV  
ZA AJDOVSKI OKRAJ

(The Command of the UDV for  
Ajdovscina District)

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This is not a true copy. It was read by the informant at [redacted] home for information purposes. [redacted] was responsible for the original's return to the UDV in Ajdovscina, but the informant took note of its contents.

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APPENDIX TWO

Translated from Slovene:

Ajdovscina, 24 April 1947

Headquarters T 22 Ajdovscina  
Secret, #344/47. D/

Subject: Circular

To : All residents and informants of T 22

T 22 orders to all its residents and informants to familiarize themselves with circular #344/47. D/.

As you have already been informed, the petitions based on information on hand should be completed before the annexation (of V.G. to Jugoslavia).

With this we declare: The District OZNA for Vjdovscina will immediately after the annexation incorporate Komen, Mirna, and Grgar Districts. All residents must prepare themselves in order that these petitions may be procured from all Districts. Petitions should be written using form #8. The petitions will distinguish between villages and Districts and will use the cover names as have been communicated to us. You will distinguish between:

- Clergy
- Divert contacts
- Private statements of the population
- Speculators
- Criminals
- Lists of VGCP in Zone "A"
- Lists of all ANG employees and ANG members (officials)

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Chief T 22  
(Signed: )

Stamp:  
POBELASCENSEVO UDV  
ZA AJDOVSKI OKRAJ

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(The Command of the UDV for  
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APPENDIX THREE

TRANSLATED FROM SLOVENE LANGUAGE:

BE. 15/9/1946

Point T 22

TO: Comr. [REDACTED]

On 11 September 1946, I had the occasion to speak with an English soldier. His name was [REDACTED] who is of British nationality and from Bristol, England.

We began a conversation when I asked him how the situation in England was. He stated that everything is organized for the KP such as it is here. His father is a schoolteacher and a KP and writes him often concerning the situation in England. [REDACTED] condemned the British and American Policy. I then, slowly began to question him how they had organized their Civil Police and how the CP treated the people. To this he replied that the Yugoslav CP (OZMA) is operating in Zone "A". Of course, I asked him how he has come to know the Yugoslav CP is operating in this area and who are the members of the Yugoslav Civil Police. He stated that according to information received at the road block from informants it is known that a member of OZMA from Batuj, one "[REDACTED]", real name [REDACTED] frequents the area. I then asked him why this man is not arrested, to which he replied that they will arrest him at a time when they are certain that he is carrying something on his person. I also asked [REDACTED] if he knows of someone else. He replied that there are several others of whom he knew but they have not crossed the block during times he has been there. He told me that the Civil Police drove to the road block on motorcycle and then proceeded by foot. He also stated that they have photographs of many of our functionaries who pass through the road block in various places. It appeared to me that [REDACTED] was suspicious and feared that I was sent by the English, who are already suspicious of him, as he is known to be a sympathizer with our cause. It was evident, from his reactions, that the English are setting up an espionage network in this area.

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I asked him about one more point; does he know Comr. [REDACTED]. He replied he did not know this man. However, I stated that [REDACTED] must be a member of the Yugoslav Police since I had heard him once shouting at a woman on a train at Ajdovscina threatening to turn her over to the police as a belogardist. He denied this with a smile, which I understood, leading me to believe he was a member of their net.

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APPENDIX THREE (cont.)

I asked him time and time again to disclose their intelligence net but he said that he cannot tell these secrets to anyone. He must know to whom he is talking. I did not have my credentials and I was not able to call you. He had to leave the following day for his company. They especially do not like him and transfer him often. He told me, however, that the C.O. of the road block, a sergeant, would work for us. The sergeant, is, as I learned later, a man who has no intentions of returning to England but will go to Yugoslavia.

All this happened in a bar but a portion of the conversation took place outside.

\*\*\*\*

APPENDIX FOUR

TRANSLATED FROM SLOVENE LANGUAGE:

The following report was made by one [REDACTED] [REDACTED], on 27 November 1946. This report reportedly reached OZNA Ajdovscina:

[REDACTED] born [REDACTED] at [REDACTED], resides at [REDACTED] and daughter of a farmer.

STATEMENT #1 CONCERNING [REDACTED]: During the Italian occupation, [REDACTED] was in Trieste as a maid until the collapse of Italy. In March 1943, she began a love affair with a [REDACTED] and went with him to Palermo. Since her youth she has been of bad character and had relations with Italian officers. In September 1943, she came home and in an attempt to eradicate her past she went to the Partisans, from which she deserted after ten days. In December 1943, I learned that [REDACTED] was a military post mistress. Since I knew her, I denounced her to Comrade "[REDACTED]" who was at that time in in the Carso section of OZNA. I told him that I did not want her to carry my mail, that I suspect her of disclosing information about Partisan troops to the Gestapo and that two of her brothers were squadristi in the Gilotti unit.

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STATEMENT #2: While she was at her home in 1943 the following incident occurred: On June 18 (1943) I was summoned to the CCR station in Komen. I did not go but later I was arrested and interrogated regarding the possible occupation of our house by the Partisans. I denied everything but the Maresciallo knew the exact hour when the Partisans were in the house. He was so careless that I saw the sworn statements denouncing me signed by [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] sister and father of [REDACTED] I

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APPENDIX FOUR (cont.)

was slapped and released. Upon my return home I told [REDACTED] that her family had betrayed me to the CGRR. She replied: You can be happy that something else did not happen to you, and she asked me where I get the money to be so nicely dressed. She also stated that I have a sister in Russia who is a pilot and that I get money from the SSSR.

STATEMENT #3: When I came on leave 28 February 1944, I noticed that the Partisans were trying to apprehend [REDACTED]. She was arrested on 1 March 1944. She was in possession of 348 Rf and coupons for German military messes. For punishment she was sent by the Vipava Military District to the IVAN GRADNIK forced labor camp. In a combat with the Germans, she escaped, and her rumored that she was in the Gorizia jail awaiting deportation to a German concentration camp. However, I learned from a Gorizia informant that she had been transported to Trieste, Via Monfalcone, in a Gestapo automobile. Two days later she wrote a letter to her mother stating: "I want you to bring me a raincoat and shoes immediately. I still serve as before." She gave this letter to her sister from Kontoval. The sister gave it to her cousin [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]. She gave it to me. I ordered her to mention the letter to the mother. The letter was then handed over to the Staff of OZMA in Trieste. After the German collapse, [REDACTED] returned to her home accompanied by Allied Officers and no one was able to harm her. Presently she resides in Trieste. According to a report from OZMA informant in Trieste, [REDACTED] is often seen with Allied Officers from the American CID and CIC and FSS Agents. She is also seen at the PMOO dances where she talks with high officials of our authorities. Often she comes home with American officers.

\*\*\*\*\*

(It was learned through Informant that the following named individuals were entrusted to apprehend [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] born [REDACTED] resident of Rihenberg.  
[REDACTED], from Bizjaki, near Rihenberg.  
[REDACTED] born [REDACTED] from Britof, near Rihenberg.  
[REDACTED] from Santa Croce, near Trieste

The leader of all a/m individuals is one [REDACTED] from BRJE in Zone B, who made the statement: "If she comes to her home in Publje, even with American, we will open fire and discourage Americans and supporting reactionaries."

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APPENDIX FIVE

TRANSLATED FROM SLOVENE LANGUAGE:

BE 16/10/1946

TO: T 770 ( )

Included are some statements concerning , from , who has been arrested by NO. It was necessary to arrest him although the road block (Jugoslav) had no derogatory information concerning him. I acquired some data concerning him. Find out where he is at present. He was sent to the Headquarters of First Battalion Second Brigade 2 KNOJ Division.

Now I am looking for information concerning the bus-driver. The NZ of Rihenberg intends to take him to Zone B. I now have a nice opportunity for intelligence work since I am a member of the committee for the purging of Fascists. The Clergy is still distributing the SLOVENSKI PRIMOREC and other clerical newspapers.

I have been of late reporting the conditions prevailing in the Christian democracy. I am in contact with a young reactionary, , from Pecenkovi, BRJE. In the village of Pecenkovi there are strange women who often come to the families of clerical sympathizers. The priest, , has many followers in the same families.

Comr. , ex-member of T 21, requested me to follow , from Martini BRJE. I learned the following: has contact once a week with a reactionary family called from Preserje. He is followed by the SKOJ from Preserje. He travels steadily between Zone A and B. He smuggles alcohol into Zone B and made false certificates allowing him to do this.

of Pecenkovi BRJE goes each day to Cernice, Zone B to the priest, , he should be searched at the road block since he is suspected as a courier of "anti-people's" mail.

As far as the trial of Bishop , the reactionaries think he was not guilty and are blaming our authorities as being atheists. They say Religion is in danger. The hope much on the KRIZARJI bands who are on the Yugoslav Austrian border to liberate them.

Since Comr. is no longer in Ajdovscina, being on leave, I propose that our contacts shall be established through .

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I do not have paper. Could you send me some typewriter paper, envelopes, and carbons. I cannot buy them and I have no money as you know.

Drago - LOZEJ Mirjo

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APPENDIX SIX

TO: T 770 Adjovscina (Stane)

STATEMENT concerning arrestee, [REDACTED] born [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. In the last few days of September SUBJECT went from Oglica, Zone B, to Rihenberg, where he was soon employed by a shoemaker, [REDACTED]. The SIAU Committee from Rihenberg decided to infiltrate him and send [REDACTED] to observe him. He obtained the following results which he swears are true.

"In the bar BIRSA, [REDACTED] stated: "On the Worker's Festival in Ajdovscina, I beat up Italian Garibaldini who participated in the Parade of Labor. The democracy in Yugoslavia is not a democracy but a dictatorship."

[REDACTED] has observed that [REDACTED] intends to escape to Germany and has begun to collect food and ammunition for his pistol. In the Bar BIRSA in Britof, [REDACTED] declared while drunk, that a family [REDACTED] from Britof are propagandists against FLEJ.

On Sunday, 13 October he behaved very badly and was identified by FZ. The Civil Police arrested him and then released him after four hours although he did not have permission to be in Zone A.

Since September until the day he was arrested, [REDACTED] has been in the Civil Police Office thirteen times, staying there from two to three hours each time. He has been seen with the C.O. of the CP Station, [REDACTED] and CP member [REDACTED] who is the worst Fascist among the Civil Police personnel.

The civilian population of Rihenberg consider [REDACTED] as being "anti-people."

(Not signed)

.....

Note: ([REDACTED] is presently in the OZMA jail in Ajdovscina, Cell #1).

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## APPENDIX SEVEN

The following is a personality report submitted to an OZNA member to be forwarded. This report was written by one [REDACTED].

The school teacher, [REDACTED], lives in Dornberg, and has been teaching in Rihenburg, since October 1946. He graduated in Gorizia; his brother is a Partisan and he visits his girl-friend, who lives in Idrija, once or twice a week.

I met him in the DIJASKI COM (Students' home) in Gorizia while I was residing there when I came from BRDA in July 1946. His political outlook has completely changed since that time. During the war he acted as a partisan first aid man. He was also a member of SKOJ, and took part in many activities such as stencilling the walls with the propaganda slogans, but he is taking no interest in anything at this time.

During our conversation after the classes, he has often said to me: "I, too, used to be as foolish as you are, but have come to know better." When I was given some questionnaires to complete with information on individuals' activities outside the school province, I asked him what I should put down on his questionnaire. He replied that I only ought to mention that he was a member of the UALS, just an ordinary member, and that he now no longer dabbled with politics, such a task being more congenial for those who were Partisans. He stated, "I have quite enough in knowing that I was a Partisan." He often states that he will not work as an active member, but will be prepared to fight if it need be.

On the whole he follows instructions issued by the Allied Military Government. He is using only those books which are approved by the AMG. He is a first-class materialist, and is teaching the children to ignore politics and concentrate on money making. On his visits to Gorizia, he invariably contacts the AMG, though there is not the slightest reason for his doing so. He makes a point of teaching the pupils only Slovene National Songs, and is omitting to teach them the Partisan songs. The other day, he went so far as to say that he will stick to this program until such a time as the annexation has been effected, and only after that date he might try to do something for the OF too.

414

There is no response from him concerning invitations to attend the conferences arranged by our District School Inspector. He did not attend a single one thus far. He is as impudent as to say that "Comrade TATJANA had better come to Rihenburg if she wishes him to attend."

He is not a people's teacher but a prudent ass. He is associating with another teacher [REDACTED], from Dornberg, who according to ROJC's statement is being conveyed to the school by a jeep and comes from St. Pietro near Gorizia. [REDACTED] is no different from ROJC.

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APPENDIX SEVEN (cont.)

In reference to the personality report of [REDACTED] Informant IG-2001 scanned a letter from District SKOJ Committee of Ajdovscina in reply to [REDACTED] of SKOJ in Rihenberg, who had written the committee for advice concerning [REDACTED].

The letter stated that [REDACTED] is an informant. [REDACTED] supposedly had learned from an unknown source that [REDACTED] is only posing as a reactionary in order to obtain information from one [REDACTED] AMG school supervisor in Komen. [REDACTED] trusts [REDACTED], believing him to be a "White". [REDACTED] was reported as reliable by [REDACTED], Secretary of the KP for the Gorizia District.

\*\*\*\*

APPENDIX EIGHT

Following are various reports sent to OZNA Ajdovscina, T 22.

Report, dated 31 August 1946: In the last eight days I have noted mass smuggling in my section. The smugglers are mostly from Vipava, and Otlica. They smuggle primarily foodstuff; the names of the smugglers are:

[REDACTED] born [REDACTED] smuggle cigarettes & alcohol  
[REDACTED] born [REDACTED] resident of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] from Martini

Report dated 22 October 1946: I have already reported that on 18 October the Allied interpreter came to the road block and showed interest in the relations of the population and Allies. He asked if he could get any contacts and also a girl. Comr. [REDACTED], our collaborator, posed as being anti-Communist and prepared to give him information. The next day the interpreter asked him about the school. On 21 October the school was raided by the Allies (the interpreter was with them). They asked the school teacher to remove all pictures of Marshal Tito.

Report dated 30 October 1946: The Civil Police Station in Rihenberg was again organized. It contains 27 men armed with automatic pistols and rifles; 2 trucks; 1 jeep; 8 Italian and other Slovene agents; patrols, daily from 2 to 4; men in each patrol going in the direction of Preserje, Vrh, Brancis, and Kodrovo. They mistreat the civilian population.

415

JUN 13 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO  
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1P

JUN 13 1947

D10643

HEADQUARTERS  
EUROPEAN COMBAND  
Office of the Deputy Director of Intelligence  
APO 777, US Army

Classification Cancelled (changed) to  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ by Authority of  
Major Briggs  
Date: Aug-1952

2-661  
26 May 1948

OHI/CIB/ES D-10643

SUBJECT: Agents of OZNA in GRAZ

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff  
United States Forces, Austria  
APO 777, US Army

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 21 June 02  
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

1. Information, evaluated C-3, regarding an OZNA center in GRAZ (048/B85), Gabelsbergerstrasse No. 20/1, British Zone of Austria, is forwarded for your information.

2. [redacted] is the head of this OZNA center. He is a Czech by birth, but pretends to be a Yugoslav. [redacted] was detained in a concentration camp in AGRAM, Yugoslavia during the war, was liberated by the Russians and later turned up in GRAZ wearing a lieutenant's uniform of the TITO partisans. After the withdrawal of the Russians he was detained several times by the Austrian police because of having weapons. [redacted] became secretary of the Concentration League and cooperated with the Austrian police. He provided himself with Austrian certificates and joined the Communist Party (KP). By his efforts the Concentration Camp League was connected with the activities of OZNA.

3. Connections with the OZNA center in GRAZ;

a. The Yugoslavian committee of repatriation in Hotel Sedimental in GRAZ; The Serb [redacted] is the liaison agent and lives under an alias at Felix Dahnplatz in GRAZ.

b. The Austrian Police;

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A KPD member named [redacted] is the liaison man. He is completely devoted to [redacted].

c. The district office of the KP at Gaidorfplatz in GRAZ;

A Czech by birth named [redacted] is the liaison agent. He claims to be a Croatian. He deals with cocaine and then he maneuvers his victims into the hands of the police.

2-661

[REDACTED]

(Basis: Ltr to A/C of S, G-2, USFA, Subj: Agents' Net of OZNA in GRAZ, dtd 16 May 47)

d. SALZBURG (N48/Z92)

Reporting point unknown. [REDACTED] a Yugoslavian, is the liaison man.

e. The Concentration Camp League of GRAZ, through [REDACTED]

4. Agent directorates and informants of OZNA in GRAZ:

a. [REDACTED] Croatian, a student, about 35-40 years of age. He was detained in the concentration camp of DACHAU for about one year. Before Christmas 1946 he was in Yugoslavia twice.

b. [REDACTED], now living in Rochausgasse No. 10, in SALZBURG.

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED] Captain of the TITO-Army, in civilian clothes.

e. [REDACTED] Captain of the TITO-Army, in civilian clothes.

f. In the middle of March, 1947, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were transferred to the OZNA center in GRAZ to replace [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], who have since disappeared from GRAZ. The present residence of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is still unknown. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are not registered.

g. [REDACTED] a Serb, lived in GRAZ until she disappeared in the middle of March, 1947. She works for the [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED]. Lately, she has been in Yugoslavia two or three times, and every time she was led to the border by an OZNA agent, from there to BELGRAD by car, and again back to the border.

h. [REDACTED] lives in Villengasse No. 30/II in GRAZ, telephone No. 3697. He is a lieutenant in the TITO-Army. He was detained [REDACTED] for six months. On 2 February he left for BRUCK on the Mur River (G18/369). He has not returned as yet. ANDRIJA is commissioned to establish agencies for the OZNA.

i. [REDACTED] a sports teacher, lived in the DP Camp of LIEBHITZ (12/X10) until the middle of March. In the DP Camp he organized communist groups composed of four persons each. He gave every one leaving for Yugoslavia 700 schillings and dinars. He has disappeared since the middle of March.

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j. [REDACTED] born in Croatia, about 54 years of age. Until 1941 he was a lawyer in PANTSCHOWA, Yugoslavia. After 1941 he lived in Croatia, working for the Germans at the Ustascha court. In 1943 he

[REDACTED]

TOP SECRET

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

5USC 552 (b) (7) (C)

[REDACTED]

(Basio; Ltr to A/C of S, G-2, USEA, Subj: Agents' Net of OZNA in GRAZ, dtd 16 May 47)

arrived in Austria with a shipment of Volksdeutschen and became a German citizen. After the surrender he was the examining magistrate in GRAZ and became an Austrian citizen. At the end of 1946 he was transferred to KLAGENFURT (7B/D28). His request to return to Yugoslavia was granted under the condition that he would work for the OZNA. His missions are:

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- (1) To purge Nazis from leading positions.
  - (2) To observe the attitude of the Austrian government and the Western occupational powers toward the Nazis.
  - (3) To issue return certificates for Yugoslavia.

5. The certificates of the OZNA agents operating in GRAZ are sent from LEIBNITZ as blanks.

6. The Concentration Camp League of GRAZ dispatches persons to Yugoslavia for sabotage training. These persons return to GRAZ after being trained.

For the Deputy Director of Intelligence:

Telephone: FRANKFURT 2-2960  
Major MAZUR

M. G. TAYLOR  
Lt. Colonel, GSC  
Executive

MEMO FOR RECORD:

ES/CIB Log 3851, and is forwarded USEA inasmuch as the activity is in the British Zone of Austria. Info is also being forwarded CIC, this Hqs. [REDACTED] this Hq. Extracted for Build-up file.

418

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 22 JUN 1999  
BY USAINSCOM/FOIPA  
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 530012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
ZONE ONE - APO 512  
U S ARMY

FILE

10643

Sub Section "WAW"  
3 April 1947  
Ref. No. a-1039

OZNA Personalities

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Partial list of Organizers and Leaders of OZNA and Communist Party in Yugoslavia.

1. The following information (Evaluation C-3) pertaining to prominent leaders and organizers of OZNA and the Communist Party in Yugoslavia was gained through an interrogation of two Yugoslav Army deserters and is herewith submitted. (Map of Yugoslavia 1:250,000 is used as reference).

2. OZNA Headquarters for the Province of KOSOVO MITROVICA is at present located at KOSOVSKA MITROVICA in the building which formerly contained the Gestapo Offices, near the LUSTA river.

The following list of individuals are prominent OZNA leaders or followers:

(b)(7)(C)  
3. [REDACTED], approximately 28 years of age, has been a known partisan since 1945, holding the position of Lt. in the SALJ Brigade until 1945, at which time he was made commanding officer of OZNA in KOSOVSKA MITROVICA (SA7200). [REDACTED] was the individual responsible for the execution of [REDACTED] (Dr.), employees of the TRBESA mines (British owned) along with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Capt.), all aforementioned individuals being prominent Albanians from KOSOVSKA MITROVICA. In 1946, [REDACTED] was married to [REDACTED]

(b)(7)(C)  
4. [REDACTED] approximately 25 years of age, has been a recognized partisan and informant of OZNA since 1941, during which period he was a Lieutenant stationed at SALJERI ODRAB. [REDACTED] is a shoemaker by profession and is at present Chief of the Internal Section of District NO located at KOSOVO MITROVICA.

5. [REDACTED] (last name unknown) alias [REDACTED] about 30 years of age, and a known informant for OZNA. He is presently residing at KOSOVO MITROVICA.

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(b)(7)(C)  
6. [REDACTED] approximately 30 years of age, an informant for OZNA, is at present employed by H. ODEORA, located in KOSOVO MITROVICA. [REDACTED] is reported to be residing at KOSOVO MITROVICA.

7. [REDACTED] (fnu) a resident of UROBEVAC, is employed in the interests of OZNA at KOSOVO MITROVICA as a train controller.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Summary Of Information Continued

(b)(7)(C) 8. [REDACTED], a resident of KOSOVO MITROVICA, is a known partisan and OZNA agent, and is at present a railway employee at his place of residence.

The following list of individuals are prominent Communist Party members and leaders:

(b)(7)(C) 9. [REDACTED] is the public prosecutor for the province of KOSOVO METOHIJA where he holds unlimited power over life or death for the populace. He is one of the most powerful Communists in the province and has direct contact with TITO, whom he has visited on many occasions. [REDACTED] has been a known partisan since 1941 and a high functionary of the KPJ along with being a prominent organizer of the Communist Party. [REDACTED] was at one time the Commanding General of the SALJSKA Brigade stationed at KOSOVO MITROVICA, ZAPARSKA Ulica. [REDACTED] is married to a native of Montenegro, his son is an employee of the Post Director at KOSOVO MITROVICA and has known contacts with OZNA. The center of [REDACTED] activities is the city of PRISTINA.

(b)(7)(C) 10. [REDACTED] is of Albanian nationality, originally from DAKOVICI (AL86177) and is at present a Colonel of JA, second in command of operational staff for KOSOVO METOHIJA, residing at PRISTINA. [REDACTED] has been a recognized partisan since 1941, and is reported to have issued orders in 1945, to burn Albanian homes until such time as the Albanians would curtail their opposition against the partisans. As a result of this massacre approximately 60 villages were destroyed and 28,000 people killed.

11. [REDACTED] is a native of Montenegro, OKRUSAI NACETUIK and a known Communist Party member. He is presently operating in KOSOVO METOHIJA.

(b)(7)(C) 12. [REDACTED] the wife of a/m, accompanied him while he was working for partisan interests at SALJSKI ODRED. [REDACTED] is a leading partisan organizer in her own right, holding meetings for the party interests on numerous occasions.

13. [REDACTED] is reported to be the president of the KOSOVO METOHIJA NO. His brother was executed by the Italians during the occupation.

14. The following are known Communist Party members residing in the vicinity of KOSOVO METOHIJA:

(fnu)

420

Ref. No. a-1039 continued.

Miscellaneous Information.

15. The Yugoslav Armored Army was located at SKOPLJE and moved in June 1946 toward the Greek border. It is reported that a period of 15 days was required to prepare the troops for departure.

16. [REDACTED], a Greek nationalist from LERIN (near the Yugoslav border) was formerly serving as a chauffeur for the Ministry of Construction located at LERIN. [REDACTED] an early member of the Communist Party, escaped from LERIN after having killed a Professor known for his Rightist sympathies. [REDACTED] previously stated that Yugoslavia was procuring aid for Greek Communists by supplying them with arms and supplies.

17. In the summer of 1946 the training school for guerilla troops was located at SKOPLJE where [REDACTED] was attending in the capacity of a Lieutenant. At this time [REDACTED] informed all interested individuals that transportation across the border into Greece could be furnished to all those desiring to engage in active combat for the Communist cause.

18. [REDACTED] is the Political Delegate of the Third Platoon, Third Company, First Battalion, First Brigade, Fourth KNOJ Division located at BELGRADE.

19. [REDACTED] a resident of [REDACTED] is a representative for the public prosecutor of KOSOVO MITROVICA (OKRUG District).

20. The Yugoslav Ensigns of the Third Company, Second Battalion, Sixth Brigade returned to their respective stations on 15 March 1947 after participating in an Officers Training Course of six months duration, held in MOSCOW Russia.

21. [REDACTED] is at present Chief of the Personnel Section for the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Macedonia.

22. [REDACTED] is at present the Administrator of Transportation for the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Macedonia.

421

[REDACTED]  
Special Agent, CIO.

-3-

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BY USAINSCOM FOU/PA  
Auth Para 4-102 EOD 5200.1R

[REDACTED]

Supervising Agent  
CIC - Zone One.

Ames

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**INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP**

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

6-2, HQ. USFET  
U. S. ARMY

DATE: 2 April 1947

FILE NO:

SUBJECT: Organization of UDBA

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1.	WD Det EUCOM	Chief CIB Dep Dir Intell EUCOM	2 Apr 1947	<p>1. Forwarded herewith for your information and retention is report MAS-71 on the organization of UDBA.</p> <p>For the EUCOM Representative:</p> <p><i>Everett C. O'Neal</i> EVERETT C. O'NEAL Captain F.A. Chief, Intelligence Section</p>
Incl: 1 Tel: Frankfurt 2-4085				

423

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

8 APR 1947

CIB Log  
No 9387

(Classification)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act  
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

- ☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- ☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- ☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.
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Page(s) 424-  
429

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DMG/VJL/rvh

CIC FILE

30 Sep. 46

TOP SECRET

By Authority of  
AC of S, G-2

HEADQUARTERS  
970th COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT  
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

Unit:

Date

1 Oct 46  
APO 757

30 September 1946

D-10643

Vol A

File: 350.09 (CIC/S-3/PG)

4562

SUBJECT: OZNA Agents Operating Near Munich

TO : Commanding Officer  
CIC Region IV  
APO 205, US Army

1. This headquarters is in receipt of a report, evaluation F-6, from Strategic Services Unit, G-2 Division, dated 24 September 1946, subject as above, which reveals that the following persons are working for OZNA in and around Munich:

a. [REDACTED] (Not identical with person of same name arrested by CIC MUNICH in Operation BINGO).

b. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] allegedly fought with the partisans during the war. They are both reported as dealing in black market cars in collaboration with one [REDACTED] black marketeer from MUNICH.

3. Subjects are further reported as known to one [REDACTED]

4. Request all available information on subjects be forwarded to this headquarters.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL INSKIPP:

DALE M. CARVEY  
Lt. Col., Inf.  
S-3

Telephone: FRANKFURT 23223

DISTRIBUTION: 3 copies Region IV  
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COL D. G. ERSKINE, BY [Signature]  
1ST LT, HQ 66TH CIC DET 1 JULY 1950

430

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Page 1 of 1 page  
Copy 4 of 4 copies

010 4562

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

## WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. D.

13 September 1946

(Date)

Subject: YUGOSLAV OZNA AGENTS IN PARIS

REFERENCE: Report No. 12337

## Summary of Information:

The Yugoslav Political Police OZNA has members of its organization in France. Among the principal OZNA agents in France are MR. [REDACTED] and MR. [REDACTED].

MR. [REDACTED] who lives at [REDACTED] has lived at this address since his arrival in Paris in 1943. He holds a German passport and is in contact with a great number of Yugoslav emigrants belonging to various political groups. After the Germans were defeated he came in contact with Tito's envoys in the Yugoslav Embassy. It appears that this man is an intermediary between certain emigrants whom he tries to convince to join the OZNA forces and the Yugoslav Embassy. A certain number of the emigrants have received orders from him stating that they should play the role of being anti-Tito and keep in close contact with various French and allied services.

Mr. [REDACTED] has collected a considerable fortune by organizing a foreign money exchange trade on a large scale. He poses as being a great philanthropist willing to help emigrants in France who have "collaborated" and gains their confidence. He is one of the principal agents of OZNA in France but recently he has had a disagreement with the Yugoslav Ambassador and this has hampered his activities.

[REDACTED] who lives at [REDACTED] worked for the Germans while the liberation of France and played the role of double agent. At present [REDACTED] has the confidence of the Yugoslav Embassy. He represents himself in an official capacity in certain diplomatic circles. [REDACTED] is in contact with a number of Frenchmen in various political circles which enables Tito's OZNA to have exact information on French political life. At the present time he is seen quite often in the corridors of the Peace Conference and it is believed that he picks up excellent information.

Previous Distribution:

Distribution:

431

## Evaluation

-of source	-of information
Reliable	_____
Credible	_____
Questionable	_____
Undetermined	_____
F	O

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(or [REDACTED], one of the heads of OZNA in France, is the political leader of the students' cells which are headed by the [REDACTED] family [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

677X69 [REDACTED] another principal of Tito's OZNA service is in France, living at the [REDACTED]

Among the Yugoslav delegates at the Peace Conference the following are members of OZNA: [REDACTED] and the former MAJOR [REDACTED] who lives at the Embassy.

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

~~SECRET~~

0115

~~SECRET~~

19678

CIB

27 August 1946

(550)

COUNTRY: GREECE

SUBJECT: Spies and Agents of the Enemy

DATE OF INFO: June 1946

EVALUATION: None given.

REFERENCE: DB-895

1. From an official Greek source of Epirus, reports of the arrest of the following named persons on charges of espionage or suspicion of espionage were received:

- a) [REDACTED] (arrested)  
[REDACTED] (Wanted)  
for espionage on behalf of Albania.
- (b)(7)(C) b) [REDACTED] (arrested)  
[REDACTED] (arrested)  
for espionage in conjunction with  
Albanian partisans.
- c) [REDACTED] son of Johan (arrested)  
as a former German soldier; at Joanniana

d) [REDACTED]

Arrested and sent to  
internment camp on SYRA  
as political refugees from  
Albania.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

- e) [REDACTED] (moved to Patras)  
[REDACTED] (moved to Zakynthos)  
[REDACTED] (moved to Patras)  
[REDACTED] (moved to Patras)  
[REDACTED] moved to Kea

2. From an official Greek source for Macedonia and Thrace the following reports were received:

433

(b)(7)(C)

- a) [REDACTED] (arrested) for clandestinely going  
into Yugoslavia to pass information against Greece  
to persons there.
- b) [REDACTED] (arrested) for going into Albania  
to pass information concerning the Greek army to the  
Albanian authorities.

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~~SECRET~~

- c) [REDACTED] (arrested)  
[REDACTED] (arrested)  
(b)(7)(C) [REDACTED] (arrested)

for attempting to cross the border in order to pass information against Greece to others.

- d) [REDACTED] (arrested)

for having gone to Bulgaria to pass military information to persons there.

- e) [REDACTED] (wanted)

(wanted)

(wanted)

for entering Greece from Bulgaria for purposes of espionage.

- f) [REDACTED] (arrested),

former "kapetanios" of ELAS, for having a false identity card. On him were found two staff maps, one of Drama and one of Serres. He stated that he was to go to Bulgaria and thence to Yugoslavia.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL  
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

434

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ON 22 JUN 1999  
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~~SECRET~~



## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-4,673/ISM-1(FOIA)

23 August 2002

Mr. John Young  
251 West 89<sup>th</sup> St., Suite 6E  
New York, NY 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your request to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (USA INSCOM) under the Freedom of Information Act, dated 29 March 2001. Therein you requested records concerning Yugoslavia Intelligence Service personalities. In processing your request, the USA INSCOM located two documents which originated with the DIA and referred them for our review and direct response to you.

Upon review, it has been determined that some portions of the documents are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(6) applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals. All reasonably segregable portions of the documents are attached hereto.

You are advised that a requester may appeal, within 60 days, an initial decision to withhold a record or part thereof. Should you wish to exercise this right, you may do so by referring to case #0627-02 and addressing your appeal to:

Defense Intelligence Agency  
ATTN: ISM-1(FOIA)  
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,

ROBERT P. RICHARDSON  
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff

Enclosures a/s

EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR MILITARY ATTACHES  
OFFICE OF THE AIR ATTACHE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

12 April 1965

SUBJECT: Invitational Orders

TO: Lt Colonel Ramiz RAMUSOVIC, Yugoslav Peoples Army  
Yugoslav Officer Passport No. S-014205, dtd 5 Apr 65  
U.S. Visa No. BLG-4923, dtd 9 Apr 65

1. Pursuant to authority contained in message DA 999949, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, and with the concurrence of the U.S. Army Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, the individual listed above, member of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, is authorized and invited to proceed on or about 15 April 1965 from his present station to the United States for further travel to Washington, D.C. and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for the purpose of attending the Command and General Staff College, Course No. 250-A-C2, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; reporting 21-23 June 1965, ending (subject to change) 10 June 1966. Upon completion of this training, he will return to proper station.

2. It is understood that the Government of Yugoslavia will furnish all travel to and from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by whatever mode of transportation is deemed necessary and appropriate. Travel in or outside of the United States at the expense of the United States Government is not authorized.

3. Student should inform the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, forty-eight (48) hours in advance of his expected arrival by telegram giving time and date of arrival and mode of transportation in order that proper reception may be accomplished.

4. If the individual listed herein encounters any difficulties in arranging transportation to his destination after arrival in the United States, he will contact the appropriate United States Port of Embarkation, location and telephone number as listed below:

<u>Port of Entry</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Telephone</u>
McGuire AFB, Wrightstown, New Jersey	U.S. Army Air Traffic Coordination Office	RAYmond 4-2100, ext. 3242

C O P Y

6. Prior to departure from his present station, Lt Colonel RATUSOVIC will obtain a medical certificate to the effect he is physically sound with no communicable diseases and has required immunizations for entry into the United States. The individual concerned will be provided sufficient funds in American dollar instruments to meet all expenses while enroute to, during attendance at, and return to station, from the school. Adequate uniforms as well as appropriate civilian clothing for off-duty wear should be taken. United States work (fatigue) uniforms less insignia may be purchased at his own expense when required for field wear or technical work.

7. The United States will relieve from attendance at schools and request their return to the country of their origin, students who violate regulations or who otherwise are a detriment to the class as a whole. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, will be informed when such action is contemplated.

8. Request for leave upon completion of course will be submitted direct by the individual to his Embassy. Written approval in English from the Embassy to the individual will constitute approval for leave.

9. The mailing address of the individual indicated herein will be in care of the installation to which he is attached.

10. No training other than that specified in paragraph 1 above will be conducted on the basis of these orders. If additional training is desired, the individual concerned will submit requests therefor directly to appropriate representatives of his government.

11. Authority: DA message 999949, 15 Jan 65, AR 551-50, AFM 16-3.

FOR THE EXECUTIVE AGENT

(b)(6)

Administrative Officer

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5  
7  
C O P Y

EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR MILITARY ATTACHES  
OFFICE OF THE AIR ATTACHE  
American Embassy  
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

C  
O  
P  
Y

5 May 1965

SUBJECT: Invitational Orders

TO: Colonel Milisav NIKIC, Yugoslav Peoples Army  
Yugoslav Official Passport No. S-014223, dated 8 April 1965  
U.S. Visa No. BLG-4941, dated 14 April 1965

1. Pursuant to authority contained in Message DA-999949, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, and with the concurrence of the U.S. Army Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, the individual listed above, member of the Yugoslav Peoples Army, is authorized and invited to proceed on or about 5 May 1965, from his present station to the United States for further travel to Washington, D.C., and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the purpose of attending the Command and General Staff College, Course No. 250-A-C2, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; reporting 21-23 June 1965, ending (subject to change) 10 June 1966. Upon completion of this training, he will return to proper station.
2. It is understood that the Government of Yugoslavia will furnish all travel to and from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, by whatever mode of transportation is deemed necessary and appropriate. Travel in or outside of the United States at the expense of the United States Government is not authorized.
3. Student should inform the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, forty-eight (48) hours in advance of his expected arrival by telegram giving time and date of arrival and mode of transportation in order that proper reception may be accomplished.
4. If the individual listed herein encounters any difficulties in arranging transportation to his destination after arrival in the United States, he will contact the appropriate United States Port of Embarkation, location and telephone number as listed below:

PORT OF ENTRY

McGuire AFB  
Wrightstown, New Jersey

OFFICE

U.S. Army Air Traffic  
Coordination Office

TELEPHONE

RAYmond 4-2100,  
Extension 3242

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